Insights & Best Practices

JTF level Command Relationships & Joint Force Organization

Focus Paper #4
November 2007

Joint Warfighting Center
United States Joint Forces Command

By the JWFC Joint Training Group
and GEN (Ret) Gary Luck & COL (Ret) Mike Findlay
Preface

This paper discusses insights and best practices in how we organize a JTF and establish command relationships to best accomplish the mission through coherent integration of our capabilities.

This paper includes and builds on insights previously distributed in the JWFC publication “Insights on Joint Operations” by General (Retired) Gary Luck dated September 2006. It focuses on JTF level organization and command relationships, and orients on land-centric JTFs to provide relevant insights for current operations in GWOT.

Focus paper #1 addresses CCIR. Focus paper #2 addresses Information Management. Focus paper #3 addresses interagency relationships. Future papers will delve more into combatant command level and multinational force organization and command relationship insights.

The Joint Warfighting Center’s joint training group and joint doctrine group are afforded the unique opportunity to visit and support commanders and staffs of joint headquarters worldwide as they prepare for, plan, and conduct operations. We gain insights into their challenges and their derived solutions as they support our national interests. We analyze and compare practices amongst the different headquarters, reflect on the various challenges, techniques and procedures, and draw out and refine what we term “best practices,” which inform and shape joint doctrine.

We want to get your thoughts on this subject. Please pass on your comments, insights, and best practices so that we may share them throughout the community. We have developed an interactive web page for this on Joint Knowledge Online at http://jko.jfcom.mil (Requires login; then go to Joint Training Group (JTG) section under the joint communities of interest heading). An alternative is contacting the JTG POC for insights and best practices, Mike Findlay at (757) 203-5939 or email at JWFC.best.practices@jfcom.mil.

Major General Jason K. Kamiya
Commander, Joint Warfighting Center

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1. Executive Summary
We fight as one team with our joint, interagency, and multinational partners. These are not just words or a slogan; we depend on each other to succeed in today's complex security environment. This is de facto interdependence: the dependence on access to each other's capabilities to succeed in assigned tasks.

Interdependence is much more than "HANDCON," an often quoted term expressing the decision on the part of subordinates to voluntarily work together absent direction by their higher commander.

Interdependence is commander driven; it is directed in guidance and intent, and implemented in orders. This is accomplished through the deliberate assignment of supported and supporting command relationships that are combined with clear battlespace geometry, delegated authorities, and the fixing of responsibilities to best combine capabilities of the joint force.

This interdependence is a quantum mindset change from a 'vertical' orientation (receiving and unilaterally accomplishing tasks directed by the higher commander…) to that of working much more closely with your horizontal warfighting partners (as depicted by the oval in the above figure). This interdependence is more than interoperability, i.e. the technical ability to work together. It is recognition that the Armed Forces fight as one team of joint, interagency, and multinational partners – and depend on access to each other’s capabilities to succeed.

Within our military, we live “joint interdependence” daily. The joint force commander (JFC) deliberately crafts the task organization and command relationships shaping a command environment in which the components must work together, supporting each other in an atmosphere of trust and confidence to accomplish the mission.

Key Insights:
- Personal relationships and mutual trust and confidence remain the critical prerequisite to the concept of interdependence.
- Recognize the value of the ‘horizontal’ piece of interdependence.
- At the JTF level, understand (or seek to clarify) the existing supported and supporting command relationships between you and your lateral organizations such as the Theater Service Component Commands (e.g. Army Service Component), functional components (e.g. the Joint Forces Air Component Command), and subunified commands (e.g. the Theater Special Operations Command). As a JTF, you will often be designated a supported command; these lateral commands may be designated a supporting command to you. We often see confusion between the joint task force and other Combatant Command forces operating within the JOA when these supported and supporting command relationships are not clear.
- Demand integration and promote interdependence amongst your subordinates by delineating clear supported/ing command relationships between them. Specify the supported commander for specific tasks together with who are supporting commanders, realizing that there will be multiple, concurrent supported and supporting commanders due to the number of ongoing tasks. Provide clear priorities to allow subordinates to allocate efforts to the various tasks.

- Decentralize mission approval authorities to allow your subordinates to work with each other and make decisions at the lowest level to take advantage of rapidly changing conditions.

- Condition/teach subordinates to plan and execute within a trust-based, horizontally-focused framework of “access to others’ forces” rather than requiring the “ownership of those forces.”

- Clarify your specific authorities over forces provided or attached to you in a TACON command relationship in terms of positioning authority, who sets priorities, mission approval authorities, and further imposition of support command relationships.

- Craft a task organization and related battlespace\(^1\) geometry coupled with clear authorities that appropriately delegates authority and fixes responsibility for all units within the JOA. These include both the battlespace owners (BSOs) and those “functional task force” commanders who operate across AOs throughout the joint operations area conducting specific mission sets (e.g. special operations, counter IED, logistics, intelligence…).

- Empower battlespace owners with “coordinating authority”\(^2\) for other units that may operate within their battlespace. Ensure battlespace owners understand functional task force responsibilities in accomplishing their respective missions across AO boundaries.

- Direct functional task force commanders to understand BSO responsibilities and comply with BSO coordinating authority for activities occurring within their assigned AOs. Direct functional task force commanders and subordinates to conduct the necessary coordination with BSOs and keep them apprised of all activities within their AO.

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\(^1\) We use the term battlespace vice doctrinally correct operational environment throughout this paper to directly address JOA and AO associated battlefield geometry considerations of C2.

\(^2\) Coordinating Authority definition: (DOD) A commander or individual assigned responsibility for coordinating specific functions or activities involving forces of two or more Military Departments or two or more forces of the same Service. The commander or individual has the authority to require consultation between the agencies involved, but does not have the authority to compel agreement. In the event that essential agreement cannot be obtained, the matter shall be referred to the appointing authority. Coordinating authority is a consultation relationship, not an authority through which command may be exercised. Coordinating authority is more applicable to planning and similar activities than to operations.
2. JTF Organization

Four key insights in JTF task organization:

- Coherently develop your task organization, command relationships (discussed in later section), and battlespace geometry (discussed in later section) as part of your concept of operations.

- Clearly designate battlespace commanders, their command authorities, their coordinating authorities, and their areas of operations.

- Establish functional task forces (e.g. special operations, counter IED, Medical, Engineer) to conduct JOA wide mission sets throughout the JOA. Direct specific authorities and coordination responsibilities for these units vis-à-vis battlespace owners.

- Clearly designate Service force/component commanders to fix authority and responsibility for those Title X / ADCON responsibilities.

- Development of Task Organization and Battlespace Geometry that supports the concept of operations. We’ve seen high expertise and clarity in the joint forces in this area. Rather than simply defaulting to a JTF task organization comprised of service forces components and functional components (e.g. land/JFLCC, air/JFACC, maritime/JFMCC, and special operations/JFSOCC), the field commanders are crafting their task organization establishing both battlespace owners and functional task forces, aligned within a logical battlespace geometry, to support their concept of operations.

- Clear designation of battlespace owners (BSO). Our joint commanders still primarily organize to fight along a geographic orientation.

At the combatant command level, we’re seeing the continued formation of geographically oriented JTFs with assigned joint operations areas (JOAs) (e.g. CJTF-HOA).

At the JTF level we’re seeing geographically-focused components / task forces with assigned areas of operation (AOs) (e.g. the regional commands in Afghanistan and the Multinational Divisions (MNDs) in Iraq and Bosnia).

- Use of functional components / task forces (e.g. special operations, counter IED, Logistical, Medical, Engineer). We’ve seen almost every joint force commander establish functionally oriented components / task forces in addition to battlespace owners to conduct specific mission sets throughout the joint operations area. Often, the forces capable of performing these specific missions are low-density/high-
demand forces, and the expertise and C2 capabilities necessary for their employment may not be resident in each of the battlespace headquarters (e.g. a Multinational Division). We discuss how the joint force commander retains agility of the force while promoting interdependence amongst the battlespace owners and these functional task forces in succeeding sections on battlespace geometry and command relationships.

- **Designation of Service force commanders** to fix responsibility for Title X / ADCON activities. The Service Components at Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) level and the Service force commanders at JTF level continue to be important contributors to mission accomplishment. These Service organizations may be dual-hatted to perform both ADCON and operational responsibilities (e.g. CJTF-82) or focused solely on their ADCON (Title 10) role (e.g. ARCENT). We normally see dual hatting at the JTF level for simplicity and savings in personnel. For example, the MNC-I in Iraq, while a joint headquarters, is also the ARFOR. We will discuss ADCON and Title 10 insights in a future focus paper.
3. Battlespace Geometry

As noted earlier, we see joint commanders laying out their battlespace in terms of ‘areas of operation’ (AOs), and then designating battlespace owners (BSOs) for the various AOs. They then empower these battlespace owners with the requisite authority commensurate with their responsibilities as battlespace owners.

**Insights:**

- **Delineate AOs within the battlespace together with clearly outlined command relationships, mission approval levels, and coordinating authorities.** This allows agility of operations. We’re seeing less reliance on boundaries as the only means to control the fight. Commanders are increasingly using supported/ing command relationships (discussed in a later section), decentralized mission approval levels, coordinating authority, situational awareness tools, liaison, and commander crosstalk rather than relying solely on boundaries to conduct operations.

- **Today’s battlespace is very complex.** Many joint players (e.g. SOF, Airpower, engineers…) operate in the battlespace owners’ areas of operation. The battlespace owners need the ‘support’ of these other players (e.g. for targeting, intelligence…) even though they may not ‘own’ them. Likewise, functional task forces normally need the support of battlespace owners (e.g. for QRF, intelligence, CASEVAC…) to accomplish their tasks. Battlespace owners are becoming increasingly more comfortable with these ‘non-assigned’ players in their battlespace. They recognize that these players are part of the team, are keeping them better informed of planned activities, and accomplishing important tasks in pursuit of overall mission accomplishment.

- **Battlespace JOA and AO ‘ownership’ is a military-centric viewpoint of terrain.** Non-coalition players (e.g. Host Nation agencies, NGOs, and other military forces) may not recognize nor heed this military control measure. Military forces operating in another sovereign country must also account for the realities of host nation sovereignty in terms of limits to their actions and in achieving full situational awareness in their AO.

- **Boundaries are potential seams – not only in understanding the adversary and local population, but also in coherently working with our partners – the host nation, local governments, and other agencies.** In developing their boundaries, commanders and staff should analyze social, physical, and adversary aspects together with political and other agency boundaries to minimize these seams. Commanders mitigate seams through proactive cross boundary information sharing and coordination.
• Battlespace owner (BSO) responsibilities. BSOs are largely responsible for everything that happens within their assigned area of operation. As listed on the adjacent figure, they are responsible for the synchronization of lethal and no lethal actions, land use, maintaining situational awareness of both adversary, neutral, and friendly activities in the area, and emplacement and control of fires support coordination measures. A best practice is for the JTF commander or higher commander to provide ‘coordinating authority’3 to BSOs for all military actions occurring within their battlespace. This requires other units to coordinate their planned and current activities with the BSO.

• Situational Awareness. One continuing challenge in today’s complex operational environment is the potential for other players (i.e. those military forces not attached to the battlespace owner or other interagency players) to not inform the battlespace owner of their planned activities and movements. We’ve heard several joint commanders and subordinates emphasize the need for these other players to keep the battlespace owner informed. This is why providing ‘coordinating authority’ to BSOs is so important.

• While not boundaries, Fire Support Coordination Measures (FSCMs) assist in integrating fires with maneuver. This paper does not fully address FSCMs except to note that the new concept of Joint Fires Areas4 (JFAs) may improve the overall efficiency of joint fires and reduce the risk of fratricide by reducing the time required for coordination, integration, and deconfliction of joint fires.

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3 Coordinating Authority definition: (DOD) A commander or individual assigned responsibility for coordinating specific functions or activities involving forces of two or more Military Departments or two or more forces of the same Service. The commander or individual has the authority to require consultation between the agencies involved, but does not have the authority to compel agreement. In the event that essential agreement cannot be obtained, the matter shall be referred to the appointing authority. Coordinating authority is a consultation relationship, not an authority through which command may be exercised. Coordinating authority is more applicable to planning and similar activities than to operations.

4 JFA definition: A three dimensional, permissive FSCM used by the joint force commander to facilitate interdiction of mobile targets and target sets without additional coordination. Established and adjusted by the delegated component commander in consultation with supported, supporting, subordinate, and affected commanders.
4. Command relationships

We’ve seen joint commanders spending a lot of time ensuring they craft the right command relationships upfront to engender an interdependent, one team one fight attitude. We see them using OPCON, TACON, and Support command relationships to allow for both unity of command of habitually organized forces (primarily using OPCON and TACON authorities), and access to the capabilities of other forces (primarily using Supported/ing Command authority). As addressed earlier, interdependence is commander driven; it is the deliberate assignment of supported and supporting command relationships combined with clear battlespace geometry, delegated authorities, and fixing of responsibilities to best integrate the capabilities of the joint force. This section addresses challenges, insights, and best practices for two of these command relationships –Supported/ing Command Relationships and TACON Command Relationships.

- **Supported/Supporting Command Relationship.** The supported/ing command relationship is probably the most powerful command relationship in terms of gaining overmatching power. It provides the authority and basis for interdependence, and is often the most appropriate in today’s complex operational environment. This support relationship in essence makes the supporting commanders responsible for the success of the supported commander. They can’t simply provide some forces and walk away from the challenge. Rather, in consonance with the joint force commander’s guidance and intent, it requires them to stay involved with the supported commander and continue to aid and assist him as he conducts operations.

  - The establishing authority is the higher joint commander. He defines the support command relationships among his subordinates in terms of who is supported and supporting for a specific mission. He also defines the relative degree of authority and priority the supported commander has in the pursuit of his mission – especially where there are limited resources supporting numerous operations. SOF and Air are good examples of some limited resources. The establishing authority is also the referee, the tie breaker, when subordinates cannot work out the necessary balance of access to capabilities. Some establishing authority best practices:
    - Give clear direction to subordinates in terms of priorities and intent to allow subordinates to work horizontally with each other in accomplishing tasks.
    - Set conditions for and demand crosstalk among supported and supporting commanders to build and reinforce the necessary horizontal personal relationships, and trust and confidence.
    - Challenge subordinates to ‘self regulate’ their allocation of capabilities to one another within your intent and through horizontal crosstalk. This crosstalk amongst your components will allow them to arrive at the optimal allocation of capabilities to accomplish both their assigned tasks and support the designated supported commanders.
- Stay involved to arbitrate and resolve conflicts between subordinate commanders in the prioritization, allocation and employment of limited capabilities supporting numerous missions.

- Supported Commander. The supported commander is given access to supporting capabilities and has the authority to provide general direction, designate and prioritize missions, targets, or objectives, and other actions for coordination and efficiency (to include requesting liaison and directing of reporting requirements). Some supported commander best practices:
  - Identify needs to supporting commanders. This is a continuing, not one time, activity.
  - Request liaison from supporting commanders to help coherently integrate supporting capabilities in the operation.
  - Bring lack of support first to supporting commanders, and then if necessary to establishing authority for resolution.

- Supporting Commander. The supporting commander is responsible to both ascertain and satisfy the needs of the supported commander within the priorities directed by the establishing authorities. Some supporting commander best practices:
  - Recognize your role in ensuring the success of the supported commander. We see those believing and following through on the ‘one team one fight’ view set the conditions for success.
  - Recognize that your support to another supported commander may have even a higher priority than a mission for which you have been tasked.
  - Take time in ascertaining supported commanders’ requirements and understanding the overall priorities in apportioning your forces to accomplish both your assigned tasks and those of other supported commanders.
  - Understand and respect the coordinating authority of supported commander. Send liaison to supported commanders to assist them in planning and in ascertaining your requirements. Direct appropriate command relationships to your subordinates to ensure you (and your subordinates) fulfill your supporting responsibilities. You, as the supporting commander, can ‘provide forces or capabilities’ in a ‘direct support’ or even ‘TACON’ relationship to a respective supported commander to ensure his success.
Supported/ing Command Relationship Insights.

- At the JTF level, understand (or seek to clarify) the existing supported and supporting command relationships between you and your lateral organizations such as the Theater Service Component Commands (e.g. Army Service Component), functional components (e.g. the Joint Forces Air Component Command), and subunified commands (e.g. the Theater Special Operations Command). As a JTF, you will normally be designated a supported command for operations in your JOA; these lateral commands will likely have a supporting command relationship to you. In some cases, you may have mutually supporting missions and a mutual support command relationship. We often see confusion between the joint task force and other Combatant Command forces operating within the JOA if these supported and supporting command relationships are not clear.

- Demand integration and promote interdependence amongst your subordinates by delineating clear support command relationships. Specify the supported commander for specific tasks together with who are supporting commanders, realizing that there will be multiple, concurrent supported and supporting commanders due to the number of ongoing tasks. For example as depicted in the figure, a Battlespace owner may be the supported commander for stability operations with SOF supporting him, while he is concurrently supporting discrete SOF high value target (HVT) missions in his AO. Provide clear priorities to allow subordinates to allocate their efforts to the various tasks.

- Understand mission approval authorities between supported commanders and supporting commanders. The supporting commander is responsible for employment of his forces and the risk decisions on employment of the force (often known as risk to the force). That said, the supported commander is responsible for the task accomplishment and can ‘veto’ a supporting commander’s concept of operations if it poses unacceptable risk to his task accomplishment (i.e. risk to the mission). For example, unacceptable risks to the mission could be likelihood of an unfavorable reaction by the populace or the prospect of a major escalation of force to rescue an endangered supporting force. Empowering a battlespace owner with “coordinating authority” directly solves this mission approval dilemma, recognizing

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### Support Command Relationships

**Internal to the JTF**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task</th>
<th>Priority</th>
<th>Supported Commander</th>
<th>Supporting Commander</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stability</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>BSO</td>
<td>JSOTF, Air</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HVT</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>JSOTF</td>
<td>BSO, Air</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counter TBM</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Air</td>
<td>JSOTF</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
that irreconcilable disagreement between the two forces go to the establishing (or appointing) authority for resolution.

- **Tactical Control (TACON) Command Relationship.** TACON is defined by Joint doctrine as the delegated authority over local direction and control for accomplishment of a specific mission. Army doctrine defines it more detail, laying out the authorities of both the parent and gaining command. We discuss the need to clarify the specific authorities and responsibilities for TACON within a joint force in this section.

We often see confusion between the parent command and gaining command in the specific authorities provided by TACON. Parent commands continue to view themselves as the key decisionmaker over the employment of the force – referring to themselves as the OPCON less TACON commander. Gaining Commands, while desiring fuller authority, do not seek to clarify their authorities and responsibilities over the capability provided. They often do not recognize the TACON force ‘as one of their own’ and fail to fully incorporate them in planning.

We often see supporting commanders ‘providing’ forces TACON to a supported commander. While this is commonly associated with the use of excess air sorties, another very effective practice is supporting commanders ‘providing’ ground or SOF forces TACON to a supported commander. An example of this is in OIF where the Marine Component and Theater SOC provide forces under the TACON of MNF-I with further subordination to MNC-I.

A challenge arises regarding specific authorities when these forces are provided TACON for a long period of time (e.g. for years in OIF). These forces have typically been transferred (attached) to the Gaining Command (e.g. MNF-I) in the higher (e.g. CENTCOM) order together with delegating a TACON command relationship. This changes the dynamics of the interdependence, relative authorities, and degree of control exercised by the parent and gaining command. Thus we find that the specific authorities over the TACON force in today’s operations need to be clearly defined. Without clearly defined authorities, it causes confusion at the operator level.

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5 A key delineator in the TACON authority is how the TACON forces are transferred to a JTF; whether they are attached to the JTF by the higher (normally GCC) headquarters in orders, or provided by a lateral headquarters (normally a supporting commander to the supported commander). Note: ‘attached’ is not a command authority in joint doctrine; this is different from Army doctrine. If attached by higher headquarters, the parent command literally loses its OPCON authority; that authority is retained by the higher headquarters unless delegated to the parent command (which can be seen in CENTCOM with SOCCENT retaining the OPCON authorities for attached TACON JSOTFs). If provided, the parent command retains the OPCON authority and dictates the degree of TACON authority provided to the JTF.
We see as a best practice the requirement for clarification of this authority and that clarification written into the establishing directive (the higher order directing the TACON or Support). Some insights and best practices are noted below:

- Clarify specifics on the TACON relationship:
  - Clarify how the TACON force has been transferred to the JTF – either attached by your higher headquarters, or provided by the parent command. Determine who specifically retains OPCON authorities for task organization and tasking of new mission sets.
  - Clarify the general mission sets that the TACON force is organized for and capable of performing. (Normally directed by the Higher Headquarters or Supporting Commander)
  - Clarify your (as the gaining command) specific authorities over the TACON force. You should normally have the command relationship with the TACON force. Clarify your: tasking authority within the general mission set direction dictated by the higher command, positioning authority, authority to set priorities, mission approval authorities, and authority to further impose support command relationships to allow agility of operations. A matrix much like that laid out in Army doctrine can help lay out the delineation / clarification of authorities (see figure).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TACON Authorities and Responsibilities</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Has command relationship with:</td>
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<tr>
<td>May be task organized by:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Receives CSS from:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Assigned position by:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Provides liaison to:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Establishes communications with:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has priorities Established by:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaining Unit can impose further Command Relationship of:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Typical per Army Doctrine)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaining Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parent Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parent Unit (Unless in Area Support Concept)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaining Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As required by Gaining Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As required by Gaining Unit &amp; Parent Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaining Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>Support</td>
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- The Parent Command organizes and then detaches or provides the force with the directed or requested capabilities. Clarify their task organization, mission approval, and re-missioning authorities. Request their continuing interface and expertise for optimal employment of the force.

- Logistics of the TACON force traditionally has been a parent command responsibility. However, this has evolved more and more to an area support responsibility (normally provided by the battlespace owner) due to the area support concept’s inherent efficiency and effectiveness.
5. Challenges and Insights – Two Focus Areas: Air & SOF

The global nature of challenges and responses coupled with high demand and low density forces have increased the need for agility at the GCC level across an AOR in enabling rapid access to capabilities. This has mandated increased use of supported and supporting command relationships, especially for Airpower and SOF. These two areas are addressed in more detail below.

- **Air support to the JTF.**

  **Observation:** USAF forces provide support to a JTF through a support relationship with USAF assets remaining under the control of a theater JFACC. The Theater JFACC provides air component coordination elements (ACCEs) at the JTFs to provide senior officer liaison to the JTF and better ascertain JTF requirements for airpower.

  The Theater JFACC concept was developed for several reasons: a requirement to optimize airpower across multiple JTFs in an AOR (i.e., “the CENTCOM model”); a requirement to optimize low density / high demand airpower assets in general; and insufficient Air Force resources to provide multiple JFACC Air Operations Centers AOCs in each theater (one for each JTF).

  The Theater JFACC model is also predicated on maintaining the Geographic Combatant Commander’s agility and flexibility of airpower, allowing for rapid shifting of airpower throughout the AOR. Apportionment, allocation, and targeting is a CCDR activity, and with insufficient JTF involvement, can reduce agility and flexibility for a JTF.

  **Insights:**
  - Clarify the Supporting relationship of Theater JFACC to the JTF. Ensure they are designated a supporting command to you.
  - Leverage the ACCE as your means to receive agile and responsive support from the JFACC.
  - Clarify your role and authorities for targeting and ISR nomination, approval, and dynamic retasking with the GCC and JFACC to ensure responsive support.
  - Clarify ROE and CDE approval authorities for air operations in your JOA to ensure operations support mission accomplishment.

- **SOF Integration.**

  **Observation:** The global networks of terrorist organizations transcend JTF JOA boundaries. Both National and Theater SOF are focused on attacking these global networks while still supporting JTF operations in their respective JOAs.

  National SOF operations are global, require national level agility, and may transcend GCC AORs. Thus National SOF is normally subordinated directly under the respective GCCs for operations in their AORs. National SOF typically has a mutual support relationship with other GCC forces including JTFs. They normally have the benefit of a high priority from the GCC to accomplish their missions.
Theater SOF is focused on regional threats that may cut across JTF JOAs within the AOR. The Theater SOC is normally tasked with AOR-wide missions for which they may be specified as the supported command. They also normally have a supporting command relationship with JTFs and may provide a joint special operations task force (JSOTF) to the JTF in a TACON role to ensure unity of command within the JOA.

Insights:
- Instill an atmosphere of mutual trust and confidence at all levels to further the fact of interdependence. Articulate the interdependent nature of operations in your intent, planning guidance, and orders. Fully integrate SOF capabilities into your planning.
- Clarify command relationships between you and both national and theater SOF. Request at minimum a mutual support relationship together with ‘coordinating authority’ over them for operations in your JOA. Clarify any TACON command relationship authorities between you and the Theater SOC.
- Direct an appropriate command relationship (typically mutual support) with SOF to your subordinates. Develop horizontal linkages with SOF at all levels down to BCT level to ensure decentralized, tactical level integration with SOF. Direct exchange of LNOs and delegate coordinating authority to your battlespace owners.
- Request liaison elements from national and theater SOF hqs (i.e. the Theater SOC), and from any provided or attached SOF hqs to better integrate their capabilities as you pursue mission accomplishment. Ensure the liaison elements have planning, current operations information sharing, and intelligence liaison capabilities.
- Provide liaison elements from your headquarters to any national SOF hqs operating in your JOA to facilitate information exchange.
- Develop clear staffing processes for coordinating and supporting SOF operations in your JOA. Articulate what type of operations must be approved (or at a minimum) coordinated at your level (e.g. politically sensitive, high risk...). Include public affairs release, CASEVAC, intelligence exchange, ISR support, QRF, detainee handling staffing procedures.
- Be prepared to provide logistical support on an area basis to SOF. Plan for this upfront.