CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE

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Best & Bad Practices
on Civil-Military Interaction

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The CCOE Civil-Military Interaction Best & Bad Practices Handbook is an electronic publication of the CIMIC Centre of Excellence.

Its dedicated aim is to provide a possibility for discussion, raise awareness and stimulate comprehensive thinking on NATO Civil-Military Interaction (CMI) related issues such as mission experiences, concepts, doctrine or lessons learned.

The views and opinions expressed or implied in the CCOE Civil-Military Interaction Best & Bad Practices Handbook are those of the author/CCOE and should not be construed as carrying the official sanction of NATO, of any national armed forces or those of CCOE.

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Introduction

One of the primary aims of the Civil-Military Cooperation Centre of Excellence (CCOE) is to contribute to lessons learned processes and improve Civil-Military Interaction (CMI). The CCOE feels that there is a need to improve mutual awareness on both sides' principles for a fruitful interaction, for instance by further development of knowledge-sharing mechanisms and promote cross-organizational activities. During the development (2011-2014) of the new NATO policy on CIMIC and CMI, the CCOE captured several 'Practical Requirements' for effective interaction from various sources.

CCOE decided to create a 'Best & Bad Practices' handbook with guidelines, tips & tricks and do's & don'ts, complemented with examples (good and bad) from the field. The publication of this 'Best & Bad Practices' handbook is in line with the CCOE's subject matter expertise on Civil-Military Interaction and contribution to NATO's policy and doctrine development.

This publication will (1) **demonstrate several different guidelines for Civil-Military Interaction**, both from a military and a civilian point-of-view. Furthermore, the aim of this article is (2) **to provide an overview of best & bad practices of experiences on CMI**. As it is the purpose of this publication to share good and bad practices in a transparent way, the publication is based on the following principles:

- Easy to read.

- Based on field experiences and reality.

- Provides balanced contributions and stories from a civilian and military perspective.

- Is in no means a policy or doctrine, but is focused on (chapter 2) **CMI guidelines**,

- (chapter 3) **do's & don'ts** and (chapter 4) **tips & tricks**.

- It is not a purely NATO document.

After reading this 'handbook' on working in the Civil-Military environment, there has hopefully been made a step closer to a better understanding of the aims and motives of some of the different actors working in the field of CMI. Next to that, the best and bad practices demonstrated in the brochure will positively contribute to a better future cooperation between these actors when working together (or next to each other) in a CMI environment.

1. The challenge of Civil-Military Interaction

1.1 Background

It is recognized that peace, security, development and stability are more interconnected than ever placing a premium on close interaction amongst all actors involved assuming their respective roles in crisis prevention and management. As military action alone is insufficient to prevent or manage crises, success in operations requires enhanced interaction amongst the military and civil actors at all levels before and during engagement. NATO's experiences in missions and operations have demonstrated that interrelations of cause and effect as well as interdependencies between military operations and civil actors are complex.

For this purposes NATO proposes an approach in which consultation and dialogue, transparency and commitment, respecting of each other principles and autonomy in decision making are fundamental to meet on equal footing. Flexibility in the design needs to be inherent allowing all parties to involve themselves as deeply, whenever and in the way they deem useful and not harming own principles, aim and agendas. NATO calls this model Comprehensive Approach, for which it does not claim ownership, but encourages other actors of the International Community (IC) to join

Recently the North Atlantic Council (NAC) approved a new policy on Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) and Civil Military Interaction (CMI) (MC 0411/2). The new policy formally introduces Civil Military Interaction as supporting activities to NATO's contribution to a Comprehensive Approach. For NATO forces a specific concept, military function and capability was developed to facilitate the interaction between them and the civil environment[1], by liaison and support to the civil environment and support to the force: Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC). Besides CIMIC, an increasing number of other military functions and disciplines interact with the civil environment with limited involvement of CIMIC staff. An example is Key Leader Engagement (KLE) that provides functionalities which fall under the defined role of CIMIC. However there is only a harmonization with CIMIC, but with no directing role of CIMIC foreseen. The outreach of these

military functions and disciplines is seen as Civil-Military Interaction, not CIMIC.

1.2 The challenge of Civil-Military Interaction

Considering the wide spectrum of interaction between all kind of organizations for crisis prevention and management, the interaction between non-military and military elements is understood as special, since it is strongly influenced by limiting principles and other challenges.

Civil-Military Interaction, being a specific form of interaction between organizations naturally is not a trademark, thus not being owned nor dominated by one of the parties involved. It is a process that offers sharing of views and visions concerning a mission to improve the overall efficiency and effectiveness of the efforts by all parties engaged. Consequently it might be understood as a virtual platform or forum. In that sense it is up to each party whether and by how far it is entering such platform. The individual involvement might depend on the mission specifics, the issues discussed there, the current security situation or principles of the individual organization. The achievable level of interaction therefore varies from de-confliction, coordination, cooperation, mutual support, cohesive joint planning, information exchange, up to partly integration.

> MC 0411/2 definition:
> *"Civil-Military Interaction (CMI) is a group of activities, founded on communication, planning and coordination, that all NATO military bodies share and conduct with international and local non-military actors, both during NATO operations and in preparation for them, which mutually increases the effectiveness and efficiency of their respective actions in response to crises."*

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[1] In this document the term "civil environment" refers to the civil authorities, civil society and population of an affected country, and all other actors of the International Community (IC), like International Organizations (IO), Non-governmental Organizations (NGO), other foreign governmental organizations and agencies.

2. Guidelines for Civil-Military Interaction

2.1 Creating a set of guidelines

This chapter provides a suggested set of guidelines in addition to approved and submitted documents provided by NATO and civilian organizations. Each guideline in this chapter is illustrated with an example from the field or based on literature. The overarching aim of developing these guidelines is to support discussion on this topic and contribute to further development of the CMI concept.

The following guidelines can provide a common ground for consultation and dialogue and comprises those that are believed to be acceptable for the majority of organizations involved in crisis prevention and management in most of the settings. In considering the following guidelines militaries can create an atmosphere in which a high degree of interaction can be achieved. The guidelines should therefore be applied wherever and whenever possible while interacting with the civil environment. A guideline aims to streamline particular processes according to a set routine or sound practice. By definition, following a guideline is never mandatory. Guidelines are not binding and are not enforced.

Guidelines:

1) Sharing perspectives
2) Comprehensive understanding
3) Respecting other entities' principles
4) Trust and confidence
5) Commitment
6) Alignment of commitment
7) Reliability
8) Accountability
9) Transparency and sharing of information
10) Areas of interaction and means of communication
11) Flexibility in sequencing and timing
12) Autonomy in decisions making
13) Aiming for local ownership and building local capacity
14) Ensuring transition
15) Joining of platforms

2.2 Guidelines and best & bad practices of Civil-Military Interaction

1.   Sharing perspectives. Sharing individual perspectives on the situation and root causes of a crisis is the first step towards de-conflicting actions and complementing each other's efforts. Embracing diversity of perspectives opens the possibility to understand the environment far better than assessing the situation in isolation.

DON'T: Stereotype

The following generic list was part of a module to make visible the existing prejudices living amongst personnel of both organizations working in mission areas:

Military vs. Civilians

Disciplined vs. Independent.
Hierarchical vs. Decentralised.
Command & Control vs. Consultation & Dialogue.
Whole career training vs. On the Job training.
Doctrinal Publications vs. Few field manuals.
End State Approach vs. Long Term View.
Objectives driven by politics vs. Driven by humanitarian concerns.
Extension of State vs. State.
Extension of State vs. State free.
Extension of State vs. Multilateral.
Extension of State vs. (Inter/Non)Governmental.
Hierarchical vs. Non Hierarchical.
Formal vs. Informal.
Doctrinal vs. Principles.
Rigid vs. Ad-hoc.
Highly Structured vs. Loosely Configured.
Boys with Toys vs. Non Guided Organizations.
Rigid vs. Children of the Sixties.
Authoritarian vs. Flaky do gooders.
Conservative vs. Undisciplined.
Impatient vs. Unpunctual.
Civilian Phobic vs. Anarchic.
Excessively Security Conscious vs. Self-righteous.
Militaristic vs. Anti-military.

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2.   Aiming for comprehensive understanding on potential measures, accepting different understandings of the situation, mandates, agendas and responsibilities is a baseline for further dialogue. However, integrating other actors' understanding into the own considerations is an intellectual challenge. If successful, it will contribute to developing an atmosphere of increased mutual trust and confidence.

DON'T: Create barriers between military and civilian partners

"A challenge to be overcome in building an integrated comprehensive capability is the task of communicating across dissimilar cultures. Just as NATO's many militaries have cultural differences, so too each civilian organization has a unique culture. Operations in Afghanistan and Kosovo experienced hard communication stovepipes among organizations that proved difficult to breech. For civilian organizations working with a strong, large and ever-present military organization, individuality is important. NGOs for instance are special organizations with cultures of strict impartiality that are essential to self-protection and effectiveness. The military should do nothing in word or deed to compromise NGOs' impartiality.

To break down barriers between military and civilian partners, NATO must engage in integrated training, educating, exercising, and planning for military and civilian personnel who may be operating together. It also needs to emphasize as a top priority the imperative to share information laterally as well as vertically across the network"[2]

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3.   Respecting other entities' principles. Respecting the principles of other entities is the basis for balanced and trustful consultations. For instance, while in dialogue with humanitarian non-governmental organizations, respecting the humanitarian principles[3] and the deriving limitations in the level of interaction with the military is the foundation for fruitful consultations with such actors. Disrespect of their principles would very likely question the military's understanding of their role and harming any further dialogue.

DON'T: Disrespect each other's principles

"During a cocktail party for [NATO] Coalition Ambassadors a very senior Operational Commander approached an International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) delegate and asked him the following question: Sir, you have people on the ground - why

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don't you mark [my enemy's] positions on our map while you're here…?"
It should not come to a surprise that the Operational Commander in this case completely ignored ICRC's humanitarian principles. It is of course by no means ICRC's job to pin-point where 'enemy' positions are located, because this severely undermines their principle of neutrality. The International Committee of the Red Cross is therefore generally speaking reluctant to accept the support of the military, fearing it could be detrimental to the preservation of its neutrality.

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4.   Trust and confidence. Trust and confidence are in first instance informal qualities and a matter of frequent personal contact and experiences between individuals. Institutionalizing them between organizations, for instance via Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) is possible, but the effect might be limited or not effective throughout all organizational levels. Having said that, it also needs to be considered that the commonly experienced requirement to interact in the field might support developing trust and confidence on that very level. However this does not necessarily lead to institutionalization or establishing a MoU on head office level. Particularly on field level the high frequency of rotation on the military side is an obstacle to building trust and confidence and therefore needs special attention.

DO: Try to build (personal) relationships

"[…] so my third piece of advice is build personal relationships. Talk often and communicate. Before you deploy, train together. Drink coffee with the civilians who share your battle space, and remember they work with you but not for you. Once you're in country, invite civilians to your meetings, and go to theirs. Remember that, like you, they are professionals far from home, applying their skills to build a safer world. You'll like them - and as in any other aspect of life, reaching out is the best way to build the relationships that allow us to become genuine partners. You might even get used to having them brief

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[2] Friis Arne Petersen & H. Binnendijk, 'From Comprehensive Approach to Comprehensive Capability', *NATO Review* nr.1 (2008).
[3] Some humanitarian actors, including certain NGOs, will want to safeguard the humanitarian principles of independence, neutrality and impartiality with the aim to protect their personnel and recipient communities. Militaries must always employ due respect for the

humanitarian space in accordance with the 2008 "UN Civil-Military Guidelines and Reference for Complex Emergencies" when conducting dialogue, information sharing and de-confliction of activities with all such organizations. According to these guidelines, humanitarian aid should only be carried out by military forces when civilian actors are not present or the security situation does not allow civilian actors to undertake these tasks.

at joint conferences without PowerPoint slides". [4] (Remarks by U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Karl Eikenberry).

5.   Commitment. Successful crisis prevention and management requires not only commitment to the process, but also to the interaction with other entities, and to the agreements made in consultations on the individual as well as on the organizational level.

DON'T: Create dependency, but manage expectations

The time frame of the respective supporting strategy and commitment must be communicated to host nation's population as soon as possible. Dependency should be prevented at all cost.

"In January 2008, United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) began to slowly draw down its forces parallel to the Government of Liberia's implementation of its Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS). The international community supported the PRS using the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) and other plans designed to help build the capacity of the Government of Liberia – particularly at the county level – to deliver essential public services. These services included security, governance, the rule of law, and economic and social development. The intent of these frameworks was to reach fulfillment of these services, articulated in a series of benchmarks, by the time of the next general election in November 2011. This had to mark the end of the second (or drawdown) phase and the beginning of the third and final phase of withdrawal, characterized by civilian-led peace building focused on development to supplant security-intensive, military-based peacekeeping operations.

In recognition of its role in underpinning this stabilization process, with the onset of these frameworks that ended the peacekeeping consolidation phase and started the drawdown phase (transitioning to peace building) in January 2008, the UNMIL Force approach to CMI changed substantially, based on the constant concern in Force Command reports on "the increasing dependence of the Government of Liberia on the assets of the Force…" Since then, the greatest risk for security and stability in

Liberia has been persistent dependency on the mission in general and the military in particular as Force capability diminishes, bringing on potentially destabilizing effects that risk the investment and sacrifices of many to bring lasting peace there."[5]

6.   Alignment of commitment.   "Where governments demonstrate political will to foster development, but lack capacity, the military should seek to align their efforts behind government strategies. Where the capacity of an affected nation is limited, the use of alternative instruments can facilitate shared priorities and responsibility for execution between national and international institutions. Where alignment behind government-led strategies is not possible due to particularly weak governance or violent conflict, the military should consult with a range of national stakeholders in the affected country, and seek opportunities for alignment with the IC's efforts. Where possible, militaries should seek to avoid activities which undermine national institution-building, such as developing parallel systems without deliberation of a transition process and long-term capacity development. It is important to identify functioning systems within existing local institutions, and work to strengthen these."[6]

DO: Align relevant strategies in the planning phase

When planning a military operation, the alignment of relevant strategies (with relevant actors other than the military) is required. This contributes to a real comprehensive approach to crisis management.

"Probably most problematic is the relation between NATO and the various humanitarian organizations. Although there is a myriad of different NGOs, the majority is very reluctant in collaborating with the military. This makes aligning activities very hard and hampers the overall civil-military effort in crisis area. This alignment is crucial however for CIMIC / CMI to be of any added value, not only from a military perspective but also in the wider scope of crisis management. A more efficient coordination is needed in order to avoid duplication of efforts to help affected populations more effectively and resolve conflict. Both parties are aware of this but due to cultural and

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[4] Remarks by U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Karl Eikenberry, in Fort Leavenworth Kansas, *Shona Ba Shona - Building an Effective CIV-MIL Partnership in Afghanistan*.

[5] Christopher Holshek, 'Civil-military coordination and transition management: the UNMIL experience', *Conflict Trends*, 3 (2011) pp. 45-46.
[6] Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, *Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States & Situations* (2007).

organizational differences it has been hard to implement such a sort of coordination or alignment. For instance the military are interested in working on the ground with NGOs but are less inclined to cooperate on the planning level because they do not want to incorporate too many civilian goals in their military planning. While on the other hand, the NGOs rather avoid cooperation on the ground but are interested in working together on the planning level in order to have some input regarding measurements."[7]

7. <u>Reliability.</u> Upholding principles and standing by commitments made during consultations helps building trust and confidence. In return, changing conditions requiring adaptation of plans in a way that given commitments cannot be kept needs to be communicated as soon as possible.

DON'T: Make promises you cannot keep

"When speaking with any Afghan, be certain of your words and intentions. If you say things like "I think we can do that" or "that sounds like a good idea," and you do not caveat it with "but I have to check before I can promise anything," they will take that as a promise to do something. If you don't follow through with that promise, you lose creditability and one of the bricks in your "relationship wall." You would prefer this wall to not get shaky.

The Afghans have had years of broken promises laid upon them. Don't add to that pile. If you're certain that you can do something and know with a 99-percent probability that it will happen, then go ahead and promise. Once you keep your promise, you will gain respect and it will drive those you interact with to keep their promises as well."[8]

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8. <u>Accountability.</u> When interacting with other organizations, a culture of truthfulness and willingness to enlightenment of incidents is regularly rewarded through improved trust and confidence. Misjudgements of the situation that result in actions with negative effects may be laid open, also for inter- and intra-organizational learning. Shortfalls identified, mistakes realized and problems encountered need to be brought into the Lessons Identified / Lessons Learned process to help improving mission success.

Comprehending the interdependencies of the multitude of actors call for a change of military education and culture in this respect.

Accountability in terms of inter-organizational principles must not be confused with the legal accountability for instance with regard to the Law of Armed Conflict. 'Good governance' being the overarching philosophy of accountability, whose development deployed military forces in missions to weak, fragile, failing and failed states regularly promote, is worth some self-reflection. Even more since military forces of democratic states are part of governmental structures and are increasingly measured in such terms not only by their political leaders, but even more by their respective population and civil society.[9]

DO: Evaluate and monitor your activities (and share the results)

"[…] measuring impact remains a critical task for humanitarian, reconstruction, stabilization and development actors. The UK Stabilisation Unit's "lessons learnt" publication [*Responding to Stabilisation Challenges in Hostile and Insecure Environments: Lessons Learned by the UK Stabilisation Unit*] provides a concise description of how monitoring and evaluation relates to the sorts of civil-military stabilization activities being undertaken by PRTs. The Stabilisation Unit document specifically notes that:
- Monitoring and evaluation allow stabilization actors to determine if their activities are effectively and efficiently achieving both the tactical/programmatic and strategic objectives of the intervention. In other words, are the interventions achieving what they are expected to achieve (e.g., improving living conditions and legitimizing state institutions)?
- Monitoring and evaluation help to identify gaps and flaws in the overall stabilization strategy/plan, an outcome which is particularly important given that stabilization environments are highly dynamic. Monitoring local-level stabilization activities may provide valuable insights into the overall relevance and effectiveness of the strategy.

- Monitoring and evaluation allow stabilization actors to learn from their past experience in order to improve

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[7] Stijn van Weezel, 'The Use of Civil-Military Co-operation in a Comprehensive Approach', *CCOE CIMIC Messenger* Vol 3. Nr 2. (2011) p.5.

[8] U.S. Centre for Army Lessons Learned, *Afghan Culture: Observations, Insights and Lessons* (Fort Leavenworth 2010).

[9] For more details on "good governance", see: Civil-Military Cooperation Centre of Excellence, *Good Governance Makes Sense: A Way to Improve Your Mission* (Enschede 2012).

their future interventions in that same context or elsewhere.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, monitoring and evaluation serve as a crucial form of communication with local communities, according to a volume, *Knowledge Shared*, edited by Edward T. Jackson and Yusuf Kassam. While such communication is considered important in all developing country contexts, it is fundamental to the success of stabilization missions and the specific activities undertaken by PRTs. The study goes on to note that, conducting an objective and in-depth evaluation of a particular project indicates that a PRT is concerned with the effect that its assistance has upon the local population. In doing so, it also demonstrates the PRTs are 'learning organizations' which are striving to improve the quality of assistance they provide. Evaluations provide a unique opportunity for PRTs to deepen or establish trust with local communities and to signal a break with any past projects, personnel or practices which may have been locally unpopular."[10]

9. Transparency and sharing of information. For the purpose of successful Civil-Military Interaction sharing of information is of key importance to develop a common understanding about the situation and necessary measures. Sharing of relevant information supports building trust, confidence and a permanent dialogue, but may also enable other constructive actors to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of their operations or security for their personnel. Consequently militaries have an interest to proactively provide appropriate information to such actors.

On the other hand security, also warranted by a disclosure policy, is essential for ensuring the protection of individuals, organisations and sources. While the tendency to over-classify information within armed forces leads to misunderstandings and limit the potential level of interaction due to different understandings concerning required measures. A common set of guidelines for sharing information helps finding a balance between protection, timely sharing with other appropriate entities, and exploitation by all actors involved.

Releasing too much information is not beneficial as it will result in overloading information channels and burying vital information underneath secondary

information. An effective implementation of the 'need to share' principle presupposes that the provider knows what information the collaboration partners need, not what they think they need. Therefore the usage of information platforms like ReliefWeb[11] for spreading information is just one option that expands direct liaison and exchange mechanisms. Hyper-linking of such platforms is currently still relatively weak and therefore a field for potential improvements.

DON'T: Underestimate the 'need to share'

"Information is not routinely shared. Military deployments and capabilities are often classified. [The military will often not share information with NGOs due to operational secrecy, for example, on issues relating to deployments and capabilities]. Many NGO officials, in turn, see little need to volunteer information on their activities. In Rwanda [1990-1993], neither NGOs, the United Nations nor the U.S. military were aware of which NGOs were present and operating. Many NGOs do not register with any embassy or otherwise try to make their presence known. In Rwanda, Somalia and other crises, NGOs often simply appeared without making any arrangements to be received. No pre-established channels for contact exist between deploying forces and relevant agencies. Although NGOs are open with information concerning the needs of suffering people, they are often reluctant to share information on other areas with the military. Some NGO officials worry that the military seeks to collect information that goes well beyond the immediate crisis."[12]

10. Areas of Interaction and Means of Communication. "During operations, the NGO/IO community and military organizations must have areas and means of interaction. These areas must span from the operations at the home office or the military headquarters to the activities in the field. For success to be possible, these areas and means of interactions must have a solid foundation of communications and information sharing. The methods of communications are based upon capabilities of each organization. They must be properly equipped to account for equipment or channel breakdown, but more importantly they must be adapted for the operations/crises to maintain the independence and the impartiality of the NGO/IO community. Without effective communications, the

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[10] Steven A. Zyck, *Civil-Military Fusion Centre Monthly Reports: Measuring the Development Impact of Provincial Reconstruction Teams* (June 2011).

[11] http://www.reliefweb.int
[12] Daniel Byman, 'Uncertain Partners: NGOs and the Military', *Survival*, Vol.43, No.2, summer 2001, p.99.

interaction (however defined) will be hampered and the operations objective will be put in doubt."[13]

DO: Share/communicate your way of operating

"In the aftermath of the 2004 tsunami in South-East Asia, in all countries military forces worked alongside their civilian counterparts in order to coordinate international humanitarian assistance in the tsunami-affected countries. Assets were put at the disposal of the humanitarian community, but the methods by which one actually gained access to those assets was not always obvious to those requesting them often resulting in uncertainty of supply. For example in Indonesia where logistics assets were essential to gain access to vulnerable communities a UN Agency representative reported having to go from one military to another to ask for help; another UN Agency Country Head was unable to persuade local commanders on the ground for helicopter support in assessing the scale of needs; and, even the USAID/WHO joint assessment from the USS Lincoln only took place some three weeks after the Tsunami."[14]

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11.   Flexibility in sequencing and timing. Harmonizing of plans requires inherent flexibility in sequencing and timing of operations to allow all parties to successfully conduct their operations. This could concern for instance the adaptation of the operational tempo, sequencing of regional engagement, continued provision of security to allow stabilization by other actors (multi-organizational engagement in a Shape – Clear – Hold – Build approach), etc.

DON'T: Plan in splendid isolation

"U.N. Security Council Resolution 751 initiated a sequence of actions that led to U.S. involvement in Somalia in April of 1992. The mandate was to provide humanitarian assistance to the Somali people and to restore order to southern Somalia while the military established a safe and secure environment for NGOs to operate effectively. [15] Although some NGOs had remained in Somalia through the two years of

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lawlessness preceding the deployment, military leaders made no attempt to contact any of the NGO representatives to obtain updated information either before or during the initial stages of the operation. A U.N. After Action Review (AAR) cited this oversight as a significant contributing factor to the operation's overall failure.[16] Various authors even posit that if the decision makers had consulted with NGOs before deployment, the disaster leading to the eventual withdrawal of forces could have been avoided."[17]

12.   Autonomy in decision-making. Although aiming for de-conflicted or even harmonized efforts is a widely understood and accepted principle, autonomy in decision-making is inevitably a consequence of the multitude of mandates, strategies, approaches and practices. Thus respecting this autonomy is not only the foundation for consultations, but also helps creating trust and confidence.

DO: Respect each other's decisions, and try to deal with them

"In Haiti, the US military played a large role in the response [of the 2010 earthquake], providing medical support, logistics and relief supplies, assisting MINUSTAH [United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti] in maintaining law and order and establishing what became the largest IDP[Internally displaced person] camp, Camp Corail. However, some reports indicated that the US military were initially reluctant to engage with the UN humanitarian coordination leadership and mechanisms because of security procedures and resistance to taking instructions from the UN. Coordination was reportedly problematic, including on access for relief flights to the US military-controlled airport, until a series of ad hoc formal agreements were developed and a joint UN/US centre was established for the secure delivery of assistance.

Although the 2010 earthquake response is credited with delivering a very large volume of assistance in a very difficult working environment, coordination was identified as a significant shortcoming. Coordinating

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[13] B. Holt, S. Eron, M. Williamson, J Philips, *Guiding Principles for Civil Military Interaction for NATO* (Norfolk 2011).

[14]   Tsunami Evaluation Coalition, *Coordination of international humanitarian assistance in tsunami-affected countries* (London 2005).

[15] Kenneth Allard, *Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned* (Washington, DC 1994), p. 14.

[16] United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, *The Comprehensive Report on Lessons Learned from United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM): April 1992-March 1995* (n.d.).

[17] Craig A. Osborne, Preparing for the Inevitable: NGO-Military Interactions in Humanitarian Assistance and Peace Operations (Fort Leavenworth, 2001) p. 19.

such a large number of humanitarian actors was problematic, and this, combined with the negative stance of some towards the military, meant that coordination with the military was weak, including with the UN mission MINUSTAH. In Haiti, as elsewhere, differing positions have been particularly prominent at the operational level. It was apparent unclear how military actors should engage with the cluster system, or how OCHA and the cluster system related to the UN mission." [18]

13.   <u>Aiming for local ownership and building local capacity.</u>[19] A conflict situation may be stabilised in the short term with the use of quick impact humanitarian efforts, diplomatic initiatives, economic incentives, and the use of military force. However, achieving long-term stability will depend on factors like establishing a functioning rule of law, a self-sustaining economy, education, etc. Thus local capacity building and local ownership are the ultimate exit strategies.

DO: Describe the sustainability of your efforts

"It can be debated if Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) are very productive, not simply because of the quality of the infrastructure, but also because they often do not have any local involvement. In the case of Afghanistan for instance, communities place a huge emphasis on the importance of transparent, accountable and locally-appropriate development that is based on local ownership[20] and the military have not understood this to be a priority. The projects are often developed in isolation – for example PRTs have not always coordinated their programmes with the Afghan National Development Strategy. This can have the effect of undermining local efforts at development. In Afghanistan's Badghis province, one of CARE's local Afghan partners had developed a sustainable micro loan business with interest rates of around 10% as part of a long term community project. The local PRT however came in and set up a short term 0% interest project, which attracted hoards of locals to the less

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sustainable option. [21] NGOs have argued that the military should involve the local community at the earliest possible opportunity, and that PRTs should offer contracts to local rather than international contractors in order to provide a more sustainable solution with long term benefits to local Afghans."[22]

14.   <u>Ensuring transition.</u> Ensuring seamless transition, including its planning should involve those civil actors normally responsible for each area from the outset and throughout the implementation phase. This will allow to take into account relevant actors' expertise, capabilities and capacity, not only in planning but also in conduct of activities and to adapt these as necessary. Where direct transition to local authorities is not possible, the military should aim for involving other actors of the IC already during the planning of such efforts, ensuring a smooth preliminary transition to one of them.

DO: Communicate your time frame

"We can look at this more closely from the IC perspective, the NATO perspective and the local actor perspective. The IC, as a group of intergovernmental organizations, national aid organizations, NGOs [...] and other actors, can all become embedded in the interactive system and find it challenging to leave. This is especially likely to occur when the organizations focus on service provision as opposed to training local actors to work the external organization out of the job.

International actors can become stuck in a region when they use measures of performance, focused on their own inputs (like projects funded, money spent, etc.) instead of measures of effectiveness. This problem is well recognized in academic literature.

However, NATO is far less susceptible than other IC actors to becoming embedded in the system given the many competing demands for resources on which NATO focuses. NATO military forces have no interest in

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[18] Victoria Metcalfe, Simone Haysom and Stuart Gordon, *Trends and Challenges in Humanitarian Civil–Military Coordination: A Review of the Literature* (London 2012) pp. 16-17.

[19] The appropriation by the relevant national authorities of commonly agreed principles and objectives as well as their active support for and commitment to the implementation of those objectives. In the absence of relevant national authorities in crisis situations or in the immediate aftermath of a conflict, Civil-Military interaction should be conducted in a way that encourages and enables national authorities to take ownership of such activities.

[20] G. McHugh & L. Gostelow, 'Provincial Reconstruction Teams and Humanitarian Military Relations in Afghanistan.' Save The Children Report (2004) p.32.

[21] Lara Olsen, 'Fighting for Humanitarian Space: NGOs in Afghanistan – The delivery of humanitarian assistance in Afghanistan: A human security dilemma for Canada.' Human Security Bulletin. *The Canadian consortium on human security*, Vol 5, issue 1. (2007) p.7.

[22] George Bragg, *Civil-Military Relations in Afghanistan: How has increasing interaction between NGOs and the military affected humanitarian operations in complex emergencies?* (Nottingham 2010).

long dwell times in theatres. However, this can lead to short term focus and failure to invest appropriately to and realistically to create to desired capabilities. For example, security forces that can protect the population and enforce the rule of law in an honest way will not be created overnight [...]. NATO desire to get in and out quickly can result in wasted effort, as small steps are made with inadequate resources, in both money and attention, and fail to generate sustainable effects."[23]

15.   Joining of platforms. It needs to be understood that in most of the crisis civil organizations are the first in theatre or have already been working there in terms of development support. Usually these organizations have established platforms and fora, so military would be well advised trying to join them instead of creating competing ones. Awareness of the establishment of the typical structures in a certain crisis (e.g. UN Cluster Approach, On-site Operations Coordination Centre) must be part of the general knowledge on all military command levels and considered in advance and crisis response planning.

DON'T: Create new structures

"Often military personnel are not aware of existing coordinating structures and mechanisms already in use by the international community, such as the 'cluster system' for humanitarian and disasters response situations. The military should look at how they can adapt themselves to support these mechanism vice

establishing their own and expecting others to follow them. This will create unnecessary duplication of efforts and stress the capacities of most civil agencies that have much less resources than their military counterparts.

Military personnel need to realize that most civilian organizations do not have the manpower or resources required to participate in additional meetings. Most of these organizations, especially in the humanitarian and development community, have relatively small staffs as most of the resources are dedicated to supporting projects of beneficiaries. These staffs are therefore often stretched too thin to accommodate additional coordination meetings. Hence, it is usually more feasible for the military to support their coordinating mechanisms than vice versa."[24]

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[23] NATO, *Engaging Local Actors: A Bi-SC Food-For-Thought Paper I* (2011).

[24] Tony Icayan, *Civil-Military Interaction (CMI) – Do's and Don'ts: Guidelines and Recommendations for Military Practitioners* (Norfolk 2011) p.7.

3. Do's & Don'ts

Based on the guidelines described in the previous chapter, complemented with some best and bad practices, it is possible to
summarize several do's and don'ts when working in the field of Civil-Military Interaction.

3.1 Do's

- Try to build (personal) relationships.

- Align relevant strategies in the planning phase.

- Evaluate and monitor your activities (and share the results).

- Share/communicate your way of operating.

- Describe the sustainability of your efforts.

- Respect each other's decisions, and try to deal with them.

- Communicate your time frame.

3.2 Don'ts

- Stereotype.

- Create barriers between military and civilian partners.

- Disrespect each other's principles.

- Create dependency.

- Make promises you cannot keep, they will turn against you.

- Underestimate the 'need to share'.

- Plan in splendid isolation.

- Create new structures.

4. Tips & Tricks

The following tips and tricks are based on the principles presented in this article, and provide suggestions for a possible way ahead.

- CMI begins with understanding of who are the relevant actors in the area of operations.

- Know what all different parties in the Area of Operations are doing or can do. Lobby on behalf of the civilian agencies for them to be provided with added funding, or at least more rapid-reaction funding, so that there can be concurrent military and civilian activity.

- Politicizing humanitarian aid and capability development should be avoided when working on CMI.

- CMI should be focused on maintaining the humanitarian space and avoiding confusion with 'NATO and UN-led military interventions labeled as 'humanitarian' interventions'.

- CMI should contribute to establishing greater coordination, dialogue and potentially training between respective organizations.

- Develop 'cultural' interoperability, through dialogue and collective training. The propositions made during these activities could be implemented through a Memorandum of Understanding between the different parties.[25]

- To promote CMI there should be a better definition of:
- *Differences* (the need to understand and respect different objectives and roles of each type of organization; civilian and military).

- *Dialogue* (the need to communicate better between each type of organization).
- *Discernment* (the recognition that there are no easy answers and that each situation is unique).[26]

- Increase communication and coordination between civilian and military operators.

- In defining optional ways of interaction, the military and civil actors must ask themselves what they can do for each other, instead of trying to integrate, 'instrumentalize' or dilute one another.[27]

- Create constructive and targeted working relationships.[28] In general it is felt that the more targeted relationships work best. The more people are involved in the engagement the more difficult it becomes. In larger meetings it becomes more difficult to build a relationship and the trust so necessary to meaningfully engage the local actors.

- Personnel who interact with local actors should not change frequently because it is difficult to have continuity to the confidence that has been built among the military and local actors.

- Well-meaning but ad hoc 'civilian' action by militaries can have unintended consequences that can reduce the impact of military actions and possibly do harm. This principle of *do no harm* and ways to address it has been painfully learned by civilian agencies over the past decades.[29]

- Not all civil and local actors like to engage with the military. Therefore, the military should respect their decisions and avoid putting them at risk, unless this interactions is essential for the mission.

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[25] Laure Borgomano-Loup, *Forum Paper: Improving NATO-NGO Relations in Crisis Response Operations* (Rome 2007) pp. 56-57.
[26] Steve Eron & E. Karoli, *Civil-Military Interaction (CMI) – Guidelines: Food For Thought Paper* (Norfolk 2011) p.5.

[27] Borgomano-Loup, *Forum*, p. 55.
[28] NATO, *BI-SC Input on Engaging Local Actors- Part II* (2012) pp. 11-12.
[29] Paul LaRose-Edwards, *NATO as a Trusted Partner in Civil-Military Interaction* (London 2007) p.7.

- If for some reason QIPs are being conducted, they at least have to be audited. The damage caused by a project executed in support of the 'wrong' entity or person will remain for a long time in the memory of local actors. Sometimes, the national appetite to 'show the flag' in relation to delivering aid could cause a negative or counterproductive effect.

- Be diplomatic, since engaging local actors is focused on relationships, good practitioners need to develop diplomatic skills in order to work towards practical solutions to issues with their civilian or military counterparts.[30]

- Military jargon and terminology can prove difficult to understand. Therefore, mutual understanding and knowledge of each other's 'vocabulary' is an important step to improve CMI. Frequent 'dialogue' between different parties can solve this problem. Such a dialogue could for instance clarify for the military the impact and dilemmas of concepts such as humanity, impartiality and neutrality. It would also help to create a common understanding of what different actor mean by 'interaction', 'cooperation' and 'coordination'.[31]

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[30] NATO, *BI-SC,* pp. 15-16.

[31] Borgomano-Loup, *Forum*, p. 57.

Conclusion

Experiences in missions and operations have demonstrated that interrelations of cause and effect as well as interdependencies between military operations and civil actors are complex and demanding. As a result, military action alone has proven to be insufficient to prevent or manage crisis. Therefore it should not come to a surprise that success in operations requires enhanced interaction amongst the military and civil actors, at all levels before and during engagement.

The guidelines, do's & don'ts and tips & tricks mentioned in this article hopefully contribute to cross-organizational synergies for improved efficiency and effectiveness between the military and civil entities. As it is the aim of this article to promote knowledge and understanding of CMI, it is hopefully clear that Civil-Military Interaction can only function when there is a common ground for consultation and dialogue, knowing that transparency and commitment, respecting of each other principles and autonomy in decision making are guaranteed.

The objective of this publication is not only to achieve greater coherence of efforts and actions by various actors engaged in crisis preventions and management, but also creates room for consensus development amongst all actors involved in CMI. The overarching goal of the CCOE to create this practical requirements handbook is therefore to develop synergies, improved efficiency and effectiveness amongst actors in the field of CMI. The lessons learned described in this article are meant to further develop a shared view of best and bad practices.

Lastly, the suggested guidelines (1-15) is meant to stimulate discussion on how to better work together in a Civil-Military environment. In the end, the guidelines summarized in this article respect the existing framework of NATO planning and CMI policy, and would not require the development of special civilian capabilities. All military personnel should be properly trained and made aware of the importance and workings of CMI. Most importantly, the proposed guidelines provide a platform for integrating different perspectives on CMI in both military and civil mandates and policies. The flexibility and neutrality of these fundamentals of CMI could hopefully lead to better planning and execution of Civil-Military Interaction.

A way ahead

As military missions become increasingly influenced by Civil-Military Interaction it is clear that there is a growing need for a set of practical requirement for the CMI concept. It is therefore recommended that the guidelines described in this article should contribute to the implementation of CMI. To engage and maintain relationships between the military and civil actors it is important that there is an increase of communication and coordination between these two sides. Only when both actors in the field of CMI share their views and best & bad practices on Civil-Military Interaction it is possible to further establish a common framework of cooperation. This article, hopefully contributes to this process, and will strengthen the possibility for cross-cultural and cross-organizational interoperability when it comes to CMI.

In conclusion, the way forward for Civil-Military Interaction is based on the understanding that *interaction* is the key to successful cooperation.

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Remarks

The Civil-Military Cooperation Centre of Excellence (CCOE), assists NATO, Sponsoring Nations and other military and civil institutions / organizations in their operational and transformation efforts in the field of civil-military interaction, by providing innovative and timely advice and subject matter expertise in the development of existing and new concepts, policy and doctrine; specialized education and training; and the contribution to the lessons learned processes.

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