



Marines from Combat Logistics Battalion 3, 1st Marine Logistics Group (Forward), offload supplies from an Osprey in support of Operation Steel Dawn in far southern Helmand Province. Read the [MCCLL topical paper on supply and maintenance operations in Afghanistan](#).



# MARINE CORPS CENTER FOR LESSONS LEARNED

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# Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL)

## Inside this issue:

### Featured Articles

**[Supply and Maintenance Operations in Afghanistan:](#)** This MCCLL topical paper provides observations and best practices concerning supply and maintenance operations of 1st Marine Logistics Group (MLG) (Forward) in support of Regional Command Southwest (RC (SW)) and Task Force Leatherneck during Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) 10.

**[Task Force Leatherneck's OEF After Action Report:](#)** 1st Marine Division (Forward) has prepared a very timely, wide-ranging, and detailed after action report (AAR) based on its deployment as Task Force Leatherneck, the ground combat element of Marine and coalition forces in the RC (SW) area of operations.

**[Two other recent OEF AARs](#)** provide additional insights into infantry battalion and engineer support battalion (ESB) operations in Afghanistan:

- ⇒ [1st Battalion, 2d Marines' OEF AAR](#) and
- ⇒ [8th ESB's First 100 Days AAR](#).

**[Lessons from Exercise Mountain Warrior \(MW\):](#)** This MCCLL "Quick Look" report provides observations and recommendations from Third Marine Regiment, the Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center, and 1st Battalion, 3d Marines (1/3) on a recent exercise.

**[Lessons from Exercise Solid Curtain/Citadel Shield 2011:](#)** This Marine Corps Installations West (MCIWEST) briefing furnishes observations from command post personnel and subordinate installations on their participation in this February 2011 exercise.

**[Total Asset Visibility \(TAV\) and Equipment Accountability:](#)** MCCLL has compiled observations and recommendations from Marine Corps Logistics Command, I Marine Expeditionary Force, and the 1st MLG concerning TAV and in-transit visibility (ITV) for logistics distribution efforts in OEF.

### [Shaping and Mentoring the Afghanistan Police:](#)

The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) has prepared a newsletter with thirteen articles on the subject of training and mentoring Afghanistan police.

**[Transitioning to Stability Operations in Iraq:](#)** This report from the Joint Center for Operational Analysis (JCOA) addresses the transition from counterinsurgency to stability operations as U.S. forces have drawn down.

**[The Most Popular Downloads from the MCCLL Website:](#)** Documents in the MCCLL repositories that have been accessed most often tend to highlight topics that Marines and other readers find most interesting.

**[The Role of High-Value Target Teams in Defeating Insurgencies:](#)** The National Defense University (NDU) has prepared a report that argues that one of the major factors in Iraq success has been the employment of interagency high-value target teams.

### News

Three items are highlighted this month: (1) information on the [Marine Corps response to the Japan earthquake/tsunami/nuclear disaster](#), (2) the recent announcement of [a new portal for Interagency collaboration](#), and (3) an article on Marine Corps plans to ["Go Green" in Afghanistan](#).

**[Reading Lists and Book Review:](#)** Two books are featured: (1) *Flags of Our Fathers* from the Commandant's List and (2) *The Longest War*, an overview of the War on Terror.

**[Roster of MCCLL Liaison Officers:](#)** This roster provides points of contact information for MCCLL representatives assigned at major Marine Corps and Joint commands and organizations.

observations highlight potential shortfalls, risks or issues experienced by units that may suggest a need for change. **The observations are not service level decisions.** In addition, some information in this newsletter has been compiled from publicly available sources and is not official USMC policy. Although the information has been gathered from reliable sources, the currency and completeness of the information is subject to change and cannot be guaranteed. Questions or comments on this newsletter and [requests to be added to the MCCLL newsletter distribution list](#) can be directed to: [Mr. Harry T. Johnson, Editor](#)

# Supply and Maintenance Operations in Afghanistan

1st Marine Logistics Group (Forward) (1st MLG (Fwd)) deployed to Operation Enduring Freedom 10 (OEF 10) in March 2010 with the mission of providing direct support (DS) tactical logistics support to 1st Marine Division (Forward) and general support (GS) to I Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward). In addition, the MLG was tasked with developing the logistics capabilities of partnered Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). During its deployment, the MLG exercised both "push" and "pull" logistics support, depending on the specific class of supply under consideration. The dispersed nature of operations in the Regional Command Southwest (RC (SW)) area of operations also required the dispersal of skill sets among multiple and geographically separated locations, with one of the main objectives being to provide maintenance support as far forward as possible.

In November 2010, a Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) collection team conducted interviews with leaders and staff of the MLG in theater. The results of these interviews have been documented in a MCCLL For Official Use Only (FOUO) topical paper, entitled, [Marine Logistics Group \(Forward\), Supply and Maintenance Operations in Afghanistan: Lessons and Observations from 1st MLG](#). Among the principle topics addressed in the report are: ■ the impact of distributed operations on unit readiness and on MLG manning, equipment and training, ■ the intermediate maintenance activities performed at various locations, ■ the role of embedded field service representatives (FSRs), and ■ the asset visibility provided by radio frequency identification systems. (Note that this latter topic is addressed in more detail in the MCCLL topical paper [Total Asset Visibility and Equipment Accountability](#) addressed [later in this newsletter](#).)



*A motor transport mechanic with Combat Logistics Regiment 15 (CLR-15), 1st MLG (Fwd), works on the engine of a 7-ton truck at Forward Operating Base (FOB) Dwyer.*

**A complete set of FOUO comments and observations are included in the topical paper. Among the observations releasable in this newsletter are:**

- **Training:** During training, it is difficult to replicate the types of vehicle recoveries required in OEF. In response to previous recommendations on this topic, the Enhanced Mojave Viper (EMV) staff has implemented increasingly challenging recovery courses.

## **Maj Luke Holian, Supply Company Commander, CLR-15 (Fwd):**

*"The biggest difference between supply operations in CONUS versus OEF is distribution, volume, and class of supply . . ."*

## **LtCol Michael Murchison, Commanding Officer, CLR-15 (Fwd):**

*"When everything is a priority, nothing is a priority . . ."*

cles is significantly different from non-combat related component replacements. For example, repairs to one major component often led to discoveries of hidden damages to other components. The repair cycle for vehicles damaged in combat was significant longer than for other types of repairs.

⇒ Warranty programs were often underutilized in theater. Warranty policies should be widely promulgated, fully understood, and adhered to.

- **Field Service Representatives (FSRs).** Contracted logistics services (CLS) and FSRs have been force multipliers and enablers due to the expertise they provide and their persistence on the battlefield. The rapid deployment of new equipment has resulted in institutional training having a difficult time keeping up with requirements, with FSRs filling the void.
- **Principal End Item (PEI) Rotation.** The metrics used for PEI rotation policies (including miles driven, hours operated, etc.) are not as applicable in theater. The established PEI rotation policy used in Iraq and other previous operations did not correlate well to Afghanistan.

- **Supply:** The volume of requisitions handled by the supply management unit (SMU) in theater was not significantly different from those experienced in CONUS; however, there were major differences in urgency, volume, and variety of tasks needed to provide responsive support.

⇒ The widespread assignment of high priority/expedited shipping codes (02/999) to repair parts resulted in their being prioritized equally and made it difficult to differentiate varying levels of urgency in the processing and distribution of parts.

- **Maintenance.** The repair of battle damaged vehi-



*Marines with Headquarters and Services Company, 1st MLG (Fwd), set up a mobile post exchange aboard Observation Post Athens in the Kajaki District of northeastern Helmand Province.*

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## Task Force Leatherneck's OEF After Action Report

From March 2010 to March 2011, 1st Marine Division (Forward) (1st MARDIV (Fwd)) deployed as the ground combat element of Marine Corps and other coalition forces in the Regional Command Southwest (RC (SW)) area of operations (AO) in Helmand and Nimruz Provinces of southwestern Afghanistan. Designated as Task Force Leatherneck, 1st MARDIV (Fwd) oversaw the doubling in size of the Marine Corps force in the AO during Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) 10.1 and 10.2 to about 13,000. In addition, during this period, TF Leatherneck helped to establish an Afghan National Army (ANA) Corps of about 10,000 members. After the ANA Corps was activated in April 2010, TF Leatherneck staff established a direct partnership with the Corps Headquarters. This partnership has matured into a model for the development of host nation security forces, while concurrently executing combat operations in a highly kinetic environment. Ideally, the development of host nation security forces would occur during the "hold and build" stages of a counterinsurgency. However, the development of TF Leatherneck's partnered ANA was primarily executed during the "clearing" stage, presenting unique challenges that had to be overcome.

Following completion of its deployment and the transfer of authority to 2d MARDIV (Fwd), 1st MARDIV (Fwd) has prepared a wide-ranging and detailed [Task Force Leatherneck After Action Report for OEF 10.1 and 10.2](#), with a wealth of information on best practices for the deployment of a division into this type of kinetic and widely dispersed environment. The AAR is over 150 pages long, with individual sections addressing: administration, intelligence, Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), civil-military operations, current operations, engineering, fires, information operations (IO), future operations, logistics, the Division Gunner, and the Division Staff Judge Advocate. **A comprehensive set of FOUO observations and recommendations are provided in the complete AAR. Among the observations releasable in this newsletter are:**

- **Air Operations:** Air operations in the RC (SW) AO are dominated by a highly dusty environment and "brownout" conditions that affect the ability of rotary wing assets to support ground commanders. Mission planning by the ground combat element must understand this limiting factor in order to plan effective levels of support.
  - **Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) Development:** A key to effective ANSF development is utilization of embedded advisor teams to facilitate partnering of units with the host nation security units. The Marine Corps and ANSF units should live, eat, train, plan, and fight together, concurrently with the exercising of command and control of their combined forces.
- ⇒ The use of embedded police mentors (EPMs) (i.e., civilian police officers contracted to provide training and advisory support to Police Advisor Teams) aides in increasing the professionalism of the Afghan National Police (ANP) forces, particularly in terms of internal operations, case file management, and community oriented policing.
- **Reintegration.** Although the reintegration of insurgents back into their communities is led by the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA), a coalition representative must be involved to ensure timely and accurate reporting and to facilitate deconfliction. When *shuras* take place concerning candidate reintegrees, this information needs to be passed as soon as possible to the appropriate coalition forces.
  - **Introduction of Tanks into the RC (SW) AO.** Due to the specific capabilities and requirements of a tank unit, a longer reception, staging, onward movement and integration (RSO&I) period is required than for an infantry unit. In order to allow for this, as much training as possible should be completed during the unit's pre-deployment training program (PTP).
  - **Communications.** The requirement to provide robust communications connectivity to the company level has constantly evolved in OEF. Enhanced Mojave Viper (EMV) should include training sets that closely mirror the anticipated equipment and communications architecture that a battalion will have to maintain while deployed in OEF.



*BGen Joseph Osterman and SgtMaj Phillip Fascetti, the Commanding General and Sergeant Major, respectively, of 1st MARDIV (Fwd) sheath the unit colors signifying the successful completion of its mission as TF Leatherneck and the transfer of authority to 2d MARDIV (Fwd).*



*1st MARDIV (Fwd) oversaw the introduction of tanks into OEF. Here, Marines with 1st Tank Battalion, 1st MARDIV (Fwd), fire the main cannon of an M1A1 Abrams tank at a Camp Leatherneck range to align their sights and prepare for upcoming missions.*

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## 1st Battalion, 2d Marines' OEF After Action Report



*Marines from Charlie Company, 1st Battalion, 2d Marines (1/2), engage enemy forces in the Now Zad District of Helmand Province.*

1st Battalion, 2d Marines (1/2) deployed into northern Helmand Province in March 2010, replacing 3d Battalion, 4th Marines (3/4) in the Now Zad District and British forces in the Musa Qal'eh District. Following its seven-month deployment, 1/2 has prepared an in-depth [OEF 10.1 After Action Report](#) that highlights the complexity and diversity of the different Afghanistan districts, resulting from numerous personal agendas, shifting loyalties, and tribal feuds, as well as unrealistic expectations of much of the local populace. One of the key observations made by 1/2 is the imperative of battalions implementing processes in their areas of operations (AOs) that will last beyond their turnover dates. Otherwise, battalions will “contribute to our fighting this war seven months at a time.”

The AAR points out that the British approach was to have separate command operations centers (COCs) for the British forces and the Afghan National Army (ANA) soldiers. 1/2 elected to set up a combined COC, and this approach provided a number of benefits, including greater redundancy in communications and improved shared situational awareness. Although there continued to be difficulties associated with the language barrier and the limited number of interpreters, these difficulties were able to be surmounted. The battle-tracking capabilities of the ANA also increased significantly during the 1/2 deployment. Even though deficiencies in the military skills of the ANA soldiers are widely recognized, 1/2 found that they know more about the enemy and the local populace and, if given the opportunity, will lead and conduct successful operations. 1/2 also points out the imperative of exploiting every opportunity to achieve positive interactions with the local populace. Failure to “own the population” by the Marine Corps battalions will provide the enemy with an endless source of recruits, sanctuary locations, and logistical support.

Readers will find that the 1/2 AAR provides numerous observations and recommendations in the areas of command and control, fires, maneuver, logistics, intelligence, force protection, information operations, security, ANSF development, governance, economic development, and sustainment. [Return to the Table of Contents!](#)

### From the 1st Bn, 2d Marines AAR:

*“There is no “silver bullet” to winning in a counter-insurgency fight; you must constantly “learn-design-learn” your way through this operational environment. If someone says that they are an “expert” in counter-insurgency operations, governance, economics, essential services, etc., it is usually the first indication for you to run as fast as you can in the opposite direction. . .”*

## 8th Engineer Support Battalion's First 100 Days in OEF

The 8th Engineer Support Battalion (ESB) deployed to Afghanistan in November 2010 and assumed responsibility for the general engineering support mission for Regional Command Southwest (RC (SW)) in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) 10.2. The focus of the battalion's efforts has been on improving tactical mobility and operational sustainment throughout the area of operations (AO). The battalion's efforts at constructing and improving roads have been designed to provide assured mobility to maneuver and logistics units. Road repair serves as an ideal counterinsurgency mission, since the improved road networks serve the needs of the battlespace owner and those of the local populace.

Based on the battalion's force generation, pre-deployment training, and first three months in theater, 8th ESB has produced its [First 100 Days After Action Report for OEF 10.2](#). This concise report provides observations and recommendations concerning the battalion's pre-deployment activities and issues related to command and control, mission events, task organization, and supply and logistics, both prior to and following the battalion's arrival in theater.

### From the 8th ESB First 100 Days AAR:

*“[Recommend that battalions] develop an aggressive home station training program to establish a working foundation for mission-based pre-deployment training at Enhanced Mojave Viper (EMV). Plan early for training opportunities where subordinate units can fully exercise motorized patrolling in relevant driving environments and terrain, as well as engineer specific pre-deployment training. If possible, deploy early to EMV to take maximum advantage of the installation's training areas. . .”*

In discussing command and control requirements, the battalion recommends that battalions “continuously exercise and demand timely reporting from small unit leaders using all theater communications technologies. . .”

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*A water purification technician with 8th ESB turns on a water pump at Forward Operating Base Nelay to supply water for laundry and shower services for 3d Battalion, 5th Marines (3/5) in the Sangin District of northern Helmand Province.*

## Lessons from Exercise Mountain Warrior



*A platoon commander with Company C, 1st Battalion, 3d Marines (1/3), communicates with his platoon by radio during a security patrolling exercise at the Marine Corps Mountain Warrior Training Center (MCMWTC) in Bridgeport, CA.*

Exercise Mountain Warrior is a program designed to provide training on critical tasks across the warfighting functions in an environment of medium to high altitudes, in complex and compartmentalized terrain, and under all weather conditions. The training replicates the environments encountered in the mountainous regions of Afghanistan and other high altitude locations and is based around a regimental headquarters and an infantry battalion that have limited available aviation and logistics assets. Mountain Warrior is conducted at the Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center (MCMWTC) in Bridgeport, California, with portions of the exercise taking place at the Hawthorne Army Depot and Naval Airstation Fallon, both in Nevada. In October 2010, the Third Marine Regiment participated in Mountain Warrior 8-10 as the regimental combat team headquarters, with 1st Battalion, 3d Marines (1/3) taking part as the infantry battalion, along with a “synthetic” (simulated) battalion. For this exercise, the existing Mountain Warrior program was reinforced with a robust military mountaineering program and incorporated a ground combat tactical focus.

In order to capture lessons and observations from the participants, the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) conducted interviews with commanders and the staffs of Headquarters, Third Marine Regiment, 1/3, and MCMWTC. The results have been documented in a MCCLL “Quick Look” Report, entitled [Exercise Mountain Warrior 8-10: Summary of Lessons, Observations and Recommendations](#). Among the observations highlighted in the quick look are: ■ the participation by the regimental staff in the mountain movements provided them with an understanding of the unique terrain, weather and environmental factors; ■ it may be desirable for units to take advantage of the many courses offered by the local MAGTF Integrated Systems Training Center (MISTCs) prior to participating in Mountain Warrior; and ■ there were a number of additional equipment items that would have been beneficial for the combat operations center (COC). [Return to the Table of Contents!](#)

## Lessons from Exercise Solid Curtain/Citadel Shield 2011

Solid Curtain/Citadel Shield is an annual exercise sponsored by the Commander, Naval Installations Command, and conducted to enhance the training and readiness of security personnel in responding to threats to installations and units. As a result, various scenarios are devised to test base security responses to simulated incidents. The 2011 exercise was conducted over a four-day period in February, with an antiterrorism/force protection scenario designed to test a variety of command and control and standard operating procedures.

Marine Corps Installations West (MCIWEST) conducted a command post exercise during this year’s Solid Curtain/Citadel Shield to test regional communications and interagency coordination and evaluate MCIWEST mission essential tasks. Participants included Marine Corps Base (MCB) Camp Pendleton, Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Camp Pendleton, MCAS Miramar, MCAS Yuma, Marine Corps Logistics Base (MCLB) Barstow, Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center (MCAGCC) 29 Palms, and Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center (MCMWTC) Bridgeport. Based on observations from each of these installations during this year’s exercise, MCIWEST has prepared a consolidated [Exercise Citadel Shield/Solid Curtain 2011 After Action Briefing](#) with a number of recommendations for improving coordination, command and control, and responding to threats to installations that should be implemented during future exercises or real-world events.



*Mock protestors descend on Naval Air Facility (NAF) El Centro in southern California’s Imperial Valley during a terrorism threat drill conducted as part of Solid Curtain/Citadel Shield 2011.*

### **From the MCIWEST After Action Briefing:**

**“Our focus in Exercise Citadel Shield/Solid Curtain is to improve our capability to communicate within and outside of our command, increase the effectiveness of our coordination with higher, adjacent and supporting commands and agencies, and conduct C2 in response to all hazard events while maintaining our capability to execute our lines of operation.”**

allow those members requesting access to the NRSW Command, Control, Communications, Computer and Intelligence (C4I) system to establish access while physically in the ROC.”

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# Total Asset Visibility and Equipment Accountability

The importance of rigorous accountability of Marine Corps equipment and other assets was emphasized by the Commandant in his [White Letter 03-08, dated 16 May 2008](#), which stressed the importance of improved accountability of all assets, especially those employed in combat environments. The term that is being used to refer to current efforts at improving accountability is **total asset visibility (TAV)** and reflects the ultimate goal of the Marine Corps to account for all assets from acquisition to implementation; in other words, from inclusion in property records to final disposition. A related term, **in-transit visibility (ITV)**, is sometimes used synonymously with TAV, but has a more specific definition, referring to the monitoring of supplies and material moving through the supply and distribution network. In practice, ITV is one of the tools used to achieve overall accountability, but does not encompass such activities as the addition of items to property records or subsequent accountability measures employed by the Marine Corps. The implementation of radio frequency identification (RFID) has been one of the means designed to support the broad goal of total asset visibility. Two types of legacy RFID tags are commonly in use; active RFID tags are battery powered and provide a signal for an interrogator to receive and read, while passive RFID tags have no internal power source and must be induced in an electromagnetic field to transmit a signal. The active RFID has proven to be an effective ITV tool and is a familiar shipping standard.



*Marines with the Supported Activities Supply System (SASSY) Retrograde Unit inventory military gear at Marine Corps Logistics Base Albany that is returning from Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).*

In an effort to identify lessons, observations and recommendations concerning TAV and ITV for logistics distribution efforts in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), a collection team from the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) interviewed key personnel from I Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), 1st Marine Logistics Group (MLG), and the Marine Corps Logistics Command (MCLC) concerning current processes for achieving TAV and ITV in Afghanistan. These interviews were conducted during October/November 2010, both in CONUS and at Camp Leatherneck and Camp Dwyer in Afghanistan. In addition, MCCLL conducted a related collection in coordination with MCLC concerning electronic key management system (EKMS) activities. The results of these interviews are documented in the MCCLL topical paper, entitled [Total Asset Visibility and Equipment Accountability: I Marine Expeditionary Force \(Forward\)](#).

**A comprehensive set of FOUO observations and recommendations is contained in the topical paper. Among the comments that are releasable in this newsletter are:**



*A soldier from Fort Carson, CO, attaches an RFID tag to a vehicle in preparation for a unit deployment.*

- **Policy, Procedures and Operations:** The distributed nature of current operations exacerbates every facet of logistics challenges, from accountability to maintenance, retrograde, distribution, and disposal, and, ultimately, to total life cycle management.

⇒ Among the systems currently employed for equipment accountability are the Supported Activities Supply System (SASSY), Marine Corps Integrated Maintenance Management System (MIMMS), and the Marine Corps Equipment Readiness Information Tool (MERIT).

⇒ The Marine Corps is currently compliant with all DoD passive RFID requirements and retains the prerogative to place active RFID tags on selected shipments.

⇒ The active RFID tags and associated system employed in theater have performed well throughout the Regional Command Southwest (RC (SW)) area of operations. A few areas of concern are addressed in the topical paper, including instances of human error.

⇒ Battery management for the active RFID tags is critical to the longevity and reliability of the tags and the overall utility of the system.

⇒ The tags should be considered essential items for recycling. Increased awareness by the end user of the utility and costs of the RFID tags and their reusable nature should aid in their retention and reuse.

- **Satellite RFID Tags:** A limited proof of concept program using the Portable Deployment Kit (PDK) and Savi Global Tags showed that the Global Tags worked as designed; however, strict adherence to the DoD ITV policy and attention to content level of detail is essential when programming the tags.



*The Portable Deployment Kit (PDK) integrates into a single carrying case several wireless tracking and data collection techniques (including bar codes, 2D bar codes, and active RFID and GPS locator systems) with satellite communications.*

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## Shaping and Mentoring the Afghanistan Police

One of the greatest challenges in conducting successful counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in Afghanistan has been the need to protect the local populace, especially in rural areas. Based on the Marine Corps and U.S. Army [Counterinsurgency Manual, MCWP 3-33.5](#), a rough “rule of thumb” concerning the number of security forces needed to win the COIN fight in Afghanistan would be about 660,000 troops (20 security forces per 1,000 inhabitants). In order to achieve anywhere near this level of security force, the Afghanistan National Police (ANP) must play a major role. In an effort to compile articles from a number of knowledgeable individuals with experience training host nation police forces, the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) has published a newsletter, entitled [Security Force Assistance: Shaping and Mentoring Afghan Police](#), with thirteen articles on this subject. In addition to providing historical back-



*The officer-in-charge of the Helmand Provincial Police Mentoring Team greets the Provincial Chief of Police during an Afghan National Police Academy graduation ceremony in Lashkar Gah.*

From the article, [Community Defense in Afghanistan](#), by Dr. Seth Jones:

*“An effective COIN strategy that secures the local population needs to focus on improving the competence of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and ANP, counter corruption, and improve broader governance in Afghanistan. . . Establishing local defense forces where there is a local initiative should be encouraged. But the efforts also need to be carefully managed by the Afghan government, with support from coalition forces. . . Keeping forces small, defensive, under the direct control of local jirgas and shuras, and monitored by Afghan national and coalition forces should prevent the rise of warlords in Afghanistan. . .”*

ground information on police forces in Afghanistan, these articles address such diverse topics as the need to reform the ANP and fight corruption, ensure that police are paid in a timely manner, and establish ANP priorities at the district level. The newsletter also provides examples of the specific experiences of ANP trainers, including those who have mentored the ANP in Logar and Wardak Provinces. The critical need to fight corruption in the ANP is a major area of emphasis; *“While most Afghan governing institutions have long been viewed with suspicion by the people, the Afghan police are especially distrusted as a result of their lengthy history of corruption, cronyism, and incompetence. Furthermore, these same police officers serve as the real face of the Afghan government for average citizens, as they are the representatives of the government most likely to interact with the local people on a routine basis. . .”*

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## Transitioning to Stability Operations in Iraq

The [MCCLL February 2011 Newsletter](#) highlighted an Executive briefing of a classified report prepared by the Joint Center for Operational Analysis (JCOA), Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), on the transition to stability operations in Iraq. This report was based on a request by General Raymond Odierno, Commanding General, U.S. Forces - Iraq (USF-I), for a study on the transition from counterinsurgency to stability operations, specifically focusing on how U.S. forces and civil agencies have adjusted to this shift and how associated challenges have been overcome. Based on this request, JCOA conducted over 200 interviews to identify those key areas that should be emphasized in the final push for stability in Iraq. JCOA has now published an unclassified version of the final report, [Transition to Stability Operations in Iraq](#), together with an associated [Case Study](#). The case study addresses the transition from the beginning of January 2009 (when the Security Agreement between the two governments was signed) to the end of August 2010 (when U.S. combat operations ended). During this period, U.S. forces drew down by about 100,000 troops.

The stability operations mission of USF-I consisted of three primary tasks: advising and assisting the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), building the Iraqi civil capacity, and conducting partnered counterterrorism operations. This transition is currently considered to be a success story; however, the enduring success of the transition remains to be seen. The accomplishments to date have been predicated on the USF-I and civil-military organizations becoming “adaptive learning” teams with the leadership guiding this change. In reflecting on the importance of information operations (IO) in the transition, General Odierno notes that *“IO will continue to play a big role. All of our statistics tell us that we have been very successful in changing the mindset . . . it is almost counter-intuitive, but as we reduce our forces we’ll need more intelligence . . . and we’ll need more IO. . .”*

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*General Odierno, Commanding General, USF-I, meets with the Iraqi Commanding General of the Ninawa Operations Command Center in Mosul to discuss future plans for Ninawa Province.*

## The Most Popular Downloads from the MCCLL Website

As Marine Corps efforts continue to focus on operations in Afghanistan (as well as Japan and Libya), MCCLL topical papers on Afghanistan topics remain among our most widely read products. In March 2011, eight of the top ten MCCLL reports addressed Afghanistan topics. The table to the right summarizes the ten MCCLL reports that were viewed most often (in order) during the month.

In comparison, the second table highlights the documents of all types that were downloaded the greatest number of times during March. Three MCCLL reports are on this list, which includes eight documents related to Afghanistan operations.

These documents were downloaded by Marines in all grades from E-3 through E-9 and from O-1 through O-7, with the greatest number of downloads being made by DoD civilians, DoD contractors, Marine Corps officers from O-1 through O-6, and enlisted Marines from E-5 through E-9.

The number of users of the MCCLL NIPR website continued to grow in March, with 663 new users registering on the site during the month.

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1. [Regimental Combat Team Afghanistan Operations](#)
2. [Operations in Afghanistan, Volume II: An Anthology of Reports and Lessons, 2007 - 2009](#)
3. [Combat Logistics Patrols in Regional Command Southwest](#)
4. [Aviation Combat Element - Forward Battle Staff Operations](#)
5. [Information Operations in Afghanistan](#)
6. [Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion Operations in Afghanistan](#)
7. [15th Marine Expeditionary Unit Collection Debrief](#)
8. [Rules of Engagement in Counterinsurgency](#)
9. [Coalition Interoperability: Georgia Deployment Program](#)
10. [Marine Corps Tactical Air Command Center Operations](#)

Top Ten MCCLL Reports, March 2011

1. [The Battle of Wanat \(U.S. Army Combined Arms Center\)](#)
2. [Regimental Combat Team Afghanistan Operations \(MCCLL\)](#)
3. [Complex Operations Lexicon \(Center for Complex Operations\)](#)
4. [MRAP and M-ATV Handbook \(Center for Army Lessons Learned \(CALL\)\)](#)
5. [Operations in Afghanistan, Volume II: An Anthology of Reports and Lessons, 2007 - 2009 \(MCCLL\)](#)
6. [IED Awareness Training in Afghanistan \(CJTF Paladin\)](#)
7. [3d Battalion, 1st Marines OEF 10.1 After Action Report](#)
8. [Combat Logistics Patrols in Regional Command Southwest \(MCCLL\)](#)
9. [Commandant's Planning Guidance 2010 \(CMC\)](#)
10. [Non-Lethal Weapons for Today's Operations \(DoD Non-Lethal Weapons Program\)](#)

Top Ten Downloads, March 2011

## Role of High-Value Target Teams in Defeating Insurgencies



*An Afghan National Army (ANA) soldier who is partnered with Marines from the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force - Afghanistan (CJSOTF-A) takes a break during operations in Herat Province of western Afghanistan.*

Although many factors contributed to coalition successes in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), one of the least heralded factors was the use of interagency teams to target high-value individuals and place insurgent clandestine organizations on the defensive. This argument is forcefully made in a new publication from the National Defense University's Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), entitled [Secret Weapon: High-Value Target Teams as an Organizational Innovation](#). The use of high-value target teams by Special Operations Forces (SOF) in Iraq was considered to be a tactical success by the end of 2004, but was not making a significant strategic difference. The teams would often hit an insurgent cell, only to have the cell quickly reconstituted, with collateral damage sometimes occurring that would alienate the local population. The INSS report identifies three separate innovations that were instituted to address this shortcoming: ■ network-based targeting, ■ the fusion of improved all-source intelligence with operational capabilities, and ■ the integration of counterterrorist and counterinsurgency efforts. Each of these innovations require unprecedented collaboration between diverse departments and agencies and between SOF and conventional forces. Together these innovations set the stage for the dramatic reversal of the security situation in Iraq in 2007. The report emphasizes how little attention these teams have attracted in Iraqi studies, even though the teams and integrated conventional force commands who collaborated tactically were able to produce quick and powerful results.

The INSS report address the initial experimentation with cross-functional teams in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2003 and the top-down emphasis on interagency teams in Iraq. In particular, the Threat Finance Exploitation Unit, supported by the U.S. Special Operations Command, was set up to analyze and dismantle the external networks that fund terrorists. The report also addresses the bottom-up experimentation with interagency teams that occurred in Iraq, identifies the key variables that contributed to the success of these teams, and discusses the use of these teams during and after the surge of U.S. forces in Iraq. A major premise of the INSS report is that there is a need to institutionalize collaborative warfare in order to ensure its continued effectiveness. As noted by one interagency veteran, "*organizations should not have to rely on personalities to generate unity of effort.*"

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## News

### Marine Corps Support for Operation Tomodachi

The expected death toll from the 11 March 2011 earthquake and tsunami in northern Japan may eventually exceed twenty thousand, with enormous additional levels of human suffering and property damage associated with these twin disasters. The Marine Corps continues to be an active participant in the massive Operation Tomodachi humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) effort, with the Japanese Prefectures of Miyagi, Fukushima, and Iwate being the focal points for these HA/DR initiatives. The III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), based in Okinawa, oversees the Marine Corps response to the disaster, with the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) hav-

ing moved to the east coast of Japan to support requests for assistance from the Japanese Defense Forces and the Government of Japan. An [Operation Tomodachi Web Page](#) has been set up on the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) website to serve as a repository for recent briefings, reports and news stories on the status of relief efforts, along with documents that provide observations and recommendations from previous HA/DR missions. Lessons have been identified following a number of earlier Marine Corps operations, including Operation Unified Response (OUR) (the January 2010 earthquake in Haiti), the October 2009 Indonesia earthquake, Hurricane Katrina in August 2005,

Operation Unified Assistance (OUA) (the Indonesian earthquake and tsunami of December 2004), and numerous other natural disasters. Additional information on the current status of U.S. military efforts in Japan can be found on the U.S. Navy's Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS) website at:



### A New Portal for Interagency Sharing

The Department of State (DoS) Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) recently announced that its Office of Knowledge Management and Information Technology has launched a new interagency sharepoint site, accessible via the internet that is designed for the transmission of Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU) information to authorized users throughout the U.S. Government. The new site will allow agencies to cross over local agency firewalls that have prevented effective collaboration and

data sharing in the past. The new portal will also provide the ability to collaborate with partner and allied governments, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and allies in the academic and private sectors in segmented, unclassified areas without cross-contaminating the SBU areas of the portal.

In order to gain access to the portal, users through the U.S. Government with .gov or .mil e-mail addresses should e-mail [scrsportalsupport@state.gov](mailto:scrsportalsupport@state.gov) with a request, indicating their first and

last names and e-mail addresses. A member of the portal support team will then contact you with user instructions. Although there may be an initial delay in responding to requests for access, all requests will be processed. Members of NGOs, academia, or allied partner governments must also obtain sponsorship from an S/CRS Director, Deputy Director, or team lead and agree to the terms of the S/CRS Trusted Agent form before being granted access.

### Going Green in Afghanistan!

[Marines Going Green To Save Lives On Battlefield, Avert Attacks On Fuel Convoys In Afghanistan](#), Associated Press:

*"The Marine Corps is going green to save lives rather than to save the planet. In a renewable energy strategy revealed to troops Monday, the service said it plans to equip thousands of Marines in Afghanistan with solar-powered gadgets over the next year in an effort to decrease the need to make risky runs for fuel through enemy territory. The Marine Corps said the change comes after the service studied a three-month period last year and*

*found that one Marine is wounded for every 50 trips made for fuel or water in Afghanistan.*

*The strategy also addresses the ongoing problem of U.S. reliance on the questionable practices of private security companies in Afghanistan that are used to protect the convoys. A congressional inquiry last year found that some of those companies have been inadvertently funneling money to the Taliban and threatening the safety of coalition troops because contractors often do not vet local recruits and wind up hiring warlords and thugs. Trucking contractors who bring in the fuel, mostly from Pakistan, pay tens of*

*millions of dollars a year to local warlords for convoy protection. Marines then truck the fuel from their bases to the smaller outposts.*

*The green strategy builds on the initial success of a Marine company wrapping up the final weeks of a seven-month deployment to a Taliban stronghold. The unit is equipped with portable solar panels for recharging radios and laptops, and solar-powered generators for running combat operations at its remote outposts. . ."*

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## Reading Lists and Book Reviews

The [Commandant's Professional Reading List](#) was updated over a year ago by a review board to ensure that it remained relevant and provided all Marines with opportunities for professional and career development. A revised list from the new Commandant, General James F. Amos, is scheduled to be published shortly and will be featured in an upcoming newsletter. The CMC list, as well as other reading lists (such as those prepared by I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) and the Director of Intelligence), provide Marines with a wealth of resources for their own development programs, featuring many books and articles that are as entertaining as they are instructive. These reading lists are highlighted on the [Marine Corps University \(MCU\) website](#), along with discussion guides and other resources.

This month, we feature *Flags of Our Fathers* by James Bradley and Ron Powers, featured on the Commandant's list for Corporals (and the basis for the 2006 Clint Eastwood movie) and a recent book that attempts to provide a concise overview on the overall War on Terror, *The Longest War* by Peter Bergen.

### *Flags of Our Fathers* by James Bradley and Ron Powers (Bantam Books, 2000)

Review by Gary Pounder, *Aerospace Power Journal*:

*"It remains the transcendent image of World War II: six US Marines--actually five Marines and a Navy corpsman--raising the American flag on Iwo Jima on 23 February 1945. The legendary photograph of the event, snapped by Joe Rosenthal of the Associated Press, won a Pulitzer prize.*

*However, details surrounding the event on Iwo Jima were quickly forgotten. Few people can even remember the names of the men who actually raised the flag, with the possible exception of Ira Hayes, the group's lone Native American whose tragic life became the basis for two Hollywood movies.*

*Authors James Bradley and Ron Powers have produced the definitive book on the flag raising and, more importantly, the men who made it possible. *Flags of Our Fathers* traces the lives of these six men who came from vastly different backgrounds and were forever united in that brief, shining moment on Mount Suribachi. Produced as a labor of love (Bradley's father was the Navy corpsman who participated in the flag raising), *Flags of Our Fathers* is a fascinating and moving account of the event, cast against the awful spectacle of combat in the Pacific theater.*

*Leading the squad was Sgt Mike Strank, the Czech immigrant described as a "Marine's Marine" and "the finest man I ever knew." He was joined by Franklin Sousey, a good-natured country boy from Kentucky; Harlon Block, the Texas high school football star who led his team to an undefeated season; Rene Gagnon, a former mill hand from New Hampshire; Hayes, a Pima Indian from Arizona, remembered by friends as an "island unto himself"; and John Bradley, the Wisconsin altar boy turned combat medic, "always eager to serve."*

*Bradley and Powers also describe the literal transformation of a generation that bore the brunt of combat during World War II. They suggest that by the time of the Iwo Jima invasion, whatever idealism and innocence we carried into the war had long since been replaced by the stark realities of combat--lessons systematically reinforced on the island's killing fields. . ."*

Read more of the review (and Chapter One from the book) [on the next page](#).

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### *The Longest War* by Peter Bergen (Free Press, 2011)

Review by Matthew M. Reed, *Managing Editor, International Affairs Review*:

*"With *The Longest War*, journalist Peter Bergen (author of "Holy War, Inc." and "The Osama bin Laden I Know" and the Director of the Counterterrorism Strategy Initiative at the New America Foundation) offers the most complete survey of the war on terrorism to date. Included is every major development from the attacks of September 11, 2001, to today's ongoing drone campaign in Pakistan. The book is a strategic retrospective that emphasizes folly.*

*Both warring parties have made mistakes, according to Bergen. After 9/11, the Bush administration wrongly framed Al Qaeda as an existential threat—a rhetorical overreach that colors counterterrorism debates to this day. It invented a case for war with Iraq despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary. And finally, Bergen dismantles the claim that "enhanced interrogation techniques" improved American security. By the author's measure, Guantanamo Bay robbed the United States of moral authority in a conflict characterized by both sides as a righteous struggle.*

*Al Qaeda is no different, writes Bergen, as it is equally guilty of tactical errors and strategic miscalculations. In ten short years, bin Laden's outfit has lost much of its appeal and destructive power. This is partially due to the American-led war effort that followed September 11; it is also a result of Al Qaeda's mistakes. The sheer brutality of Al Qaeda in Iraq—which killed thousands of Iraqis and initiated a civil war—turned off many who sympathized with the movement's grievances. Al Qaeda's 2003 campaign in Saudi Arabia was also a costly blunder. Once Al Qaeda struck the kingdom, American and Saudi security interests converged like never before. Greater cooperation followed, intelligence sharing accelerated, and Saudi Arabia began the long process of delegitimizing Al Qaeda and dismantling its support networks.*

*Flawed assumptions consume much of the narrative too. Bergen raises two ideological preoccupations that handicapped the Bush administration's decision making. First, the Bush White House assumed only states could perpetrate acts of spectacular violence and that state-sponsored terrorism presented the greatest danger to the United States, even though 9/11 proved otherwise, to a degree that nearly guaranteed failure. . ."* Read more of the review [on the next page](#).

## Reading Lists and Book Review (continued)

(Review of [Flags of Our Fathers](#) continued) “. . . We see Sergeant Strank showing his boys the “safest” way to attack an enemy emplacement, just moments before he was killed by friendly fire; Harlan Block leading the platoon with the grace and confidence of a football star, dying in combat just hours after Mike Strank; Franklin Sousey's gentle charm and humor providing a spark for his fellow Marines until he fell from a sniper's bullet, just days before the battle ended.

The authors effectively capture the irony that inevitably surrounds all historical events. The reader learns that Strank and his men were selected for the job largely because they were in the right place at the right time--having just strung a new communications line to the top of Mount Suribachi. The now-famous flag raising was actually the second of the morning: a Marine commander had ordered the erection of another banner big enough “so every SOB on the island can see it. . .” [Read the remainder of the review from Aerospace Power Journal.](#)

(Review of [The Longest War](#) continued) “. . . Only when the blood in the streets was ankle-deep did the White House concede nation building was necessary since it offered both stability and a way forward.

Al Qaeda's miscalculations proved worse by far: it expected the U.S. to withdraw from the broader Middle East after 9/11, just as it had done in Lebanon and Somalia. Instead, the attacks drew Washington and autocratic Middle Eastern regimes even closer because Al Qaeda threatened both. Al Qaeda's goals also included the dissolution of regional governments and their replacement with puritanical Islamist regimes. It has since achieved absolutely none of these stated objectives because it underestimated American resolve, overstated its own power, and assumed more Muslims would join the cause.

The [Longest War](#) is both a useful history and a call to action for American policymakers. . .” [Read the remainder of the review in International Affairs Review.](#)

### [Flags of Our Fathers](#)

#### [Chapter One \(from the New York Times Online\)](#)

*The only thing new in the world is the history you don't know. --Harry Truman*

*“In the spring of 1998, six boys called to me from half a century ago on a distant mountain and I went there. For a few days I set aside my comfortable life—my business concerns, my life in Rye, New York—and made a pilgrimage to the other side of the world, to a primitive flyspeck island in the Pacific. There, waiting for me, was the mountain the boys had climbed in the midst of a terrible battle half a century earlier. One of them was my father. The mountain was called Suribachi; the island, Iwo Jima.*

*The fate of the late-twentieth and twenty-first centuries was forged in blood on that island and others like it. The combatants, on either side, were kids—kids who had mostly come of age in cultures that resembled those of the nineteenth century. My young father and his five comrades were typical of these kids. Tired, scared, thirsty, brave; tiny integers in the vast confusion of war-making, trying to do their duty, trying to survive.*

*But something unusual happened to these six: History turned all its focus, for 1/400th of a second, on them. It froze them in an elegant instant of battle: froze them in a camera lens as they hoisted an American flag on a makeshift pole. Their collective image, blurred and indistinct yet unforgettable, became the most recognized, the most reproduced, in the history of photography. It gave them a kind of immortality—a faceless immortality. The flagraising on Iwo Jima became a symbol of the island, the mountain, the battle; of World War II; of the highest ideals of the nation, of valor incarnate. It became everything except the salvation of the boys who formed it.*

*For these six, history had a different set of agendas. Three were killed in action in the continuing battle. Of the three survivors, two were overtaken and eventually destroyed—dead of drink and heartbreak. Only one of them managed to live in peace into an advanced age. He achieved this peace by willing the past into a cave of silence.*

*My father, John Henry Bradley, returned home to small-town Wisconsin after the war. He shoved the mementos of his immortality into a few cardboard boxes and hid these in a closet. He married his third-grade sweetheart. He opened a funeral home; fathered eight children; joined the PTA, the Lions, the Elks; and shut out any conversation on the topic of raising the flag on Iwo Jima.*

*When he died in January 1994, in the town of his birth, he might have believed he was taking the unwanted story of his part in the flag raising with him to the grave, where he apparently felt it belonged. He had trained us, as children, to deflect the phone-call requests for media interviews that never diminished over the years. We were to tell the caller that our father was on a fishing trip. But John Bradley never fished. No copy of the famous photograph hung in our house.”*

Read the remainder of [Chapter One, Flags of Our Fathers, in the New York Times Online](#)

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## Roster of MCCLL Liaison Officers

The latest roster of Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) liaison officers (LnOs) at major Marine Corps and joint commands and organizations is provided below. Note that Mr. Steve Thompson is currently the only MCCLL LnO deployed in theater. Until individuals are identified and deployed to serve as MCCLL representatives for the ground combat, aviation combat, and logistics combat elements, Mr. Thompson will serve in all of these capacities. Contact information for additional in-theater LnOs will be provided once it becomes available. Individuals from commands and organizations that do not have a MCCLL representative may contact [Mr. Mark Silvia](#), the MCCLL Operations Officer at 703-432-1284. [Return to the Table of Contents!](#)

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