MARINE CORPS CENTER FOR LESSONS LEARNED

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Front Cover photo credit: Cpl Tatum Vayavananda

A Marine rifleman with the Black Sea Rotational Force 2011 (BSRF-11) launches into the shields of a Romanian riot-control detail during training on non-lethal weapons and riot control procedures.
In January 2008, the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) approved "The Long War Concept: Send in the Marines" as the operational concept to guide employment of Marine Corps forces in support of the Global War On Terror (GWOT). Although the concept emphasized the need for a persistent presence in target regions, it also stressed the importance of avoiding the employment of large facilities and permanent presences. This was designed to demonstrate both the U.S. commitment to strategic goals and the need to reduce the perception of colonialism or favoritism. The Long War Concept highlights the requirement to establish theater security cooperation (TSC) programs that involve forward-deployed Marine forces in support of geographic combatant commanders as called for in various relevant campaign plans.

As a result of this requirement, Marine Corps Forces, Europe (MARFOREUR) submitted a request in early 2008 for a deployed force to conduct TSC activities in the Black Sea, Caucasus and Balkan regions. This led to the deployment of the first Black Sea Rotational Force (BSRF) in 2010, which included a three-month engagement in Romania as a Security Cooperation Marine Air-Ground Task Force (SCMAGTF). Among the objectives of the BSRF was to provide training opportunities for partner nations and U.S. Marines and help develop military-to-military personal relationships and build mutual trust and confidence. BSRF 2010 was sourced with a combination of active duty and reserve elements. The following year, Marine Corps Forces Command (MARFORCOM) sourced BSRF-11 predominantly from Marine Corps Forces Reserve (MARFORRES) units. Training was conducted aboard Camp Pendleton, CA, prior to the BSRF’s deployment in May 2011 to the permanent forward operating site (PFOS) of U.S. European Command (EUCOM) Task Force-East (TF-E), located in Constanta, Romania. During its five-month deployment, BSRF-11 participated in events with partner nations from throughout the region, each event being tailored to the specific objectives of the geographic combatant commander. Training was provided in such areas as combat marksmanship, nonlethal weapons, patrolling, and Marine Corps martial arts. The participating nations included Romania, Bulgaria, the Republic of Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, Macedonia, Serbia, Azerbaijan, Greece, Bosnia, Albania, Montenegro and Croatia.

In an effort to identify and document lessons learned by BSRF-2011, MARFOREUR requested that the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) conduct a phased collection in Germany, the continental U.S., and Romania from June to October 2011 that included one-on-one interviews, the
distribution of questionnaires, and reviews of pertinent source documents, directives and available quantitative data. The results have been documented in a MCCLL report, entitled Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force: Black Sea Rotational Force 2011.

A complete set of FOUO comments and observations are included in the MCCLL report. Among the observations releasable in this newsletter are:

- **Planning.** Participation throughout the planning process by key personnel located in CONUS, as well as on-site in Europe, is considered to be crucial to the success of BSRF deployments.
- Detailed advanced planning to identify partner nations and determine manpower and funding requirements in advance of BSRF was also crucial to the success of this deployment.
- **Pre-deployment Training Program (PTP).** A compressed PTP timeline was necessary, so that much of the deployment planning occurred simultaneously with training.
- The Marine Corps Training and Advisory Group (MCTAG) dispatched mobile training teams (MTT) to provide individual training packages in such areas as small unit tactics, basic urban skills, and techniques of instruction.
- The Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning (CAOCL) provided beneficial classes during PTP that focused on the main countries with which the BSRF would engage.
- **Operations.** The organization of BSRF-11 as a MAGTF provided it with a flexible expeditionary force structure that enabled it to respond effectively to many specific mission requirements throughout its five-month deployment.
- Ongoing coordination with the Offices of Defense Cooperation (ODCs) at those U.S. embassies that supported specific BSRF events was considered to be crucial to the overall success of BSRF-11.
- BSRF-11 operations emphasized non-commissioned officer (NCO) professional development, which was significantly different from the historical doctrine employed in many of the supported nations. They were used to a much more limited role for NCOs.
- Translation and interpreter support for BSRF-11 was provided in a variety of ways. When working with NATO countries, in which English is a requirement, translation support was not a significant issue. For non-NATO countries, the U.S. embassy country teams arranged for translator support.
- The BSRF-11 civil affairs detachment coordinated with ODCs in several of the partnered nations to identify potential projects. The BSRF was able to complete a number of these projects.
Lessons from Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) Operations
The 2011 Deployment of the 13th MEU

During the past three years, the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) has conducted five collections that specifically focused on lessons learned during Marine expeditionary unit (MEU) deployments involving a wide variety of missions, including combat operations in Afghanistan and Libya, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) missions, and major training exercises with the military forces of numerous allied/friendly nations. In addition, other collections during this period focused on specific MEU-related topics, such as MV-22 Osprey operations during a MEU deployment. These MEU operations are particularly important in helping the Marine Corps re-establish its amphibious roots, as well as re-introducing Marines to cultural exchanges and training with a variety of forces from other nations. Most recently, the MCCLL November 2011 Newsletter highlighted the nine-month deployment of the 26th MEU in 2010/2011 that included a battalion landing team (BLT) deployed into Afghanistan, an HA/DR mission in Pakistan, support to Operation Odyssey Dawn (OOD) in Libya, and theater security cooperation (TSC) exercises with several nations in Africa and the Middle East.

In its continuing effort to document lessons learned from these type deployments, MCCLL program analysts conducted interviews in September 2011 with key personnel who were completing a seven-month deployment with the 13th MEU. The results of this collection have been documented in a MCCLL report, entitled 13th MEU Lessons and Observations: Deployment from February to September 2011.

In addition to the command element, the MEU deployed with:

- a ground combat element (GCE) consisting of Battalion Landing Team 1st Battalion, 1st Marines (BLT 1/1) (with attachments),
- an aviation combat element (ACE) consisting of Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 163 (HMM-163) (Reinforced), and
- a logistics combat element (LCE) consisting of Combat Logistics Battalion 13 (CLB-13). As has been the case with many recent MEU deployments, the 13th MEU operated in a disaggregated mode that involved split amphibious ready group (ARG) operations on three ships, the USS Boxer (LHD-4), the USS Green Bay (LPD-20) and USS Comstock (LSD-45). Split operations tend to result in complex command and control and logistics situations that the MEU must continuously address. Unlike some recent MEU deployments in which planned operations and training were impacted greatly by real-world events, the 13th
MEU was able to support the majority of its planned missions.

A complete set of FOUO comments and observations are included in the MCCLL report. Among the observations releasable in this newsletter are:

- **Pre-deployment Training Program (PTP).** Although this particular MEU had a longer PTP timeline than normal, a full year would be desirable to fill gaps in individual and small unit training.
- **The opportunity for the aviation and logistics elements to participate in Enhanced Mojave Viper (EMV) training was considered to be a positive development.**
- **At-sea training periods for the command, logistics and aviation elements helped prepare them for the significant coordination and operational issues faced aboard ship.**
- **During PTP, the 13th MEU communications section focused on integration with the Navy aboard ship as its main priority.**
- **Operations.** The ability of the Green Bay (which is a new LPD class ship) to operate independently is considered to be a major benefit.
- **The availability of high-demand, low-density military occupational specialty (MOS) Marines resulted in the need for extensive cross training in order to provide sufficient support across the MEU.**
- **The scheduling of planning conferences with host nations was an important element in helping ensure the success of TSC events during this deployment. "They are not flashy and do not make the news, but [training with foreign militaries] will pay huge dividends for us down the road." -- LtCol Craig Wonson, USMC, Command Officer, BLT 1/1.**
- **The exercises provided the combatant commander with important partnership-building opportunities with the host nations.**
- **Having a sufficient number of translators/linguists was critical to their success.**
- **Cultural integration during the TSCs was also important. After ten years of Marines operating in the hostile environments of Iraq and Afghanistan, the re-introduction of Marines to environments in which liberty in the host country is a normal routine was considered to be an essential mission component.**
- **The TSCs allowed units to conduct sustainment training when not operating with host nationals. In a number of cases, host nation training occurred in the morning and sustainment training in the afternoon.**
- **The ship-to-ship communications issues faced during this deployment were similar to those identified during other MEU deployments. (See the MCCLL report on Operations of the 26th MEU).**
Regimental Combat Team 8 (RCT-8) deployed in January 2011 to begin a twelve-month deployment as the command element (CE) for ground combat forces operating in the highly kinetic environment of northern Helmand Province, as well as portions of Nimruz Province. The infantry and supporting units of RCT-8 conducted full-spectrum counterinsurgency (COIN) operations across a diverse geographical area, with a dozen different infantry battalions operating at one time or another in the area of operation (AO). Based on the experiences of the RCT-8 leadership and staff during this deployment, the RCT has prepared a comprehensive Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) After Action Report (AAR) that provides numerous observations and recommendations for follow-on commands.

The AAR highlights the fact that "despite the complexity of the environment… the tactics, techniques and procedures applied within a doctrinally sound framework have enabled RCT-8 units to achieve a degree of success . . . [with] innovation, discipline, constant refinement of battle drills, unity of effort, and economy of force . . . [reinforcing] some of the most basic principles of Marine Corps doctrine, while identifying yet again the need to adapt in a fluid and chaotic environment.”

RCT-8 emphasizes the need for all Marines to develop an operational mindset. In particular, intelligence analysts need to review and analyze intelligence based on an operational understanding of friendly force actions. A shared and commonly understood vision of operations will facilitate focused intelligence research, analysis, and production to meet the intelligence needs of commanders.

Among the battalions operating in the RCT-8 AO was a light infantry battalion from the Republic of Georgia. This battalion proved to be effective in conducting screening missions, route security, base security, and patrolling. However, language barriers presented difficulties; those Georgian soldiers who are fluent in English should be exploited to the greatest extent possible.

The AAR highlights the tremendous reach-back capability that can be provided by the Marine Corps Information Operations Center (MCIOC). This capability can be leveraged to obtain subject matter expertise that will assist in formulating effective information operations messages to be disseminated in theater. Among the many other topics addressed in the AAR include the effective employment of tanks, use of snipers, development of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), the impact of Afghan culture on the supply system, the timely collection and exploitation of evidence, logistics issues, and recommendations for establishing effective communications across the widely dispersed AO.
1st Battalion, 9th Marines (1/9) deployed into central Helmand Province in June 2011 to replace 2d Battalion, 3d Marines (2/3) and begin a seven-month mission to conduct counterinsurgency (COIN) and stability operations in the Nawa District, which has now become one of the most stable districts in the Regional Command Southwest (RC (SW)) area of operations (AO). Based on the first three months of the battalion's deployment, 1/9 has prepared a very detailed and comprehensive First 100 Days After Action Report (AAR) that addresses a wide range of topics that should be of great interest to follow-on units.

As has been highlighted by many infantry battalions based on recent Afghanistan deployments, 1/9 found that the decision-making capabilities of small unit leaders is proving to be critical to effective COIN operations. The distributed nature of the battlespace necessitates that these small unit leaders be able to make sound decisions during execution of the missions as well as during their planning. Satellite patrolling proved to be one of the most effective approaches for maneuvering through the district's open desert terrain, which is often crisscrossed by numerous canals. Tactical patience is considered to be an imperative for small unit leaders.

The battalion points out the importance of marksmanship training for effective COIN operations. The nature of the fight in rural Helmand Province often involves long range engagements that push the limits of the weapons systems. The battalion recommends that training focus on the types of engagements that are most likely to be encountered by infantry patrols in theater. Units should also conduct "dry" practical applications to allow Marines to practice range estimation before going live on the range.

In ensuring a robust intelligence collection and dissemination capability, the battalion emphasizes the importance of the company-level intelligence cells (CLICs). Rigorous pre-deployment training of the CLIC Marines, as well as sustainment training on a regular basis in theater, is needed in order for the CLIC to be able to support the operational tempo and the large in-theater intelligence production requirements.

In the Nawa District, the battalion's combat operations center (COC) was able to be co-located with the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) Operations Coordination Center - District (OCC-D), as an interim step towards a fully functioning and integrated partnered command and control node. The current arrangement allows for shared awareness and a coordinated response to enemy actions. Among the areas which are recommended for focusing ANSF mentoring are: (1) basic battle-tracking skills and (2) map reading and plotting. In addition, ANSF manpower issues should be addressed so that 24-hour operations of the OCC-D can be achieved.

"...Small victories are the key to success when it comes to partnership with the Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP). Success at the patrolman level includes successful vehicle and personnel searches, proper weapons carriage, and performance of basic police functions around the precinct. ... Treat the partnership like a tactical situation. Exploit opportunities that arise and be prepared to mentor at any time. ... The more time the partnered forces spend together, the more each group is willing to learn from one another. If it starts to feel like a burden, then it probably is. Stop and reevaluate the approach to partnering."

-- From the 1/9 First 100 Days AAR
2d Supply Battalion (Forward) (-) (Reinforced) assumed the role of Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Support Battalion (MSB) 11.2 near the end of September 2011, replacing the 2d Maintenance Battalion. The MSB is tasked with providing general combat service support (CSS) to Regional Command Southwest (RC (SW)) and to execute intermediate supply, field-level maintenance, medical and distribution functions to provide sustained CSS to units in the RC (SW) area of operations (AO). The MSB functions as a cohesive general support logistics unit in order to efficiently integrate the capabilities of supply, maintenance, medical and distribution and to ensure uninterrupted support to RC (SW). A major focus of MSB 11.2 was to make sure that the support provided was pushed as far forward in the battlespace as possible. Based on the first three month's of the battalion's deployment, MSB 11.2 has prepared its OEF 11.2 First 100 Days After Action Report (AAR) to capture initial lessons learned from its experiences as the general support (GS) logistics battalion for RC (SW).

MSB 11.2 points out the need for detailed planning prior to all combat logistics patrols (CLPs) that should take into account the terrain being traversed and the local civilian population, as well as the space constraints that apply to the specific CLP. The supporting route clearance patrols (RCP) need to have a firm understanding of the parameters associated with the CLP and be fully involved in the planning process. A strong working relationship also needs to be established with the S-3 and the Unit Movement Control Center (UMCC) in developing the load plans and planning the overall patrol.

Due to the austere nature of the Afghanistan environment, the delivery of repair parts proved to be a continual challenge. Even when the parts had arrived in theater, the processing of the supply parts through the supply system and their emplacement on a CLP could result in a significant repair cycle time (RCT). This can often result in an unbalanced maintenance schedule, with intensive work for a period of time and then a hiatus until the parts arrive. The battalion recommends that general support motor transportation (GSMT) CLPs be scheduled "more intensively" in order to deliver parts in a timely manner and also spread out the workload of supply and maintenance detachments more evenly.

Among the other topics addressed in the AAR are: joint route selection, employment of intelligence systems, convoy operations coordination, combat operations center (COC) training, UMCC operations, distribution optimization, mishap reporting, gear retrograde, soak lot operations, secondary reparable movements, and numerous observations and recommendations on specific logistics systems.

"... The Marine Logistics Group (MLG) sponsored a supply and maintenance summit that covered many topics to assist customers. The classes provided the "how to" on open purchase requests (OPRs) up front and explained OEF-specific procedures that benefited the customer. ... the MLG [should] continue to sponsor a supply/maintenance summit for the adjacent MEF commands as they conduct their reliefs in place (RIP)/transfers of authority (TOA) in theater in order to ensure continuity and that pertinent data is passed with regards to supply and maintenance activities. ..." ~ From the MSB 11.2 First 100 Days AAR
Lessons from Coalition Advisors

Working with "Unpartnered" Afghan National Army Units

For the past four years, the Marine Corps has provided security force assistance (SFA) in varying degrees to Afghanistan military and police forces in both partnered and unpartnered situations. Beginning in 2008, Marine advisor teams worked with unpartnered Afghan National Army units in the eastern provinces, while 2d Battalion, 7th Marines (2/7) trained Afghan police units in northwestern Helmand Province and eastern Farah Province. At the time of the surge into Helmand in early 2009, there were few Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) units with which to partner, as the focus was on counterinsurgency operations designed to create an environment in which the ANSF could grow and be successful. In 2010 and 2011, the Marine Corps was finally able to partner with ANSF units at all levels and begin building them into capable forces and pushing them into the lead in certain locations.

Now, with the planned drawdown of Marine Corps forces in Afghanistan, fewer units will be able to partner with their ANSF counterparts. This will result in many Afghan units once again being trained and mentored by small Marine advisor teams, with many Marine units operating in the background as advisors and enablers.

In an effort to capture lessons and best practices that have been identified by coalition advisors who have been attached to unpartnered Afghan units at one point or another, the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) representative to II Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) (Forward), Dr. Jerry Meyerle, has prepared a paper with Lessons from Advisors with Unpartnered Afghan National Army (ANA) Units that is based on interviews with advisors who have functioned in this type of role in the past. These include advisors attached to the ANA 2nd Brigade, 215th Corps, advisors who deployed in the Regional Command East area of operations prior to the surge, and U.S. Army advisors who were deployed in Regional Command West in 2007/2008. All of these advisors were attached to unpartnered ANA kandaks (i.e., battalion-sized ANA units), some of which were able to eventually "own" their battlespace and operate at considerable distance from coalition maneuver units.

Among the common themes articulated by these advisors were:

▪ **Adopt an advisory mindset.** Advising and assisting the ANSF requires a completely different approach than conducting partnered counterinsurgency operations.

▪ **Give the ANA their own battlespace.** The ANA units should be "uncovered" sooner rather than later.

▪ **Provide adequate overwatch.** It is important to set the ANA units up for high-profile victories.

▪ **Use advisor teams to maintain influence and situational awareness.** The teams can serve as liaisons to provide the ANA kandaks with access to external resources.

▪ **Let the ANA do counterinsurgency their own way.** It is advisable to allow and enable ANA units to adopt their own approaches to security (as many Marines who have served as embedded advisors already understand).

▪ **Test the ANA's ability to operate independently by making them independent.** The human factors of leadership and unit cohesion are considered to be key to successful independent operations.

An Afghan National Army (ANA) soldier searches the motorcycle of a local national at a temporary checkpoint in the Garmisir District of southern Helmand Province under the watchful eye of a Marine from 1st Battalion, 3d Marines (1/3). The ANA was able to take control of eight patrol bases in Garmisir and consolidate its forces into squad-sized elements during 1/3’s deployment.
A second recent report from the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) was prepared in response to a request from the Regional Command Southwest (RC (SW)) Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) Development Division. As RC (SW) prepares for the planned drawdown of Marine forces and those of its partner nations in Helmand and Nimruz Provinces, the leadership realizes the importance of the ANSF being recognized by the local citizenry as legitimate and able to provide an acceptable level of security. In particular, the Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP), the primary police force throughout the country, must be willing to engage with the public and provide the level of support that they desire. The CNA report, entitled *What Do Afghans Want from the Police*, focuses on the need for this public engagement to occur in order for the AUP to evolve into the type of police force that the local residents desire.

The report emphasizes the fact that the Afghan populace does not necessarily want their police force to perform the same law enforcement functions that Western countries consider to be self-evident components of effective policing. Southern Afghanistan has never had the type of community police force that is common in rural communities throughout the U.S. and Europe. Despite the lack of a trained police force, rural Helmand was not lawless prior to the rise of the Taliban. Communities historically resolved their own disputes with little interference from provincial or national officials. Tribal elders or mullahs resolved most disputes locally through negotiation, mediation, and arbitration. It is not surprising then that the public and community elders have limited understanding of the potential role of the police as criminal investigators. After the Taliban came to power, the government disbanded the national police and never formed a new police force. Local communities formed local militias that owed allegiance to tribal elders, warlords or local commanders, working only in their own group's interests. Although the current government reinstated a national police, many of its members were from the anti-Taliban militias, and they continued to abuse members of the local populace outside their groups. Although new leadership at the provincial and district levels, additional training, and international mentoring has resulted in improved police behavior in Helmand since 2006, the police culture has been slow to change. Police abuses continue, including police officers demanding bribes and beating witnesses. As noted *later in this newsletter*, elements of the Afghan National Police, including the AUP, are widely perceived as being more corrupt and less effective than their counterparts in the Afghan National Army (ANA).

The CNA report emphasizes the importance of the military police advisors encouraging members of the AUP to engage more with the public at all levels. They should concentrate on mentoring individual Afghan policemen, especially officers and non-commissioned officers, who demonstrate the greatest skills at engaging the public. This will be difficult, since "many police recruits have a military mindset, and telling them that a significant part of their job should consist of talking to people may not mesh with why they joined the police. The police leadership must see the value in community engagement or it will not occur."
Corruption in Afghanistan
A Six-Part Series from the Civil Military Fusion Centre

It has long been recognized that corruption within elements of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) permeates all levels and is one of the main impediments to the establishment of effective rule of law and sustainable private sector economic growth. Although the GIRoA has made several commitments over the years to address corruption, the problem is still assessed to be systemic and one of the major roadblocks to effective governance at all levels.

In an effort to compile and document the current situation in Afghanistan with respect to corruption, the Civil Military Fusion Centre (CFC) of the NATO Allied Command Transformation has prepared a six-part series of reports on various aspects of this problem. These reports were published from November 2011 to January 2012 and are now available in the MCCLL repositories, as well as from the CFC. The individual reports address the following topics:

- **An Overview of Corruption in Afghanistan.** This report provides an introduction to corruption in Afghanistan, including the principal causes and many of the significant effects that corruption has on governance and security.
- **Corruption and Afghanistan's Education Sector.** Among the types of corrupt practices that are common in Afghan education are teachers having to pay bribes to their superiors to receive salaries and the presence of "ghost teachers," who receive a salary and perform no work.
- **Corruption and Infrastructure in Afghanistan.** Corruption in the infrastructure sector is often related to irregular practices during the procurement process and involves not only Afghan officials and private companies, but also foreign personnel who live in the country.
- **Afghanistan's Anti-Corruption Institutions.** The High Office of Oversight and Anti-Corruption (JOOAC) is currently the highest authority for anti-corruption efforts in the GIRoA, serving as the focal point for policy development and implementation of anti-corruption strategies.
- **The Impact of Corruption on Investment.** Afghanistan has the potential to attract investment due to its geostrategic location along the ancient Silk Route and its rich mineral resources. Among the major obstacles to foreign investment are access to reliable electricity, land and finances, as well as anti-competitive behavior, tax administration policies, and systemic government and private sector corruption.
- **Corruption in the Afghan National Security Forces.** This report points out that the Afghan National Army (ANA) is considered to be relatively free from corruption in comparison to the Afghan National Police (ANP), which is widely perceived as being both corrupt and ineffective.

Photo credit: Cpl Daniel Wulz

Afghan Border Police (ABP) patrol with Marines and Sailors from Border Advisory Team 2 (BAT 2) between Tahgaz and the Dishu Ferry during Operation Eagle Hunt. Among the major goals of the BAT is ensuring that the ABP leadership is free from corruption.
Resources for the Counter-IED Fight
A SmartBook from the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory

Although plans are proceeding as scheduled for the drawdown of Marine Corps forces in Afghanistan over the next two years as the security mission transitions to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), one of the major threats faced by Marines in the Afghanistan theater of operations is increasingly migrating to many other localities around the world. Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) are a major area of concern in many nations and will likely remain so in the foreseeable future. They may very well be a threat during any future military operations. In an effort to document the programs and systems that are available (or under development) to counter this threat, the Counter-IED (C-IED) Division of the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory (MCWL) has prepared a comprehensive Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) (Forward) SmartBook that focuses on this threat.


For each of the systems referenced in the SmartBook, a brief system description is provided, along with a concept of employment, training requirements, maintenance requirements, available program and/or system websites, and points of contact.

Photo credit: LCpl Victor Barrera

Members of the Society of American Military Engineers receive a class on the PackBot, a robot designed to cross rough terrain and use its cameras and claws to interrogate suspected improvised explosive device (IED) hazards.
Lessons from an Amphibious Landing Exercise

PHIBLEX 2012 After Action Report from 3d Marine Expeditionary Brigade

The annual Philippine - U.S. Amphibious Landing Exercise (PHIBLEX) is a bilateral training exercise that is conducted with the Republic of the Philippines in support of the Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) plan of U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) and the Cooperative Security and Engagement Plan of Marine Corps Forces Pacific (MFP). The exercise is designed to enhance the amphibious readiness of both militaries and is traditionally focused on amphibious readiness group (ARG)/Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) bilateral training with augmentation from aviation and logistics elements.

PHIBLEX-12 was conducted in October 2011, with the Commanding General, 3d Marine Expeditionary Brigade (3d MEB) designated as the Officer Conducting the Exercise (OCE), and III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) serving as the Executive Agent. PHIBLEX-12 consisted of a field training exercise (FTX), a command post exercise, and related humanitarian civic assistance (HCA) operations.

3d MEB has now completed its After Action Report (AAR) for PHIBLEX-12 that includes detailed recommendations for enhancing the planning and implementation of future exercises. In particular, the AAR highlights the fact that the senior leadership was pleased with the high-quality of the products that were produced by the operations section. However, as these products were being developed during the exercise, it became apparent that it would be more efficient to "fall in on" well-established standard operating procedures (SOPs). The lessons learned during this exercise can serve as the basis for the development and formal adoption of such SOPs.

3d MEB emphasizes the extensive capabilities of the Marines and Sailors assigned to the MEU and ARG and points out that some of the high skill sets could have been exploited to a greater extent to provide additional humanitarian assistance support during the exercise. These skill sets included plumbers, electricians and engineers.

"... PHIBLEX-12 was a successful exercise and all training objectives were met. As with every exercise, the AAR focuses on what needs to be improved... The challenge is to learn from [these observations and recommendations] by taking corrective action and incorporating them into 3d MEB standard operating procedures (SOPs) and other policy instructions. 3d MEB continues to evolve through the assignment of permanent key staff members and the development of SOPs..." -- From the PHIBLEX-12 AAR
Energy Conservation by the Marine Corps

The MCCLL October 2011 Newsletter highlighted a short news article on efforts by the U.S. Marine Corps to accelerate the fielding of systems into Afghanistan that will not only conserve energy, but also reduce fuel costs and minimize the number of fuel convoys on the roads that are increasingly subject to attack by insurgents. As pointed out in the article, the Marine Corps hopes to achieve savings of as much as $40 million per year by fielding energy-saving equipment, including tent liners, LED lights, solar powered radios, and solar panel networks. One of the key components of the Marine Corps energy conservation program is the Solar Portable Alternative Communications Energy System (SPACES), which was initially deployed with 3d Battalion, 5th Marines (3/5) into the Sangin District of northern Helmand Province in December 2010. Even though the focus of the battalion's efforts was on dealing with an insurgency in a district that was engaged in some of the fiercest fighting in Afghanistan, the battalion's leadership acknowledged the net positive impact that SPACES had on operations and recognized its potential to reduced the number of Marines placed in harm's way during fuel convoys.

MCCLL has recently added a System Assessment Report on SPACES in its data repository that provides more detailed information on this major component of the Marine Corps energy conservation program. The report, prepared by the Marine Corps Operational Test and Evaluation Activity (MCOTEA), includes an evaluation of survey results from the SPACES Forward Operational Assessment (FOA) that was conducted in October 2011. The FOA was based on the system's fielding with 1st Battalion, 9th Marines (1/9) and designed to address the ability of SPACES to reduce the combat load of Marines and the dependence of units on fossil fuel.

Due to the importance of energy conservation to Marine Corps planners, a collection on the topic of renewable energy equipment employment within Regional Command Southwest (RC (SW)) was included in the MCCLL FY 2012 Campaign Plan and is tentatively scheduled for later this year.

“SPACES are tremendously useful in support of dwell operations and observation positions. The number issued to the platoon satisfied mission requirements without detracting from mission efficiency or unnecessarily adding to the combat load...”

“Outstanding piece of gear for use during dwell operations where another power source was not available...”

-- Sample survey responses from the SPACES Forward Operational Assessment
The Most Popular Downloads from the MCCLL Website

Many of the documents highlighted in MCCLL monthly newsletters and weekly new data rollups are downloaded every month from the MCCLL repositories. These include MCCLL reports and "quick looks," Marine Corps unit after action reports (AARs), recent doctrinal publications, briefings on a wide range of topics, and many other source documents with valuable lessons learned. In an effort to inform readers concerning the products that other Marines, civilian Marines, and contractors have found of interest, we intend to continue publishing a monthly list of documents that have been accessed and downloaded most often during the previous month.

During January 2012, the documents listed in the table below were most frequently accessed. This diverse collection of documents includes two MCCLL reports, three AARs based on Afghanistan deployments, the latest safety product from the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) Safety Division, a "Playbook" of current Marine Corps talking points from the USMC Division of Public Affairs, a SmartBook on counter-IED systems from the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab, a briefing on the Afghan economy, and a paper on the tremendous contributions made by the Marine Corps in recent years.

These documents were downloaded most often by officers in grades from O-1 to O-5, NCOs and SNCOs in grades from E-5 to E-7, DoD civilians in grades from GS-11 to GS-14, and DoD contractors.

There continue to be a large number of new registrations on the MCCLL website, with 700 new registrants signing up in January.

Top Ten Downloads from the MCCLL Website, January 2012

1. Enhanced Company Operations in OEF: Lessons from 2d Battalion, 3d Marines (MCCLL)
2. Regimental Combat Team 1 (RCT-1) Operations in OEF (MCCLL)
3. Marine Corps Playbook for 19 December 2011 (HQMC Division of Public Affairs)
4. The Marine Mask of War (Foreign Policy Research Institute)
5. OEF After Action Report (AAR) from RCT-8
6. The Afghanistan Economy (Afghan Desk, Department of State)
7. OEF First 100 Days AAR from RCT-5
8. Did You Know: Risks of "Fad Diets" (CMC Safety Division)
9. Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward) SmartBook (Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory)
10. OEF 11.1 AAR from 2d Battalion, 8th Marines (2/8)

Photo credit: 2ndLt Chris Harper

An air interdiction force (AIF) team leader from Regimental Combat Team 5 (RCT-5) searches a local man during an Afghan Border Police (ABP) operation in the Khan-Neshin District of southern Helmand Province.
Marine Corps Training Trends

In July 2011, the U.S. Marine Corps Training and Education Command (TECOM) Lessons Integration Division (TLID) published the first in a planned series of semi-annual reports that compile training trends that have been highlighted in Systemic Trends Reports and in after action reports (AARs) submitted by commands and units to MCCCLL, as well as in responses to surveys administered to members of the operating forces following their deployments. The purpose of these semi-annual reports is to increase awareness on the part of the Training Support Centers (TSCs) concerning tactical-level training trends.

TLID has now prepared the Second Edition of the TSC Report that highlights trends that were identified during the second half of Calendar Year (CY) 2011. Among the topics highlighted in this report are:

- marksmanship training,
- Joint Fires Observer (JFO) integration,
- company-level intelligence cells (CLICs),
- metal detector training,
- Combat Hunter training,
- medical training (including the Combat Life Saver (CLS) program),
- NATO 10-Line reporting procedures,
- radio communications,
- command, control, communications, intelligence (C4I) systems,
- driver training,
- vehicle recoveries,
- the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) and contracting,
- intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets, and
- standard operating procedures (SOPs).

Lessons from the 2d Marine Division (Forward) Force Preservation Council

The 2d Marine Division (MARDIV) (Forward) Force Preservation Council (FPC) meets on a quarterly basis to discuss medical and tactical safety best practices that are common across the Task Force Leatherneck area of operations in Helmand Province, Afghanistan. The objective of these meetings is to assist commanders at all levels in maintaining unit readiness and developing dynamic feedback processes for capturing lessons learned to assist in preserving the force.

The latest meeting of the council was held on December 2011 and included attendance by the Division Sergeant Major, Division Surgeon, and Division Safety Director, the Executive Officer of Headquarters Battalion, the Executive Officers and Sergeants Major from Regimental Combat Team 8 (RCT-8), 2d Battalion, 12th Marines (2/12), and the 3d Combat Engineer Battalion, the Regimental Surgeon and Operational Stress Control and Readiness (OSCAR) provider from RCT-5, and the Sergeant Major from 1st Reconnaissance Battalion. The results of the meeting have now been documented in the 2d MARDIV (Fwd) FPC After Action Report for 4th Quarter, CY 2011.

Among the topics addressed during the latest meeting of the council were: the OSCAR Extender Program, Combat Stress Teams (CSTs), the suicide prevention program, field sanitation, rabies vaccinations, enforcing the use of the Combat Application Tourniquet (CAT), tactical vehicle safety, and fire prevention and protection. The AAR emphasizes the fact that among the most valuable contributions of the meeting were the promulgation of medical and tactical safety best practices during the open discussions. It became clear that many units
face the same issues, and the collaborative discussion period provided the attendees with an opportunity to share experiences, combine efforts, and develop innovative solutions to problems.

Readers may also be interested in reviewing the results of the 3d Quarter, CY 2011 meeting, which included not only the FPC AAR, but also a compilation of briefings presented during the meeting.

The CMC Safety Division highlights these signs of a "fad diet":
- Recommendations that promise a quick fix.
- Inclusion of lists of good and bad foods.
- Promises of a weight loss of more than one-to-two pounds a week.
- Does not require exercise.
- Includes "magic" foods or supplements.
- Identifies bizarre quantities and limitations.
- Calls for specific food combinations.
- Involves recommendations based on a single study (which may not have included peer review or have ignored differences among groups).

Marines and civilians are reminded that the best way to lose weight is to eat a healthy diet and get regular exercise. In addition, to maintaining a healthy weight, this approach can help reduce your susceptibility to a number of diseases and increase your energy level and general well being.

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**Health Risks of Fad Diets**

The most recent Did You Know from the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) Safety Division is on the topic of Risks of the Fad Diet and addresses the numerous individual diets that are being promoted by the weight-loss industry. Unfortunately, many of these diets suggest that food can change the body's chemistry or blame specific hormones for weight problems. Not only are these myths, but these diets generally do not teach healthy eating habits, which is the only type of diet that most individuals are likely to stick with. Although they may not work in the long term, these diets are very successful in bringing in over $30 billion dollars per year to the diet industry.

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"... Eat fresh fruits and vegetables, whole grains, lean meats and low fat dairy products, limiting highly processed foods, and you will reduce your risk of obesity, heart disease, some cancers and diabetes. Be wary of diets or products that seem too good to be true, because in most likelihood, they probably are." -- From risk of the "Fad Diet"

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As Marines struggle to shed pounds, they should avoid turning to quick-fix diets that deprive their body of proper nutrition. As noted by Joan Fitzgibbon, dietician at the Naval Medical Center, San Diego, the incorporation of additional physical activity and making healthy food choices are the proper ways to "make a difference" in maintaining a healthy weight.
Reading Lists and Book Reviews

In July 2011, the Commandant's Professional Reading List was revised by a review panel established by General James F. Amos to ensure that the list continues to be relevant and provides Marines with a variety of resources to broaden their perspectives and help ensure that they benefit from the experiences of others. The list continues to highlight First to Fight: An Inside View of the U.S. Marine Corps by LtGen Victor H. Krulak, USMC (Ret), as the Commandant’s "choice book" to be read by all Marines. In addition, each Marine is tasked to read a minimum of one book from the list for their grade each year. The CMC list, as well as other reading lists (such as those prepared by I Marine Expeditionary Force (1 MEF) and the Director of Intelligence), are highlighted on the Marine Corps University (MCU) website, along with discussion guides and other resources.

This month we feature three books:

1. The Passion of Command by Bryan McCoy, on the Commandant's list for Master Sergeant, First Sergeant, Captain and Chief Warrant Officer 4,

2. Team of Rivals: The Political Genius of Abraham Lincoln by Doris Goodwin, on the Commandant's list for Major and Chief Warrant Officer 5, and

3. A new book concerning a major battle in Afghanistan to prevent the Taliban from taking Kandahar City, entitled Lions of Kandahar by Rusty Bradley and Kevin Maurer.

The Passion of Command: The Moral Imperative of Leadership
- Colonel B. P. McCoy (Marine Corps Association, 2006)

In embedded journalist John Koopman’s book about the march into Baghdad, McCoy’s Marines, Lt. Col. Bryan P. “Darkside” McCoy has the title role. In military expert Bing West’s book about the battle of Fallujah, No True Glory, the colonel is known as “Killer” McCoy. Darkside? Killer? Can “Attila the Hun” be far behind? Who is this guy whose self-described “idea of success was to win a fight without having to win a bunch of medals in the process?”

Now we know from the officer himself. As commander of 3rd Battalion, 4th Marine Regiment, he led the first Marines into Baghdad when the war started in 2003.

The Passion of Command, a slim paperback McCoy wrote for war fighters, offers an insightful look at how a war is being fought, how a Shakespeare-quoting (“we band of brothers”) marathon runner thinks and how a leader leads. McCoy is succinct, divides his points into segments and speaks in words that are sometimes blunt, sometimes elegant.

In combat, leadership stakes are as high as it gets: life and death. “Let’s confront one issue head-on and spare each other blushes on the subject of killing,” he says. His job, he says, was to kill and to order others to kill. “Combat is at once voracious and capricious, a domain where compassion (to the enemy) is seldom rewarded. Indeed, it is often punished by bleeding emotional energy from you when you have none to give.”

The leader has his troops to worry about. “The leader is entrusted with the lives of his men and accepts unlimited liability for their welfare. The task of bearing such a burden requires more than passive preparation from organizational schooling and mandatory training. Such a task demands passion in the medieval Latin sense of the word: to suffer for love.”

How do you instill passion? In a few key ways, McCoy says:

Through tough training. “We trained as though the men were professional athletes.” Otherwise, “severe physical fatigue makes an individual vulnerable to a wide array of afflictions.”

Through compassion. McCoy stresses the need to let everybody know somebody will help. His serious issue is casualty evacuation. “Just as marksmanship engenders confidence, so does the knowledge that if one is struck down in the fight one will be treated and evacuated promptly and professionally.”

Through discipline. For McCoy, this is defined as “reinforced habit designed to produce a specific character, or pattern of behavior, that is strong enough to override creature comforts, personal wants and lapses in fortitude.”

What is required of the individual who must enforce McCoy’s rules?

A force of personality. A leader “displays a bias for action, makes decisions in a timely manner, seeks responsibility, accepts consequences, and is highly competent at his job.”

Social energy. Mutual respect. “People will endure incredible hardship if first the leader endures the same hardship shoulder to shoulder with them. Second, the men know why the hardship is necessary.”

The virtue of shame. “No one wants to be known or remembered for coming up short when most needed.”

To project the responsibilities of an officer, McCoy concedes that a leader must sometimes wear “the warrior’s stone mask” as a way to make orders that are “impossible expectations with heavy dollops of cruelty.”

The mask can keep an officer a gentleman, but it can make him into a machine. While “the mask granted me immunity from my conscience” during the stress of war, later McCoy was “shocked by my own indifference” and “doubted my own humanity.” He admits having become “intoxicated by the thrill of the fight, as war removed its own Mask of glory and romance and revealed to me its true face of fleshless bone, and the dark side of man, and perhaps myself.”

Away from battle and back on the home front, McCoy is compelled to remove his stone face when he comes across a warrior friend’s poignant newspaper essay about compassion during combat. The piece is a catharsis for McCoy, and underneath his mask, he finds tears in his eyes. The reader finds humanity.

-- Review by J. Ford Huffman, Air Force Times

Team of Rivals: The Political Genius of Abraham Lincoln

- Doris Goodwin (Simon & Schuster, 2006)

More books about Abraham Lincoln line the shelves of libraries than about any other American. Can there be anything new to say about our 16th president? Surprisingly, the answer is yes. Having previously offered fresh insights into Lyndon Johnson, the Kennedys and Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt, Doris Kearns Goodwin has written an elegant, incisive study of Lincoln and leading members of his cabinet that will appeal to experts as well as to those whose knowledge of Lincoln is an amalgam of high school history and popular mythology.

Team of Rivals (an apt but uninspiring title) opens in May 1860 with four men awaiting news from the national convention of the Republican Party in Chicago. Thousands of supporters were gathered in Auburn, N.Y., where a cannon was primed to fire a salute to the expected nomination of Senator William Henry Seward for president. In Columbus, Ohio, Gov. Salmon P. Chase hoped that if Seward faltered, the mantle would fall on his shoulders. In St. Louis, 66-year-old Edward Bates, a judge who still called himself a Whig, hoped the convention might turn to him as the only candidate who could carry the conservative free states, whose electoral votes were necessary for a Republican victory. In Springfield, Ill., a former one-term congressman who had been twice defeated for election to the Senate waited with resigned expectation that his long-shot candidacy would be flattened by the Seward steamroller.

Although her readers presumably know who won the nomination, Goodwin leaves them in suspense for almost 250 pages as she chronicles the personal stories and political careers of these four men. The unifying theme is the growing sectional polarization over the issues of slavery and its expansion. But each story follows a separate track until they begin to converge with the death of the Whig Party and the birth of the Republican Party in the mid-1850s.

Having served four years as governor of New York and nearly 12 as a senator, Seward emerged as the leader of the new party after 1856, when it fell just short of electing a president on a platform of restricting the expansion of slavery. Next to Seward in prominence was Chase, who had organized the Free Soil Party in 1848, became its first senator in 1849 and represented the cutting edge of the Republican anti-slavery ideology.

In contrast, Lincoln’s career languished in relative obscurity before 1858. In Goodwin’s telling, however, his story gradually and subtly takes precedence. His famous debates with Stephen A. Douglas in 1858 gave him national exposure, though Douglas won re-election to the Senate. Lincoln's Cooper Union
address in New York and his subsequent tour of New England in early 1860 increased his visibility. Although some newspapers still spelled his first name "Abram," Lincoln appealed to a growing number of Republicans as the strongest potential nominee. Less radical than Chase and more firmly antislavery than Bates, he seemed the one most likely to carry the Lower Northern states of Pennsylvania, Indiana and Illinois that the Republicans had lost in 1856, without alienating the antislavery Northern tier states from New England to Minnesota. Although Lincoln's "house divided" speech in 1858 was as uncompromising as Seward's "irrepressible conflict" address that same year, Seward, as well as Chase, had a more radical reputation than Lincoln. But because they had been in public life much longer than Lincoln, they had also made more enemies.

Having set the stage for the nominating convention, Goodwin recounts the drama of Lincoln's surprising first-ballot strength (102 votes to Seward's 173½, Chase's 49, and Bates's 48). On the second ballot Lincoln pulled almost even with Seward, and amid rising excitement in a convention hall packed with a leather-lunged home-state cheering section, he won a stunning victory on the third ballot. All three of his shocked rivals believed the better man had lost. Lincoln's subsequent election as president did not change their minds.

The Republican victory without a single electoral vote (and scarcely any popular votes) from the 15 slave states provoked seven of them to secede and form the Confederate States of America. In this crisis, Lincoln took the unparalleled step of appointing to his cabinet all three of his rivals plus a fourth, Simon Cameron, Pennsylvania's favorite son. Seward got the top spot as secretary of state; Chase became secretary of the Treasury, Bates attorney general and Cameron secretary of war. Could this "team of rivals," each of them initially convinced of his superiority to the inexperienced president, work together in harmony? Joseph Medill, the editor of The Chicago Tribune and one of Lincoln's most loyal supporters, later asked the president why he had made these appointments. "We needed the strongest men of the party in the cabinet," Lincoln replied. "These were the very strongest men. Then I had no right to deprive the country of their services." They were indeed strong men, Goodwin notes. "But in the end, it was the prairie lawyer from Springfield who would emerge as the proudest of them all."

Seward at first shared the widespread assumption that he would be the "premier" of the administration. During the tense weeks between Lincoln's inauguration on March 4, 1861, and the eruption of war on April 12, when Confederate guns fired on Fort Sumter, Seward recommended that Lincoln withdraw the troops from Sumter and then worked to undermine the president's determination to hold and resupply the fort. This tug of war climaxed with Seward's notorious memorandum to Lincoln complaining that the administration was "without a policy either domestic or foreign." Seward proposed to abandon Fort Sumter while reinforcing Fort Pickens (at Pensacola) to preserve "the symbolism of federal authority." Seward also suggested an ultimatum to provoke war with Spain or France over their violations of the Monroe Doctrine as a way to reunite the country. "Whatever policy we adopt," Seward declared, "either the President must do it himself . . . or devolve it on some member of his Cabinet. . . . I neither seek to evade nor assume responsibility" . . .

-- Complete review by James M. McPherson, is available from the The New York Times Online

Lions of Kandahar: The Story of a Fight Against All Odds
- Rusty Bradley and Kevin Maurer (Bantam, 2011)

There's no big-picture analysis. Instead, there's a big fight for a little hill, and as exposition without pretense, the details of the battle make a big impact.

How "the actions of the 3rd Special Forces Group soldiers, the [International Security Assistance Force] and their Afghan Army allies disrupted the largest-ever Taliban offensive aimed at taking over Kandahar City" is a well-paced narrative.

The authors — Army Special Forces Maj. Rusty Bradley and Kevin Maurer, a newspaper reporter with a dozen embeds — know the territory and the trials.

Bradley returns to Afghanistan in 2006, and his third time might not be the charm. "The first thing I noticed when I walked in [to headquarters] was the memorial wall. . . . I fought back tears for my friends. It happened every time I came back."

The title comes from Bradley giving Afghan soldiers his can-do “football-coach-before-the-big-game-speech. . . . You are the Lions of Kandahar! You
are the protectors of southern Afghanistan!”

Sperwan Ghar is “a tall hill” and ideal spot for calling down “hellish airstrikes.” Against the odds, 30 Green Berets and 50 Afghan soldiers and air support repel counterattacks, kill or wound “nearly 800 enemy fighters including eight Taliban commanders” and liberate “a valley the Soviets never conquered.”

Aside from the straightforward story, part of what makes “Lions” likable is the occasional aside from Bradley:

• “The Apaches were making a final gun run before turning sharply back toward Kandahar. They unloaded everything they had. … I vowed right there and then to keep at least $20 in my pocket in case I ever ran into a thirsty gunship pilot.”

• “The first two minutes of a fight are the most precious. You know who you are up against in the first 30 seconds, if you live that long.”

• “You can’t cram a soldier into boots and equipment made by the lowest bidder and mass produced for every soldier. … That’s why most special operations soldiers wear civilian hiking boots.”

• “A general somewhere in the chain of command had moved up the attack without conducting a reconnaissance of the target. … I am never amazed that certain generals, however far away they are, know more about the battlefield than those standing on it.”

• “I had cheated death but now I knew I wasn’t bulletproof — not a feeling you want to have in the middle of a firefight.”

- Review by J. Ford Huffman, The Marine Corps Times

Photo credit: LCpl Bruno J. Bego

Explosives ordnance disposal (EOD) Marines and Sailors from 2d Marine Logistics Group (Forward) collect unserviceable ammunition at the Sink East Range near Camp Leatherneck that are scheduled to be disposed of in a series of controlled detonations.

The Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) newsletter provides “initial impressions” summaries that identify key observations and potential lessons from collection efforts. These observations highlight potential shortfalls, risks or issues experienced by units that may suggest a need for change. The observations are not service level decisions. In addition, some information in this newsletter has been compiled from publicly available sources and is not official USMC policy. Although the information has been gathered from reliable sources, the currency and completeness of the information is subject to change and cannot be guaranteed. Questions or comments (or requests to be added to the MCCLL newsletter distribution list) can be directed to: Mr. Harry T. Johnson, Editor Telephone: 703) 432-1279 DSN: 312-378-1279.

MCCLL Products "in the Pipeline"

The results of a number of recently completed, ongoing and planned collection efforts are scheduled to be documented in MCCLL reports within the next few months. "Stay tuned" for these MCCLL products:

- OEF Explosives Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Employment and Operations
- The Stand-up of Marine Corps Forces Central Command (MARCENT) Forward
- Lessons Learned by Joint Terminal Attack Controllers (JTACs)/Joint Fires Observers (JFOs)
- Combat Engineer Operations in OEF
- Regimental Combat Team 8 Operations in OEF
- Operations of the 22d Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU)
- MV-22 Osprey Operations in OEF
- Lessons from Exercise Bold Alligator 2012
Roster of MCCLL Program Analysts

The latest roster of Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) representatives at major Marine Corps and joint commands and organizations is provided below. Note that Mr. Michael Smith has replaced Mr. Scott Kemp at 2d MLG (Fwd); he will also serve as the MCCLL representative at 2d MAW. Mr. Kemp has returned to his assignment as the program analyst at LOGCOM. Mr. Paul Voss has been assigned as the new MCCLL representative at 2d MAW. Individuals from commands and organizations that do not have a MCCLL representative may contact Mr. Mark Silvia, the MCCLL Operations Officer at 703-432-1284.

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The Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) articles contained in this newsletter represent the considered judgement of experienced analysts assigned to MCCLL. The purpose of the newsletter is to apprise members of the Marine Corps (as well as members of other Services and Department of Defense (DoD) commands and agencies) of recent items of interest contained in the Marine Corps Lessons Management System (LMS). Some information in this newsletter has been compiled from publicly available sources and is not official USMC policy. Although the information has been gathered from reliable sources, the currency and completeness of the information is subject to change and cannot be guaranteed.