JOINT ANALYSIS AND LESSONS LEARNED CENTRE
NATO LESSONS LEARNED CONFERENCE
10 – 12 NOVEMBER 2015

The Commander JALLC Welcomes You

Welcome to the 12th NATO Lessons Learned Conference, hosted by the Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre.

The Conference theme this year is: “Closing the loop: The Lessons Learned capability in support of NATO Transformation”.

Much progress has been made in recent years by the Alliance towards improving Lessons Learned Capability. It is this capability that drives the NATO transformational loop, starting with a simple but significant observation and with an organizational change that improves the way “NATO Works”. The Conference focuses on closing that loop: the tangible output from the Lessons Learned process.

The first part of this year’s Conference will examine a number of lessons and the Lessons Learned Process drive and support NATO transformation from different perspectives. The second part of the Conference will examine the interaction between NATO and Non-NATO Entities and what can be done to ensure success in the future. The final part of the Conference will bring the audience closer to the lessons from Crisis Management Operations.

In this light, we can offer you a compelling series of lessons which will afford the opportunity for you to share your experiences and that of your colleagues and discuss openly your experiences and the Conference theme in general.

Supporting these panels we are fortunate to be joined by some of the finest speakers and briefers. I think you will find the programme is the finest and most intellectually stimulating programme possible.

Thus, when you leave this Conference, you will have a much greater understanding of how the Lessons Learned processes can be used to deliver on the deliverables we will set ourselves in the Conference for an effective Lessons Learned Capability.

I again extend you a most cordial welcome and sincerely hope that your participation will be productive and profitable to you.
At this year’s Conference we looked at how we can “close the loop” to ensure the Lessons Learned capability supports NATO’s transformation. I believe that, over the course of the conference, we discovered that the transformational loop, once closed, effectively becomes a cycle; a cycle of continuous learning and change. A cycle that we, the Lessons Learned Community, must drive towards improving the Way NATO Works.

The world has become a far less stable and secure place remarkably quickly; but NATO has responded remarkably quickly too; NATO is ready to respond swiftly and firmly to the new security challenges and recognizes the need to transform, the need to ensure its commitment to unity, defence, and deterrence. The challenges NATO faces in light of the changing security environment, as highlighted during this conference, are diverse in nature, perhaps more so now than ever before. As mentioned on the very first day of the conference, not just by myself, but also by General Zuliani, General Yakovleff, Major General Gersten and Lieutenant Colonel Green, it is this changing security environment that requires NATO to transform.

During Supreme Allied Commander Transformation’s (SACT) visit to the JALLC earlier in November, he shared his vision of NATO’s transformational future with us; building what he referred to as NATO’s Capacity - the sum of its capabilities or, as SACT himself put it: “the ability or power to deliver the effect NATO requires to underpin Deterrence and a credible, flexible, resilient, and adaptable Defence Posture.” He also set out six key areas of NATO’s capacity that he is currently exploring: Command and Control (C2), Logistics and Sustainment, Training, Partnerships, Manpower, and Capabilities. As I look back over the conference, I must admit, that I recognize these six key areas in what we have discussed here during the conference.

We discussed C2 in the context of exercising the Joint Task Force HQs and covered the topic of logistics and sustainment when discussing crisis management. Training was a hot topic this conference, with many presentations covering different aspects. This has been a historic conference in terms of the number of International Organizations and NGOs that have not only participated but also delivered presentations, proving that NATO is keen to develop partnerships for future success. We also discussed the perennial problems NATO faces in terms of manpower and, finally, this whole conference has been dedicated to improving NATO’s capabilities; the Lessons Learned Capability in particular.

The transformational loop did not start with this Conference and it must not end with it either. It is everyone’s job to contribute to closing the loop and driving the learning cycle. I call upon you all to make observations, identify lessons, and help NATO continue to be the learning organization I know it to be. I am convinced of the importance of the Lessons Learned capability in supporting NATO’s transformation and I am confident the work done during the Conference this year has contributed, and will continue to contribute, to that transformation.
This year’s conference was opened by GEN Mirco Zuliani, Deputy SACT (DSACT). He welcomed everyone to the 2015 Lesson Learned Conference and began by noting that JALLC’s activities over the past year made valuable contributions to NATO’s transformational agenda. Specifically, he highlighted: last year’s conference, the Two Decades of Lessons from Operations and Exercises study, and how the JALLC has contributed to capturing Lessons Learned from the ISAF mission. He noted that, “through a formal approach to learning, individuals and the organization can reduce the risk of repeating mistakes and improve the chance that successes are repeated.” In the military context, this means reduced operational risk, lower cost, and improved operational effectiveness.

GEN Zuliani said these factors are much more relevant today because NATO is facing a reshaping of its mission due to budget uncertainty, declining resources, and a historic realignment of interests and influences around the world. However, the Alliance needs to be prepared to address a broad range of contingencies and unpredictable crises well into the future. That means NATO must prepare its posture for the challenges of an uncertain future.

He added we must, therefore, use Lessons Learned to prepare for the future, to adapt, to innovate, and to build a powerful network of expertise to enable transformation. NATO faces the rise of new technologies, national powers, and non-state actors; sophisticated, deadly and often asymmetric emerging threats, ranging from cyberattacks to transnational criminal networks; as well as persistent, volatile, traditional threats. NATO’s long-term security will depend on whether the Alliance can address today’s crises while also planning and preparing for tomorrow’s threats and challenges.

GEN Zuliani also noted that the NATO Lessons Learned Conference was timely because it addresses key issues relating to operations and exercises, includes the involvement of non-NATO organizations, and explores how the Lessons Learned process supports transformation. It offers a great opportunity to share our understanding of past crises and operations, listen to others’ perspectives, and develop ideas on how to improve the Alliance’s effectiveness, because learning must be used to justify changes that will lead to improved performance.

DSACT then took a few moments to discuss two of the most important investments NATO is making in Allied Command Transformation (ACT). First, he explained, ACT has a great responsibility in sustaining and exploiting a NATO-wide Lessons Learned capability. This includes drawing on the input from operations, exercises, and capability development programmes for the benefit of the Alliance. The Lessons Learned capability supports all ACT Strategic goals by seeking continuous improvement in processes, structures, policies, procedures, and working methods. These improvements are focused on capability development, priorities and critical shortfalls, readiness, and interoperability.

Second, ACT is committed to providing a coherent and integrated training system, contributing directly to maintaining a collective set of national forces matching a rapidly evolving and uncertain security environment. For example, NATO’s recent live exercise, the largest since 2002 with over 30,000 troops, conducted in Italy, Portugal, and Spain, will be a source of highly valuable lessons.
Recognizing the critical role Lessons Learned plays in the delivery of interoperable, ready, and effective forces, ACT has established a Force Development Board whose aim is to prioritize, direct, and synchronize activities in the Force Development Cycle over a five year horizon. This is done through the provision of cross-functional harmonization. The Force Development Board provides management oversight of ACT activities and initiatives, and ensures a dynamic and effective integration of lessons into outputs and the culture of the organization.

DSACT further highlighted that this work is extremely beneficial in order to coordinate and synchronize joint analysis priorities during NATO operations, during crisis management, and in other high priority areas such as the Readiness Action Plan. We must also ensure that lessons are shared and delivered to those whose work requires their consideration. General Zuliani urged the audience to consider how best to exploit the NATO Lessons Learned Portal, and how to promote and further develop its use. Improving the sharing of lessons between the NATO Command Structure and Centres of Excellence, and making the most of the ties with international organizations and NGOs, is necessary to achieve a wider and more effective Lessons Learned capability.

GEN Zuliani concluded by reiterating that ACT’s mission is to lead the Alliance’s military transformation, ensure a foresight of future security challenges, shape connected forces through ambitious and realistic training / exercises, and enable innovative interoperable capabilities through co-operation within NATO, its partners, and International Organizations. This hard work is critical in order to spread the concept that Lessons Learned is not a small community business, but rather is everybody’s day-by-day business.
The first panel of the conference looked at the strategic perspective of Lessons Learned from past and ongoing operations as a major driver for NATO transformation. The Panel was opened by LTG Michel Yakovleff, VCOS Shape, who noted there is a necessity for NATO to transform, but not necessarily along the lines of operations. LTG Yakovleff gave three reasons for the necessity of the Alliance to transform.

First, NATO has to determine which lessons from the strategic level are the right ones to guide its transformation. He mentioned that NATO has had it relatively easy in terms of the types of adversaries it has confronted over the last two decades of operations. He called this a "massive technical overmatch," noting that NATO will face challenges in the future in areas it has normally held an advantage over in the past.

Second, NATO needs to determine what needs to be transformed. NATO must be prepared to, "fight in contested spaces" in the future. This may include facing challenges to NATO’s existing air supremacy and maritime dominance, and facing new challenges in the areas of electronic warfare and cyberspace. Fighting in these contested spaces will also require that Alliance members be prepared to accept the cost of high intensity peer level conflicts. NATO will likely have to transform in these areas, or learn to fight in the absence of them (i.e. “unlearn” past dependencies), in order to be successful.

Third, NATO needs to consider how we transform Alliance. Part of preparing for these future challenges will involve the use of Lessons Learned analysis. The contested areas NATO will have to fight in are unlike any current or past operations, which mean lessons from exercises may be an even more valuable contribution to NATO’s transformation agenda, and should be deliberately used by NATO to transform.

BG Mîndrescu, COM JALLC, followed LTG Yakovleff, presenting the recently completed JALLC project: Strategic Lessons from ISAF. The report sought to identify areas at the military strategic level where lessons from ISAF can contribute to future NATO-led operations. He explained the methodology applied during the analysis and how the analysis requirement for this project was answered through identifying the ISAF Periodic Mission Reviews (or PMRs) as the main source of data that would provide the information needed to develop understanding and, ultimately, useful conclusions and recommendations. The analysis for this project resulted in a total of 643 evidence-based observations with strategic relevance for NATO. The observations captured by the project team were analysed and organized into strategic categories (11 to be precise): Nation’s Influence; Training; Protection of Civilians; Funding; Information and Lessons Sharing; Comprehensive Approach; Unity of Command; STRATCOM; C2; Security Forces Assistance (SFA); Transition to Resolute Support Mission (RSM). The 11 strategic topics were then grouped into five (Infrastructure was not included) of the six domains of the Political Military Economic, Social, Infrastructure, and Information (PMESII) construct.

BG Mîndrescu went on to explain that, from the conclusions drawn in connection with this project, it is clear that ISAF has provided fertile learning ground for NATO. NATO’s performance in current operations in areas such as counterinsurgency, SFA, training, etc. was influenced from the implementation of lessons extracted
The JALLC’s Principal Operational Research Analyst (PORA) followed BG Mîndrescu’s presentation with an overview of another ISAF-related JALLC project which looked at how ISAF effectively reduced civilian casualties (CIVCAS) during the course of the mission in Afghanistan. He began by highlighting that, although ISAF Commanders had taken steps to reduce CIVCAS in Afghanistan, a number of high profile CIVCAS events in 2008 and 2009 acted as a catalyst for change to NATO’s civilian casualty mitigation policy which ultimately resulted in a material reduction in the number of casualties recorded. To ensure that NATO benefits as much as possible from ISAF’s CIVCAS reduction efforts, the JALLC was tasked to analyse how ISAF significantly reduced civilian casualties.

The JALLC’s PORA explained that the JALLC’s project team used both quantitative (statistical) analysis and a qualitative (literature) analysis in their approach to analysing the available data. In terms of the statistical analysis, the project team gained access to and analysed data from, among others, the Combined Information Data Network Exchange (CIDNE) system.

The statistical analysis of the ISAF CIVCAS data demonstrated that ISAF did indeed successfully reduce ISAF-caused CIVCAS over the period investigated. However, CIVCAS statistics by themselves did not provide a good way of understanding CIVCAS trends. The project team still had to consider the intensity and tempo of both friendly and enemy actions and developed metrics to measure these trends. The project team was then able to determine the probability or likelihood of a CIVCAS incident occurring during a significant kinetic event through the use of regression analysis. The analysis showed that ISAF was successful at reducing ISAF-caused CIVCAS.

The project team also reviewed more than 200 different NATO and non-NATO documents on ISAF and CIVCAS-related topics, including reports from United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), Human Rights Watch, and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The combination of the qualitative and quantitative analysis allowed the project team to verify certain key CIVCAS reduction strategies and best practices developed by ISAF. These practices fell into three categories that, if consistently applied, resulted in a three-stage CIVCAS Reduction Cycle: Prevention Stage, a Mitigation Stage, and a Learning Stage.

The JALLC’s PORA noted that all of these measures ultimately contributed to the right mindset, the right process, and the right conduct of operations to reduce CIVCAS.

The JALLC’s PORA also noted that all of these measures ultimately contributed to the right mindset, the right process, and the right conduct of operations to reduce CIVCAS. Moreover, the project team was able to make recommendations in several areas covering Overarching NATO CIVCAS Policy; Joint doctrine; JTF HQ SOPs (SOP 215); CIVCAS Tracking tools; NATO-led Training; Condolence Payments; and Terminology. You can find out more about this and any other JALLC project by visiting our website at www.jallc.nato.int for an unclassified summary in our factsheets.
Lessons from past and ongoing operations are a major driver for NATO transformation

An Air Perspective

The second panel of the conference also explored lessons from past and ongoing operations, this time looking specifically at air operations, led by NATO or international coalitions. MG Peter Gersten, Deputy Commanding General for Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTFOIR) led the discussion and provided a real-world and timely presentation that looked at lessons from OIR and how they might be integrated by NATO.

He began by noting that current operations are not like anything we have envisioned, seen, or done before. Current operations consist of Counter-Improvised Explosive Devices (C-IED), counter-terrorism, guerrilla warfare tactics, proxy, and counter-insurgency mixed with traditional armed combat. Some call this hybrid warfare. In the past these elements were trained as separate disciplines; now they must be conducted simultaneously.

For MG Gersten, the CJTFOIR’s main objective, together with its regional partners, is to stop the expansion of, and then militarily defeat Daesh (al-Dawla al-Islamiya al-Iraq al-Sham). Daesh (formerly ISIS / ISIL) has transformed itself from a loosely organized, moderately equipped collection of terrorist groups into an organized, well-equipped, and well-funded organization, acquiring large swaths of regional territory. MG Gersten noted that the expansion of Daesh has now stopped and is being contained. Daesh’s capabilities have also been severely degraded and are currently being dismantled.

This progress is thanks to numerous actors, and has been a constantly changing and evolving process; not without its challenges. MG Gersten described overcoming the challenges as “flying the airplane, while you were designing and building it, and delivering ordnance, all at the same time.” Specifically, numerous challenges and lessons were felt in the synchronization of operations: coordinating the coalition strategy; interoperability across coalition capabilities; significant differences between international ground forces and their capabilities; classification, IT, and C2 issues; and overlapping levels of command / battlespace, to name a few. Most significant of all was the strategic implications of Russia’s appearance in the battlespace.

MG Gersten finished his presentation by saying that OIR mission cannot be completed without its coalition partners and that they are seeing momentum. But tactical and strategic patience is needed. Daesh has been halted and forced to adapt to coalition operations. However, the Coalition operates in a constantly evolving environment and the enemy changes and adapts on a month-to-month basis. These issues will continue to challenge the operation, and must be captured in the Lessons Learned process.

BG Mehmet Yalinalp DCOS Plans HQ, AIRCOM, concluded the panel with a discussion on lessons from previous air operations looking at current planning considerations. In particular, key Lessons Identified from Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR (OUP) were presented.

BG Mehmet Yalinalp began his presentation by reviewing three observations from OUP in the areas of manning, training, and intelligence. First, it was observed that there were insufficient numbers of and appropriately trained personnel to fill the manning requirements of the operation. The remedial action was to maximize
“The Lessons Learned Process led to key changes in the way NATO C2 air operations are planned.”

NATO reorganization, establish supporting entities with Air Command (AIRCOM), and develop a Joint Forces Air Component (JFAC) doctrine and robust augmentation process.

The second observation was that the NATO Response Force (NRF) preparation and certification process did not train the Combined Forces Air Command (CFAC) effectively for Smaller Joint Operation (SJO) air heavy kinetic operations. The remedial action for this observation was to enhance inputs to Supreme Allied Commander Europe’s (SACEUR) Annual Guidance on Education, Training, Exercises and Evaluation (SAGE), provide Initial Functional JFAC Training (IFJT), and develop and participate in a comprehensive Exercise Programme.

The third observation addressed by BG Yalinalp was that the CFAC was initially unable to stand-up an Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Division capable of supporting the Air Tasking Order (ATO) in a dynamic / kinetic operation. The analysis of this observation highlighted that no dedicated NATO Targeting and Intelligence Centre currently exists.

BG Yalinalp also described HQ AIRCOM Air Planning Outcomes, and highlighted that early stand-up of a JFAC to C2 air is vital to prepare the operational environment. More importantly, the JFAC can be complex and manpower intensive. The Lessons Learned process led to key changes in the way NATO C2 air operations are planned. Although any land operation will require air defence through a tailored JFAC, it is vital to stand-up of the JFAC C2 to support land and maritime operations early.
Lessons from Exercises are essential to NATO transformation

The Training Audience’s Perspective

The third and final panel of the first day of the Conference looked at how lessons from Exercises are essential to NATO transformation from the Training Audience’s Perspective. This panel was led by LTG Riccardo Marchio, COM NRDC-ITA, who spoke on key lessons from recent Exercises and the NFS Joint Command and Control standby period. LTG Marchio provided an update on the NATO Rapid Deployable Corps (NRDC)-ITA profile; highlighted the path used to develop Joint Roles and Capabilities; noted Best Practices during the Certification Training Event; and identified key takeaways for the conference.

LTG Marchio noted that NRDC-ITA is one of nine Graduated Readiness Forces (GRF) HQs. As part of its learning path to develop Joint Roles and Capabilities, the Joint Task Force (JTF) HQ certification process highlighted several Lessons Identified. There were 194 action items across areas including: policy, leadership, facilities, organization, doctrine, and personnel. These items were incorporated into Lessons Learned Analysis Focus Areas to develop a Standing Action Plan.

LTG Marchio highlighted that one of the best practices during the certification training event was the use of an Integrated Model for the JTF HQ, including the development of the three pillars (C2) structure. The key advantage to this latter best practice was the JTF HQ’s ability to achieve effects across its identified strategic objectives. LTG Marchio concluded by confirming that the key takeaways from the recent exercise, and the NFS Joint C2 standby period, include having a flexible but clear understanding of what is meant by Integrated Model; getting the right approach to the training events (i.e. learning opportunities); and utilizing the tremendous value of the Lessons Learned cycle within the HQ.

BG Mehmet Yalinalp spoke for the second time that day on key lessons from recent exercises in the build-up to exercise TRIDENT JET 16, and early perspectives on exercise TRIDENT JUNCTURE 15 LIVEX. The presentation focused on the exercises from the perspective of Bi-SC Directive 075-003, which covers the exercise reporting process.

BG Yalinalp identified key reoccurring Lessons Identified across several themes from previous air exercises. These reoccurring themes were found in exercises STEADFAST JAZZ 2013, RAMSTEIN AMBITION II-14, and RAMSTEIN AMBITION II-15 and included lessons on JFAC Organization / Manning, Exercise Scenario realism, Training, Targeting, and Doctrine.

In terms of a revised approach to Exercise TRIDENT JET 16, BG Yalinalp highlighted that a blended approach was utilized. This approach used traditional exercises (RAMSTEIN AMBITION II-15) with table top exercises (TRIDENT JUNCTURE 16). This blended approach used less than 20% of the manning initially required. Additionally, AIRMOC intends to prove this new, lean, and adaptive approach, while ensuring effective and challenging training. Doing so could represent a cornerstone event, and perhaps even a blueprint for the future of NATO’s training programmes.

BG Yalinalp’s early perspective on Exercise TRIDENT JUNCTURE 15 LIVEX included one initial key observation; a lack of a dedicated Communications platform / networks, allowing communications between NATO and national entities at the appropriate security level. Not having such a platform hindered
communications and operations at times. BG Yalinalp concluded his presentation by saying that the appearance of reoccurring themes does not necessarily mean we are not learning our lessons. It means we must work to close the loop in order to facilitate NATO transformation.

LTC Gary Green, from STRIKFORNATO, concluded the day with a review of STRIKFORNATO and key lessons from exercise BALTOPS 15. In particular, LTC Green reviewed the challenges and successes, reiterating that we are living in a rapidly changing security environment, and this situation will likely endure into the foreseeable future. He noted that the "history of NATO is transformation." It is therefore imperative that NATO transform in order to be relevant as the strategic environment evolves. Exercise BALTOPS 15 was a part of that transformational process.

BALTOPS 15 aim was to deliver a high-end exercise to enhance interoperability and tactical proficiency of maritime units. While interoperability is nothing new to NATO, BALTOPS 15 embraced the concept at a level not attempted in the past. BALTOPS 15 also provided assurance and delivered a message that NATO is ready in the Baltic by demonstrating the unity of the Alliance.

The BALTOPS 15 Exercise was not without its challenges, however. Hundreds of Lessons Identified and a lot of best practices were collected during the exercise. Some of the noted challenges included information and interoperability issues. In several instances, commanders could not disseminate the appropriate information to the appropriate people at the appropriate time. This is not new, and will likely remain an enduring challenge for NATO.

There were also a number of successes during the exercise. As LTC Green noted, BALTOPS 15 built a plan, built the team, delivered the message, and achieved the aim. First, BALTOPS 15 had a plan to show Alliance resolve in the Baltic and executed that objective. Second, rather than the exercise being a U.S.-led exercise, it was a NATO-led exercise. This again helped deliver the message that NATO is ready in the Baltic. Finally, the exercise shared assets and integrated strategic capabilities.

LTC Green concluded that BALTOPS 15 was a significant success: much was learned and we need to build on the identified successes such as building partnerships, showing resolve, and identifying interoperability issues. NATO now needs to apply those Lessons Identified and engage with its partners in realistic training together.

"NATO and partners need to engage in realistic training together. ”

Key Speaker:
LTG Riccardo Marchio, COM NRDC - ITA

Panel Members:
BG Mehmet Yalinalp, DCOS Plans HQ, AIRCOM; LTC Gary Green, STRIKFORNATO
The second day of the Conference kicked off with a panel on the topic: Lessons from Exercises are essential to NATO transformation – the Trainers’ Perspective. It began with MG Reinhard Wolski, COM Joint Warfare Centre (JWC), discussing key lessons from directing recent NATO exercises from the perspective of Bi-SC Directive 075-003. Overall he noted several lessons and potential areas for improvement such as: effective information and knowledge management, strategic communication, battlespace management, ISR and targeting, integration of national Communications and Information Systems (CIS) and NATO technology, response cell manning, challenges of multi-level exercises, and joint analysis.

MG Wolski explained that planning and conducting multi-level exercises has been a formidable challenge. For example, key deliverables based on sound thinking of the full array of implications on C2 must be analysed, defined, delivered, and decided early in the planning process. This was no easy task. MG Wolski stated his hope for a unitary planning process which promotes scalability and adaptability within realistic planning timelines.

He also explained that effective information and knowledge management has been a challenge for the joint headquarters across every TRIDENT exercise. As information availability increases, along with technical solutions to collect and display information, our capability to manage it becomes increasingly important. Thus, leveraging knowledge and experience must be a commander’s priority.

Strategic communications (STRATCOM) was also an area that emerged as requiring improvement. JWC has incorporated STRATCOM as a key element in the planning and preparation of exercise scenarios. Most recently during Exercise TRIDENT JUNCTURE 15, the importance of having robust engagement strategies, and the means to execute them, with non-NATO entities, became apparent. However, there are security, technical, classification, and ethical aspects which must be considered when conducting STRATCOM. How these aspects should be dealt with needs to be clarified in doctrine, prepared in scenarios, tested in exercises, and mastered in execution.

Battlespace management has also been a challenging for the Joint Headquarters. The Commander’s ability to observe multiple planning horizons, orient his staff, decide his courses of action, and coordinate subordinate action(s), largely determines mission success. JWC therefore needs to build increasingly demanding exercises, with significant attention to detail, to adequately challenge and exercise the main training audience.

MG Wolski further noted that the relationship between ISR and the targeting process presents more challenges in a hybrid warfare environment. Not only does the demand of modern warfare demonstrate our strengths, but it also exposes our weaknesses. We require high levels of effective communications across all systems, as well as an agile and responsive targeting cycle, in order to achieve mission success.

Integration of national CIS and NATO technology was noted as another challenge. MG Wolski voiced that we must ensure that developing technology does not outstrip our interoperability, both technically and doctrinally. Maintaining the agility, flexibility, security, and interoperability of our CIS will be critical to our success.
Another lesson from the last series of TRIDENT exercises is the requirement for a properly manned response cell. While this coordination has at times been an afterthought, MG Wolski asserted that addressing this requirement needed to begin at the EXSPEC stage. A robust, fully manned, and experienced response cell will enhance any exercise, and TRIDENT JUNCTURE 15 was no exception. MG Wolski stated that he hopes to see a clear mandate in the exercise planning process within manning requirements.

Lastly, MG Wolski asserted he would like to see a stronger focus on phase four of the exercise: the analysis phase. He stated that more engagement post-exercise would help ensure that we derive the best benefits quickly so that we can turn Lessons Identified into Lessons Learned. He closed by observing that Lessons Learned are often associated with past practice, but it actually arms us to face the future better.

BG Dzintars Roga, ACOS JFT/JETE, followed MG Wolski’s presentation with a discussion on key lessons from the TRIDENT series exercises. He started by stating that command engagement early in the planning process as being critical to success and has proven to ensure the best tailoring of the exercise resources to the training audience’s needs. Along similar lines as MG Wolski, BG Roga stressed that it is critical to get the right number and the right people into Exercise Control (EXCON). As exercises get more complex, more people are required. He also added that as more training audiences are added to exercises, the exercises themselves become more complex. This increases the likelihood that major training objectives may be compromised by having too many focus areas per exercise.

BG Wojciech Grabowski, COM JFTC, concluded the panel, discussing Joint Force Training Centre (JFTC) lessons from recent exercise / training events. While he noted there have been numerous Lessons Identified, he focused on five key lessons:

First, it was identified that it was important for the JFTC Training Team to conduct an In-Theatre Recce Visit in order to obtain Situational Awareness on all major issues. The information gained from this visit was vital to developing and executing a relevant, realistic, and challenging training event. Second, the development of a progressive training concept model was essential to producing the best training results. Third, the importance of realistically simulating the operational environment and battle rhythm of the actual headquarters was identified as important for the training audience. Fourth, the significance of employing current in-theatre or recently redeployed Subject Matter Experts (SME) and Afghan National Defence and Security Forces (ANDSF) staff during the training events was highly beneficial. Doing so has proven to be essential in attempting to simulate the theatre environment. Fifth, it is important to train to the requirements developed by the in-theatre HQ in cooperation with the JFTC. These training requirements are vital for the development of the training objectives.

“Situational Awareness was vital to developing and executing a relevant, realistic, and challenging training event.”
Demonstrating how the Lessons Learned process supports NATO transformation

The second panel of day two of the Conference discussed the topic: Demonstrating how the Lessons Learned process supports NATO transformation. BG Henrik Sommer, ACOS CEI, opened the panel with a brief on how ACT intends to capture lessons in order to support NATO transformation. He stressed that the Lessons Learned process is an essential component of an organizational culture that stresses an operational doctrine committed to continuous improvement and learning. He stated, "we do not want to continue to make the same mistakes." In order for the Alliance to adapt, develop, and transform, it must sustain a robust Lessons Learned capability and the associated means to implement change.

BG Sommer discussed the importance of leadership and the need for a culture of sharing. Commanders at any level have a key role in developing, establishing, implementing, maintaining, sustaining, and improving a Lessons Learned capability, and that the Lessons Learned process is a command and senior management responsibility.

BG Sommer asked the poignant question of whether everyone fully uses the NATO Lessons Learned Portal (NLLP) in order to ensure the dissemination of that information. In the past, there has been a reluctance to share Lessons Learned products. However, we must share the information throughout the entire Lessons Learned cycle to be successful. ACT is committed to supporting all phases of the cycle, and is the lead within NATO for the overall NATO Lessons Learned process. BG Sommer then further explained that ACT identified four main targets aimed at promoting a robust and ready Lessons Learned system.

First is force development synchronization through the Force Development Board (FDB). The FDB enables Commanders to prioritize, direct, and synchronize activities in the force development cycle over a five-year period. Second is the continuous process of improvement with regard to an HQs' internal Lessons Learned capability, and incorporating lessons from previous exercises, helping to ensure the Lessons Learned loop is closed.

Third, ACT aims to improve the Lessons Learned process through the recently signed Bi-SC Directive (80-91) which introduces a standardized procedure leading to the identification of a Lesson Identified Tasking Authority responsible for the decision of remedial actions, recommendations, commitment of resources, tasking of action bodies, and the tracking of lesson implementation. The fourth target was the modernization of the NLLP, which must become NATO’s tool to push and pull lessons and information in order to ensure the transformation of the Alliance. According to BG Sommer NATO is on the right path towards a more effective Lessons Learned capability, but we still need to work on output-focused processes, information sharing, and portal modernization.

Mr Dieter Schmaglowski, Deputy Director of the NATO Standardization Office (NSO), continued with a discussion on how Lessons Identified feed the development of operational standards to include doctrine. He explained that for operational standards to be effective and key enablers for NATO operations, they must be both relevant and implemented. That has not always been the case. It is important that we take the necessary steps to send and receive feedback to ensure that NATO standards are kept relevant.

“We must share the information throughout the entire Lessons Learned cycle to be successful.”
He went on to explain that too often Lessons Identified have a negative connotation and are viewed as a mistake or failure, when in reality they are simply extremely valuable. They are experience gained and should be used to improve and refine operational standards. Objective and frequent feedback, through Lessons Identified, is essential to developing and refining solutions. The bottom line is that observations and Lessons Identified with relevance to standardization must be fed into the NATO transformation process.

Mr Schmaglowski continued by describing how the NATO standardization process mirrors the NATO Lessons Learned process. Expanding on his opening remark, he noted, a lesson identified truly becomes a lesson learned when the revised standard is implemented, closing the loop. In his closing remarks, Mr Schmaglowski made some recommendations, including making better use of NATO and National Exercises to confirm the relevance of operational standards and improving and accelerating the feedback loop which currently takes too long. His final recommendation echoed BG Sommer’s point about information sharing: Nations must be willing to share lessons and provide feedback. Too often there is resistance to this aspect of the Lessons Learned cycle.

The next speaker, CAPT Mark Cooper, Branch head of NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP), HQ SACT, discussed how Lessons Learned feed the NDPP and what should be done to improve this process, beginning with a brief explanation of the NDPP cycle. He then expanded on the methodology through which Lessons Identified are incorporated, stressing the difficulty in determining whether the lessons currently identified regarding current capabilities are being properly applied in the NDPP for the development of future capabilities. He noted that this has been difficult to measure.

According to CAPT Cooper, the NDPP has embraced Lessons Identified and Lessons Learned in order to enhance and improve their processes in support of the Alliance. He explained that this is a very complex activity with a large number of organizations and stakeholders contributing to the process; separated by time, distance, experience, and objectives. CAPT Cooper noted that one of the challenges has been the length of time the process takes; overall a four year cycle, posing significant challenges a three year staff turnover cycle.

The final panel speaker, COL Francois-Regis Boulvert, Federated Mission Network (FMN) Coordinator, HQ SACT, discussed a success story: how lessons from the Afghan Mission Network feed the development of the FMN concept. After presenting the background and history, he explained the implementation plan for the FMN and its fundamental principles, stressing that the development and use of these networks was not as simple as it sounds. Federated principles and Lessons Learned from Afghanistan have been implemented in NATO doctrine, processes, training, exercises, and capability development on an enduring basis. Consequently, the FMN spirit is shared among all affiliates and will enhance interoperability in a coalition from the outset of any mission.
How NATO can better interact with Non-NATO entities?

The third panel of the Conference’s second day explored the topic of how NATO can better interact with Non-NATO entities (NNEs). Mrs Loredana Alemanno Testa, section head of the Operations Division Protection of Civilians, NATO International Staff (IS), opened the discussion, focusing on the protection of civilians.

Mrs Alemanno Testa stressed the importance of NATO comprehensively engaging with a full range of actors and NNEs in the protection of civilians. This is because there is a much broader set of desired outcomes within a NATO-led operation that we need to achieve. She highlighted four specifically: safe and secure environment; good governance; rule of law; and social and economic development. The military is really only capable of achieving the first desired outcome: a safe and secure environment. The other three must be achieved by other NNEs such as International Organizations (IOs), NGOs, and the host nation.

Mrs Alemanno Testa went on to highlight recent progress being made with regard to NATO’s engagement of NNEs. Exercise TRIDENT JUNCTURE 15, for example, had some elements of protection of civilians and children in armed conflict included in the scenario. In addition, there have been some Lessons Identified when working with NGOs in this respect. First, it is important to determine who is responsible for what, which is not necessarily an easy task. Second, many NGOs do not have the funding and means to participate in exercises, implying that NATO can only engage them once real world operations begin. And third, there is a need to exchange feedback, doing so will inevitably help build and foster relationships with IOs and NGOs. The way forward for NATO engagement with NNEs is to foster a relationship of mutual communication and collaboration in order to ensure the overall safety and protection of civilian populations.

Mr Gilles Hansoul followed with a presentation on lessons the ICRC drew from its cooperation with NATO. He began with some background on ICRC’s international mandate, which is to protect and assist victims of armed conflicts. He further explained the fundamental principles underlying the ICRC; those of humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence, and confidentiality. Mr Hansoul reiterated that the ICRC desires a close relationship with NATO, with open dialogue and communication. However, they cannot be seen to be a part of NATO; they must remain neutral and impartial in order to ensure the trust of all parties.

Mr Hansoul organized the lessons from ICRC and NATO dialogue into three main categories: operational; training and exercises; and Lessons Learned projects. From the operational perspective, ICRC has learned that the ICRC-NATO dialogue must begin from the onset of an operation. There must be dialogue between the ICRC, commanders, and the legal advisors. With regard to training and exercises, Mr Hansoul made the suggestion to develop a standing written memorandum of understanding for the ICRC-NATO relationship. He noted this would improve the process overall. From the Lessons Learned projects perspective, Mr Hansoul explained that the ICRC lessons are mostly at the operational level, with a much smaller percentage at the strategic and tactical level. However, he noted, the ICRC’s contribution to the Lessons Learned process in general depends on NATO’s readiness to discuss key issues.

The next speaker, representing the Emergency Services Branch, United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), was Ms Teresa
“Even in the most complex situations there is a need for some level of interaction, engagement, and cooperation.”

Encarnação. She discussed lessons UNOCHA drew from its interaction with NATO and described the current environment in which military and humanitarian actors work closely together in the same theatre of operations. She stressed that even in the most complex situations there is a need for some level of interaction, engagement, and cooperation. That being said, IOs and NGOs do have some constraints with how they can, and do, interact with the military.

Ms Encarnação pointed out some lessons from various operations which took place in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Libya. First in Pakistan, the designation of full-time Civil / Military Coordination Officers or Liaison Officers was critical to ensure proper coordination. Also, the need to establish specific criteria for the request of military assistance for humanitarian actors was highlighted. In Afghanistan a Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) was established with ISAF on disaster relief response. This made the relationship easier to manage by helping to determine what assets were needed. The interaction between UNOCHA and NATO in Libya served as one of the best examples of coordination between the two organizations, demonstrating the importance of a strong working relationship and good communication prior to taking action.

Ms Encarnação then proposed some recommendations. First is the “pull not push” mind-set for the use of military assets, the use of which may not be helpful from a humanitarian perspective. Second is the importance of establishing civil-military liaison arrangements. Third is the essential interaction in training and exercises. This can help both sides understand what can realistically be expected from each other during operations. Fourth is the importance of Joint After Action Reviews. It is very important to open the door to honest discussions; not just to identify issues, but to make positive changes as well. Fifth, STRATCOM is important when UNOCHA is providing humanitarian assistance. The perception that NATO and NGOs are not the same entity needs to be maintained for the local population.

The panel concluded with LTC Lars Cramer-Larsen, Lessons Learned Branch Chief, Civil- Military Cooperation (CIMIC) Centre of Excellence (COE), discussing how NATO can improve its cooperation with NNEs. LTC Cramer-Larsen began with the suggestion that we may be on the verge of a paradigm shift with the current conflict in Syria and Iraq. In contemporary conflict military victory is not the only solution. He noted that we need to operate across all domains for conflict resolution, and we need to utilize a Comprehensive Approach.

LTC Cramer-Larsen described the way ahead for Civil-Military interaction and CIMIC with CIMIC COE (CCOE) Vision 2020, which, he noted has four overall themes. The first is a focus on connecting people in order to facilitate communications. The second is a focus on sharing collective knowledge where information would be available for our Communities of Interest. The third is a focus on gaining unity of purpose. The final focus is to regard the CCOE as the preferred network campus in this respect. This all must be supported by an active engagement strategy.
What lessons Non-NATO entities drew from their interaction/cooperation with NATO in Afghanistan?

The final panel of the second Conference day addressed lessons NNEs drew from their interaction and cooperation with NATO in Afghanistan. The key speaker, Ms Danielle Bell, Director of Human Rights, United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), opened with lessons UNAMA drew from its cooperation with ISAF. She expressed how UNAMA and ISAF had a shared commitment to the protection of civilians from the consequences of armed conflict. Their joint mitigation efforts had a measurable impact on civilian protection, resulting in a reduction of civilian deaths and injuries. Most importantly, the Oxford Research Group independently assessed the cooperation between ISAF and UNAMA as a global best practice.

Ms Bell continued by expanding on some of the reasons for this effective engagement between UNAMA and ISAF. She stressed the importance of deconfliction. This is the process through which UNAMA and ISAF worked together to review every civilian casualty incident allegedly caused by military operations, and determined if there were lessons to be identified as a result. Both parties would openly share their findings from their own point of view. This dialogue worked both ways and resulted in more accurate reporting from both the military and the NGOs in theatre. Ms Bell also explained the value in sharing protection of civilians and human rights reports with ISAF before publication. Since these reports are widely read and accepted as fair, allowing ISAF to review these reports before publication, ensured the accuracy of reports, as well as giving ISAF the opportunity to include the scope of their efforts to protect civilians.

Ms Bell then noted that UNAMA learned the importance of developing military/civilian engagement structures which facilitated information sharing between military and civilian entities. ISAF held a quarterly meeting on civilian protection with the UN, IOs and NGOs, human rights groups, and other key national organizations. These meetings helped break down traditional barriers between NATO and NNEs, and reduced the chance of misunderstanding and mistrust that had existed between ISAF and NNEs in the past. Ms Bell concluded her presentation by saying that in Afghanistan, a military culture was being developed that leaned increasingly toward the protection of civilians. Constructive and frank engagement between parties was extremely successful, and the tactical gains through the support of military forces, may only be considered achievements if they are sustainable.

Mr Gene Aloise, Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) Deputy Inspector General, continued the panel discussion with lessons SIGAR drew from its interaction with NATO. SIGAR provides independent and objective oversight of the funds the US has provided to implement reconstruction programmes in Afghanistan.

To illustrate the impact SIGAR’s efforts have had on the region, he highlighted some of their accomplishments in Afghanistan. First he looked at the Afghan Local Police (ALP), an armed defence force at village level, established to free up Afghan Security Forces. SIGAR found that, despite significant investment by the US, there was a risk of failure of the project due to inadequate logistics support. By fixing the logistics problem, ISAF could ensure the continued viability of the ALP programme.

Mr Aloise also highlighted an investigation into the personnel and payroll data for the Afghan National Army and Police. While conducting the investigation, SIGAR...
discovered that payroll data could not be verified, exposing the risk that the frontline soldiers and police were not getting paid. His last example focused on lack of weapons accountability for the ANDSF. Despite significant investment by the US, they found that disciplined inventory did not exist.

Mr Aloise concluded by announcing that SIGAR recently launched a Lessons Learned programme to conduct a comprehensive analysis of reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. While the findings of the corresponding report are not final yet, SIGAR has focused on seven questions regarding Lessons Identified. The questions included: Does the project or programme make a clear and identifiable contribution to our national interests or strategic objectives? Does the recipient country want and need the programme? Has it been coordinated with other US agencies, with the recipient government, and with other international donors? Do security conditions permit effective implementation and oversight? Does the programme have adequate safeguards to detect, deter, and mitigate corruption? Does the recipient government have the financial resources, technical capacity, and political will to sustain it? And have the implementing agencies established meaningful, measurable metrics for determining successful project outcomes? Projects that have the best chance of success can answer these questions.

Mr Alan van Egmond, United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Senior Advisor to US Department of State, Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, concluded the panel by discussing lessons USAID drew from its cooperation with NATO, specifically ISAF. He began by stressing the importance of unity of effort between military and civilian agencies when conducting a counter-insurgency campaign. He noted that, although not an easy task, we all have to work together.

Managing what he referred to in his presentation as the “Military/Civilian to Civilian/Military Continuum” remains work in progress for counter-insurgency operations. However, according to Mr Van Egmond, we need to find a balance; we need to determine who has the lead. When referring to the military, Mr Van Egmond noted, “hope is not a plan.” However, for civilians, hope is often a key part of the main policy trying to be achieved. In this respect, it is fundamental to win the hearts and minds of the local population. Another Lesson Identified was the importance of having civilians involved early in joint campaign planning. Often civilians were asked to execute a plan that they did not have any involvement in creating.

Finally, Mr Egmond concluded by stating, we are most likely to be successful if we work together in all facets of joint planning, joint training, and joint operations. We must assess if the mission can be sustained successfully by civilians when their military counterparts have departed.

Key Speaker:
Ms Danielle Bell, Director of Human Rights, UNAMA

Panel Members:
Mr. Gene Aloise, SIGAR Deputy Inspector General; Mr Alan van Egmond, USAID, Senior Advisor to US DoS Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan
Ukraine Crisis: A Political/Military Perspective

The last day of the Conference began with a panel of presentations on key lessons from crisis management operations. This first panel explored how the Ukraine crisis caused the Alliance to adopt Assurance and Adaptation Measures in order to respond to changes in the international security environment. BG Gianmarco Badialetti, Deputy Director for Operations, NATO International Military Staff (IMS) opened the presentations as key speaker, and reviewed lessons from a political / military perspective. He began by noting that within a short amount of time, NATO had reacted to events in Ukraine but that the situation remains one of rapid change that NATO must keep up with.

BG Badialetti highlighted that it is necessary to shift the geostrategic direction of NATO. Specifically, he noted that the speed at which we need to make strategic decisions and transform is not aligning with the speed at which strategic changes are occurring. It currently takes years to develop and / or change policy. It takes years and sometimes decades to develop a credible capability. The Ukraine crisis, however, unfolded in months. All that being said, NATO’s response, the Readiness Action Plan (RAP), was developed remarkably quickly. Prior to development of the RAP, the Allies convened in Wales to develop measures that would support Alliance members in key strategic areas, designed to let Moscow know NATO is aware of its activities, will respond to events, and is ready to protect and defend NATO territory. However, it was also recognized that something more than these measures would be required if NATO was to respond to the evolving situation in Ukraine. The result was the RAP.

BG Badialetti highlighted that the RAP rests on two pillars. The first is Assurance Measures, and the second is Adaptation Measures. The RAP’s Assurance Measures are intended to show NATO’s commitment and resolve. The Adaptation Measures are in place to ensure the RAP evolves and stays relevant to the evolving geostrategic situation. It is important to recognize that the RAP is work in progress. He concluded by reminding the audience that the RAP is not a destination; it is part of an ongoing process that will influence the transformation of NATO and that the speed of geostrategic change necessitates that NATO continue to transform.

COL Jon Acornley, from SHAPE Comprehensive Crisis and Operations Management Centre (C(COMC) was the next presenter. He reviewed key lessons from the Assurance Measures that were put in place in response to events in Ukraine. COL Acornley provided a description of SACEUR’s Comprehensive Crisis and Operations Management (C(COM) strategic decision-making process. He noted that the decision making process is flexible, cross-functional, and task-organized. It includes the ability to scan the horizon; examine multiple events simultaneously; produce initial strategic insights; and to prepare military advice, direction, and guidance. With that background for context, COL Acornley provided lessons that were identified and learned relating to the way the crisis in Ukraine was handled. Although NATO’s initial activities were to increase NATO’s military footprint and demonstrate Alliance resolve / capabilities, an appropriate effort had to be made not to escalate the situation. Therefore, Immediate Assurance Measures (IAM) were essential to mitigate the assessed threat to national and collective security interests.
and to demonstrate Alliance solidarity. Consequently, the ability to think, plan, and act strategically and comprehensively was somewhat hindered during the initial stages of the crisis.

With regard to interoperability and responsiveness of NATO Forces, although an ambitious Training and Exercise programme has been the main enhancement, the approval process for such activities needs to be sped up if NATO is to be truly agile. NATO also learned that it must add equal weight to target domestic audiences with STRATCOM messaging. COL Acornley concluded by saying that through the RAP work, NATO’s core tasks are now reflected in the Strategic Concept.

Mr David Campion, the Operations Support Officer from the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Conflict Prevention Centre, concluded the panel by presenting some of the lessons the OSCE has identified from its crisis management operations in Ukraine. Mr Campion discussed how the crisis resulted in a significant change in mindset for the OSCE and how it has changed the OSCE’s operational environment more generally.

Mr Campion began by referencing MG Gersten’s comments about “flying the airplane while building it” and summed up the OSCE experience in Ukraine by saying “we did not even realize we were flying it.” The experiences the OSCE has gained from the crisis in Ukraine, has resulted in the OSCE finding itself in a “completely different space”. For instance, in the past, OSCE was not set up to respond to crises or rapidly changing events. In the past, field missions were placed and worked in benign environments. However, in March 2014, the OSCE decided to become involved in the crisis in Ukraine and deployed a Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), composed of international civilian monitors. This was the first time the OSCE deployed a field mission to an unstable and deteriorating environment. The result was a complete change to the way the OSCE would do business in the space of a year.

The SMM to Ukraine brought altogether different and unforeseen challenges for the OSCE. As Mr Campion revealed, every decision caused new challenges. Every time OSCE thought it had addressed a challenge, a new unforeseen one would arise. More importantly, the OSCE did not have a reference point, any history, or any experience on how to deal with these developments and challenges. Even the simplest of logistical issues, such as replacing computers, became a significant challenge in a large, rapidly changing, active combat zone. Consequently, the OSCE had to conduct operations and or acquire new capabilities, none of which would have been thought possible in the past, and none of which the OSCE had any experience with.

Mr Campion elaborated that although many lessons have been learned along the way, many more still have to be addressed. He noted that the OSCE is still largely formalizing their Lessons Identified and Lessons Learned in this respect.
Ebola: Management of a Humanitarian Crisis

The final panel of the conference also looked at key lessons from crisis management operations, this time focussing on the Ebola humanitarian crisis. COL Andrew Jackson, assisted by MAJ Lee Rickard, both from the GBR AD Lessons Exploitation Centre, who provided some historical background, started the panel discussion by presenting lessons from the UK’s military engagement in Sierra-Leone in support of the UK Department for International Development (DFID).

MAJ Rickard highlighted that in the past, previous outbreaks of Ebola occurred primarily in remote villages, affected relatively few people, and burned themselves out. When the virus struck in 2014, most officials therefore thought the outbreak would run the same course. However, it did not. This time there was an increased transmission rate due to specific circumstances that caused the spread of the virus to urban areas. Consequently, the outbreak overwhelmed local and then regional health centres. The international community began to address the Ebola outbreak once it became clear it was an epidemic of unprecedented size and scale and had the potential become a threat to international peace and security. This is where the UK DFID, with support from the UK MoD, became involved. As such, the UK MoD deployed and sustained a 20-bed Ebola Treatment Unit (ETU), a 6-month deployment of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary ship RFA ARGUS that included three MERLIN helicopters for personnel and logistics lift, deployment of a Royal Marines Amphibious Detachment to provide riverine ferry service, and in extremis strategic Aero Medevac services.

COL Jackson highlighted that there were challenges in deploying these assets, and in operating with DFID. Key lessons and observations have since been identified in the areas of logistics, humanitarian operations, C2, information operations, prepare / project / protection of assets, and sustainment. In the final analysis, COL Jackson said that a rapid feedback loop was required for in theatre problem solving, and could feed into longer term preparations.

CDR Ray Glenn, from the US’ centre for Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis (JCOA) then presented the JCOA’s Study on the Ebola crisis, explaining the premise and importance of the study. JCOA conducted over 200 interviews and reviewed more than 300 documents relating to the research area. Findings were organized into six categories: Preparedness, Strategic Decision Making, Initial Military Response, Main Response – Support & Enable, Transition, and Implications for Future Operations.

According to CDR Glenn, the JCOA concluded from the key findings of the study that affected nations, the international community, and the US Government were ill-prepared to respond to the scale and severity of the Ebola outbreak (Preparedness). Debate about the nature and extent of the US Government response consumed critical time while the crisis worsened (Strategic Decision Making). The US Department of Defense (DoD) and Africa Command (AFRICOM) overcame several force projection challenges to establish the theatre for Operation UNITED ASSISTANCE (Initial Military Response). Overcoming initial complications, the DoD supported and enabled successful USAID-led whole of government efforts to contain Ebola (Main Response – Support & Enable). Transition efforts were planned in advance and executed effectively, however early force-sourcing decisions created complications (Transition). The Ebola crisis highlighted shortfalls in planning, policies, and preparedness across the DoD for response to global...
“The Ebola crisis highlighted shortfalls in planning, policies, and preparedness for response to global infectious disease outbreaks.”

infectious disease outbreaks (Implications for Future Operations).

MAJ Dr Jean-Baptiste Pohl, of the Direction Centrale du Service de Santé des Armées (DCSSA, French Central Army Health Service Directorate), followed CDR Glenn’s presentation and provided lessons from the French military intervention against Ebola in Guinea. France supported Ebola response initiatives in Guinea during the crisis due to the historical colonial connection between Guinea and France. France took a supporting role during the crisis, providing assistance in a variety of areas including: education, training, and awareness for health care workers; establishing safe and dignified burials; providing ETUs for health care workers; and helping establish sanitary border controls.

MAJ Dr Pohl also highlighted that their efforts helped establish isolation care and treatment practices. Guinean authorities were provided access to experienced medical staff, and advanced therapeutic and diagnostic laboratory capabilities. The French government also fostered coordination between local and French political authorities, as well as with relevant IOs and NGOs. The aim for the future is to ensure that Guinea be better prepared to deal with a similar scale of outbreak in the future.

The final panel speaker of the conference, LTC Dr Benjamin Queyriaux reviewed NATO’s lessons from the Ebola Crisis from the Military Medicine (MILMED)COE’s point of view. He reviewed their Lessons Learned methodology and the top five lessons relating to the Ebola crisis. First, he noted that during the Ebola crisis, Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) and Medical services provided a response together, removing the artificial borders between CBRN and Medical during this crisis. Second, during an outbreak such as the Ebola crisis, there is a necessity for triage. This was a missing element between ETUs and classical treatment facilities. Third, there overarching coordination is important to successfully managing a medical humanitarian crisis. This is because during the crisis, the allocation of military, IO, and NGO treatment facilities (mainly ETU) was uncoordinated. Fourth, existing doctrine and best practices were not applied during the crisis; standard operating procedure for treating patients on site was not applied to non-national healthcare workers during the crisis. Fifth, there is an identified requirement for a NATO Medical Intelligence unit. NATO medical planning and operations are currently based on a few Nations’ medical intelligence capabilities; NATO does not have any autonomy when it comes to gathering and utilizing medical intelligence.

LTC Dr Queyriaux concluded by noting NATO’s ability to respond to a crisis of the magnitude of the Ebola outbreak, was both positive and negative. NATO has the materiel, knowledge, and trained personnel to cope with managing such a humanitarian crisis. Moreover, CBRN and Medical capabilities worked well together. However, NATO requires a doctrinal push to improve and complete CBRN / Medical cooperation developments. An outbreak management coordination capability needs to be set up. There is a medical intelligence capability gap to correct.
How ACT supports NATO transformation

During the Conference, updates were provided by ACT. LTC Harribert Rahmel, from HQ SACT Capability Engineering and Innovation (CEI), Innovation, Doctrine and Lessons Learned (IDLL) Branch, updated the audience on the Force Development Board (FDB) and the Allied Joint Doctrine Campaign Plan (AJDCP). He outlined that the FDB was established to enable prioritization, direction, and synchronization of activities in the Force Development Cycle through the provision of cross-functional harmonization, mitigating risks, and taking opportunities to enhance delivery of strategic objectives. The FDB enables capability synchronization, mitigates plans for risks and exploitation, directs Lessons Learned activities, addresses new and emerging requirements, and drives the development of cohesive doctrine. Moreover, the FDB enables forward planning by turning the Force Development Cycle into a force development related activity across ACT.

LTC Rahmel, then discussed the AJDCP which improves the cohesion of Allied Joint Doctrine by providing a structured approach for prioritizing updates and revisions. The AJDCP is supplemented and endorsed by the Allied Joint Operations Doctrine Working Group, and approved by the Military Committee Joint Standardization Board. The AJDCP synchronizes doctrine development activities with exercises, concept development, and policy revisions. LTC Rahmel concluded the update by noting that ACT provides access to the three-star FDB, strategic level planning, and top down cohesion. These are all important elements of NATO transformation.

COL Santiago San Antonio, the JALLC’s chief Plans & Programming Division, presented an update on the JALLC’s current programme of work and completed projects from 2014-2015. COL San Antonio highlighted that JALLC reports have covered a wide range of topics in various areas including: training, doctrine, operations, concepts, and procedures. The JALLC has produced 169 analysis reports since 2002, and these reports have had a positive impact on NATO’s Transformation Agenda. The overview of recent JALLC and ongoing analysis projects / reports included: Cyber Defence, Ballistic Missile Defence C2, Two Decades of Lessons from Operations and Exercises, the NATO EXTRA Portal, Attack the Networks (AtN), Joint Logistics Support Group, Exercise TRIDENT JAGUAR 2014 and 2015, CIVCAS Reduction, Lessons Learned ISAF, Viability of Standing Naval Forces, and Regional Focus.

LTC Tiberiu Szmuck, from HQ SACT JFT, rounded off the NATO updates with a short presentation on the NATO EXTRA (EXercise, Training, Reporting and Analysis) Portal. LTC Szmuck explained that the NATO EXTRA Portal is the information sharing platform for the NATO EXTRA Community of Interest (COI). It is a hub of expertise and training related links, a library, a database, and an online forum board to exchange ideas. It can be used to announce events and share information within the EXTRA COI. LTC Szmuck concluded that the concept of a single centralized exercises and training related information sharing platform within NATO is a good idea for future versions of the EXTRA COI Portal, and needs to be further analysed.

NATO Updates:
LTC Harribert Rahmel, HQ SACT CEI/IDLL; COL Santiago San Antonio, JALLC P&P Division Head; LTC Tiberiu Szmuck, HQ SACT JFT
MAJ Philippe Belda of the CIED COE provided the conference audience with an update on the CIED COI Content Manager. He noted that experience gained in Afghanistan resulted in the understanding that there was a need to share CIED related lessons and develop a CIED COE. According to MAJ Belda, the purpose of the COI Content Manager was to share lessons related information, capture and share knowledge, and create a “one-stop-shop” portal for CIED related information such as: Lessons Learned / Lessons Identified, CIED knowledge, and information to successfully Attack the Networks. Most importantly, "we want to reduce the number of casualties. We do not want to "re learn" or "re observe" the lessons of early ISAF missions."

CDR Yusuf Uğur Kocabaş of the Defence Against Terrorism (DAT) COE, briefed the audience on NATO's counter terrorism experience in Afghanistan. CDR Kocabaş highlighted that the COE-DAT is necessary because terrorism is a challenging and real threat. The COE-DAT, therefore, undertakes research projects that are based on identified gaps in counterterrorism knowledge. CDR Yusuf Uğur Kocabaş, for instance, noted the DAT COE is conducting research on NATO's Counter-Terrorism Approach; Counter-Terrorism and Conflict Resolution; Crisis Management in Counter-Terrorism; Counter-Terrorism and Hybrid Warfare; Urbanization and Counter-Terrorism; and Leadership Targeting as a Strategy in the Struggle Against Terrorism. The DAT COE has contributed to many of NATO's current concepts such as the Strategic Foresight Analysis (SFA) and Attack the Network (AtN) Concept.

CDR Kocabaş concluded the update by reiterating that the DAT COE acts as a hub to connect relevant counterterrorism stakeholders. It provides subject matter expertise, conducts DAT-related training and education, supports NATO testing and validation, assists in doctrine development, and contributes to NATO standardization. Finally, the Military Police (MP) COE was represented by LTC Rafal Szczypinski. He noted in his update that, prior to the creation of the MP COE, there was no common MP Lessons Learned entity for NATO. Now, the MP COE is growing; it currently consists of eight Sponsoring Nations, one Partner Nation, and five potential Sponsoring Nations.

The mission of the MP COE is to enhance the capabilities of NATO MP forces, foster interoperability, and provide subject matter expertise on MP activities in accordance with the Alliance’s Strategic Concept. The MP COE’s Lessons Learned Branch’s primary responsibilities include gathering and analysing Lessons Identified and Lessons Learned and Best Practices; disseminating Lessons Learned; ensuring that Lessons Identified, Lessons Learned and Best Practices are incorporated into the NATO MP COE curriculum, and acting as a repository for related Lessons Learned and Best Practices in multinational operations.
Conference Agenda

TUESDAY, 10 NOVEMBER

09:00 - 09:10 | Admin Remarks – LTC Stephane Barret, JALLC

09:10 - 09:20 | COM JALLC Welcome – BG Mircea Mindrescu, COM JALLC

09:20 - 09:35 | Conference Opening – General Mirco Zuliani, DSACT

Panel: Lessons from past and ongoing operations are a major driver for NATO transformation – A Strategic Perspective

Strategic lessons from past and ongoing operations need to be identified, analysed, and shared in order to inform NATO transformation.

09:35 - 09:55 | Key Speaker: LTG Michel Yakovleff, VCOS SHAPE – Strategic lessons from the ongoing operations

09:55 - 10:10 | Strategic lessons from ISAF – BG Mircea Mindrescu, COM JALLC

10:10 - 10:30 | How ISAF reduced Civilian Casualties – Mr. John Redmayne, JALLC

10:30 - 10:55 | Panel Discussion

10:55 - 11:25 | BREAK

Panel: Lessons from past and ongoing operations are a major driver for NATO transformation – An Air Perspective

Air operations are frequently the primary military solution of choice to an evolving crisis. Strategic and operational lessons from air operations, led by NATO or International Coalitions, should be used to inform the Alliance’s transformation.

11:25 - 11:45 | Key Speaker: MG Peter E. Gersten, Deputy Commanding General for CJTF-OIR – What Lessons from CJTF - Operation Inherent Resolve can be integrated by NATO?

11:45 - 12:05 | Lessons from previous Air Operations and current planning considerations – BG Mehmet Yalinalp, DCOS PLANS HQ AIRCOM

12:05 - 12:25 | Panel Discussion

NATO Updates – How ACT supports NATO transformation

12:25 - 12:45 | Force Development Board and Allied Joint Doctrine Campaign Plan (AJDCP) – LTC Harribert Rahmel, HQ SACT CEI/IDLL


12:55 - 13:05 | The NATO EXTRA COI Portal; Way Ahead and Future Usage – LTC Tiberius Szmuck, HQ SACT JFT

13:05 - 13:20 | Group PHOTO

13:20 - 14:20 | LUNCH

COE Updates – How COEs contribute to NATO transformation

14:20 - 14:30 | C-IED Community of Interest Content Manager - 'Reality vs Intentions – MAJ Philippe Belda, LL Section Chief, C-IED COE

14:30 - 14:45 | Getting value from hidden Lessons: NATO’s Counter Terrorism
TUESDAY, 10 NOVEMBER

Experience in Afghanistan – CDR Yusuf Uğur Kocabaş, LL Branch Chief, DAT COE

14:45 - 15:00 | The NATO Military Police LL Capability Team as the platform to support NATO Military Police to prepare and conduct present and future operations – LTC Rafał Szczypinski, LL Branch Head, MP COE

15:00 - 15:30 | BREAK

Panel: Lessons from Exercises are essential to NATO transformation – The Training Audience’s Perspective

Lessons from exercises are essential to NATO transformation by contributing directly to maintaining a collective set of national forces, the NATO Command Structure and the NATO Force Structure interoperable and with full range of capabilities and structures for the Alliance to meet its level of ambition.

15:30 - 15:50 | Key Speaker: LTG Riccardo Marchio, COM NRDC-ITA – Key Lessons from recent Exercises and NFS Joint C2 standby period

15:50 - 16:10 | Key lessons from recent Exercises and the build-up to TRIDENT JET 16 from the Bi-SC Dir 075-003 perspective – BG Mehmet Yalinalp, DCOS PLANS HQ AIRCOM

16:10 - 16:30 | Key lessons from BALTOPS 15 as part of the wider Allied Shield – LTC Gary Green, STRIKFORNATO

16:30 - 16:55 | Panel Discussion

16:55 - 17:05 | Daily Wrap-Up and Admin Remarks – LTC Stephane Barret, JALLC
Lessons from exercises are essential to NATO transformation by contributing directly to maintaining a collective set of national forces, the NATO Command Structure and the NATO Force Structure interoperable and with full range of capabilities and structures for the Alliance to meet its level of ambition.

08:50 - 09:10 | Key Speaker: MG Reinhard Wolski, COM JWC – JWC/ODE Key Lessons from directing recent NATO Exercises from the BiSC Dir 075-003 perspective

09:10 - 09:30 | JFT/OSE Key Lessons from Scheduling TRIDENT Series Exercises – BG Dzintars Roga, ACOS JFT/JETE

09:30 - 09:50 | JFTC Key Lessons from recent exercise/training events – BG Wojciech Grabowski, COM JFTC

10:50 - 11:10 | Key Speaker: BG Henrik Sommer, ACOS CEI – How ACT intends to capture Lessons in order to support NATO transformation?

11:10 - 11:30 | How LI feed development of operational standards to include doctrine and what should be improved? – Mr Dieter Schmaglowski, Deputy Director NSO

11:30 - 11:50 | How LL feed the NDPP and what should be improved? – CAPT Mark Cooper, Branch Head of NDPP, HQ SACT

11:50 - 12:10 | A success story: How Lessons from AMN feed the development of the FMN concept – COL Francois-Regis Boulvert, FMN Coordinator, HQ SACT

12:10 - 12:35 | Panel Discussion

12:35 - 13:35 | LUNCH

Panel: How NATO can better interact with Non-NATO entities?

The international security environment and recent crises on the international stage have shown that close cooperation between NATO and Non-NATO actors is a prerequisite for the successful management of such crises.
WEDNESDAY, 11 NOVEMBER

13:35 - 13:55 | Key Speaker: Mrs Loredana Alemanno Testa, Ops Div Protection of Civilians Section Head, NATO IS – How can NATO improve its cooperation with Non-NATO entities?

13:55 - 14:15 | What lessons ICRC drew from its cooperation with NATO? – Mr Gilles Hansoul, ICRC

14:15 - 14:35 | What lessons UNOCHA drew from its interaction with NATO? – Mrs Teresa Encarnação, Emergency Services Branch, UNOCHA

14:35 - 14:55 | How can NATO improve its cooperation with Non-NATO entities? – LTC Lars Cramer-Larsen, LL Branch Chief, CIMIC COE

14:55 - 15:15 | Panel Discussion

15:15 - 15:45 | BREAK

Panel: What lessons Non-NATO entities drew from their interaction/cooperation with NATO in Afghanistan?

During its presence in Afghanistan, NATO interacted and cooperated with Non-NATO entities present in theatre. These entities drew their own lessons from this cooperation and interaction with NATO.

15:45 - 16:05 | Key Speaker: Mrs Danielle Bell, Director of Human Rights, UNAMA – What lessons UNAMA drew from its cooperation with ISAF?

16:05 - 16:25 | What lessons SIGAR drew from its interaction with NATO? – Mr Gene Aloise, SIGAR Deputy Inspector General

16:25 - 16:45 | What lessons USAID drew from its cooperation with NATO (ISAF)? – Mr Alan Van Egmond, USAID, Senior Advisor to US DoS Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan

16:45 - 17:05 | Panel Discussion

17:05 - 17:15 | Daily Wrap-Up and Admin Remarks – LTC Stephane Barret, JALLC
Panel: Key lessons from Crisis Management operations – Ukraine Crisis: A Political/Military Perspective

The recent crisis in Ukraine has caused the Alliance to adopt Assurance Measures and Adaptation Measures in order to respond to the changes in the international security environment. There are lessons from both the political and military perspectives as a result of how that Crisis has been managed that require identification, analysis, and should be shared in order to contribute to NATO transformation.

08:50 - 09:10 | Key Speaker: BG Gianmarco Badialetti, Deputy Director for Operations, NATO IMS – Lessons from a political/military perspective

09:10 - 09:30 | Lessons from a strategic perspective – COL Jon Acornley, SHAPE CCOMC

09:30 - 09:50 | Lessons from OSCE engagement that could apply for NATO – Mr David Campion, OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre

09:50 - 10:10 | Panel Discussion

10:10 - 10:40 | BREAK

Panel: Key lessons from Crisis Management operations – Ebola: Management of a Humanitarian Crisis

The humanitarian crisis resulting from the outbreak of Ebola, and its significance to the international community in general, could be considered as potential source of lessons and best practices which should be identified, analysed, and shared in order to contribute to NATO’s transformation in support of managing future humanitarian crises.

10:40 - 11:10 | Key Speaker: COL Andrew Jackson, GBR AD Lessons Exploitation Centre – Lessons from the military engagement in Sierra-Leone (with support of MAJ Lee Rickard)


11:30 - 11:40 | Lessons from the military engagement in Guinea – MC Jean-Baptiste Pohl, FRA DCSSA

11:40 - 12:05 | What lessons from the Ebola Crisis should be captured by NATO? – LTC Benjamin Queyriaux, DHSC Head, MILMED COE

12:05 - 12:35 | Panel Discussion

12:35 - 12:45 | Admin Remarks – LTC Stephane Barret, JALLC

12:45 - 13:00 | Conference Closure – BG Mircea Mindrescu, COM JALLC

13:00 - 14:00 | LUNCH
Supporting SACT with evidence based Lessons from Operations and Exercises — Two Decades of Lessons from Operations and Exercises (November 2014)

NATO Lessons Learned Portal: Since 2010 over 1500 users have joined the Portal, uploading more than 1000 documents and lessons. The Portal currently hosts 14 Community of Interest Sites, with six more under development.

JALLC Analysis Report Endorsement Rate 2015: 80%.

Supporting Commander ISAF in identifying Lessons from NATO’s counter- and anti-corruption efforts in Afghanistan — Counter- and Anti-Corruption: Theory and Practice from NATO Operations (May 2013)

NATO Lessons Learned Conference: Annual Lessons Learned based conference, three days, topical theme, panel discussions and presentations; 250-300 Participants; 35-40 nations, IO’s, NGO’s.

Supporting the Joint Warfare Centre to improve NATO’s collective exercises and training — Conducting and Resourcing Combined Training Events and Exercises (November 2012)

NATO Lessons Learned Staff Officers Course: 652 officers and civilians from 45 nations, including 130 students from Partner nations, have completed the course.

Supporting the International Military Staff by identifying the military requirements for NATO’s Attack the Networks capability, in order to contribute to its improvement. — Attack the Networks (May 2015)

Supporting the International Military Staff to improve NATO’s efforts to prevent Civilian Casualties (CIVCAS) by analysing how ISAF significantly reduced CIVAS — Protection of Civilians (February 2015)

JATT Outreach: 450 engagement days outside the JALLC to around 35 nations in Europe, Asia, Australia, and North America.
WHAT PEOPLE ARE SAYING...

"This year's conference has been another great opportunity to exchange ideas and discuss challenges."

"I was surprised by the quantity and quality of the information presented; well done!"

"The facilities were excellent, the staff friendly, and the content interesting."

"I would recommend attending this conference to anyone from the Lessons Learned Community or anyone who is interested in learning more about how NATO learns."

"My key take away is that we have a lot to do, but now I have a better idea of where to start and who to talk to."

CONFERENCE COMMITMENTS

The JALLC will continue to publish high quality and intellectually honest analysis products that document NATO's learning and steer leaders' understanding of the problems we face. The JALLC will continue to provide and improve the tools for learning and sharing, such as our handbooks and training courses, that help you provide a similar product for your leaders. More specifically, we will continue to improve the NLLP so that it becomes the preeminent sharing tool for all of you. Finally, we will continue to provide support to all of you in developing your own organizations' Lessons Learned capability.

As in past years, you must champion learning in your organization and push sharing with others, whether you are a Lessons Learned practitioner, an operator, or a leader. You must make sure that, when appropriate, your learning is reflected in our doctrine, policies, directives, and plans. You must contribute your learning as requested by the JALLC, SACT and SACEUR and make suggestions to improve the NATO Lessons Learned Process, the NLLP sharing and staffing areas, and other Lessons Learned tools. Promote the use of the NLLP and the NATO EXTRA Portal, suggest our Lessons Learned Staff Officers Course and our JALLC Analyst Training Course, and remember to visit the JALLC website for regular updates of what is going on at the JALLC.
CONFERENCE STATISTICS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Attendance</th>
<th>276</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO National Bodies</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partner National Bodies</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attendees from IOs</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO National Representation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National MOD &amp; Joint Staff</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Commands/HQs</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Training/Doctrine/ LL Centres</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Nations Represented</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO Representation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO HQ</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agencies</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCS HQs</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NFS HQs</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COEs</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partner National Representation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National MOD &amp; Joint Staff</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Commands/HQs</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Training/Doctrine/ LL Centres</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOs &amp; NGOs</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A complete list of attendees with contact details is available on the Conference site, accessible via the NATO LL Portal.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

The JALLC wishes to thank the following organizations and individuals for their support to and efforts during and after this Conference:

The Portuguese Army Military Academy for allowing us to use the facilities, and for their support in IT, catering, and admin during the Conference itself.

All the speakers and presenters without whom there could be no Conference.

The United States Navy Reserve NATO ACT Detachment Atlanta, Georgia, for their outstanding editorial and administrative support.

COL Fernando Duarte, LTC Stephane Barret, Mr Stefan Olaru and MAJ Srecko Gogic, the lead Conference planners for this year’s Conference. Ms Jodie Lazell, CDR Marcos Sevilla and Mr Kyle Christensen for their editorial support in producing this report, as well as the rest of my staff from Administration, Registry & Base Support Group, IM& CIS, and BUDFIN branches who assisted in its execution.

Finally, all the attendees for your engagement and enthusiasm in helping to make NATO into a successful learning organization.

MARK YOUR CALENDARS

CONFERENCE 2016

The 2016 NATO LL Conference will be held October 2016 in Lisbon. The dates will be confirmed during the 2nd Quarter of 2016.

The 2016 NATO LL Conference will aim to build on this year’s success by further exploring how we learn and share.

To do so, we will again try to achieve a balance in attendees and presenters between Operators, who can tell us what NATO is learning, and LL Practitioners, who will tell us how we are capturing and institutionalizing that learning.
The JALLC was established in Lisbon, Portugal, in September 2002 as NATO’s lead agency for the analysis of operations, training and experiments, and for the dissemination of Lessons Learned. The precursor body to the JALLC was the Permanent Maritime Analysis Team (PAT) based at Northwood, UK.

The PAT was established in 1978 and conducted operational analysis of NATO maritime exercises. The PAT formed the core of the team tasked with analysis of the NATO IFOR and SFOR operations in the Former Yugoslavia which concluded that NATO lacked a standing joint analysis capability, ultimately leading to the operational requirement for the JALLC to be approved by the NATO Military Committee in June 1997.

The implementation concept, recommending the JALLC be located in Portugal as the most efficient and effective location for NATO’s analysis and Lessons Learned capability, was submitted to the International Military Staff in January 2000 and approved by the Military Committee on 07 December 2001. Finally, on 02 May 2002, the North Atlantic Council approved the activation of the JALLC as a NATO Military Body from 02 September 2002 and the simultaneous de-activation of the PAT. The JALLC was formally opened on 06 December 2002 and declared full operational capability on 28 March 2006.

Our Mission

Today, the JALLC is NATO’s centre for performing Joint Analysis of operations, training, exercises and experiments, based on analysis requirements generated by both NATO strategic commands. The JALLC supports the exchange of Lessons Learned and facilitates the development of Lessons Learned Capabilities, reinforcing the continuous transformation and modernization of NATO’s forces and capabilities.

Our Role & Tasks

The JALLC, as part of the NATO Command Structure, and subordinate to HQ Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT), provides analysis support to operations, training, exercises, and experimentation. The JALLC also supports the overarching NATO Lessons Learned capability by maintaining and managing the NATO Lessons Learned Portal; providing (joint) analysis and Lessons Learned training; and engaging, through the JALLC Advisory & Training Team (JATT), with NATO commands and the Allies, partners, and other entities to support their Lessons Learned capability development. In addition the JALLC provides a wide range of support services to the NATO Force Structure and Agency Structure in Portugal.
Joint Analysis

Why does NATO need Joint Analysis?

The results of the JALLC’s Joint Analysis of tasked Analysis Requirements (see below) are used to support decisions that will result in enduring improvements, Lessons Learned (LL), and the subsequent Transformation of the Alliance. The relationship between these terms forms the fundamental basis of the JALLC’s Mission. As well as its use in support of LL processes, analysis provides decision-making support to NATO in other areas, including day to day operations; Capability Development; Concept Development; and Training. The JALLC conducts its Joint Analysis projects in accordance with the JALLC Project Approach (JPA), an adaption of the PRINCE2® (Projects IN a Controlled Environment) approach, which ensures the focus on quality and timeliness of JALLC analysis products. The JPA leads projects through a five stage approach with the Planning, Executing, and Production Stages housing the majority of the key analysis activities. Within the stages, analysis activities are divided into phases at the end of which a quality control check takes place to ensure the project is running according to plan and meets the JALLC’s high quality standards.

How does the JALLC conduct Joint Analysis?

Refer to Revision 2 of JALLC SOP/PD for further details. PAF = Project Assessment Review. PMB = Project Management Board. JL&L = NATO Lessons Learned Portal.
The Analysis Tasking Process

The JALLC is tasked by Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT) to carry out a wide range of analysis projects based on Analysis Requirements (AR) generated from both NATO strategic commands based on NATO-wide requests for analysis. ARs are enduring issues that affect NATO and require further analysis to ensure the Alliance learns and transforms.

ARs can be proposed by any NATO command within Allied Command Operations (ACO) via Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). SHAPE prioritizes ACO’s ARs for operations and exercises and forwards them to HQ SACT where they are merged with Allied Commander Transformation’ (ACT) ARs for exercises, training, experimentation and capability development. Additionally, the NATO Nations, the International Military Staff (IMS), and International Staff (IS) can submit proposals for analysis to HQ SACT.

HQ SACT and SHAPE cooperatively prioritize all the ARs and develop the Prioritized Analysis Requirements List (PARL). The PARL is used to design a responsive and balanced JALLC Programme of Work (POW) which is revised twice a year to reflect the operational and transformational needs of NATO. However, if new issues arise, they may be inserted into the JALLC POW as Emergent Analysis Requirements (EARs).

Lessons Learned

What are Lessons Learned?

The term Lessons Learned (LL) is broadly used to describe people, things and activities related to the act of learning from experience to achieve improvements. The idea of Lessons Learned in an organization is that through a formal approach to learning, individuals and the organization can reduce the risk of repeating mistakes and increase the chance that successes are repeated. In the military context, this means reduced operational risk, increased cost efficiency, and improved operational effectiveness.

NATO’s Lessons Learned Capability

In September 2011, the North Atlantic Council approved the revised NATO Lessons Learned Policy which provides the overarching policy for Lessons Learned in NATO. NATO defines its Lessons Learned capability as follows:

"A Lessons Learned capability provides a commander with the structure, process and tools necessary to capture, analyse and take remedial action on any issue and to communicate and share results to achieve improvement."

The NATO Lessons Learned capability comprises several important elements. Strong leadership support and a positive Lessons Learned mindset across an organization are extremely important, governing the success of real learning, sustained improvement and profitable knowledge-sharing among the Allies.
The NATO Lessons Learned Process is divided into several phases. The process starts with the Analysis Phase in which the Root Cause of an observation and potential Remedial Action is identified. This is where the JALLC is often asked to step in to conduct analysis and provide the observing organization with the information it needs to follow the rest of the process. The output of this Analysis Phase is a Lesson Identified (LI).

An LI is then sent through the Remedial Action Phase during which it is Endorsed and Action Bodies are tasked with the implementation of the LI. Following successful validation of the LI, it is deemed an LL and the formal process concludes. However, it is important that the LL is further disseminated and published via the NATO Lessons Learned Portal, which is managed by the JALLC, to ensure the LL is put into NATO-wide practice.

The NATO Lessons Learned Conference

Since 2003, the JALLC has hosted the annual NATO Lessons Learned Conference (NLLC) on behalf of Supreme Allied Commander Transformation. This event brings together participants from NATO and National entities and provides an opportunity to exchange knowledge, experience, and expertise within the NATO Lessons Learned Community, stimulating discussions on how to improve NATO’s Joint Analysis and the Lessons Learned capability, enabling the continuous transformation of the Alliance.
Outreach, Support, and Education

Besides its core activities of conducting Joint Analysis and contributing to the Lessons Learned process, the JALLC performs a host of other activities which are of great importance to the Alliance and its Transformation:

**Outreach:** The JALLC’s Advisory and Training Team (JATT) was established to support ACT outreach activities and assists NATO, Nations, and other organizations to enhance and/or develop their Lessons Learned Capability by offering advice and training on analysis and the NATO Lessons Learned Capability.

**Support to Exercises:** The JALLC provides training and advice on the NATO Lessons Learned Process throughout Exercise Planning Process to NATO LL staff officers employed in exercises and can provide direct support, acting as a Lessons Learned advisory body, during Exercise Phase IIIb upon request. The JALLC also manages and maintains the NATO EXTRA Portal, the single.

**NATO Lessons Learned Conference (NLLC):** Each year the JALLC organizes the NLLC which is an important event in the Lessons Learned calendar. The conference brings together the NATO Lessons Learned Community and provides an excellent opportunity for the exchange of information and discussion on the Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned processes.

**Training:** The JALLC Analyst Training Course (JATC) is a five-day course which is held twice a year by the JALLC. It covers a wide range of issues and topics related to the conduct of analysis at the JALLC, including the JALLC Project Approach (JPA) and basic statistical analysis. The JALLC also runs the NATO Lessons Learned Staff Officers (LLSO) Course, held three times a year and hosted by SWEDINT. This course covers the management and execution of an organizational Lessons Learned process using NATO Lessons Learned related processes, training, tools, and information sharing in order to develop a Lessons Learned capability.

The JALLC also provides a wide range of support services to the NATO Force Structure and Agency Structure in Portugal.
The NATO Lessons Learned Portal

The JALLC developed and manages the NATO Lessons Learned Portal (NLLP) which is NATO's key tool for sharing of Lessons Learned and related information. The NLLP is a centralized platform, allowing the NATO Lessons Learned Community to share LL related documents, such as overarching reference documents, operational, experimental and exercises-related lessons (Observations, Li, LL) and other documents relevant to Communities of Interest (CoI).

The NLLP also supports NATO’s various CoI's, providing them with access to the portal's libraries as well as dedicated CoI features including areas to announce events and share ideas. The NLLP also supports the planning of Lessons Learned activities and includes an interface with dedicated Lessons Learned courses.

**JALLC Products**

The JALLC produces a large quantity of analysis and related products each year:

- **JALLC Analysis Products**: Since its inauguration the JALLC has published over 150 Analysis Reports. The JALLC publishes 6-8 Analysis Reports each year with an average endorsement rate of 75%. In addition to analysis reports, the JALLC can develop tailor-made products such as applications, dashboards, and internet portals.

- **Factsheets**: The JALLC produces an unclassified, ready for public consumption, summary (two pages) of each report that it publishes.

- **Handbooks and Guides**: The JALLC maintains the NATO Lessons Learned Handbook, the Joint Analysis Handbook and several guides such as the NATO EXTRA Portal User Manual.

- **Brochures**: The JALLC publishes brochures on its key activities and products, including on the JPA, the JATT, and the NATO EXTRA Portal.

- **The Explorer**: The JALLC’s own newsletter which features the latest news and interesting articles highlighting the JALLC’s work.

- **The NLLC Report**: The summary of the annual NATO Lessons Learned Conference.
The JALLC at a Glance

How to get JALLC Support

NATO organizations can submit analysis requirements through their chain of command to SHAPE and HQ SACT for consideration in the JALLC’s biannual Programme of Work. Urgent requirements can be submitted outside the Programme of Work if required. For more information on the JALLC, our activities, and how to engage the JALLC, visit our website: www.jallc.nato.int

Brigadier-General, Mircea Mindrescu
Romanian Army
Commander JALLC

Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre

Avenida Tenente Martins - Monsanto
1500-589 Lisboa, Portugal
Phone: +351 217 717 007/8/9
Fax: +351 217 717 098
E-mail: jallc@jallc.nato.int

Supporting Intelligent Change

How we do it....

Supporting the Exercise and Training Community of Interest by developing the NATO EXTRA Portal allowing for improved sharing of Lessons and experience - The NATO EXTRA Portal (January 2015).

Supporting SHAPE’s efforts to harmonize the RAP with the CFAO by developing a document research application - The HYperlinked Document Reference Application: HYDRA (July 2015)

Supporting HQ SACT to identify shortfalls in NATO’s Cyber Defence and improve the NATO Command Structure’s ability to respond to Cyber Threats - Cyber Defence Situational Awareness in NATO (October 2014)
One of our Success Stories...

Attack the Networks (AtN) – In this report, published in March 2015, the JALLC explores the need for a new and broader AtN concept, which the JALLC has termed Network Identification and Engagement. This new concept considers AtN outside the scope of Counter-Improvised Explosive Devices, where it was initially developed, and looks at how it can be further developed as a capability. This report was sent by the International Military Staff (IMS) to all Military Representatives for consideration.

The JALLC received a personal letter of thanks from the International Staff, Emerging Security Challenges Division, and the IMS Intelligence Division, praising the excellence of the work done and its importance to the Alliance, commenting in particular on the comprehensive nature of the study and the high level of professionalism and expertise of the project team.

Upcoming JALLC Projects:

The JALLC is currently working on the following projects from its 2015 Programme of Work:

Two Decades II – Commanders’ Insights: This is the follow-on study from the 2014 study on Two Decades of Lessons from Operations and Exercises and will look specifically at NATO Commander’s insights and experience - December 2015.

International Organizations (IO) & NGOs in the NCMP: This study will investigate the interaction between IOs & NGOs and NATO in the context of NATO’s crisis management planning - January 2016.

NAEW&C: The purpose of this study is to derive observations and lessons from the NATO E-3A capability in order to support the development of the Alliance Future Surveillance and Control capability - January 2016.

Regional Focus Implementation: This study will examine how Regional Focus has been implemented in NATO in recent years and how it could further be improved in the context of the NATO’s Readiness Action Plan - February 2016.

Find out more about the JALLC

If you want to find out more about the JALLC—the organization, our activities, and products, or how to get in touch with us—, visit our website: www.jallc.nato.int. You will also find useful information on our training courses, links to factsheets, handbooks, guides, and other publications, as well as the link to the NATO Lessons Learned Portal.