


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CAPTURED PERSONS, MATERIEL AND DOCUMENTS



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
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NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION
NATO STANDARDIZATION AGENCY (NSA)
NATO LETTER OF PROMULGATION

8 August 2007

1. AJP-2.5(A) – HANDLING OF CAPTURED PERSONS, MATERIEL AND DOCUMENTS is a NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED publication. The agreement of nations to use this publication is recorded in STANAG 2195.
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Juan A. MORENO
Vice Admiral, ESP(N)
Director, NATO Standardization Agency



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RECORD OF SPECIFIC RESERVATIONS

NATION	SPECIFIC RESERVATIONS
BEL	<p>1) Owing to the medical profession secrecy the Belgian Ministry of Fefence consider the sentence "list any wounds, injuries, illnesses" in Point 27 of Appendix 1 to Annex K as non-existing</p> <p>2) The Belgian Ministry of Defence considres that, in view of Appendix 2 to Annex K, the "Medical records" will be handled according to the applicable medical professionsecrecy standards.</p> <p>3) With the rspect to Paragraph 0707,2,d,(4), the Belgian Ministry of Defence interprets the "safety of the CPERS" as the "medical safety of the CPERS"</p>
NLD	<p>Further to paragraph 0104 under 2 and paragraph 0105 under 1, The Netherlands will apply the Additional Protocol I (1977) and relevant sections of the Third Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War (1949) to determine the status of captured personnel during an armed conflict. The Netherlands thus considers the stipulations of the Additional Protocol I (1977) to have been incorporated into Annex V and the glossary of AJP-2.5(A).</p>
USA	<p>A. The United Staes of America(USA) does not subscribe to the generic application of the Geneva Conventions as implied in paragraphs 0104.1, 0302.3.b, 0303.2.d, 0702.1.a(3), and 0706.1. Not all captured personnel meet the criteria of an enemy prisoner of war(EPW) under GC3 or that of a protected person as set forth in GC4. For those individuals who do not meet the requirements of either GC3 or GC4, the USA will apply Department of Defense Policy as set forth in DOD Directive 5100.77. It is Department of Defense Policy that members of Armed Forces will comply with the law of war during all armed conflicts, no matter how they are characterized, and in all other military operations. The Law of war is defined as: That part of international law that regulates the conduct of armed hostilities. It is often called the "law of armed conflict." The law of war encompasses all international law for the conduct of hostilities binding on the United States or its individual citizens, including treaties and international agreements to which the Unites States is a party, and applicable customary international law.</p> <p>B. The USA does not subscribe to language in Para. 0104.3, the provision that any detainee who is not an enemy prisoner of war or is protected under GC4 will be handed over to competent civilian authorities. The USA will comply with US policy regarding any individual detained who does not meet the requirements of the Geneva Convention.</p> <p>C. The USA does not subscribe to the language in paragraphs 0204.1.c(1) and 0805.1.b, to the extent that captured persons (CPERs) do not meet the criteria of GC3 or GC4. The USA shall treat all CPERs humanely and in accordance with applicable law and US policy as provided in US domestic law and the laws of war.</p> <p>D. The USA does not subscribe to the 24 hours and 72 hours timelines for keeping CPERs at collecting points and holding areas as set forth in paragraphs 0302.01, 0302.2, G001.6, and G002.12. Within the operational environment, the amount of time CPERs stay at collecting points and holding areas is a function of security and operational considerations, which include ensuring the safety of CPERs. The US will keep detainees at collecting points and holding areas only as long as circumstances require based on security/operational conditions and available transportation.</p>

USA	<p>E. The USA does not subscribe to Para. 0303.2.e, as it is inconsistent with current US policy. The USA will comply with applicable law and policy as provided in US law, policy and the laws of war.</p> <p>F. The USA does not agree with the word "communicate" in Para. 0303.7. The USA will comply with Article 70, GC3, which provides that an enemy prisoner of war may "write" to his family. Further, Article 70 only applies to capture cards. It does not provide for "letters, cards and emails." The USA will comply with Article 71, GC3, with respect to correspondence.</p> <p>G. The USA does not subscribe to the International Committee of the Red Cross(ICRC) having the right to "investigate" or "inspect" USA facilities per Para. 0304.1 and Annex M, page M-1. The ICRC mission is to be an impartial, neutral and independent organization whose exclusively humanitarian mission is to protect the lives and dignity of victims of war and internal violence, and to provide them with assistance. It directs and coordinates the international relief activities conducted by the movement in situations of conflict. It also endeavours to prevent suffering by promoting and strengthening humanitarian law and universal humanitarian principles.</p> <p>H. The USA does not subscribe to the ICRC being allowed unfettered access to individual CPERS held in interrogation facilities as per Para. 0401.1. While the USA agrees that ICRC may have access to interrogation facilities, the Geneva Conventions specifically recognize that access to CPERS by the ICRC may be limited for reasons of "imperative military necessity" under GC3, Article 126.</p> <p>I. The USA does not use the term "international humanitarian law" in Para. 0801.2. The USA uses the term "law of war" or "Law of Armed Conflict." The USA will comply with the law of war as described in reservation "a" above.</p> <p>J. The USA does not subscribe to the practice of allowing prisoners of war (POWs) to maintain possessions of medical supplies in Annex L, Para. L004 and Annex V, POW HANDLING ORGANISATION / ACTION AT COLLECTING POINT table. USA policy is that any medical supplies, especially medications found in the possession of the POWs at time of capture, must be confiscated, placed in a locked container, and identified with POW's name and capture tag number. This ensures the POW's safety by preventing the risk of individual suicide attempts or use of medical supplies by other POWs for suicide attempts while in custody. In addition, there is no guarantee that substances reported to be prescription drugs or medical supplies are in fact prescription drugs or medical supplies. Such substances should be assessed for medical intelligence value and determined by competent medical authority to be what they are reported to be. Medical supplies can be subsequently provided in a controlled, prescribed manner. If medical personnel of an enemy force are detained as captured personnel, captured medical supplies and drugs can be distributed to them for the purpose of providing medical care to POWs within areas designated by the Coalition as POW medical treatment areas.</p>

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

0101 Purpose

The purpose of this publication is to provide guidance on the procedures for the handling and administration of captured persons (CPERS) and their effects, for the interrogation of CPERS, as well as the procedures for the handling and reporting of captured materiel (CMAT) and documents (CDOCs) within the NATO alliance. It is also intended to improve cooperation between NATO forces during operations and provide a sound procedural base for instruction in the service schools and establishments of NATO and its member states.

0102 Scope

This publication is intended to cover the handling of CPERS, CMAT and CDOCs in operations across the spectrum of armed conflict. Since warfighting is the basis for the ability of NATO to conduct other types of operations, the procedures outlined in this publication are primarily applicable to conventional military operations. However, the adaptation of these procedures to other types of operations such as Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations (NA5CRO) and Defence Against Terrorism Operations (DATOs) is also addressed. The publication also provides general guidelines for the handling of CPERS, CMAT and CDOCs in multinational operations based on the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept with the participation of both NATO member Nations and coalition partners.

0103 Terms and Definitions

1. Terms, definitions, acronyms and abbreviations used in this publication are explained in the Glossary.
2. For purposes of convenience, a CPERS, either a prisoner of war (POW) or other detained person¹, is referred to throughout the publication as "he". However, it should be remembered that a CPER may be male or female. Where particular procedures refer to female POWs or other detained person, this will be made clear in the text of the publication.
3. The term "Detaining Power" will, throughout this publication, have the meaning given in the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 12 August 1949 (GC3) and the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949 (GC4).

0104 Prisoner of War Status

1. CPERS can be divided into two broad categories: CPERS who are POWs and other persons whose liberty has been restricted. All CPERS enjoy the protections of the GCs as set forth in GC4, Article 4, or other applicable international law while in the custody of a Detaining Power.

¹ In this context the term "detained person" does not include refugees, displaced persons and other persons who have been detained for their own protection. It does, however, include retained personnel.

2. POW status is conferred on CPERS who fall within the categories listed in Article 4 of GC3. These categories are included in the definition of a POW in the Glossary, or, if ratified by the nations concerned, those who meet the expanded definition of a POW as stated in Protocol I of the 1977 Protocols².

3. Should any doubt arise as to whether any persons, including those appearing to be POWs, having committed a belligerent act and having fallen into Allied hands, belong to any of the categories of persons entitled to POW status pursuant to article 4 of GC3, such persons shall enjoy the protection of GC3 until such time as their status has been determined by a competent tribunal. If such a tribunal determines that an individual does not qualify for POW status, then the Detaining Power must determine whether the detained person qualifies as a "protected person" pursuant to GC4 and obtain legal advice relative to the proper course of action for dealing with such detained persons. If it is determined that these detained persons do not have POW or protected status, they will be handed over to competent civilian authorities (national, United Nations or authorities of other international organisations) or held in the custody of a NATO force in accordance with the provisions of the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) for that particular operation or mission.

4. Furthermore, when NATO forces are engaged in NA5CROs including DATOs, the MOA should contain specific guidelines as to which individuals will have POW status in accordance with applicable international law. Directions for handling other detained persons, once their status has been determined by a competent authority, including those suspected of terrorism, crimes against humanity, war crimes or other crimes, are also to be included in the MOA relevant to that particular operation or mission. These procedures are described in general terms in Chapters 7 and 8.

5. Children captured as participants in a hostile action will be detained and handled in accordance with applicable international law³. They will be segregated from adult CPERS.

0105 The Geneva Conventions

1. Treatment of POWs as well as the handling of personal possessions including personal documents belonging to them will at all times be in accordance with GC3 and, if ratified by the nations concerned, with the 1977 Protocols².

2. Treatment of other detained persons as well as the handling of their personal possessions and documents will at all times be in accordance with applicable international law.

0106 The Detaining Power

1. The responsibilities of the "Detaining Power" as set out in GC3 rest with the nation which initiated the capture or detention of the CPERS in question. CPERS awaiting the determination of their real status are considered as POWs. Both such CPERS and confirmed POWs may only be transferred by the Detaining Power in accordance with the conditions laid down in GC3, Article 12 (2). NATO is not a state and, therefore, cannot itself be a party to treaties and other international instruments relating

² It should be noted that not all NATO member nations have ratified the 1977 Additional Protocols. However, nations should honour those provisions of the Protocols that they consider customary international law.

³ GC4 and the Additional Protocols refer to CPERS under the age of 15 as children. GC3 does not address the issue of children captured as active participants in an armed conflict. This issue will be referred to the member nations for legal guidance and should be addressed in the MOA, if relevant to the particular operation or mission. Guidance may also be found in the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child of 20 November 1989 and in the Optional Protocol of 25 May 2000 to this Convention on the involvement of children in armed conflict. (For the purposes of that Convention, a child means every human being below the age of 18 years unless, under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier.)

to the conduct of armed conflict. Individual NATO troop contributing nations may, of course, be a party to such international instruments. In NATO-led operations, a lead nation may be designated to receive POWs from of other NATO nations participating in the operation. A MOA may be entered into to govern the procedures for transfer and the responsibilities of the designated nation following transfer. Any such arrangements must be in accordance with GC3, Article 12.

0107 Knowledge of the Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Protocols

1. The Geneva Conventions require the signatories in time of both peace and war to circulate the text of the Conventions as widely as possible within their countries. They are especially required to ensure that the provisions and implications of the Conventions are clearly understood by the members of their armed forces and by the civilians attached to them. This is especially important for those who may be called upon to deal with CPERS. It is suggested in the Conventions that instruction in them is included in the syllabus of appropriate military and civilian courses of instruction.
2. The conventions also state that any military or other authority assuming responsibility for dealing with POWs in time of war or armed conflict must be in possession of the text of the Conventions and that its personnel must be instructed in how the Conventions affect them in the execution of their duties with POWs.
3. If ratified by the nations concerned, these requirements are, by inference, also applicable to the 1977 Protocols.

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CHAPTER 2

Procedures for Handling Persons, Materiel and Documents upon Capture

0201 Introduction

1. CPERS and their effects, CMAT and CDOCs are prime sources of information and should be exploited for intelligence purposes with a minimum of delay. Intelligence exploitation, therefore, requires expeditious and correct handling and reporting on these information sources. The procedures outlined in this chapter pertain specifically to the handling of persons, materiel and documents at the point of capture. A more detailed description of the procedures for the subsequent handling of CPERS and their effects, CMAT and CDOCs is given in Chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6 of this publication.
2. When practicable, suitably manned, trained and equipped forces should be allocated to combat units specifically to process CPERS and their effects as well as CMAT and CDOCs and subsequently evacuate them from the combat zone.
3. Especially in connection with NA5CROs, capturing units should be aware of the possibility that, depending on national or NATO directives, CPERS may be suspected of having committed acts subject to legal prosecution, and that CMAT and CDOCs may constitute evidence that could be used in legal proceedings. Therefore, such CPERS, CMAT and CDOCs should be properly tagged and subsequently handed over to the military police or other competent authorities as soon as possible.

0202 Persons

1. Conditions allowing, the following procedures should be followed at the initial point of capture:
 - a. CPERS should be disarmed immediately, and their weapons made safe. Personnel conducting searches should be aware that CPERS may carry concealed explosives on their person (in order to carry out "suicide bombings"). The CPERS and his effects should be thoroughly searched. CPERS should be searched by personnel of their own gender. If that is not possible, CPERS may be searched by personnel of the opposite sex in the presence of a witness, when possible an officer or non-commissioned officer, to ensure that the search is conducted in accordance with standards of propriety relevant to that particular situation. All documents and effects of military or investigative interest as well as items that may pose a threat to the security of own forces should be removed.
 - b. CPERS with POW status may retain clothing, identity documents, protective equipment (helmets, gas masks and those articles issued for personal protection), eating utensils, personal effects etc., as stipulated in GC3, Article 18. All identification

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documents should be reviewed/inspected and catalogued, and then returned to the POW as soon as possible.

- c. A Capture Tag (CAPTAG) should then be filled out and provided to the CPERS. The designated parts of the tag will be attached to his personal effects and documents in accordance with the procedures outlined at Annex A.
- d. Where a group of CPERS are taken at the same time or are to be evacuated together, a Group Capture Report (GROUPEPREP) should be completed. The format for this report is at Annex B. Category A or B CPERS (as described in paragraph 0205) are to be separately reported by an Intelligence Report (INTREP). (Refer to STANAG 2022.)⁴ Any Category A or B CPERS should be moved to the nearest suitable interrogation unit or facility as expeditiously as practicable.
- e. It is important that the personal effects, CMAT and CDOCs taken from the CPERS accompany him to the next receiving unit. Valuable information may be lost by not having these items available during processing and interrogation.
- f. CPERS should be allowed no opportunity to exchange information among themselves, to exchange identities or to dispose of materiel, documents and personal effects.
- g. Subsequent questioning and interrogation must not be compromised by unauthorised and unsupervised contact between CPERS and personnel not concerned with interrogation duties.
- h. Within the confines of the tactical situation, CPERS are to be segregated according to rank, grade, service, sex, nationality or warring faction, and if necessary, ethnic and religious group to minimise the opportunity to prepare counter-interrogation measures. Children should be separated from adult CPERS. Furthermore, deserters, civilians and regime and other indoctrination personnel will be individually segregated from other CPERS. Such segregation shall be undertaken in a manner which does not violate applicable international law (e.g. GC3, Articles 16 and 22, for CPERS with POW status).
- i. CPERS are to be guarded in a manner, which shall deny the opportunity for self-injury, suicide, escape or sabotage. Use of force, including lethal force, will be in accordance with the established principles of self-defence and Rules of Engagement (ROE).

⁴ An INTREP may follow one of the following formats: the “5W” format (Who, What, Where, When, Why-and How) or the “SALUTE” format (Size, Activity, Location, Unit, Time, Equipment) format.

- j. CPERS will also be prevented from observing sensitive and critical activities, materiel and procedures involving NATO, national or allied forces.
- k. CPERS are to be escorted to the nearest initial collecting point as quickly as possible and subsequently evacuated to higher echelon's collecting point or holding area as expeditiously as possible.
- l. Naval and air force personnel should be identified and the intelligence organisation is to be notified in order that interrogation by naval/air force personnel may take place at the earliest opportunity.

0203 The Handling of Persons Captured at Sea

1. The handling of persons captured at sea is in addition to GC3 governed by the Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea of 12 August 1949 (GC2). In this Convention, the term 'shipwrecked' covers all eventualities at sea including sinking by enemy action and the crashing of aircraft into the sea.

2. The handling of POWs captured at sea should follow the principles and, where practicable, the same procedures set out in Chapters 1 through 6 of this publication. Although the unique nature of maritime operations and the organisation and manning of naval units may preclude strict adherence to these procedures, the GCs, in particular GC2, Article 16, and applicable international law must be respected. Additional special provisions that take the different nature of maritime and amphibious operations into account are detailed in Annex C.

0204 Tactical Questioning

1. As soon as possible after capture, CPERS should be screened by interrogators or personnel trained in tactical questioning. Tactical questioning may also be conducted at sea. This tactical questioning should be carried out so that subsequent interrogations are not compromised or jeopardised. The object of tactical questioning is to screen CPERS and to obtain valuable information which would deteriorate or be lost altogether if the questioning was delayed until a trained interrogator could be made available. In order to achieve this, it is necessary that:

- a. CPERS are thoroughly searched even though this may already have been done at the point of capture.
- b. The tactical questioners should have been provided, by the unit commander and his intelligence staff, with clearly stated information requirements.
- c. In the course of questioning, tactical questioners are to adhere to the following provisions:

- (1) No physical or moral coercion shall be exercised against CPERS, in particular to obtain information from them or from third parties. (In accordance with GC4, Article 31.)
- (2) A POW, when questioned on the subject, is bound only to give his surname, first names and rank, date of birth, and army, regimental, personal or serial number, or failing this, equivalent information. Neither physical or mental torture, nor any other form of coercion may be inflicted in order to secure information of any kind whatever. They may not be threatened, insulted or exposed to unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any kind. (In accordance with GC3, Article 17.)
- (3) CPERS who are incapable, for physical or mental reasons, of stating their identity are to be handed over to the unit medical staff for treatment and/or evacuation.
- (4) Questioning of CPERS shall be carried out in a language which they can understand.

2. For each captured person, the tactical questioners produce a Tactical Questioning Report (TQREP) referring to the CPERS number (from the CAPTAG). The format of a TQREP is provided in Annex D.

3. Tactical questioners and interrogators check that CPERS and any associated documents or effects have been correctly tagged and that these documents and effects accompany the CPERS as they are moved.

0205 Categorisation

1. CPERS shall be categorised according to their assessed intelligence value as early as possible. This may be done by capturing units where a tactical questioning and language capability exists. This categorisation shall be reassessed by interrogation units (IUs) whenever they receive CPERS.

2. Categories:

- a. **Category A.** CPERS of high value whose broad or specific knowledge of the adversary's war effort or of the activities of one of the parties in the conflict makes it necessary for them to be interrogated without delay by specialised interrogation personnel and at the highest level. Category A CPERS could include the following:
 - (1) General Officers or their equivalents.
 - (2) Chiefs of Staff of major formations, and heads of staff sections down to Army level.
 - (3) Officers in intelligence or communications organisations or appointments.
 - (4) Officers in special police units and counter-terrorist units.
 - (5) Officers and NCOs of Special Operations Forces.
 - (6) Personnel with knowledge of ciphers/cryptography.

- (7) Personnel with knowledge of subjects of particular intelligence interest or importance like:
- (a) Scientific and technical personnel – personnel with current knowledge of radiological, biological and chemical weapons or any other new type of materiel or weapon of mass destruction.
 - (b) Psychological operations (PSYOPS) personnel.
 - (c) Regime officials.
 - (d) Indoctrination personnel (e.g. political officers).
 - (e) Other CPERS with wide knowledge of the adversary's or the particular warring faction's military capabilities or political, religious, cultural, psychological and economic factors.
 - (f) Persons with knowledge of organised crime organisations and operations. (These persons are to be reported to relevant legal and law enforcement authorities for further interrogation.)
 - (g) Persons with knowledge of terrorist organisations and operations. (These persons are to be reported to the counterintelligence and security organisations for further interrogation.)
 - (h) Persons with knowledge of terrorism, war crimes, crimes against humanity and other crimes. (These persons are to be reported to relevant legal and law enforcement authorities for further interrogation.)
 - (i) Aviation personnel/naval personnel whose mission subordination, training and knowledge of enemy locations, movements and organisation are thought likely to be of considerable interest.
- (8) CPERS who display a willingness to assist interrogation staff in the achievement of their primary task and whose assistance can be material to the achievement of that task.
- b. **Category B.** CPERS who have sufficient information of intelligence value to warrant further interrogation or who may be of assistance to interrogation staff.
 - c. **Category C.** CPERS who have information of limited, immediate tactical value, which is, therefore, time sensitive.
 - d. **Category D.** CPERS of no intelligence interest.

3. The above definitions are a broad guide only and considerable latitude shall be exercised by interrogation staff in the categorising of CPERS.

4. The timely interrogation and exploitation of CPERS in Category A and B is vital to the achievement of the primary aim of interrogation. The swift transfer of Category A and B CPERS to a Joint Interrogation Centre (JIC) or a Combined Joint Interrogation Centre (CJIC), which are described in paragraph 0402, is therefore extremely important.

5. When a capturing unit moves a CPERS who is assessed or presumed to be Category A or B to a medical facility or to a holding point, the intelligence organisation should be alerted as soon as possible to ensure the early exploitation of his intelligence potential.

0206 Materiel

1. CMAT includes items necessary to equip, operate, maintain, or support military, terrorist or criminal activities without distinction as to its application for administrative or combat purposes. (However, CMAT does not include real estate, installations, and utilities.) CMAT that has no further intelligence value or value as evidence in legal proceedings will ordinarily be disposed of through appropriate logistics channels or by ordnance personnel. Generally, this CMAT will be handed over to or retrieved by service and recovery units.

2. Great care should be taken to ensure the safe handling of CMAT. The possibility that CMAT and other items having belonged to or been used by an adversary could be booby-trapped should be considered before they are handled. All weapons and armaments should be cleared or otherwise rendered safe. Ammunition should be stored so that the danger of explosion is minimised. Weapons of mass destruction and other weapons and equipment containing bio-hazardous, radioactive or toxic materials should be cordoned off, and trained personnel should be summoned to dispose of them. High-voltage equipment should be handled with great care.

3. CMAT and Associated Technical Documents (ATDs) considered of intelligence or other interest will be handled by the capturing unit in the following manner:

- a. An INTREP will be prepared by the capturing unit upon the discovery or capture of CMAT or ATDs believed to be of intelligence interest. The reporting channels are from the capturing unit through the chain of command to the first Technical Intelligence (TECHINT) element.
- b. If possible, the capturing unit will conduct a preliminary screening to obtain information of immediate technical or tactical value. A Preliminary Technical Report (PRETECHREP) as set out in Annex E will be prepared and submitted through established intelligence channels.
- c. CMAT will be tagged by the capturing unit as follows:

National identifying letters of capturing unit as prescribed in STANAG 1059—see Annex W.

Designation of capturing unit including service.

DTG of capture.

Location of capture (geographic coordinates or UTM grid reference including grid zone designation and 100,000-metre square identification).

Adversary unit or warring faction from which CMAT was captured (including national identifying letters in accordance with STANAG 1059).

Summary of circumstances of capture.

Associated CPERS.

- d. ATDs will be tagged as described in paragraph 0207.1. c.

- e. CMAT and any ATDs should be subsequently evacuated.
- f. If the CMAT cannot be evacuated, ATDs should be forwarded with photographs, drawings or a detailed description of the CMAT to the nearest intelligence staff for exploitation. The CMAT should be kept under guard until further instructions are received.
- g. If CMAT has to be destroyed for operational or safety reasons, unidentified items should be photographed, sketched or described in writing as documentation. This documentation will then be forwarded to the nearest intelligence staff for exploitation.

4. CMAT and ATDs that may constitute evidence in legal proceedings against CPERS suspected of crimes against humanity, terrorism, war crimes and other crimes as applicable will be safeguarded or secured separately from other CMAT and ATDs. Tags for such CMAT and ATDs should be marked "EVIDENCE". These items should be reported as soon as possible by the capturing unit or person to the military police or other personnel specially trained and authorised to handle evidence, so that they may establish a chain of custody/evidence. Guidelines for handling items to be used as evidence are detailed in Annex F.

0207 Documents

1. CDOCs are important sources of intelligence and information. It should be noted that documents include all types of media that may contain, record or store information. A detailed definition of the term "document" may found in the Glossary. Therefore, specialist personnel may be required to access information from various types of media. CDOCs considered of intelligence interest will be handled by the capturing unit in the following manner:

- a. If possible, the capturing unit will conduct a preliminary screening to obtain information of immediate technical or tactical value.
- b. An INTREP identifying the CDOCs and its disposition as well as giving information considered to be of immediate tactical value will be prepared and submitted by the capturing unit.
- c. The original CDOCs should not be marked on; they should be collected and stored in watertight containers or bags and tagged. The capturing unit/person will tag the CDOC or CDOCs as follows.

National identifying letters of capturing unit as prescribed in STANAG 1059.

Designation of capturing unit including service.

Serial number of the CDOC or CDOCs. This will consist of a number allocated sequentially by the capturing unit.

DTG of capture.

Location of capture (geographic coordinates or UTM grid reference including grid zone designation and 100,000-metre square identification).

Adversary unit or warring faction from which CDOC was captured (including national identifying letters in accordance with STANAG 1059).

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

Summary of circumstances under which the CDOCs were obtained.

Interrogation serial number of any associated CPERS, if appropriate or known. CDOCs associated with a captured person should be marked with part C of the CAPTAG.

2. CDOCs that may constitute evidence in legal proceedings against CPERS suspected of crimes against humanity, terrorism, war crimes and other crimes as applicable will be safeguarded or secured separately from other CDOCs when practicable. Tags identifying such documents should be marked "EVIDENCE". These documents should be reported as soon as possible by the capturing unit or person to the military police or other personnel specially trained and authorised to handle evidence in order to establish a chain of custody/evidence. Guidelines for handling items to be used as evidence are detailed in Annex F.

CHAPTER 3

Procedures for Handling Captured Persons

0301 General Handling Procedures

1. Standard administrative procedures for the handling of CPERS will be as set out below. Operational conditions may require deviations from these procedures. Where this is the case, the principles and procedures will be followed as far as circumstances allow. The provisions of applicable international law will always be observed.

The Detaining Power will at all times be responsible for the care, custody and control of CPERS. Article 12 of GC3 permits the transfer of POWs from the custody of the Detaining Power to the custody of another power that has ratified GC3 and has the will and means to uphold the provisions of the Convention.

2. The interrogation of CPERS is set out in Chapter 4 of this publication and should be read in conjunction with this chapter.

3. As soon as possible after capture, individuals are to be provided with tags in accordance with the procedures outlined in Annex A and collected at a suitable point or area where a GROUPCAPREP should be compiled (see Annex B).

4. Evacuation is to be carried out as soon as the tactical situation permits to one of the following facilities that should be situated far enough from the combat zone for the CPERS to be out of danger:

- a. Collecting points.
- b. Holding areas.
- c. Long-term detention facilities.
- d. Medical facilities.
- e. Interrogation units (usually collocated with a-c above).

5. Figure 3-1 illustrates the CPERS evacuation chain and lists recommended actions at each stage in the CPERS handling process.




Figure 3-1: CPERS Evacuation Chain.

0302 Facilities

1. **Collecting Points.** These are usually established at battalion or brigade level, but may also be established at any appropriate command level. A central collecting point may be established at division level. Collecting points are intended to hold CPERS for up to 24 hours. They should be evacuated as soon as the tactical situation permits. Interrogation units may be collocated with them.
2. **Holding Areas.** These will usually be temporary areas located at division and corps level, but in certain operations may also be located at brigade level. Holding areas are intended to hold CPERS for up to 72 hours from time of capture. They should be evacuated as soon as the tactical situation permits. At corps level holding areas for accommodating large numbers of CPERS for longer periods of time may be established. Interrogation units may also be collocated with these.
3. **Long-Term Detention Facilities.** These include POW facilities and other detention facilities.
 - a. **POW Facilities.** POW facilities are of a more established nature and are designed for the extended internment and complete administration of POWs. These facilities may be established in the Communications Zone, the Rear Combat Zone or other location away from the battlefield, or outside the area of operations. POWs not selected for interrogation may be transported directly to a POW facility. Interrogation units or centres may be collocated with POW facilities. POWs will be treated in accordance with GC3.
 - b. **Other Detention Facilities.** Other detention facilities include internment facilities and other installations separate from POW facilities that are designed for the extended incarceration of other detained persons pending decision on their status and disposition. CPERS held in such facilities are entitled to treatment in accordance with international law including GC4 when applicable. In all cases, internment will occur only when absolutely necessary to the security of the Detaining Power and will be in accordance with the provisions of GC4 when applicable.
 - c. **Medical Facilities.** CPERS will receive proper medical treatment to include dispatch to the nearest facility as necessary. They will remain the responsibility of the CPERS administration organisation while undergoing treatment.
 - d. **Interrogation Units.** CPERS assessed to have information of immediate tactical value may be subjected to tactical questioning. Based on the results of tactical questioning, an evaluation of effects or the circumstances of capture, CPERS who are assessed as Category A or B as defined in Chapter 2 of this publication, are to be sent to the nearest suitable interrogation unit. These units will normally be collocated with the collecting points and holding areas. The early exploitation of a captured person's intelligence potential may make it necessary for interrogation units to come forward to the initial point of capture.
 - e. **Guidelines.** Guidelines for establishing collecting points, holding areas and long-term detention facilities are contained in Annex G.

0303 Processing of POWs and Other CPERS

1. **Stage 1 – The Capture.** Whenever conditions allow, the procedures outlined in Chapter 2 of this publication are to be followed by the capturing unit.

2. **Stage 2 – Evacuation and Holding.** The tasks set out in Chapter 2 of this publication shall be completed at the collecting point if they have not been done at the point of capture. The duties and procedures of escorts and guards are detailed in Annex H. At holding areas registration of CPERS should take place and the following processes should be completed.

- a. POWs are to be informed of their rights under GC3 as summarised in Annex I.
- b. POWs are to be issued an Internment Serial Number (INTERNSN). The INTERNSN is a unique serial number allocated by the national POW handling organisation to enable the identification and tracking of the POW during his internment. A recommended format for an INTERNSN is detailed in Annex J.
- c. Records and record cards for POWs are to be initiated (Annex K). All records for POWs and other CPERS should be digitised when possible and maintained in databases accessible to intelligence and law enforcement agencies. Biometric data may be used in addition to photographs and fingerprints to ensure unmistakable identification of CPERS.
- d. Civilians who do not have POW status may be interned and will be treated in accordance with GC4 and applicable international law. They shall be accommodated and administered separately from POWs and from persons deprived of liberty for any other reason.
- e. CPERS other than those with POW status suspected of terrorism, war crimes, crimes against humanity and other crimes will be handed over to the law enforcement agencies or judicial authorities appointed by NATO to deal with them as determined by the MOA.

3. POWs may be transferred from/to collecting points and holding areas into or from the custody of interrogation units. The responsibility for the guarding, feeding, medical treatment and safety of POWs remains with the unit which has custody of the POWs.

4. GC3 stipulates that a nation transferring POWs to another nation still has the obligation to ensure that treatment of the transferred POWs is in accordance with the GC3 and other applicable international law. Any such transfer should be conducted in accordance with the operational plan.

5. **Stage 3 – POW Facilities.** If any of the above procedures or duties have not been carried out, they will be completed by the facility authorities at the earliest opportunity.

6. POWs may be transferred to the custody of interrogation units or interrogation centers and from such custody as described above. If not already allocated, it will be the responsibility of the facility staff to allocate a POW INTERNSN to CPERS who have been interrogated before completion of processing and registration. Interrogation Serial Numbers (INTGSNs) shall not be used for this purpose. The responsibility for the safeguarding, feeding and medical treatment of CPERS so transferred remains with the unit having custody of them. When CPERS are transferred to a holding area or POW facility under the control of another NATO nation's armed forces or of a NATO nation acting as the Detaining Power on behalf of the nations participating in a NATO force, the transferring nation or formation will ensure that the information required by this publication is transferred together with the CPERS. The receiving forces will be responsible for completing the documentation required by their own forces or those required by this publication.

7. As soon as possible after capture and not more than one week after arrival at a temporary or long-term holding facility or a hospital every POW shall be given the opportunity to communicate with his family and – in wartime – the Central Prisoner of War Agency. Resulting letters, cards and e-

mails will be forwarded as quickly as possible after inspection by intelligence personnel or appropriate authority.

8. **POW Personal Property.** The procedure for handling, recording and safeguarding the personal property taken from POWs as set out in Annex L shall be used.

9. **Financial Accountability.** GC3 establishes how the financial matters of POWs should be handled. This includes records of pay, accounts and work records. The officer commanding the POW facility will ensure that all such GC3 requirements are met.

10. **POW Rights.** GC3 requires that POWs have access to copies of GC3 in their own language. This is the responsibility of the Detaining Power. This responsibility may be delegated to the officer commanding the POW facility.

0304 Inspections, Media Operations, Visits and Photography

1. **Inspections.** Representatives and delegates of Protecting Powers and International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) delegates have the right to investigate the treatment and administration of CPERS and other CPERS wherever they may be in accordance with GC3, GC4 or other applicable international law. They are to be given every assistance in this work. This right may only be suspended for reasons of “imperative military necessity” by the national authority of the detaining power, and then only as an exceptional and temporary measure. Legal advice must be sought before taking such action. The provision of full and open inspection facilities will assist in establishing a favourable impression of the quality of the treatment of CPERS. The role of the ICRC is explained in Annex M.

2. **Media Operations.** The increased ability of the international press to focus on the treatment of CPERS could lead to adverse publicity and pressure. This could in turn damage domestic and international support for an operation. Also, media exposure could jeopardise military and law enforcement operations. The section responsible for media operations within the headquarters is to be kept informed of operations and data pertaining to CPERS within the Command’s Area of Responsibility (AOR). The Command should issue a policy regarding media access to CPERS and facilities holding CPERS consistent with applicable international law.

3. **Visits.** The Command should issue a policy regarding the authorisation of visits by persons who are not representatives or delegates of a Protecting Power or the ICRC. Such visits should serve an official purpose and be limited in frequency, scope and duration. Operational security within CPERS facilities should be strictly maintained. Exposure of CPERS to the media and other visitors to facilities holding CPERS must not violate the provisions of the Geneva Conventions and other applicable international law especially regarding protection against public curiosity.

4. **Photography.** All photography of CPERS and facilities holding CPERS must serve an official purpose and be approved by the Commander or the senior officer responsible for the handling of CPERS. The GCs (inter alia GC3, Articles 13 and 14) must be complied with.

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CHAPTER 4

Interrogation of Captured Persons

0401 General Provisions

1. **Geneva Conventions.** The treatment of CPERS held for interrogation will comply with the provisions of the Geneva Conventions, or other applicable international law. The responsibilities of the Detaining Power as set out in GC3 and GC4 shall rest with the capturing or detaining nation. The term "Detaining Power" will have the meaning as understood in GC3 and GC4. The ICRC is to be allowed access to individual CPERS held in interrogation facilities, but not to sensitive areas (e.g. operations and communications rooms).
2. **Interrogation Personnel.** A lead interrogator should be designated with responsibility for the conduct of the interrogation. Interrogators must be trained and qualified to conduct systematic and extended questioning of CPERS to obtain information of intelligence value. They should have the necessary language skills to conduct interrogations in the area of operations. If interpreters are used, it should be noted that this may diminish the interrogators' effectiveness and may entail security problems.
3. **Aim.** The primary aim of interrogation is the timely extraction of information from CPERS following tactical questioning, and the timely dissemination of information and intelligence resulting from interrogations to relevant commands in order that it may be used in the production of intelligence estimates and in decision making. In order to achieve this aim, CPERS should be screened by trained personnel as soon as possible after their capture in order to obtain information of immediate tactical value and to categorise them according to their assessed intelligence or counter-intelligence value to ensure the effective allocation of interrogation resources. Category A or B CPERS (as assessed in accordance with paragraph. 0205) during tactical questioning (as described in paragraph 0204) should be transferred as soon as possible to an interrogation unit or centre. The categorisation of a CPERS may be changed based on the results of an interrogation and with the passage of time.
4. **Responsibilities.** The responsibilities are as follows:
 - a. The operational commander through his intelligence organisation is responsible for the interrogation of CPERS in order to obtain information of intelligence or counter-intelligence value.
 - b. Information obtained during operational interrogation may not be admissible as evidence in criminal proceedings unless certain legal procedures have been followed. Therefore, interrogation of CPERS for the purpose of obtaining evidence to be used in criminal proceedings should be the responsibility of competent law enforcement agencies or judicial authorities. If criminal activity is uncovered during interrogation the appropriate law enforcement agencies or judicial authorities must immediately be involved to process the information for legal consideration. Ordinarily, where criminal activity is suspected, questioning by law enforcement agencies or judicial authorities should take place first. Failure to do so may taint any evidence obtained by questioning. This, in turn, may prevent a successful prosecution for the criminal activity concerned. If it is deemed desirable for military intelligence personnel to be present during a law enforcement interview of a

suspect legal advice should be obtained first to determine the effect this may have upon the admissibility of the evidence gathered during the interview. Ultimately, in a NATO operation, the commander of the NATO force may have to decide whether interrogation for the purpose of intelligence collection or an interview to obtain evidence in accordance with legal standards has the highest priority in a particular case.

- c. The responsibility for the handling, guarding, administration and welfare of CPERS in custody of NATO forces shall rest with the CJ1 staff. The guard force and administrative staff shall not conduct interrogation operations.
- d. CPERS should be held by the interrogation organisation for the minimum time consistent with the effective exploitation of their intelligence potential. It is not the intention that interrogation staff should assume administrative responsibility for CPERS.

5. **Handling of CPERS During the Interrogation Phase.** If practicable, throughout the interrogation phase, CPERS should be:

- a. Segregated according to rank, grade, service, sex, nationality or warring faction, and if necessary, ethnic and religious group to minimise the opportunity to prepare counter-interrogation measures. Children should be separated from adult CPERS. However, young children should not be separated from immediate family members, if captured with them. Furthermore, civilians, deserters, regime officials, indoctrination personnel and persons deemed to require protection from other CPERS will be individually segregated. Such segregation shall be undertaken in a manner which does not violate applicable international law (e.g. GC3, Articles 16 and 22).
- b. Allowed no opportunity to exchange information among themselves, to exchange identities or to dispose of materiel, documents and effects of intelligence interest. Whenever possible facilities should allow for prisoners to be segregated from each other to prevent communication with and observation of each other while in transit to and from the interrogation facility.
- c. Allowed no opportunity to compromise interrogation operations by unauthorised and unsupervised contact with personnel not concerned with interrogation duties.
- d. Allowed no opportunity to observe sensitive and critical activities, materiel and procedures involving NATO or national forces.
- e. Guarded in a manner, which shall deny the opportunity for self-injury, suicide, escape or sabotage. Use of force, including lethal force, will be in accordance with the established ROE.
- f. Provided necessary medical care and regularly examined by medical personnel.

6. **Other CPERS Treated As POWs.** The procedures for the debriefing of defectors and adversary deserters and the questioning of other combatants shall be the same as those for POWs. Such categories shall be segregated from other CPERS during interrogation and holding wherever practicable.

0402 Organisation

1. It is important that the interrogation organisation is as flexible and straightforward as possible. An Interrogation Unit (IU) and a Joint Interrogation Centre (JIC) may comprise the basic interrogation organisation.
 - a. **IU.** The primary aim of IUs is to exploit the time-sensitive intelligence potential of CPERS in Categories A, B and C, and to identify Category A and B CPERS in order to arrange their early transfer to a JIC. IUs may be set up and employed at any appropriate command level. Such units would form part of the appropriate command or task force's intelligence organisation. They may operate at holding areas for CPERS or elsewhere to meet the commander's intelligence requirements. IUs will, therefore, operate as closely as possible to collecting points, holding areas, and, possibly, long-term holding facilities as possible to avoid the need for separate guard forces as well as medical, catering and other administrative staffs. Only personnel who are trained and qualified to conduct interrogations should be employed as interrogators. Naval, army and air force interrogation staffs may be attached to IUs where appropriate, thus forming, Joint Interrogation Units (JIU). Interrogation personnel from two or more nations may form Combined Joint Interrogation Units (CJIU). IUs may be supported by one or more teams capable of, and responsible for, providing linguistic and technical support to interrogations and translating and exploiting CDOCs. These teams should consist of linguists and technical specialists capable of retrieving information from electronic media.
 - b. **JIC.** JICs may be set up and employed at any appropriate joint command level. Combined Joint Interrogation Centres (CJICs) may be established. Ideally JIC/CJICs would be collocated at POW facilities and other long-term detention facilities in order to facilitate interrogation operations and minimise the need for administrative and logistic support. The primary aim of JIC/CJICs is the extensive and, where necessary, extended interrogation of CPERS in order that their tactical, operational and strategic intelligence potential can be fully exploited. Appropriate navy, army or air force interrogation staffs should be organic to those centers. JIC/CJICs should also have organic teams capable of, and responsible for, providing linguistic support to interrogations and translating and exploiting CDOCs. These teams should consist of linguists and technical specialists capable of retrieving information from electronic media.
2. The aim of the above organisations is to ensure the effective use of the interrogation resources in an armed conflict. Where IUs or JICs are established, they should not only report their products through national reporting channels but also those reporting channels of the relevant NATO command.
3. Nations which do not have a need or organisation for the formation of a JIC may delegate this responsibility to an IU, a JIU or a CJIC.

0403 Procedures at Interrogation Units

1. IUs, JIUs and CJIUs receiving CPERS shall adopt the following procedures:
 - a. Allocate an Interrogation Serial Number to CPERS selected for interrogation in accordance with the procedure set out at Annex N.

- b. Review the GROUPECAPREP, the TQREP and any associated documents and materiel.
- c. Conduct a thorough search of the CPERS to ensure that he has been properly disarmed and that all material of intelligence interest has been recovered. During the search of the CPERS his physical and mental condition should be observed and all items in his possession should be thoroughly inspected and evaluated for intelligence value and for their potential danger to own personnel and to the CPERS himself. Effects and articles essential to his safety will be returned to him after the search has been completed. The principles set out in applicable international law shall be strictly observed. Results of the search including observations of the CPERS physical and mental condition as well as information of intelligence value gathered from documents, effects and other articles should be recorded in a Search Report (SEARCHREP). A sample format for a SEARCHREP is shown in Annex O. This information may also be included in the Interrogation Report (INTGREP).
- d. At the end of each interrogation an INTGREP will be submitted by the most appropriate means. The INTGREP is described in Annex P.
- e. On completion of interrogation at the IU, POWs shall be sent to a JIC/CJIC for further specialised interrogation, if warranted. If the POWs are deemed to be of no further intelligence interest, they shall be forwarded to a POW facility established by the Detaining Power in accordance with the current administrative instructions.
- f. CPERS who are not POWs will be processed in accordance with instructions from higher national or NATO command.

0404 Procedures at Joint Interrogation Centers and Combined Joint Interrogation Centers

1. JICs and CJICs receiving CPERS shall adopt the following procedures:
 - a. Allocate an Interrogation Serial Number (INTGSN) to CPERS selected for interrogation in accordance with the procedure set out at Annex N, if one has not already been allocated.
 - b. Review any pertinent reports (such as INTREPS and Intelligence Summaries) as well as any reports from previous questioning and interrogation as well as any associated documents and materiel.
 - c. Search the CPERS to ensure that they are properly disarmed and that all objects of intelligence interest have been recovered. If an extensive and thorough search has been conducted by an interrogation unit at lower echelon, results of the search should be reported in a Search Report or included in the INTGREP; if a search has not been conducted, this should also be recorded in the INTGREP. Effects and articles essential to CPERS' safety will be returned to them after inspection to ensure that they contain no material of intelligence interest and cannot be used to harm interrogation and guard personnel or to inflict self-injury.
 - d. At the end of each interrogation an INTGREP will be submitted by the most appropriate means.

2. On completion of interrogation, POWs shall be sent to a POW facility established by the Detaining Power in accordance with the current administrative instructions and applicable international law.
3. CPERS who are not POWs will be processed in accordance with instructions from higher national or NATO command.
4. POWs sent to POW facilities and other detained persons who remain in custody after interrogation may be subjected to further interrogation should the need arise.

0405 Reporting

1. **INTREPs.** The capturing unit should identify any category A or B CPERS and report them by submitting an INTREP. These CPERS will be moved to the nearest suitable interrogation unit or facility as expeditiously as practicable.
2. **Interrogation Serial Number.** Every individual selected for interrogation will be given an INTGSN. This number, once issued, will remain with the captured person throughout his interrogation at whatever level and should not be changed. This number is issued for intelligence source identification. This number shall not be confused with the POW Internment Serial Number (INTERNSN), which should NOT be used for this purpose. The INTGSN will be composed as detailed in Annex N.
3. **Search Report.** The Search Report is used to record the results of the thorough and extensive search conducted by IUs and JICs. Results of the search including observations of the CPERS physical and mental condition as well as information of intelligence value gathered from documents, effects and other articles should be recorded in a Search Report. A sample format for a Search Report is shown in Annex O. This information may also be included in the INTGREP.
4. **Interrogation Reports.** INTGREPs may also be used to report results gathered from the search and tactical questioning (or screening), if this has not been done previously. INTGREPs shall be forwarded to the Command intelligence organisation as quickly as possible. One copy shall remain in the captured person's file which shall accompany him through all phases of the interrogation process. These reports will remain in the intelligence channels and shall not be forwarded to the administrative authorities when CPERS are sent to detention facilities or other holding facilities. A sample format for an INTGREP is shown in Annex P.
5. **Intelligence Reports.** The preparation of full INTGREPs shall not delay the communication of important interrogation products to the Command. Where such information has been sent in advance of the INTGREP in the form of, for example, an INTREP, this fact should be mentioned and any relevant message identification and DTG should be referred to in the report.
6. **CDOC Exploitation.** Information and intelligence obtained from the exploitation of CDOCs will normally be separately reported in accordance with Chapter 6 of this publication. INTGREPs will refer to such exploitation, particularly where CPERS are prepared to confirm such information/intelligence.

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CHAPTER 5

Captured Materiel and Associated Technical Documents

0501 General

1. Exploitation of CMAT, and ATDs should be carried out carefully and promptly. Some of this materiel may be unknown or only partially known in its design, construction, technical data, function, capabilities, modes of employment, etc. Therefore, it is of utmost importance to gain information for possible counteractivities and necessary protective measures to support friendly operations. Materiel and ATDs of special intelligence interest should be stated in the intelligence staff's information and other intelligence requirements and included in the Intelligence Collection Plan.
2. CMAT and ATDs of interest to a particular component or nation should preferably be handed over to that component or nation at the earliest possible moment for exploitation.
3. Procurement of technical experts and the way they should be utilised for exploitation are to be decided by the nations. Nations may decide to establish Joint Captured Materiel Exploitation Centres (JCMECs) on a permanent or ad hoc basis. Guidance on this matter is offered in Annex Q.
4. The results of the exploitation of CMAT and ATDs shall be made available to the commander and to other NATO or national commanders and authorities in accordance with stated intelligence requirements and reporting procedures consistent with national laws and policy. In combined operations TECHINT as well as photographic documentation of the CMAT and copies of ATDs should be shared among all the troop-contributing nations. If a command intelligence database has been established such intelligence and information may be stored in it.
5. TECHINT personnel and units often operate under the operational control of the intelligence staff. However, logistic staff must provide transportation support for the evacuation of CMAT from the combat zone to a facility where intelligence exploitation can take place. Furthermore, workshops and other logistic facilities may have to be placed at the disposal of TECHINT personnel and staff in their work.
6. Procedures for handling CMAT and ATDs that may constitute evidence in criminal proceedings are detailed in Annex F.

0502 Safety

Great care should be taken to ensure the safe handling of CMAT. When necessary, trained personnel (e.g. Explosive Ordnance Disposal specialists) should be tasked to handle or dispose of weapons, armaments, ammunition and explosives. All weapons and armaments should be cleared or otherwise rendered safe. Ammunition should be stored so that the danger of explosion is minimised. Weapons of mass destruction and other weapons and equipment containing bio-hazardous, radioactive or toxic materials should be cordoned off, and specialists should dispose of them. High-voltage equipment should be handled with great care. The possibility that CMAT and other items having belonged to or been used by an adversary could be booby-trapped should be considered before they are handled.

0503 Exploitation

1. Intelligence exploitation of CMAT and ATDs is in principle a national responsibility to be undertaken by the capturing nation, but this responsibility may be assumed by a NATO Command or Force. Wherever forces of two or more NATO nations are operating together, mutual support for the purposes of proper and timely exploitation should be given. This is especially important when the capturing nation does not have the necessary technical capability to exploit particular CMAT and ATDs. In that case such CMAT and ATDs should be turned over to an allied nation that has such a capability as expeditiously as possible. In cases where responsibility for exploitation is handed over to an allied nation, that nation will keep the capturing nation fully informed of the results obtained and will forward copies of ATDs and reports prepared. The exploiting nation will be responsible for reporting as described in this Chapter.
2. During the exploitation process, CMAT and the original copy of ATDs must be kept together. When exploitation has been completed, the CMAT must be handed over to appropriate national agencies for utilisation or disposal, with copies of ATDs as appropriate. A copy of the ATDs will be forwarded to the document exploitation unit of the national JIC or, if applicable, the CJIC (see Chapter 4 of this publication), or other national or NATO agency responsible for CDOCs. When possible, photographs of the CMAT should be taken and removed with the CMAT/ATDs.
3. In the exploitation of CMAT and ATDs, close coordination should be exercised between elements at various levels within the intelligence organisation where linguistic and technical assistance could be sought. CPERS associated with CMAT and ATDs should, if possible, be kept available for questioning during the exploitation process, but the evacuation and interrogation of CPERS have higher priority.
4. CMAT and ATDs considered to be of intelligence or other interest will be exploited through the following process. Whenever feasible, in order to expedite handling, the processing stages may be combined.
 - a. **Reporting.** The capturing unit reports the capture or discovery of CMAT or ATDs believed to be of intelligence or other interest through higher headquarters to the first TECHINT element in the chain of command by means of a PRETECHREP (as at Annex E) or an INTREP.
 - b. **Preliminary Screening.** Preliminary screening and reporting of information of immediate technical, operational or other value through established intelligence channels will be accomplished by the capturing unit.
 - c. **Complementary Examination.** Complementary examination and reporting may be carried out in the field by technical experts or Technical Exploitation Teams (TETs). (See Annex Q.) If possible, the preliminary screening, translation and categorization of ATDs should be carried out by translators specialized in the exploitation of technical documents.
 - d. **Detailed Exploitation.** If special circumstances require it, detailed exploitation may be undertaken outside the AO. (See Annex Q.)
5. CMAT and ATDs will be tagged as follows by the first technical exploitation specialist or team performing exploitation for intelligence or other purposes:
 - a. **CMAT.**

- Serial number of CMAT of intelligence interest.
 - Serial number of ATDs if applicable.
- b. **ATDs**
As for CMAT above, with the serial number(s) of associated CMAT and clearly marked with the flagword "TECHDOC".
- c. **Associated CPERS**. The capture tag number and the interrogation serial number (if allocated) will be recorded on the CMAT and ATD tags in order to facilitate interrogation to obtain information of technical, operational or other value.

0504 Reporting

1. Reports will be submitted in accordance with relevant reporting procedures. Copies of all reports should follow the CMAT during the exploitation process. The following reports are required:
- a. **INTREP**. An INTREP will be prepared by the capturing unit upon the discovery or capture of CMAT or ATDs believed to be of intelligence interest. The reporting channels are from the capturing unit through the chain of command to the first element with technical exploitation capability.
 - b. **Preliminary Technical Report**. A PRETECHREP may be prepared and submitted by the capturing unit or a Technical Exploitation Team (TET) after preliminary screening. (See Annex E.)
 - c. **Complementary Technical Report**. A COMTECHREP type A, B or C will be prepared and submitted by proper authority or TET after complementary examination in the field. (See Annexes R, S and T.)
 - d. **Detailed Technical Report**. A DETECHREP will be prepared and submitted by proper authority or Specialist Team after detailed exploitation in rear areas. This report has no set format. The flagword DETECHREP should be used as report identifier, and the report will include necessary data identifying the CMAT and its disposition.
 - e. INTREPs may, as the circumstances dictate, be submitted in advance but not in lieu of the reports listed above.

0505 Further Handling

1. An appropriate national or NATO commander or staff will direct and coordinate the exploitation process and decide when CMAT can be handed over for utilisation or disposal. Intelligence staff will ensure that duplicate photographs of CMAT and copies of ATDs are provided and distributed for further exploitation by technical and other elements as appropriate.
2. When exploitation is complete, final disposition of the materiel will be carried out as determined by the commander or his staff or in accordance with agreed procedures.

0506 Security

1. CMAT and ATDs will be classified in accordance with the applicable security classification guidance, also considering the circumstances of capture and the value of denying the opposing forces the knowledge that a particular document or piece of materiel is in NATO hands.

2. At all stages during the intelligence exploitation process, the CMAT and ATDs will be placed under guard in order to prevent looting, misuse or destruction. No item is authorised for retention as a war trophy or souvenir. CMAT and ATDs to be used as evidence in legal proceedings against CPERS suspected of terrorist acts, crimes against humanity, war crimes and other crimes are to be safeguarded separately from other CMAT and ATDs and should be in the custody of the military police or other investigative authority. (Guidelines for the handling of such CMAT and ATDs may be found in Annex F.) The investigative authority will assist in the intelligence exploitation of such evidence.

CHAPTER 6

Captured Documents

0601 General

1. CDOCs are valuable sources of information and should be exploited for intelligence or law enforcement purposes with a minimum of delay. It should be noted that documents include all types of media that may contain, record or store information. Therefore, specialist personnel may be required to access information from various types of media. A detailed definition of the term “document” may be found in the Glossary.
2. ATDs, which are marked “TECHDOC”, will be handled as described in Chapter 5. All other types of CDOCs will be handled as described in this Chapter.
3. Nations may decide to establish Joint Captured Document Exploitation Centres (JCDECs) on a permanent or ad hoc basis. A CJTF may decide to establish a Combined Joint Captured Document Exploitation Centres (CJCDEC) on a permanent or ad hoc basis. Guidance on this matter is offered in Annex U.

0602 Categorisation

1. CDOCs should be categorised according to their assessed intelligence or other value as soon after capture as possible. The categorisation of each CDOC should be reassessed as it is exploited and assessed by document exploitation elements at each level in the chain of command.
2. In order to ensure the timely exploitation of time-sensitive CDOCs of intelligence or other value, CDOCs are to be divided into categories as follows:
 - a. **Category A.** Documents which because of their special intelligence or other value require priority removal and/or special handling and are of interest to another command, collection agency or other agency i.e. TECHINT, air force, navy, PSYOPS, cryptography, law enforcement etc. These documents should be translated as quickly as possible to exploit information of intelligence or other value to operations and to force protection. Specific examples of Category A documents change according to the Priority Intelligence Requirements and will be set forth in each document exploitation element's standing operating procedures. Documents to be used as evidence in legal proceedings against CPERS suspected of terrorism, crimes against humanity, war crimes and other crimes will be handled as Category A documents.
 - b. **Category B.** Documents containing information of intelligence or other interest to the supported field command (answering operational-level intelligence requirements). These documents should also be translated as quickly as possible to exploit information of intelligence or other value to operations and to force protection.
 - c. **Category C.** Personal documents and items containing no perceived information of intelligence or other interest but still requiring special administrative accountability i.e. currency, works of art, family photos, or letters. Category C is the lowest category of CDOCs that can be assigned by field elements.

- d. **Category D.** Documents containing no known information of immediate intelligence or other value. This designation should be applied only by the echelon at which appropriate document exploitation expertise exists.

3. In principle, CDOCs are the responsibility of the nation of the capturing unit. However, in order to ensure that information of intelligence or other interest is efficiently utilised, such documents should be handled through command channels in the initial phases of the exploitation process. Final and thorough exploitation will be the responsibility of the capturing nation, the NATO Force or NATO Command in accordance with national law and policies or the MOA.

0603 Exploitation

1. Exploitation of CDOCs is in principle a national responsibility to be undertaken by the capturing nation, but this responsibility may be assumed by a NATO Command or Force. Wherever forces of two or more NATO nations are operating together, mutual support for the purposes of proper and timely exploitation should be given. This is especially important when the capturing nation does not have the necessary capability to exploit CDOCs. In that case such CDOCs should be turned over as expeditiously as possible to an allied nation that has such a capability. In cases where responsibility for exploitation is handed over to an allied nation, that nation will keep the capturing nation fully informed of the results obtained and will forward copies of CDOCs and reports prepared. The exploiting nation will be responsible for reporting as described in this Chapter.

2. CDOCs will be forwarded as expeditiously as appropriate to the document exploitation unit of the national JIC or, if applicable, the CJIC (see Chapter 4 of this publication), or other national or NATO agency, such as a JCDEC or Combined Joint Captured Document Exploitation Centre (CJCDEC), responsible for captured documents.

3. CDOCs associated with CPERS should, if possible, follow the CPERS from whom it was taken during the interrogation and exploitation process. If specialist exploitation is necessary, copies of the CDOC may follow the CPERS in lieu of the original CDOC.

4. CDOCs considered to be of intelligence or other interest will be exploited through the following process. Whenever feasible, in order to expedite handling, the processing stages may be combined.

- a. **Reporting.** The capturing unit reports the capture or discovery of CDOCs believed to be of intelligence or other interest through higher headquarters to the first document exploitation element in the chain of command by means of an INTREP.
- b. **Preliminary Screening.** If possible, preliminary screening, translation, categorisation should be accomplished by translators specialised in the exploitation of military and technical documents. Therefore, tactical questioners should forward CDOCs to DOCEX specialists in (C)JICs or (C)JCDECs as soon as possible, or these specialists should be detached to lower tactical levels. Reporting of information of immediate tactical value gained from CDOCs through established intelligence channels will be accomplished by personnel conducting tactical questioning for the capturing unit.
- c. **Supplementary Examination.** Supplementary examination should be carried out by translators specialised in the exploitation of military or technical documents. Therefore, interrogators should forward CDOCs to DOCEX specialists in (C)JICs or (C)JCDECs as soon as possible, or these specialists should be detached to lower tactical levels. CDOCs of

special intelligence or other interest will be reproduced and disseminated to intelligence and other staffs, as appropriate.

- d. **Detailed Exploitation.** Detailed exploitation and reporting may take place at a (C)JIC or at a (C)JCDEC by DOCEX specialists.

5. Information technology may be used to support the translation of documents and to scan them for reproduction and dissemination.

0604 Translation

1. **Levels of Translation.** Translation of CDOCs is often a time-consuming task. Therefore, depending on the assessed intelligence or other value of the CDOCs, the following levels of translation may be carried out:

- a. **Summary Translation.** A summary translation should consist of a concise outline of the contents in the CDOC and highlight information of intelligence or other value.
- b. **Extract Translation.** Specific parts of a CDOC containing specific information of intelligence or other value may be translated in full.
- c. **Full or Complete Translation.** A full or complete translation of a CDOC may be made when the entire contents of a CDOC are of such intelligence or other value as to warrant a complete translation.

2. A CDOC may go through several levels of translation. As the result of a preliminary screening, it may initially be translated in summary form before being forwarded to the next higher echelon. After complementary examination and evaluation, a translation of excerpts of intelligence or other interest to this or a higher echelon may be made. Finally, a full or complete translation may be made in order to facilitate a detailed exploitation of the CDOC.

0605 Tagging and Handling of CDOCs

1. Capturing units shall do everything possible to preserve the integrity of captured documents. CDOCs should be placed in appropriate protective containers for transit and storage (file folders, ration cases, watertight bags, etc).

2. The capturing unit will tag or otherwise identify the container holding the CDOC in accordance with the procedures stated in Chapter 2, para 0204. It is important that the original CDOC not be marked or otherwise altered. CDOCs associated with a CPERS should be tagged with part C of the Captured Personnel and Personal Effects Tag. If this CPERS has been interrogated, the INTGSN should be noted on the tag.

3. CDOCs will be categorised as described in paragraph 0602. 2. The CDOC containers or tags should be clearly marked with the letters "CDOC CAT" followed by the category letter.

Example: CDOC CAT "C".

4. Documents constituting evidence to be used in legal proceedings against persons suspected of terrorism, crimes against humanity, war crimes and other crimes will be marked "EVIDENCE". Such documents will be kept separate from other documents and will be stored under guard or in a secure area in order to ensure an unbroken chain of custody/evidence. Procedures for handling such CDOCs are outlined in Annex F. Copies of CDOCs assessed to be of intelligence or other value will be provided to the intelligence element of the capturing nation.

5. CDOCs, even if assessed to be damaged in the field, should not be disposed of or destroyed until reviewed by DOCEX specialists.

0606 Reporting, Reproduction and Dissemination

1. The reporting of information and intelligence obtained from documents should be as expeditious as possible. The use of information technology makes it possible to transfer documents and translations of documents with great speed to experts for exploitation and to intelligence and other customers. Databases should, therefore, be established to retrieve stored documents, and link analysis should be employed to exploit information obtained from these documents by identifying links to persons, places and events.

2. Reports will be submitted in accordance with relevant reporting procedures. Copies of all reports should follow the CDOCs through the exploitation process. NATO information systems such as the Battlefield Information Collection and Exploitation System (BICES) and Crisis Response Operations in NATO Open Systems (CRONOS) should be used for the widest dissemination to NATO and coalition forces (through plug-in systems) to process and disseminate CDOCs in a uniformed and expeditious manner. The following reports are required:

- a. **Intelligence Report.** An INTREP identifying the CDOC and its disposition, and giving information considered to be of immediate value, will be prepared and submitted by the capturing unit and other exploiting elements as appropriate.
- b. **Detailed Document Report.** A Detailed Document Report (DEDOCREP) will be prepared and submitted after a complementary and detailed examination/exploitation has found the CDOC to be of current intelligence or other value. This report has no set format. An adapted INTREP format could be used. It should include, at minimum, a summary translation. The flagword "DEDOCREP" will be used as the report identifier, and the report will include necessary data identifying the CDOC and its disposition.

3. **Reproduction and dissemination of CDOCs and translations as necessary will be carried** out at the earliest possible stage of the exploitation process. Copies of CDOCs considered of interest or translations thereof and lists of exploited documents, whether disseminated or not, will be submitted to appropriate national and NATO staffs.

0607 Handling of Category "A" Documents

All Category A documents require special, restricted handling. The national and NATO Command or Force headquarters should be kept informed of the seizure and disposition of such documents as soon as possible. If appropriate, they are to be handed over to the relevant component or nation without delay. Here they should be handled in close coordination with the intelligence and other relevant specialist staff.

0608 Handling of Special Documents

1. **Unmarked Maps, Charts, Air Imagery, Etc.** Unmarked maps, charts, air imagery and other types of cartographic material and information should be forwarded to the nearest geographic staff, survey unit or topographical section for exploitation. Copies may be retained to meet operational needs.
2. **Marked Maps, Charts and Air Imagery.** Marked maps, charts and air imagery will be immediately forwarded to the nearest national supporting intelligence centre or other all-source analysis facility for analysis, but relevant geographic staffs, survey units and topographical sections are to be informed of their existence, with scale, series, edition and other identification data.
3. **Personal Papers.** Personal papers belonging to a captured person, such as identity papers, personal letters and photographs that are not to be used as evidence, etc., if examined and determined to be of no intelligence or other value, will be returned to him in accordance with applicable international law. Copies of such papers will be made and forwarded to the appropriate agency, e.g. a DOCEX unit.

0609 Further Handling

Further handling is to be carried out in accordance with the procedures for handling CMAT/ATDs as described in Chapter 5.

0610 Security

1. CDOCs will be classified in accordance with national and NATO security regulations and protected in accordance with their intelligence or other value based on their operational sensitivity and in order to ensure protection of the information as well as sources and collection methods. The DOCEX or other intelligence element initially handling the CDOC should determine its classification. Circumstances of capture and the value of denying the opposing forces the knowledge that a particular piece of materiel or document is in own or NATO hands are also important considerations in determining the proper classification of a CDOC. The original classification markings on CDOCs should, therefore, not necessarily serve as a guideline. The classification of a CDOC may subsequently be reviewed as to its continued intelligence or other relevance.
2. CDOCs to be used as evidence in legal proceedings against CPERS suspected of terrorist acts, crimes against humanity, war crimes and other crimes are to be safeguarded separately from other CDOCs and should be in the custody of the military police or other investigative authority. (Guidelines for the handling of such CDOCs may be found in Annex F.) Copies of such CDOCs should be supplied to intelligence and other appropriate staffs. The investigative authority will assist in the intelligence and other exploitation of such evidence.

CHAPTER 7

Captured Persons, Materiel and Documents in Combined Joint Operations

0701 General

1. This Chapter is intended to provide guidance to NATO forces and other forces participating in a NATO Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) operation on the handling and processing of persons, materiel and documents captured during that operation. Furthermore, the aim of this Chapter is to describe the responsibilities of the Commander of the CJTF and his staff. It provides guidelines for the planning necessary to ensure that CPERS with various types of status are handled in accordance with international law or other applicable law. It also provides guidance on how to handle CMAT and CDOCs so that they may be exploited for intelligence and other purposes.

2. NATO member countries and other countries participating under the auspices of NATO in a coalition must be prepared to conduct operations across the spectrum of conflict. In the course of these operations, NATO and Coalition forces will have to be prepared to deal with CPERS of various categories. They must be able to handle CMAT and CDOCs correctly and expeditiously to extract information of intelligence and other value, including evidence for use in legal proceedings against CPERS suspected of war crimes, crimes against humanity, or terrorism. The handling of CPERS, CMAT and CDOCs needs to be taken into consideration by the commander, at each echelon, in all aspects of planning for operations and in subsequent conduct of operations.

3. The greatest number of CPERS may be expected to come from the Land Component Command's AO. Therefore, the main emphasis of this Chapter is on the handling of persons, materiel and documents captured in the land environment. Nevertheless, the principles of planning and preparation for dealing with CPERS, CMAT and CDOCs are valid for other environments and for commanders at all levels within the AO.

0702 Responsibilities

1. **The Nations and NATO.** The member Nations must have a common understanding of the definitions and procedures regarding CPERS, CMAT and CDOCs and their handling prior to forming a CJTF. NATO, in conjunction with the troop-contributing nations to a CJTF, develops ROE applicable to the particular operation or mission. The member Nations support NATO in manning the CJTF staff and units to provide the necessary manpower to handle CPERS, CMAT and CDOCs.

- a. The nations participating in the CJTF should formulate a Memorandum of Agreement which includes:
 - (1) A common definition of a POW consistent with the provisions of the GCs and other applicable international law as they pertain to the particular operation or mission.
 - (2) Procedures for determining the status of CPERS who do not immediately fall under these pre-defined categories (e.g. by convening a tribunal to determine POW status).

- (3) Measures to ensure that all CPERS regardless of status are treated in accordance with the GCs or other applicable international law.
- (4) Procedures for the transfer of CPERS to a CJTF organisation handling CPERS so that the obligations of the detaining member nation of the CJTF in accordance with applicable international law are fulfilled. In general, the handover of CPERS with POW status between nations and to a CJTF may require:
 - The designation of a Nation that assumes the responsibilities of the detaining power on behalf of all nations contributing troops to the CJTF. This Nation will provide the commander of the CJTF organisation handling CPERS.
 - The written authorisation of the government of each Nation contributing troops to the CJTF permitting the transfer of its CPERS to the lead nation charged with the handling of CPERS on behalf of all troop-contributing nations.
 - Provisions for regular inspections by representatives of the troop-contributing nations with CPERS in the custody of the CJTF.
- (5) Conditions and procedures for the handover of CPERS who have not been accorded POW status to:
 - Appropriate civil authorities in the host nation (if it has a functioning law enforcement and judicial system meeting recognised international standards for the treatment of detained persons and for fair and impartial judicial proceedings),
 - An international police authority (e.g. the United Nations Civilian Police), or
 - An international tribunal.
- (6) If relevant, conditions and procedures for the extradition of CPERS who have not been accorded POW status to:
 - A NATO member state,
 - A non-NATO member state participating in the CJTF, or
 - Another state requesting extradition.
- (7) Agreed interrogation methods and techniques.
- (8) Provisions for release of persons in accordance with GCs or other applicable international law
- (9) Provisions for inspections by representatives and delegates of Protecting Powers and ICRC delegates including a mechanism for suspending such inspections on the grounds of imperative military necessity.
- (10) Procedures regarding the exploitation of CMAT and CDOCs. This is to include provisions for the transportation and storage of such CMAT and CDOCs.
- (11) Procedures regarding the final disposition of CMAT and CDOCs including final ownership of these items and financial and logistical responsibility for their final removal or destruction.
- (12) Procedures regarding the sharing of intelligence and information obtained through interrogation and the exploitation of CMAT and CDOCs by the troop-contributing nations.

- (13) Standards ensuring the interoperability of communications and information systems, thus enabling the expeditious reporting of intelligence and information obtained from all sources including interrogation and the exploitation of CMAT and CDOCs.
 - (14) Provisions for the establishment of intelligence databases in accordance with AIntP-3 data exchange standards. These databases should be accessible by the intelligence staffs of all component commands and multinational and single nation formations and units.
 - (15) Standards and procedures for the collection, processing, recording and storage of personal data on CPERS, including, if applicable, biometric data.
 - (16) Regulations and procedures regarding the photography of CPERS and CPERS facilities including the prohibition of private photography of such persons and facilities.
- b. NATO drives efforts to meet the Statement of Requirements developed by the CJTF for personnel to be contributed by the member Nations and coalition partners to man staff positions in the CJTF headquarters and for units to handle CPERS, CMAT and CDOCs. In developing the operational plans with annexes and ROE, NATO should include procedures for dealing with special categories of CPERS such as those suspected of committing or conspiring to commit war crimes, crimes against humanity or terrorist acts.

2. **The CJTF Commander.** The CJTF Commander is responsible for planning and conducting operations within the constraints and restraints of the GCs or other applicable international law. Therefore, he must also have exact knowledge of his responsibilities for CPERS and their handling. This Chapter only lists the main responsibilities which the Commander and his staff must discharge. The Commander and his staff must, therefore, be familiar with the provisions of the GCs or other applicable international law in as much detail as possible. The moral and political importance placed on the correct and humane treatment of CPERS in all types of conflicts makes it essential that the Commander receives competent legal, political, medical and intelligence advice in these matters.

The commander's main responsibilities regarding the treatment of CPERS are to ensure that:

- a. The individual members of his force comply with the provisions of the GCs or other applicable international law.
- b. Persons captured by the CJTF are treated in accordance with the GCs or other applicable international law.

3. **The Staff.** Although the commander bears the overall responsibility for the handling of CPERS, CMAT and CDOCs, he delegates responsibility for certain aspects of the process to his staff. The following discussion identifies tasks and suggests staff sections and special staff that could execute them. It is not a complete list. In a CJTF these tasks may be delegated or assigned in a number of different ways.

- a. **CJ1 Staff.** The CJ1 has overall staff responsibility for the handling of CPERS within the Combined Joint Task Force Headquarters (CJTTFHQ). He will be assisted by CJ2 for intelligence and CJ3 for operational matters, CJ4 for logistical and medical matters, the Legal Advisor for matters pertaining to the GCs or other applicable international law and

the Provost Marshal for matters pertaining to the physical detention and guarding of CPERS. CJ1 may be responsible for :

- (1) Developing policy for the handling of CPERS within the CJTF AO in conformity with the GCs or other applicable international law.
- (2) Issuing instructions for the safe custody, welfare, discipline and, if necessary, evacuation of CPERS from the AO.
- (3) Determining the format of the INTERNSN to be used by the CJTF.
- (4) Issuing instructions for the administration of CPERS including submission of reports and returns in accordance with the GCs or other applicable law (in connection with e.g. transfers, deaths, repatriations).
- (5) Issuing instructions on the collection, processing, recording and storage of personal data on CPERS. These instructions may include guidelines for the use of biometrics.
- (6) Appointing officers and staffs to run CJTF collection points and holding areas for CPERS and the Combined Joint Detention and Interrogation Facility (CJDIF) within the AO and the issuing of orders for the operation of these collection points and holding areas and facilities.
- (7) Providing on the advice of CJ2, interpreters for CJTF and CJDIF collection points and holding areas, and Interrogation Teams as well as interpreters for CDOC and CMAT Exploitation Centres and Teams.
- (8) Determining the status of CPERS and convening boards of inquiry where necessary to include review and appeal boards.
- (9) Arranging for the transfer of CPERS to other nations; or to international legal bodies, consistent with GCs or other applicable international law. Additionally, CJ1 is responsible for the transfer of CPERS from the nations' forces participating in the CJTF, and from the other component commands to CJTF collection points and holding areas for CPERS as well as to the CJDIF.
- (10) Assisting in the repatriation of CPERS with POW status during and after hostilities.
- (11) Provisions for regular inspections by representatives of the troop-contributing nations with CPERS in the custody of the CJTF.
- (12) Developing media policy as it pertains to the handling of CPERS and policy regarding visits to CPERS facilities.

b. **CJ2 Staff.** CJ2 may be responsible for:

- (1) Producing estimates of likely numbers of POWs before the beginning of an operation (assisted by the CJ3 and CJ5 Staff as well as national intelligence organisations).
- (2) Organising the formation of CJ2, including CJ2X, and the Interrogation Element of the CJDIF (assisted by CJ1).

- (3) Tasking the CJDIF in accordance with the Commander's Priority Intelligence Requirements to collect information and intelligence through interrogation of CPERS and exploitation of CMAT, CDOCs and personal effects belonging to CPERS.
 - (4) Processing and disseminating information and intelligence collected by the CJDIF.
 - (5) Determining security policy regarding CPERS and CPERS facilities, including photography of CPERS, CPERS facilities, CMAT and CDOCs.
- c. **CJ3 Staff.** CJ3 may be responsible for:
- (1) Selecting locations for collection points and holding areas for CPERS and the location of the CJDIF (assisted by CJ2 and CJ4) and issuing orders to units for their construction.
 - (2) Issuing instructions for the activation of CJTF collection points and holding areas for CPERS and the CJDIF.
 - (3) Identifying units to act as guards and escorts for CPERS and to reinforce military police and issuing orders for execution of these tasks.
- d. **CJ4 Staff.** CJ4 may be responsible for:
- (1) Procuring and providing construction materials and stores for the establishment of collection points, holding areas and long-term detention facilities for CPERS, storage facilities for CMAT and the CJDIF.
 - (2) Producing Administrative Instructions covering the feeding, clothing, movement and accommodation of CPERS.
 - (3) Planning for the provision of sufficient resources to meet the requirements for the handling of the projected numbers of CPERS and expected amount of CMAT.
 - (4) Issuing instructions for the medical examination and treatment of CPERS.
 - (5) Recovering or disposing of CMAT after it has been examined.
- e. **Force Provost Marshal.** The Force Provost Marshal (FPM) is the NATO Commander's principal staff advisor on Military Police matters. (He may, or may not, be double-hatted as the NATO Military Police Commander. If he is also the NATO Military Police Commander, he is empowered to execute Operational Command of allocated military police resources.) He may be responsible for:
- (1) Providing guidelines and policy for the guarding and escort of CPERS by other military units within the AO.
 - (2) Planning military police operations to handle CPERS.
 - (3) Supporting the CJTF staff in the planning process as it pertains to the handling of CPERS.

- (4) Providing guidance for the guarding of CPERS at CJTF collection points, handling areas and long-term detention facilities.
 - (5) If he is also the NATO Military Police Commander, he may be responsible for supervising all military provosts or police assigned to the CJTF in the execution of their duties in handling CPERS.
- f. **Additional Responsibilities.** The Commander should furthermore delegate responsibility for the following tasks:
- (1) Inspection and validation of all handling procedures for CPERS, and of all detention facilities, to ensure compliance with the provisions of the GCs or other applicable international law.
 - (2) Liaison with the ICRC.
 - (3) Development of agreed biometric standards as well Standard Operating Procedures for collecting, processing, transmitting and storing biometric data from CPERS.

0703 The Handling of CPERS and the Operational Planning Process

1. The impact of persons captured by the CJTF on the Commander's plan will vary according to the type of operation. This is especially relevant when dealing with several types of CPERS in the same operation. In general, the impact on operations of having to handle CPERS may be described as follows:

- a. The obligation to protect and the need to guard CPERS reduces the numbers of troops available for operations or other duties.
- b. Guarding and escorting CPERS generally requires that troops assigned to these duties receive special training.
- c. The logistical requirements of dealing with CPERS place an additional burden on the CJTF's logistic resources.
- d. The transport of CPERS places an additional burden on the transport system.
- e. CPERS may hamper the conduct of operations and inhibit the commander's operational flexibility.
- f. The administration of CPERS creates additional pressures on the CJTF staff.
- g. CPERS contribute to improved intelligence about military, political, criminal and terrorist actors in the CJTF Area of Intelligence Responsibility and Area of Interest.

2. A number of steps may be taken in conjunction with the Operational Planning Process to determine the impact of CPERS on an operation and provide the basis for making the necessary preparations to deal with persons captured by the CJTF during the operation. These steps are:

- a. **Step 1.** CJ2 assesses whether the operation will result in the capture of POWs or other persons, and the category and projected numbers of the anticipated CPERS.

- b. **Step 2.** If the assessment in Step 1 indicates the operation will result in the capture of POWs or other persons, this should then be considered in the planning process as 'Other Relevant Factors'. Early consideration of religious, cultural and ethnic factors will facilitate the planning and conduct of CPERS operations.
- c. **Step 3.** Having considered the impact of POWs and other CPERS on the plan, measures for handling POWs and other CPERS should be considered as a possible task. Troops and other necessary resources should subsequently be allocated to the task. This will normally include guard personnel, interpreters, logistical support, transport and medical support.
- d. **Step 4.** Once the Commander has selected his course of action, details of his plan for handling POWs and other CPERS are included in the 'Execution' paragraph of his orders. Depending on the potential impact of POWs and other CPERS on the operation, the need to make a specific plan for their handling may be reflected in the 'Concept of Operations'. However, POWs and other CPERS will always be included in the 'Coordinating Instructions' for the execution of the plan.

3. Dealing with CPERS will nearly always affect an operation in unexpected ways. The Commander and staff of the CJTF will rarely be able to make a plan for the handling of CPERS with any assurance that it will succeed without significant difficulty. Therefore, it is necessary to base the plan on a worst-case scenario and prepare to allocate sufficient resources to meet that challenge. In the non-linear battlespace, POWs and other persons may be captured by different units of different nationalities. The unplanned arrival of large numbers of CPERS in a commander's AO can create enormous problems for the conduct of the operation.

0704 The Organisation for Handling CPERS

1. An organisation and a chain of command for the handling and exploitation of CPERS, CMAT and CDOCs should be established if the CJTF is to deal effectively with these issues.
2. In the pre-deployment planning phase of an operation, the CJTF may establish an organisation, e.g. a CJDIF, for handling CPERS commensurate in size with the estimated number of POWs and other persons to be captured during the operation or campaign. If a CJDIF is established, the CJTF should identify units to conduct the handling of CPERS.
3. This organisation for handling CPERS assumes responsibility for all aspects of the evacuation and custody of CPERS once they have been delivered to a CJTF collection point, leaving unit and formation commanders free to conduct operations. A diagram showing the relationship between the CJTF headquarters and the organisation for handling CPERS, e.g. a CJDIF, is shown in Figure 7-1.




Figure 7-1. Example of CJTF Organisation for Handling CPERS.

4. The organisation for handling CPERS, CMAT and CDOCs should be flexible, adapting to the size of the operation or campaign and the CJ2 assessment of the expected numbers of POWs and other CPERS. CJTF intermediate collection points and holding areas may be established in direct support of formations and units; however, in principle, formations and units are responsible for guarding and transporting CPERS to the CJTF collection point. The size of the AO, the availability and type of transport and the numbers of CPERS involved, will determine if intermediate holding areas and collection points are required.

0705 The CJDIF

1. A CJDIF may be established within the framework of a CJTF. It may also be established within the framework of a multinational formation (e.g. division or brigade), a sector or an agreement between two or more participating nations. (In these cases the term Multinational Detention and Interrogation Facility—or something to that effect—may be more appropriate.)

2. The mission of the CJDIF is:

- a. To assume custody of CPERS resulting from a combined joint operation either as POWs in an armed conflict or as other CPERS apprehended during a NA5CRO.

- b. To provide for their long-term detention until a decision has been reached on their final disposition.
- c. To conduct competent interrogations of POWs and other CPERS by trained interrogators for the purpose of gathering information of intelligence and other value.
- d. To provide support to law enforcement personnel and other legal authorities in the questioning of CPERS for the purpose of obtaining evidence to be used in legal proceedings.

0706 Responsibilities Pursuant to the Geneva Conventions or Other Applicable International Law as They Pertain to the CJDIF

1. The responsibilities of the “Detaining Power” as set out in GC3 rest with the nation which initiated the capture or detention of the CPERS in question. POWs may only be transferred by the Detaining Power in accordance with the conditions laid down in GC3, Article 12 (2). NATO is not a state and, therefore, cannot itself be a party to treaties and other international instruments relating to the conduct of armed conflict. Individual NATO troop contributing nations may, of course, be a party to such international instruments. In NATO-led operations, a lead nation may be designated to receive POWs from other NATO nations participating in the operation. The lead nation, which should subsequently fill the position of Commander of CJTF, will be responsible to each nation transferring POWs to the CJDIF for ensuring that the treatment of POWs is in accordance with international law, including GC3 or, where civilians are detained, in accordance with GC4. A MOA may be entered into to govern the procedures for transfer and the responsibilities of the designated nation following transfer. Any such arrangements involving POWs must be in accordance with GC3, Article 12.

2. GC3 also stipulates that a nation transferring POWs to another nation still has the obligation to ensure that treatment of the transferred POWs is in accordance with the GC3 or other applicable international law. Ideally, this responsibility could be met by requiring each nation to appoint its senior officer serving in the CJDIF as its representative responsible for ensuring that the treatment of persons captured by its troops is in accordance with GC3 or other applicable international law, thus fulfilling its obligations in accordance with GC3.

0707 Organisation

1. The organisation of the CJDIF will invariably be based on the type of combined joint operation being conducted, the estimated or real number of CPERS to be detained and interrogated, and the adjusted Statement of Requirements based on contributions from the participating nations. An example of how a CJDIF may be organised is shown in Figure 7-2.




Figure 7-2. Example Organisation of a CJDIF

2. A CJDIF may comprise the following functions and elements:
 - a. Commander. The Commander has overall responsibility for the operation of the CJDIF. He is especially responsible for ensuring that the treatment of CPERS in his custody is in accordance with the GCs or other applicable international law.
 - b. Legal Advisor. The operation of the CJDIF is governed by a wide range of international laws, including the GCs, and regulations. Breaches of these laws and regulations may have serious consequences for both the violators and the Commander. Therefore, the Commander should have a qualified legal advisor to assist him in ensuring compliance with all applicable conventions, laws and regulations.
 - c. Deputy Commander. The Deputy Commander assumes command of the CJDIF in the Commander's absence. He is also Chief of the facility's Operations Staff. In this capacity

he is responsible to the Commander for the planning, coordination and conduct of operations within the facility.

- d. Staff. The work of the Staff is directed by the Deputy Commander. The Staff may consist of the following functions and elements:
- (1) Administration. Administration is mainly responsible for receiving, processing, maintaining and transferring records and documents concerning the administration of CPERS in the custody of the CJDIF.
 - (2) Service Support. This section provides the service support necessary to operate the CJDIF. This includes supply, maintenance, construction, transportation etc. Depending on the size of the CJDIF, budget and finance can either be a separate function or integrated in the Service Support Section.
 - (3) Provost Officer (Military Police Officer). The Provost Officer (Military Police Officer) is the staff officer responsible for planning and supervising detention operations. He advises the CJDIF Commander on matters pertaining to detention procedures. As delegated by the Commander, he conducts inspections to ensure that relevant regulations are followed and that the detention facilities and the treatment of CPERS in the custody of the CJDIF are in compliance with all applicable conventions, laws and regulations. In that capacity, he should have powers of arrest over all personnel serving in the CJDIF. He may also serve as the CJDIF security officer.
 - (4) Medical Officer. The Medical Officer is the staff officer responsible for medical services within the CJDIF. In this capacity he is responsible to the Commander for the health and safety of the CPERS in the custody of the CJDIF. He advises the Commander on matters pertaining to health, hygiene and sanitation. He supervises the CJDIF Medical Section and Infirmary. In a smaller CJDIF he also provides medical treatment to all personnel in the absence of other physicians.
- e. Detention Element. The Detention Wing guards, escorts, handles, houses, clothes and feeds the CPERS in the custody of the CJDIF. Furthermore, it provides medical treatment and bath and laundry facilities for the detained persons.
- f. Interrogation Element. The Interrogation Wing plans and conducts interrogations based on the Information Requirements determined by CJ2. Information collected from interrogations and from the exploitation of documents and effects is reported to CJ2. To support subsequent interrogations and to record interrogations for documentation purposes, an audio-visual documentation section may be included in the organisation of the Interrogation Wing.

0708 CMAT and CDOCs

1. In general, the procedures for handling CMAT and CDOCs will be in accordance with the guidelines given in Chapters 2, 5 and 6 of this Publication. Specific procedures may be adapted to the requirements of a particular operation or campaign.

2. Available resources for the handling and exploitation of CMAT and CDOCs will also determine the size and capabilities of the organisations designated to carry out these tasks. Where possible, a CJCMEC and a CJCDEC as outlined in Annexes Q and U respectively will provide the most capable organisational structure for the handling and exploitation of CMAT and CDOCs. They

may be attached to the CJDIF. TETs and DOCEX Teams, may be detached to support interrogation units in the field. The tasks of the TETs are described in Annex Q and those of the DOCEX Teams in Annex U.

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CHAPTER 7

Captured Persons, Materiel and Documents in Combined Joint Operations

0709 General

4. This Chapter is intended to provide guidance to NATO forces and other forces participating in a NATO Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) operation on the handling and processing of persons, materiel and documents captured during that operation. Furthermore, the aim of this Chapter is to describe the responsibilities of the Commander of the CJTF and his staff. It provides guidelines for the planning necessary to ensure that CPERS with various types of status are handled in accordance with international law or other applicable law. It also provides guidance on how to handle CMAT and CDOCs so that they may be exploited for intelligence and other purposes.

5. NATO member countries and other countries participating under the auspices of NATO in a coalition must be prepared to conduct operations across the spectrum of conflict. In the course of these operations, NATO and Coalition forces will have to be prepared to deal with CPERS of various categories. They must be able to handle CMAT and CDOCs correctly and expeditiously to extract information of intelligence and other value, including evidence for use in legal proceedings against CPERS suspected of war crimes, crimes against humanity, or terrorism. The handling of CPERS, CMAT and CDOCs needs to be taken into consideration by the commander, at each echelon, in all aspects of planning for operations and in subsequent conduct of operations.

6. The greatest number of CPERS may be expected to come from the Land Component Command's AO. Therefore, the main emphasis of this Chapter is on the handling of persons, materiel and documents captured in the land environment. Nevertheless, the principles of planning and preparation for dealing with CPERS, CMAT and CDOCs are valid for other environments and for commanders at all levels within the AO.

0710 Responsibilities

4. **The Nations and NATO.** The member Nations must have a common understanding of the definitions and procedures regarding CPERS, CMAT and CDOCs and their handling prior to forming a CJTF. NATO, in conjunction with the troop-contributing nations to a CJTF, develops ROE applicable to the particular operation or mission. The member Nations support NATO in manning the CJTF staff and units to provide the necessary manpower to handle CPERS, CMAT and CDOCs.

c. The nations participating in the CJTF should formulate a Memorandum of Agreement which includes:

(17) A common definition of a POW consistent with the provisions of the GCs and other applicable international law as they pertain to the particular operation or mission.

(18) Procedures for determining the status of CPERS who do not immediately fall under these pre-defined categories (e.g. by convening a tribunal to determine POW status).

- (19) Measures to ensure that all CPERS regardless of status are treated in accordance with the GCs or other applicable international law.
- (20) Procedures for the transfer of CPERS to a CJTF organisation handling CPERS so that the obligations of the detaining member nation of the CJTF in accordance with applicable international law are fulfilled. In general, the handover of CPERS with POW status between nations and to a CJTF may require:
- The designation of a Nation that assumes the responsibilities of the detaining power on behalf of all nations contributing troops to the CJTF. This Nation will provide the commander of the CJTF organisation handling CPERS.
 - The written authorisation of the government of each Nation contributing troops to the CJTF permitting the transfer of its CPERS to the lead nation charged with the handling of CPERS on behalf of all troop-contributing nations.
 - Provisions for regular inspections by representatives of the troop-contributing nations with CPERS in the custody of the CJTF.
- (21) Conditions and procedures for the handover of CPERS who have not been accorded POW status to:
- Appropriate civil authorities in the host nation (if it has a functioning law enforcement and judicial system meeting recognised international standards for the treatment of detained persons and for fair and impartial judicial proceedings),
 - An international police authority (e.g. the United Nations Civilian Police), or
 - An international tribunal.
- (22) If relevant, conditions and procedures for the extradition of CPERS who have not been accorded POW status to:
- A NATO member state,
 - A non-NATO member state participating in the CJTF, or
 - Another state requesting extradition.
- (23) Agreed interrogation methods and techniques.
- (24) Provisions for release of persons in accordance with GCs or other applicable international law
- (25) Provisions for inspections by representatives and delegates of Protecting Powers and ICRC delegates including a mechanism for suspending such inspections on the grounds of imperative military necessity.
- (26) Procedures regarding the exploitation of CMAT and CDOCs. This is to include provisions for the transportation and storage of such CMAT and CDOCs.
- (27) Procedures regarding the final disposition of CMAT and CDOCs including final ownership of these items and financial and logistical responsibility for their final removal or destruction.
- (28) Procedures regarding the sharing of intelligence and information obtained through interrogation and the exploitation of CMAT and CDOCs by the troop-contributing nations.

- (29) Standards ensuring the interoperability of communications and information systems, thus enabling the expeditious reporting of intelligence and information obtained from all sources including interrogation and the exploitation of CMAT and CDOCs.
 - (30) Provisions for the establishment of intelligence databases in accordance with AIntP-3 data exchange standards. These databases should be accessible by the intelligence staffs of all component commands and multinational and single nation formations and units.
 - (31) Standards and procedures for the collection, processing, recording and storage of personal data on CPERS, including, if applicable, biometric data.
 - (32) Regulations and procedures regarding the photography of CPERS and CPERS facilities including the prohibition of private photography of such persons and facilities.
- d. NATO drives efforts to meet the Statement of Requirements developed by the CJTF for personnel to be contributed by the member Nations and coalition partners to man staff positions in the CJTF headquarters and for units to handle CPERS, CMAT and CDOCs. In developing the operational plans with annexes and ROE, NATO should include procedures for dealing with special categories of CPERS such as those suspected of committing or conspiring to commit war crimes, crimes against humanity or terrorist acts.

5. **The CJTF Commander.** The CJTF Commander is responsible for planning and conducting operations within the constraints and restraints of the GCs or other applicable international law. Therefore, he must also have exact knowledge of his responsibilities for CPERS and their handling. This Chapter only lists the main responsibilities which the Commander and his staff must discharge. The Commander and his staff must, therefore, be familiar with the provisions of the GCs or other applicable international law in as much detail as possible. The moral and political importance placed on the correct and humane treatment of CPERS in all types of conflicts makes it essential that the Commander receives competent legal, political, medical and intelligence advice in these matters.

The commander's main responsibilities regarding the treatment of CPERS are to ensure that:

- c. The individual members of his force comply with the provisions of the GCs or other applicable international law.
- d. Persons captured by the CJTF are treated in accordance with the GCs or other applicable international law.

6. **The Staff.** Although the commander bears the overall responsibility for the handling of CPERS, CMAT and CDOCs, he delegates responsibility for certain aspects of the process to his staff. The following discussion identifies tasks and suggests staff sections and special staff that could execute them. It is not a complete list. In a CJTF these tasks may be delegated or assigned in a number of different ways.

- g. **CJ1 Staff.** The CJ1 has overall staff responsibility for the handling of CPERS within the Combined Joint Task Force Headquarters (CJTTFHQ). He will be assisted by CJ2 for intelligence and CJ3 for operational matters, CJ4 for logistical and medical matters, the Legal Advisor for matters pertaining to the GCs or other applicable international law and

the Provost Marshal for matters pertaining to the physical detention and guarding of CPERS. CJ1 may be responsible for :

- (13) Developing policy for the handling of CPERS within the CJTF AO in conformity with the GCs or other applicable international law.
- (14) Issuing instructions for the safe custody, welfare, discipline and, if necessary, evacuation of CPERS from the AO.
- (15) Determining the format of the INTERNSN to be used by the CJTF.
- (16) Issuing instructions for the administration of CPERS including submission of reports and returns in accordance with the GCs or other applicable law (in connection with e.g. transfers, deaths, repatriations).
- (17) Issuing instructions on the collection, processing, recording and storage of personal data on CPERS. These instructions may include guidelines for the use of biometrics.
- (18) Appointing officers and staffs to run CJTF collection points and holding areas for CPERS and the Combined Joint Detention and Interrogation Facility (CJDIF) within the AO and the issuing of orders for the operation of these collection points and holding areas and facilities.
- (19) Providing on the advice of CJ2, interpreters for CJTF and CJDIF collection points and holding areas, and Interrogation Teams as well as interpreters for CDOC and CMAT Exploitation Centres and Teams.
- (20) Determining the status of CPERS and convening boards of inquiry where necessary to include review and appeal boards.
- (21) Arranging for the transfer of CPERS to other nations; or to international legal bodies, consistent with GCs or other applicable international law. Additionally, CJ1 is responsible for the transfer of CPERS from the nations' forces participating in the CJTF, and from the other component commands to CJTF collection points and holding areas for CPERS as well as to the CJDIF.
- (22) Assisting in the repatriation of CPERS with POW status during and after hostilities.
- (23) Provisions for regular inspections by representatives of the troop-contributing nations with CPERS in the custody of the CJTF.
- (24) Developing media policy as it pertains to the handling of CPERS and policy regarding visits to CPERS facilities.

h. **CJ2 Staff.** CJ2 may be responsible for:

- (6) Producing estimates of likely numbers of POWs before the beginning of an operation (assisted by the CJ3 and CJ5 Staff as well as national intelligence organisations).

- (7) Organising the formation of CJ2, including CJ2X, and the Interrogation Element of the CJDIF (assisted by CJ1).
 - (8) Tasking the CJDIF in accordance with the Commander's Priority Intelligence Requirements to collect information and intelligence through interrogation of CPERS and exploitation of CMAT, CDOCs and personal effects belonging to CPERS.
 - (9) Processing and disseminating information and intelligence collected by the CJDIF.
 - (10) Determining security policy regarding CPERS and CPERS facilities, including photography of CPERS, CPERS facilities, CMAT and CDOCs.
- i. **CJ3 Staff.** CJ3 may be responsible for:
- (4) Selecting locations for collection points and holding areas for CPERS and the location of the CJDIF (assisted by CJ2 and CJ4) and issuing orders to units for their construction.
 - (5) Issuing instructions for the activation of CJTF collection points and holding areas for CPERS and the CJDIF.
 - (6) Identifying units to act as guards and escorts for CPERS and to reinforce military police and issuing orders for execution of these tasks.
- j. **CJ4 Staff.** CJ4 may be responsible for:
- (6) Procuring and providing construction materials and stores for the establishment of collection points, holding areas and long-term detention facilities for CPERS, storage facilities for CMAT and the CJDIF.
 - (7) Producing Administrative Instructions covering the feeding, clothing, movement and accommodation of CPERS.
 - (8) Planning for the provision of sufficient resources to meet the requirements for the handling of the projected numbers of CPERS and expected amount of CMAT.
 - (9) Issuing instructions for the medical examination and treatment of CPERS.
 - (10) Recovering or disposing of CMAT after it has been examined.
- k. **Force Provost Marshal.** The Force Provost Marshal (FPM) is the NATO Commander's principal staff advisor on Military Police matters. (He may, or may not, be double-hatted as the NATO Military Police Commander. If he is also the NATO Military Police Commander, he is empowered to execute Operational Command of allocated military police resources.) He may be responsible for:
- (6) Providing guidelines and policy for the guarding and escort of CPERS by other military units within the AO.
 - (7) Planning military police operations to handle CPERS.

- (8) Supporting the CJTF staff in the planning process as it pertains to the handling of CPERS.
- (9) Providing guidance for the guarding of CPERS at CJTF collection points, handling areas and long-term detention facilities.
- (10) If he is also the NATO Military Police Commander, he may be responsible for supervising all military provosts or police assigned to the CJTF in the execution of their duties in handling CPERS.

1. **Additional Responsibilities.** The Commander should furthermore delegate responsibility for the following tasks:

- (4) Inspection and validation of all handling procedures for CPERS, and of all detention facilities, to ensure compliance with the provisions of the GCs or other applicable international law.
- (5) Liaison with the ICRC.
- (6) Development of agreed biometric standards as well Standard Operating Procedures for collecting, processing, transmitting and storing biometric data from CPERS.

0711 The Handling of CPERS and the Operational Planning Process

4. The impact of persons captured by the CJTF on the Commander's plan will vary according to the type of operation. This is especially relevant when dealing with several types of CPERS in the same operation. In general, the impact on operations of having to handle CPERS may be described as follows:

- h. The obligation to protect and the need to guard CPERS reduces the numbers of troops available for operations or other duties.
- i. Guarding and escorting CPERS generally requires that troops assigned to these duties receive special training.
- j. The logistical requirements of dealing with CPERS place an additional burden on the CJTF's logistic resources.
- k. The transport of CPERS places an additional burden on the transport system.
- l. CPERS may hamper the conduct of operations and inhibit the commander's operational flexibility.
- m. The administration of CPERS creates additional pressures on the CJTF staff.
- n. CPERS contribute to improved intelligence about military, political, criminal and terrorist actors in the CJTF Area of Intelligence Responsibility and Area of Interest.

5. A number of steps may be taken in conjunction with the Operational Planning Process to determine the impact of CPERS on an operation and provide the basis for making the necessary preparations to deal with persons captured by the CJTF during the operation. These steps are:

- e. **Step 1.** CJ2 assesses whether the operation will result in the capture of POWs or other persons, and the category and projected numbers of the anticipated CPERS.
- f. **Step 2.** If the assessment in Step 1 indicates the operation will result in the capture of POWs or other persons, this should then be considered in the planning process as 'Other Relevant Factors'. Early consideration of religious, cultural and ethnic factors will facilitate the planning and conduct of CPERS operations.
- g. **Step 3.** Having considered the impact of POWs and other CPERS on the plan, measures for handling POWs and other CPERS should be considered as a possible task. Troops and other necessary resources should subsequently be allocated to the task. This will normally include guard personnel, interpreters, logistical support, transport and medical support.
- h. **Step 4.** Once the Commander has selected his course of action, details of his plan for handling POWs and other CPERS are included in the 'Execution' paragraph of his orders. Depending on the potential impact of POWs and other CPERS on the operation, the need to make a specific plan for their handling may be reflected in the 'Concept of Operations'. However, POWs and other CPERS will always be included in the 'Coordinating Instructions' for the execution of the plan.

6. Dealing with CPERS will nearly always affect an operation in unexpected ways. The Commander and staff of the CJTF will rarely be able to make a plan for the handling of CPERS with any assurance that it will succeed without significant difficulty. Therefore, it is necessary to base the plan on a worst-case scenario and prepare to allocate sufficient resources to meet that challenge. In the non-linear battlespace, POWs and other persons may be captured by different units of different nationalities. The unplanned arrival of large numbers of CPERS in a commander's AO can create enormous problems for the conduct of the operation.

0712 The Organisation for Handling CPERS

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6. In the pre-deployment planning phase of an operation, the CJTF may establish an organisation, e.g. a CJDIF, for handling CPERS commensurate in size with the estimated number of POWs and other persons to be captured during the operation or campaign. If a CJDIF is established, the CJTF should identify units to conduct the handling of CPERS.

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


Figure 7-1. Example of CJTF Organisation for Handling CPERS.

8. The organisation for handling CPERS, CMAT and CDOCs should be flexible, adapting to the size of the operation or campaign and the CJ2 assessment of the expected numbers of POWs and other CPERS. CJTF intermediate collection points and holding areas may be established in direct support of formations and units; however, in principle, formations and units are responsible for guarding and transporting CPERS to the CJTF collection point. The size of the AO, the availability and type of transport and the numbers of CPERS involved, will determine if intermediate holding areas and collection points are required.

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3. A CJDIF may be established within the framework of a CJTF. It may also be established within the framework of a multinational formation (e.g. division or brigade), a sector or an agreement between two or more participating nations. (In these cases the term Multinational Detention and Interrogation Facility—or something to that effect—may be more appropriate.)

4. The mission of the CJDIF is:

- e. To assume custody of CPERS resulting from a combined joint operation either as POWs in an armed conflict or as other CPERS apprehended during a NA5CRO.
- f. To provide for their long-term detention until a decision has been reached on their final disposition.

- g. To conduct competent interrogations of POWs and other CPERS by trained interrogators for the purpose of gathering information of intelligence and other value.
- h. To provide support to law enforcement personnel and other legal authorities in the questioning of CPERS for the purpose of obtaining evidence to be used in legal proceedings.

0714 Responsibilities Pursuant to the Geneva Conventions or Other Applicable International Law as They Pertain to the CJDIF

3. The responsibilities of the “Detaining Power” as set out in GC3 rest with the nation which initiated the capture or detention of the CPERS in question. POWs may only be transferred by the Detaining Power in accordance with the conditions laid down in GC3, Article 12 (2). NATO is not a state and, therefore, cannot itself be a party to treaties and other international instruments relating to the conduct of armed conflict. Individual NATO troop contributing nations may, of course, be a party to such international instruments. In NATO-led operations, a lead nation may be designated to receive POWs from other NATO nations participating in the operation. The lead nation, which should subsequently fill the position of Commander of CJTF, will be responsible to each nation transferring POWs to the CJDIF for ensuring that the treatment of POWs is in accordance with international law, including GC3 or, where civilians are detained, in accordance with GC4. A MOA may be entered into to govern the procedures for transfer and the responsibilities of the designated nation following transfer. Any such arrangements involving POWs must be in accordance with GC3, Article 12.

4. GC3 also stipulates that a nation transferring POWs to another nation still has the obligation to ensure that treatment of the transferred POWs is in accordance with the GC3 or other applicable international law. Ideally, this responsibility could be met by requiring each nation to appoint its senior officer serving in the CJDIF as its representative responsible for ensuring that the treatment of persons captured by its troops is in accordance with GC3 or other applicable international law, thus fulfilling its obligations in accordance with GC3.

0715 Organisation

3. The organisation of the CJDIF will invariably be based on the type of combined joint operation being conducted, the estimated or real number of CPERS to be detained and interrogated, and the adjusted Statement of Requirements based on contributions from the participating nations. An example of how a CJDIF may be organised is shown in Figure 7-2.




Figure 7-2. Example Organisation of a CJDIF

4. A CJDIF may comprise the following functions and elements:
 - g. Commander. The Commander has overall responsibility for the operation of the CJDIF. He is especially responsible for ensuring that the treatment of CPERS in his custody is in accordance with the GCs or other applicable international law.
 - h. Legal Advisor. The operation of the CJDIF is governed by a wide range of international laws, including the GCs, and regulations. Breaches of these laws and regulations may have serious consequences for both the violators and the Commander. Therefore, the Commander should have a qualified legal advisor to assist him in ensuring compliance with all applicable conventions, laws and regulations.
 - i. Deputy Commander. The Deputy Commander assumes command of the CJDIF in the Commander's absence. He is also Chief of the facility's Operations Staff. In this capacity he is responsible to the Commander for the planning, coordination and conduct of operations within the facility.
 - j. Staff. The work of the Staff is directed by the Deputy Commander. The Staff may consist of the following functions and elements:

- (1) Administration. Administration is mainly responsible for receiving, processing, maintaining and transferring records and documents concerning the administration of CPERS in the custody of the CJDIF.
 - (2) Service Support. This section provides the service support necessary to operate the CJDIF. This includes supply, maintenance, construction, transportation etc. Depending on the size of the CJDIF, budget and finance can either be a separate function or integrated in the Service Support Section.
 - (3) Provost Officer (Military Police Officer). The Provost Officer (Military Police Officer) is the staff officer responsible for planning and supervising detention operations. He advises the CJDIF Commander on matters pertaining to detention procedures. As delegated by the Commander, he conducts inspections to ensure that relevant regulations are followed and that the detention facilities and the treatment of CPERS in the custody of the CJDIF are in compliance with all applicable conventions, laws and regulations. In that capacity, he should have powers of arrest over all personnel serving in the CJDIF. He may also serve as the CJDIF security officer.
 - (4) Medical Officer. The Medical Officer is the staff officer responsible for medical services within the CJDIF. In this capacity he is responsible to the Commander for the health and safety of the CPERS in the custody of the CJDIF. He advises the Commander on matters pertaining to health, hygiene and sanitation. He supervises the CJDIF Medical Section and Infirmary. In a smaller CJDIF he also provides medical treatment to all personnel in the absence of other physicians.
- k. Detention Element. The Detention Wing guards, escorts, handles, houses, clothes and feeds the CPERS in the custody of the CJDIF. Furthermore, it provides medical treatment and bath and laundry facilities for the detained persons.
 - l. Interrogation Element. The Interrogation Wing plans and conducts interrogations based on the Information Requirements determined by CJ2. Information collected from interrogations and from the exploitation of documents and effects is reported to CJ2. To support subsequent interrogations and to record interrogations for documentation purposes, an audio-visual documentation section may be included in the organisation of the Interrogation Wing.

0716 CMAT and CDOCs

3. In general, the procedures for handling CMAT and CDOCs will be in accordance with the guidelines given in Chapters 2, 5 and 6 of this Publication. Specific procedures may be adapted to the requirements of a particular operation or campaign.

4. Available resources for the handling and exploitation of CMAT and CDOCs will also determine the size and capabilities of the organisations designated to carry out these tasks. Where possible, a CJCMEC and a CJCDEC as outlined in Annexes Q and U respectively will provide the most capable organisational structure for the handling and exploitation of CMAT and CDOCs. They may be attached to the CJDIF. TETs and DOCEX Teams, may be detached to support interrogation units in the field. The tasks of the TETs are described in Annex Q and those of the DOCEX Teams in Annex U.

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CHAPTER 8

Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations

0717 General

7. This Chapter is intended to provide guidance to NATO forces in the handling and processing of CPERS, CMAT and CDOCs during the conduct of Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations (NA5CROs).

8. NA5CROs are described in Allied Joint Publication 3.4, *Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations*, as "multifunctional operations which encompass those political, military and civil activities, initiated and executed in accordance with international law, including international humanitarian law, contributing to conflict prevention and resolution, and crisis management in the pursuit of declared Alliance objectives".

9. The purpose of NA5CROs is to conduct missions that contribute to international peace and security. They are intended to respond in a timely and co-ordinated manner to crises that could either affect the security of NATO nations, or threaten stability and lead to conflict on the periphery of the Alliance. NA5CROs range from support operations that are primarily associated with civil agencies; e.g. support to humanitarian operations, support to disaster relief operations, support to non-combatant evacuation operations, extraction operations, military aid, enforcement of sanctions; through operations in support of peace to combat operations.

10. Since the mid-1990s NATO has focused on two types of operations:

- Peace Support Operations (PSOs) and
- Defence Against Terrorism Operations (DATOs).

0718 Peace Support Operations

1. Operations in the support of peace are recognised as an aspect of NA5CROs. PSOs are normally conducted in support of an internationally recognised organisation such as the United Nations or the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe. They involve military forces and diplomatic and humanitarian agencies. The purpose of a PSO is to achieve a long-term political settlement or other specified conditions. PSOs include peacekeeping and peace enforcement as well as conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace building, and humanitarian operations.

2. PSOs contain their own unique characteristics and problems for NATO forces conducting them. In many cases the conflict is undeclared, and there are armed personnel engaged with militia or irregular forces who are not easily identified. In some cases, NATO forces conducting a PSO will be required to stabilise conflict areas with or without the assistance of the local government. These forces may also be called upon to assist local officials in minimising criminal activities; and if authorised, to apprehend persons suspected of crimes against humanity and war crimes.

0719 Defence Against Terrorism Operations

1. Even though MC 327/2, *NATO Military Policy for Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations*, does not at present recognise DATOs as an aspect of NA5CROs, the purpose and nature of DATOs are, for the purpose of this publication, assumed to be governed by the same principles as NA5CROs.
2. Defence against terrorism comprises counterterrorism and anti-terrorism as well as measures to combat criminal activities in support of terrorism. Counterterrorism is defined in AAP-6 as “all offensive measures taken to neutralise terrorism before and after hostile acts are carried out. (Note: such measures include those counterforce activities justified for the defence of individuals as well as containment measures implemented by civilian organisations or military forces.)” Military operations executed by NATO forces in response to terrorism may be conducted by conventional forces or by specially organised, equipped and trained counterterrorism assets. Anti-terrorism is commonly defined as those measures, usually passive, that are meant to reduce vulnerabilities to terrorist acts.
3. DATOs contain their own unique characteristics and problems for NATO forces conducting them. DATOs may be conducted in the context of an undeclared conflict against state-sponsored or transnational, autonomous armed groups who are not easily identified, and who often do not fall under the categories of combatants defined in the GC3 or applicable international law. NATO forces engaged in a DATO may be required to operate in conflict areas with or without the assistance of the local government. These forces will usually be authorised to apprehend persons suspected of terrorist acts as well as crimes against humanity, war crimes and other crimes.

0720 Responsibilities

1. If there is no functioning local system of law enforcement, the NATO Force may be responsible for maintaining basic law and order in the AO. In that case guidance must be provided on the procedures to be followed in incidents resulting in NATO personnel detaining civilians and/or hostile forces or belligerents. This guidance may be expressed in a memorandum of agreement, the ROE, the operational order and other directives.
2. In a NA5CRO conducted within an AO under the sovereignty of a recognised national government that has functioning police and court structures, the government of the host nation must determine its own status and responsibilities under international law and its national laws with regard to persons captured by its forces on its territory and is not affected by NATO decisions regarding the handling of CPERS, CMAT and CDOCs. In any case, the transfer of CPERS to the host country is contingent on its compliance with the GCs or other applicable international law. Procedures for handling nationals of the host country and foreign nationals detained by the NATO Force must be negotiated with the government of the host country by NATO, the nations participating in the NA5CRO or the international body providing the mandate for the operation.
3. The NATO Force and the nations participating in the NA5CRO will under all circumstances adhere to the provisions of the GCs and applicable international law. Furthermore, it is the responsibility of the NATO Command charged with the operation and the nations whose forces are engaged in a particular NA5CRO to include, in the operational plan, specific ROE to be followed in that NA5CRO and also to include specific directions for the handling of CPERS including CPERS suspected of terrorism, crimes against humanity, war crimes and other crimes.

0721 Treatment of CPERS

1. All CPERS, regardless of capture or detention circumstances, shall be treated in a humane manner in accordance with the GCs or other applicable international law. Their personal possessions

and documents, except for effects that may constitute evidence in legal proceedings, will also be handled in accordance with applicable international law. This is reflected in the following rules of behaviour towards CPERS:

- a. CPERS shall be treated humanely.
- b. CPERS shall not be physically or mentally abused.
- c. Contact with CPERS shall not be of a sexual nature.
- d. Members of the NATO force shall not accept bribes nor engage in commercial dealings with CPERS.

0722 General Procedures

1. Where practicable, CPERS, CMAT and CDOCs will be dealt with in accordance with the procedures outlined in Chapters 1-6 and relevant Annexes of this Publication. However, special measures may have to be taken regarding the handling of certain CPERS as they may pose a greater threat to guards and other personnel dealing with them than is the case with typical POWs and other CPERS.

- a. **Use of Force.** The use of force against any person to effect detention, and particularly against civilians, shall be in accordance with the principles of necessity and proportionality. No more force is to be used than that which is reasonable and necessary for the detention of the person or persons in question in accordance with the principles of self-defence and established ROE.
- b. **Disarming and Confiscation.** Persons captured or detained in the course of a NA5CRO are to be disarmed. Weapons and other articles that constitute a threat to members of the NATO Force or the individual being detained as well as items that are to be used as evidence in legal proceedings shall be confiscated. Confiscated items must be safeguarded, the appropriate records kept and a receipt given. Unless otherwise instructed, such items will follow the CPERS as he is processed.
- c. **Search.** Searches are conducted to remove documents and effects of military or investigative interest as well as items that may pose a threat to the security of own forces or to the CPERS himself. Such items may be removed except for clothing, identity documents, protective equipment etc, as stipulated in applicable international law. All identification documents should be reviewed/inspected and catalogued, and then returned to the CPERS. Searches should be conducted in accordance with the following procedures:
 - (1) Searches are not to be used to humiliate or intimidate.
 - (2) CPERS should be searched by personnel of their own gender. If that is not possible, CPERS may be searched by personnel of the opposite sex in the presence of a witness, when possible an officer or non-commissioned officer, to ensure that the search is conducted in accordance with standards of propriety relevant to that particular situation.
 - (3) Vehicles or beasts of burden will be searched.

- (4) Searchers must neither be overly friendly nor overbearing.
 - (5) Searches will always be conducted by two or more persons so as to maintain security.
 - (6) Searches must be carried out, when possible, in such a way as to avoid unnecessary damage.
 - (7) Searches will be promptly and fully reported in accordance with the Standing Operating Procedures.
 - (8) Care should be taken in handling articles of a religious or cultural nature so as not to unnecessarily offend the person being searched..
- d. **Detention.** Again, CPERS are at minimum to receive the same treatment that is accorded to POWs by GC3 until their status is determined. However, in certain circumstances it may be necessary to seek guidance from higher echelon's Provost Officer (Military Police Officer) or Legal Branch to ascertain the appropriate level of detention for the CPERS. For example, certain CPERS will have to be segregated from individuals held for other reasons, and special measures may have to be taken to restrain them so that they cannot escape, destroy evidence, inflict self-harm or communicate with their accomplices.
- e. Figure 8 – 1 illustrates the handling process for CPERS in NA5CRO.




Figure 8 – 1. CPERS Handling Process in a NA5CRO

0723 CPERS Suspected of Committing or Conspiring to Commit Terrorist Acts, War Crimes, Crimes Against Humanity or Other Crimes

1. If a CPERS is suspected of having committed, been involved in, or having knowledge of terrorist acts, crimes against humanity, war crimes or other crimes, the Legal Branch and Force Provost Marshal (Military Police Officer) will be notified and will be involved as soon as possible. An uncontaminated, unbroken chain of custody/evidence is imperative to ensure a fair hearing if the CPERS is brought to trial. (Guidance is provided in Annex F.) The individual and all pertinent records, documents, photographs, and items pertaining to the alleged crime will be segregated from the other CPERS. The CPERS will be held in a separate facility (if possible) and will be given a CAPTAG, as shown in Annex A of this document. The tag will indicate in the additional remarks section the suspicion of involvement in or knowledge of terrorist acts, crimes against humanity, war crimes and other crimes. All associated documents and items will be tagged and processed in accordance with Chapters 5 and 6 of this Publication. All documents and other items will accompany the CPERS as he is processed through the system until handover to the legal authorities. The documents and other items will be guarded. As soon as possible a "chain of evidence" will be established by NATO forces and maintained by the CPERS administration system, and all other concerned authorities until handover has been completed.

2. The capturing unit will notify the higher echelon's headquarters as soon as possible of the CPERS's capture. If appropriate, preliminary questioning may be carried out by the capturing unit to obtain information of immediate value. Tactical questioning should subsequently be conducted by qualified personnel. Any incriminating information divulged by the CPERS should be reported as well. However, this information may not necessarily be admissible as evidence. Subsequent interrogation should, therefore, be conducted by appropriate law enforcement agencies and judicial authorities. The CPERS will be processed through the system as outlined in this Publication, until such time as higher authority determines that other procedures are required. The NATO Force Commander will contact higher (i.e. NATO) authority, who will determine whether the CPERS is to be turned over to civilian authority and whether a full investigation is warranted. It may be appropriate for him to appoint an officer (e.g. the Force Provost Marshal (Military Police Officer) or the Legal Advisor) to liaise with the competent international authorities.

0724 Additional Procedures

1. **Reporting.** All cases of detention are to be reported through the chain of command in accordance with the procedures outlined in this Allied Joint Publication and with the directives issued by the commander of NATO force or command conducting the NA5CRO. All the particulars and details of the detention should be included in the report in order that the status of the CPERS and his continued detention can be reviewed.

2. **Release.** Guidelines for the release of the CPERS should be issued by the commander of NATO force or command conducting the NA5CRO. Generally, a CPERS may only be released by the Commander after consultation with the Force Provost Marshal and Legal Branch.

3. **Records.** The Military Police, or other element as ordered by the Commander, is at all times to maintain and store a full record of the detention, including the medical record and the medical release form, and a record of the procedures followed during the period of custody. All circumstances relating to the apprehension and detention of the CPERS must be recorded and reported up the chain of command, including:

- a. When and why a person is detained.
- b. When a person is searched.

- c. When items are confiscated.
- d. When a person is questioned.
- e. When a person is released.

4. **Segregation.** POWs are to be separated in accordance with GC3. Other CPERS shall be segregated according to citizenship. As the circumstances require, these CPERS may be further segregated in the following categories:

- a. Ethnic or religious groups.
- b. CPERS suspected of having committed, been involved in, or having knowledge of terrorist acts, crimes against humanity, war crimes and other crimes. (These CPERS should be segregated from each other as well as from other CPERS.)
- c. Members of warring factions.
- d. Within these categories, males shall be segregated from females.
- e. Other CPERS as necessary (e.g. mentally disturbed or disabled CPERS, children, etc.).

0725 Media Operations

1. The increased ability of the international media to focus on the treatment of CPERS could lead to adverse publicity and pressure and jeopardise military and law enforcement operations. The section responsible for media operations within the NATO force or command's headquarters should be involved in the CPERS planning process and kept informed of CPERS operations and data.

2. Exposure of CPERS to the media must not violate the provisions of the GCs, in particular GC3, Articles 13 and 14, or other applicable international law.

ANNEX A

Capture Tag

A001 General

1. The need to ensure that CPERS, POWs as well as other CPERS, their effects, their equipment and documentation are cross-related/identified is important to the intelligence and law enforcement effort. Therefore, a means of preserving the link between the CPERS and his equipment should be established at the earliest practicable moment after capture.
2. The CAPTAG, is shown at Appendix 1 to this Annex. However, this degree of administration may be impossible in confused war conditions and where linguistic difficulties arise. The CAPTAG should be completed as fully as possible and at the earliest stage possible. The administration of the CAPTAG system must not be allowed to interfere with the speedy exploitation of the intelligence potential of the CPERS. An incomplete CAPTAG and/or capture report, and early transfer, is preferable to a CPERS being held at the point of capture until time is available for the administrative procedures to be fully completed.
3. The CAPTAG should not be used to label CMAT and CDOC which are not associated with an individual. The procedures for dealing with such items are contained in Chapters 5 and 6.
4. The CAPTAG is in three parts:
 - a. Top Marked – PART A. This shall be provided to the captive in a manner which ensures, as far as practicable, that interchange between CPERS is difficult. While specific arrangements will be left to the discretion of the capturing unit, the ideal arrangement would be to attach the tag to the captured person's body directly by use of a plastic wrist or leg band rather than to attach it to the captive's clothing.
 - b. Middle Marked – PART B. This shall either remain attached to PART A, or be detached and held by the prisoner guard/escort, and turned over to the first interrogation unit or element located at the collecting point or CPERS holding facility. Use of PART B is at the discretion of the NATO or national forces having custody of CPERS.
 - c. Bottom Marked – PART C. This shall be attached to the documents or effects found in the possession of the CPERS and turned over to the prisoner guard/escort. Where possible, these items shall be placed in a single container and sealed in order that the items may not become detached from the tag.
5. An example of a CAPTAG is set out at Appendix 1 to this Annex.
6. It shall be the responsibility of the capturing unit to cross-refer the CAPTAG to the Group Capture Report (see Annex B) wherever possible.
7. Capture Tag Serial Numbers. The CAPTAG shall be clearly marked with a serial number which shall be in the following format.

- a. Nationality of Capturing Unit. In accordance with the identification letters set out in STANAG 1059 – Codes for Geographical Entities. (See Annex W.)
 - b. A serial number allocated in numerical sequence by the capturing unit. Nations and NATO commands are responsible for allocating blocks of serial numbers to formations/units under their command.
8. The Capture Tag Serial Number shall be used as a temporary identification only. CPERS will be issued an Internment Serial Number (INTERNSN) when they arrive at the Holding Area or other CPERS holding facility. (See Annex J.)

APPENDIX TO ANNEX A

Capture Tag Format

(Reinforced Section)

O
ATTACH TO CAPTURED PERSON (CPERS)
PART A
CAPTURE SERIAL NUMBER OF TAG DTG OF CAPTURE LOCATIONS OF CAPTURE CPERS NAME CPERS RANK CPERS SERVICE NO CPERS DATE OF BIRTH CPERS NATIONALITY POWER SERVED BY CPERS CAPTURING UNIT
PART C ATTACHED TO EQUIPMENT OR DOCUMENTS YES/NO COMMENTS OR REMARKS ON REVERSE OF PART B YES/NO
PART B
CAPTURE SERIAL NUMBER OF TAG DTG OF CAPTURE LOCATIONS OF CAPTURE CPERS NAME CPERS RANK CPERS SERVICE NO CPERS DATE OF BIRTH CPERS NATIONALITY POWER SERVED BY CPERS CAPTURING UNIT
PART C
CAPTURE SERIAL NUMBER OF TAG DTG OF CAPTURE LOCATIONS OF CAPTURE CPERS NAME CPERS RANK CPERS SERVICE NO CPERS DATE OF BIRTH CPERS NATIONALITY POWER SERVED BY CPERS CAPTURING UNIT

O
REMARKS: INCLUDE ANY INFORMATION WHICH MAY ASSIST THE INTELLIGENCE EFFORT, E.G., CIRCUMSTANCES OF CAPTURE. ASSOCIATED PERSONS CAPTURED AT THE SAME TIME/LOCATIONS, WITH CPERS UNIT ETC.
ADDITIONAL COMMENTS OR REMARKS, AS REQUIRED
(PERFORATION) (REINFORCED SECTION)
ATTACH TO CPERS EQUIPMENT OR DOCUMENTS ENSURE ALL DOCUMENTS/EQUIPMENT ARE SECURE IN ONE PACKAGE MARKED WITH X IN BOX BELOW, IF OF PARTICULAR INTELLIGENCE IMPORTANCE.

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ANNEX B

Group Capture Report

B001 GENERAL

1. The capturing unit will complete a GROUPOCAPREP at the time of capture whenever circumstances allow. The GROUPOCAPREP shall alert the CPERS handling organisation to facilitate the planning, movement, care and disposition of CPERS.
2. A copy of the GROUPOCAPREP should be held by the escort accompanying the CPERS, and this copy should be handed to the authority receiving the CPERS. It should also list the tag numbers of the CPERS in the group, and may also contain any remarks by the capturing unit or the escort on the behavior or conduct of individuals at capture or during evacuation
3. Capturing units should complete the GROUPOCAPREP as well as the capture tag (in accordance with Appendix 1 to Annex B) as fully as circumstances allow but should not delay the transfer of CPERS to CPERS handling facilities because it has not been possible to complete them. The guiding principle is that an incomplete GROUPOCAPREP and early transfer to next echelon's CPERS handling facility is preferable to a full report and late transfer. Where an incomplete GROUPOCAPREP is sent, amplifying or follow-up reports should be sent as soon as circumstances allow.
4. Where the capturing unit has the ability to categorise CPERS, this should be done and the category noted in the GROUPOCAPREP.

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APPENDIX TO ANNEX B

Sample Format of a Group Capture Report

(The GROUPOCAPREP should be as complete as circumstances allow. It should ideally contain the following information).

1. Designator of Capturing Unit:

2. Date/Time Group of Capture:

|D|D|T|T|T|T|Z|M|M|M|Y|Y|

3. Location of Capture:

a. UTM/Grid Reference.

|N|N|A|A|A|N|N|N|N|N|N|

b. Latitude/Longitude

|N|N|N|N|N|N|N|A|■|N|N|N|N|N|N|N|A|

4. Numbers of Captured Persons (CPERS): (Use one-up numerics, i.e. OM0001, OM0002).

a. Officers-Male

|O|M|_|_|_|_|

b. Officers-Female

|O|F|_|_|_|_|

c. NCOs-Male

|N|M|_|_|_|_|

d. NCOs-Female

|N|F|_|_|_|_|

e. Other Ranks-Male

|S|M|_|_|_|_|

f. Other Ranks-Female

S	F				
---	---	--	--	--	--

g. Others (Description)-Male

C	M				
---	---	--	--	--	--

h. Others (Description)-Female

C	F				
---	---	--	--	--	--

5. Captured Documents (CDOCs): (Numbers, type, nationality).
6. Captured Materiel (CMAT): (Numbers, type, nationality).
7. Circumstances of Capture: (include wherever possible direction of movement, size of force, speed of movement, etc.).
8. Location at Time of Report.
9. Evacuation Intentions: (To where, when and by what means).

ANNEX C

Special Provisions for the Handling of Persons Captured at Sea

C001. General Principles. Persons captured at sea—be they from enemy ships or destroyed aircraft—are to be dealt with under the same principles as detailed in Chapter 2.

C002. After an Engagement at Sea. After each engagement at sea GC2 places a duty on all Parties to the conflict to take all possible measures to, whenever circumstances permit, search for and rescue those who have been wounded and shipwrecked as a result of the action.

C003. Hospital Ships. A belligerent warship may approach a military or civil hospital ship and free from it those of its own forces held there as POWs. It may also capture those members of an opposing force who are being treated on the hospital ship. These actions may only be carried out if the wounded and sick are medically capable of being moved and if the capturing warship can provide suitable medical care.

C004. Neutral Ports. Unless other arrangements are made between the belligerents and the neutral power, POWs who are landed at a neutral port will be interned by the neutral power and prevented from taking any further part in the conflict.

C005. CPERS Documentation. The capturing ship is to record details of each CPERS and forward them up the chain of command as soon as possible. This information will then be transmitted through the national or NATO appropriate agency to the Protecting Power or, if so designated, the ICRC.

C006. Reports. Ships capturing POWs and other CPERS are to forward a GROUPCAPREP through their chain of command as soon as possible.

C007. Tactical Questioning and Interrogation. Tactical questioning may be conducted at sea in order to obtain information of immediate value and to determine whether CPERS should be subject to further interrogation. Interrogation may be conducted onboard vessels until evacuation to more suitable facilities ashore is possible.

C008. Evacuation of CPERS. Consistent with international law, CPERS can only be held temporarily on board a naval vessel. CPERS and their associated documentation are to be transferred to a CPERS handling facility on land as soon as possible. During the transfer from the ship they are to be escorted by military police or trained guards where possible. The escort for such transfers may be from either the organisation handling CPERS or another military unit depending on the circumstances prevailing at the time.

C009. Transfer of CPERS Between Ships. CPERS taken aboard by minor war vessels, ships with small ships' companies and auxiliary ships with limited military personnel are, where possible, to be transferred to major units where the infrastructure will enable more effective CPERS handling.

C0010. Guidelines for Guarding and Handling CPERS at Sea. It is difficult to be prescriptive with guidance on guarding and handling of CPERS at sea, as each class of ships' capability will differ, as will the size of the crew and its skills. As part of his military decision making

process, the Maritime Component Commander or the amphibious task force commander will need to consider the possibility of taking prisoners in his plan. This will typically be the responsibility of the Force or Group Logistic Co-ordinator. At a lower level individual units deployed as part of the Task Force will be required to develop contingency plans for dealing with CPERS. These plans should cover accommodation, feeding, exercise and medical treatment of CPERS held onboard. Where possible CPERS should be given the same standard of accommodation, food and facilities as those of the Detaining Power. However, practically it may be impossible to give CPERS domestic accommodation onboard and they may have to be held in vehicle decks and hangers until evacuation ashore can be arranged.

C0011. Removal of CPERS to Maritime Units in Amphibious Operations. CPERS taken by amphibious forces deployed alongside land forces are to be processed through the land forces CPERS handling organisation. However, CPERS taken during amphibious raids or in the initial stages of an amphibious landing may need to be brought back to maritime units when:

- a. The landing force is withdrawn to sea, and no assets left ashore and the operation is terminated.
- b. Where only a limited beachhead has been established and the retention of CPERS in the AO would put them at significant risk from the continuing battle.

The removal of large numbers of CPERS to sea may overwhelm the capacity of the amphibious task force to deal effectively with them. A decision may have to be taken as to how many CPERS and of what category are to be held or released.

ANNEX D

Sample Format of a Tactical Questioning Report

CPERS CATEGORY: A B C D		
CPERS NUMBER:		EVACUATION DATE
PERSONAL	SURNAME:	
	FIRST NAME:	
	OTHER NAMES:	
	GENDER: MALE FEMALE	
	SERVICE/ ID NO:	
	DATE OF BIRTH:	
	PLACE OF BIRTH:	
	NATIONALITY:	
	LANGUAGES:	
	MARITAL STATUS: SINGLE MARRIED DIVORCED WIDOW(-ER)	
STATUS: MILITARY / CIVILIAN / PARAMILITARY / OTHER:		
ADMIN	SCREENER:	SCREENING DTG:
	APPROACHES:	
MILITARY	BRANCH: ARMY AIR FORCE NAVY MARINES/NAVAL INFANTRY OTHER SERVICE:	
	CONSCRIPTED: YES NO	
	RANK:	
	ADVERSARY UNIT DESIGNATION:	
	DUTY POSITION:	
	JOB:	
	SKILLS:	
	EXPERIENCE:	
CAPTURE	DTG:	CAPTURING UNIT:
	PLACE:	DOCUMENTS:
	CIRCUMSTANCES:	
	WEAPONS/EQUIPMENT/MATERIEL:	
COPER NUMBER:		
CIVILIAN	OCCUPATION:	
	ETHNICITY:	
	PLACE OF RESIDENCE:	
	ORGANISATION:	

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	DUTIES:
	SKILLS:
ASSESSMENT	PHYSICAL CONDITION:
	EDUCATION:
	INTELLIGENCE: ABOVE AVERAGE AVERAGE BELOW AVERAGE-
	MENTAL STATE:
	LEVEL OF COOPERATION: HIGH MEDIUM LOW NONE
INTELLIGENCE VALUE: HIGH MEDIUM LOW NONE (Explain in Remarks.)	
ON WATCH OR WANTED LIST: YES NO	
REMARKS	
PIR / IR	

ANNEX E

Preliminary Technical Report (PRETECHREP)

1. To be submitted by accelerated intelligence reporting procedures immediately following the acquisition of significant equipment.
 2. Only use those letters for which information is available.
-

- a. DTG of report.
- b. Rank, name and unit of person submitting report.
- c. Equipment
 - (1) Type⁵.
 - (2) Name.
 - (3) Quantity.
- d. Nationality and designation of unit or organisation to which the equipment belongs (using national identifying letters in accordance with STANAG 1059—see Annex W).
- e. Technical characteristics of immediate tactical value.
- f. Locations.
 - (1) Capture
DTG and location (geographic co-ordinates or UTM grid reference including grid zone designation and 100,000 m square identification) of capture.
 - (2) Present
Present location (geographic co-ordinates or UTM grid reference including grid zone designation and 100,000-m square identification) of captured equipment.
- g. Description/characteristics of equipment as applicable:
 - (1) Country of manufacture (using national identifying letters in accordance with STANAG 1059—see Annex W).

⁵ Term to be in accordance with AIntP-3. Refer to STANAGs pertaining to designation of aircraft and ships.

- (2) Manufacturer and factory of origin.
- (3) Dimensions, weight, caliber, etc.
- (4) Condition, cause of failure.

- h. Description/characteristics of unusual equipment subsystems as applicable⁶:
- i. Details of associated technical documents as appropriate.
- j. Recommended disposal.
- k. Imagery of equipment or subsystems.
- l. Other information.

⁶ To be repeated as often as necessary.

ANNEX F

Guidelines for Handling Evidence

F001 General

This Appendix provides general guidelines for the handling of CMAT and CDOCs to be used as evidence in legal proceedings against CPERS suspected of crimes against humanity, terrorism, war crimes and other crimes. The detailed procedures for identifying, handling, storing, transferring, releasing and disposing of CMAT and CDOCs used as evidence should follow accepted international legal standards and may be set down in national manuals or regulations or in Standing Operating Procedures for a NATO force.

F002 Evidence Custody

1. CMAT and CDOCs constituting evidence should be reported as soon as possible by the capturing unit or person to the military police or other personnel specially trained and authorised to handle evidence in order to ensure proper handling.
2. It is the responsibility of all military police or other law enforcement personnel to take every precaution to preserve the integrity of evidence in its original condition. Evidence must be entered into the custodial system as soon as possible after its collection, seizure, or surrender.
3. The Force Provost Marshal should establish and operate an evidence custodial system. This custodial system could consist of:
 - a. An evidence custodian (designated in writing by the Force Provost Marshal).
 - b. An alternate evidence custodian (designated in writing by the Force Provost Marshal).
 - c. Evidence storage facilities.
 - d. An evidence log.
 - e. An active evidence custody record or file.
 - f. A final evidence disposition record or file.
4. The evidence custodian or, in his absence the alternate evidence custodian, has responsibilities which cannot be further delegated. He should ensure that:
 - a. Evidence is properly inventoried, tagged, packaged, and marked prior to acceptance for storage. The evidence tag should include the name, date of birth—and if applicable—the rank and service number of the associated CPERS. The tag should also include an identifying number, such as the INTERNSN, that connects the evidence to the CPERS.
 - b. Evidence custody documents are properly completed by military police personnel delivering the evidence for safekeeping prior to acceptance for storage.

- c. Evidence is properly safeguarded.
- d. The evidence log, active evidence custody record and final evidence disposition files are properly maintained.
- e. Inventories of evidence holdings are conducted regularly.
- f. Evidence is disposed of in accordance with proper national or NATO force procedures.

F003 Evidence Submission

1. The capturing unit or person should tag the CMAT or CDOC as follows:

National identifying letters of capturing unit as prescribed in STANAG 1059. (See Annex W.)

Designation of capturing unit including service.

DTG of capture.

Location of capture (geographic coordinates or UTM grid reference including grid zone designation and 100,000-metre square identification).

Captured from Unit (enemy or warring faction) (including national identifying letters in accordance with STANAG 1059—see Annex W).

Summary of circumstances of capture.

Associated CPERS.

The law enforcement person first assuming custody of evidence will subsequently mark the evidence itself for future identification as evidence. If such marking is not possible, the evidence will be put in a container that can be marked. The marking should consist of time and date of acquisition and the rank and name of the person who assumed custody of the evidence. When any person submits evidence to the evidence custodian, it shall be properly tagged, in appropriate containers if needed.

2. All evidence being submitted shall be carefully examined, counted and weighed, as appropriate, by the accepting custodian. The submitting individual must ensure those items being retained have some evidentiary value. Any items which do not have evidentiary value will be promptly returned or disposed of by the submitting individual, in accordance with authorised procedures. The evidence custodian should not accept items that are not evidence nor should he accept evidence which is not properly tagged and accompanied by the stipulated documentation such as a custody receipt. Each item of evidence should therefore have a case control number or an equivalent designator identifying the police report that pertains to the evidence seized.

F004 Evidence Storage Facilities

All property received as evidence will be physically safeguarded and stored in a separate and distinct "evidence room." The evidence room should be of sufficient size to allow for the handling, storage, and processing of volumes of evidence consistent with the size of the law enforcement operation. It must also provide for the secure storage of the evidence. When a room has been designated as an evidence room, other equipment and property, personal or official, shall not be stored in it under any circumstances.

F005 Evidence Inventory

1. When evidence is first received into custody by law enforcement personnel, whether confiscated during an investigation or received from a unit or command representative, the receiving party must inventory the evidence personally. Subsequently, when evidence is transferred between parties for any reason, the inventory must be verified by the receiving individual unless it has been placed in a sealed container by law enforcement personnel. Money and controlled substances will be verified even if in a sealed container.
2. When an inventory is taken, it shall be accomplished by the evidence custodian, and a disinterested officer outside of the provost marshal office. An entry shall be entered into the evidence log reflecting the inventory and the participating personnel.

F006 Transfer and Shipment of Evidence

Physical evidence coming into the possession of military law enforcement personnel will, from time to time, require its transfer and shipment to another agency where the chain-of-custody must be maintained. Shipment shall be made by reliable and secure means. Documentation proving an unbroken chain-of-custody shall be maintained.

F007 Disposal of Evidence

1. The final disposal of evidence requires authorisation as follows:
 - a. Approval for the final disposal of evidence shall be obtained from appropriate authority, and entered in the final disposal section of the appropriate documentation, such as an evidence custody receipt.
 - b. Obtaining authorisation for disposal of evidence will be accomplished by the evidence custodian.
 - c. Any evidence which was used in any court action shall not normally be disposed of until the initial trial and subsequent appeals have been completed. Authorisation for disposal must be obtained from the commander, the appropriate legal officer or his representative.
 - d. Any evidence which is entered into the evidence custody system and which is not utilised in judicial or administrative action may be disposed of upon authorisation from the provost marshal or his designated representative.
2. Specific guidelines for evidence disposal are as follows:
 - a. Evidence which is obtained during the course of an investigation and is the personal property of an individual shall, whenever possible, be returned to that person, with the exception of items, the mere possession of which is unlawful. Such items would include narcotics, unlawfully obtained drugs, illegal firearms, explosives, counterfeit currency, or counterfeit identification. When personal property is returned to the owner or his authorised representative, the individual receiving the property will be required to sign for it.
 - b. Evidence which, by its nature, cannot be returned to the owner or entered into a national supply system for disposal, such as narcotics, illegal firearms or other contraband, shall be destroyed. Such destruction shall be accomplished by or in the presence of the evidence custodian and either a Staff Non-commissioned Officer or Commissioned Officer assigned

to the provost marshal's office. Such destruction shall be of a nature so as to make the evidence unusable for any lawful or unlawful purpose other than residual scrap.

ANNEX G

Holding Facilities for Captured Persons

G001 General

1. The GC3 provides very specific requirements for the construction and operation of Holding Areas and Facilities for POWs. In summary, they require that:

- a. POWs, and by inference, other CPERS are only to be detained in facilities which are based on land and in circumstances which guarantee the maintenance of adequate standards of hygiene and health.
- b. POWs are not normally to be detained in prisons.
- c. POWs are to be quartered under conditions as favourable as those for the forces of the Detaining Power that are billeted in the same area. These conditions shall make allowance for the habits and customs of the POWs and must be in no way prejudicial to their health. This requirement applies particularly to the arrangements made for POW dormitories.
- d. Accommodation is to be protected from damp, adequately heated and lighted, particularly at night and protected against fire. Latrine facilities for use both by day and night are to be provided. Baths and showers are to be provided together with sufficient supplies of water for personal toilet and laundry. Adequate facilities are to be provided for messing.
- e. A medical facility capable of accommodating sick POWs is to be provided. Adequate premises and the necessary equipment for POWs to take exercise are also required whenever military considerations permit.
- f. POW Holding facilities are to be marked so as to be easily identifiable from the air by day.

2. Collecting Points, Holding Areas and Holding Facilities should be sited so that CPERS are not able to observe sensitive installations or operational activities of friendly forces.

3. With the exception of initial collecting points, construction of all CPERS holding facilities is an engineer responsibility. The tasking of engineer support is the responsibility of the operations staff and the provision of construction materials is a logistics responsibility. Since the construction of CPERS holding facilities requires considerable resources, planning and allocation of resources should be initiated as early as possible.

4. Existing structures should be used when possible to reduce construction requirements.

G002 Collecting point

1. Figure G-1 shows an example layout of an initial collecting point.




Figure G-1: Example of an Initial Collecting Point.

2. **Function.** The Collecting Point is a facility where individual CPERS and small groups of CPERS are consolidated into larger groups before being moved up the CPERS handling chain. While it is not possible to set firm limits for the time a CPERS will remain in a Collecting Point, the aim should be for them to be moved within 24 hours of their arrival.

3. **Siting.** The Collecting Point is to be established at battalion or brigade level, but may also be established at any appropriate command level. A central collecting point may be established at division level. An example is shown in Figure G-2. It is likely that there will be one Collecting Point in each brigade area although this will depend on the overall size of the Area of Operations (AO). Proximity to the Main Supply Route (MSR) will speed up the evacuation process. Collecting Points must be able to move with little or no notice.

4. **Construction.** The Collecting Point should, where possible, be based on an existing building. This increases the shelter available for CPERS and reduces the need for engineer support to erect perimeter wire and overhead shelter (CPERS can be made to dig for their own protection). There is no formal design for a Collecting Point but it must be built to suit the climate, the weather and the operational situation.




Figure G-2: Example of a Central Collecting Point (200 man capacity).

5. The size and configuration of compounds and the placement of internal facilities, field registration and processing sites, intelligence screening sites, close-confinement areas for disruptive captives and medical facilities vary depending on the situation.
6. Construction supplies include general purpose medium-size tents (approximately 20 captives per tent), concertina wire, barbed or razor wire, screening materials, long and short pickets, staples, anchors and water cans.
7. The Interrogation Unit must be located far enough from the CPERS to perform its function effectively and should be screened from the CPERS, including routes in and out of the interrogation area.

G003 Holding Area

1. **Function.** The CPERS Holding Area is an intermediate stage in the evacuation of CPERS to their final destination in a CPERS long-term holding facility. The CPERS Holding Area can accommodate more CPERS than Collecting Points and ideally CPERS should not stay for more than 72 hours. CPERS will require segregation in accordance with the procedures outlined in Chapters 2 and 3 of this publication.

Figure G-3 shows an example layout of a holding area.

2. **Numbers.** The CPERS Holding Area should be built on a modular basis. For planning purposes the CPERS Holding Area should be capable of accommodating 500 CPERS in transit to a CPERS long-term holding facility.

3. **Siting.** The CPERS Holding Area should be sited so that it will support CPERS operations and facilitate transit to a CPERS long-term holding facility. The holding area will normally be established away from an area of immediate danger in a location with access to a MSR.




Figure G-3: Example of a Holding Area (500 man capacity).

G004 Long-Term Holding Facility

1. The Long-Term Holding Facility is the final stage in the CPERS handling process. It is a purpose built facility capable of accommodating large numbers of CPERS for an indefinite period.

The essential difference between the CPERS Holding Area and the Long-Term CPERS Holding Facility is the nature of its construction. Figure G-4 shows an example layout of a long-term holding facility for POWs. A Long-Term Holding Facility for other CPERS should contain facilities for segregation according to type or status. Prisons⁷ and other suitable buildings may be used to accommodate these CPERS. The Long-Term Holding Facility provides more durable accommodation and generally more solid construction methods for perimeter fences, guard towers, interrogation facilities and administrative offices.




Figure G-4: Example of a POW Long-Term Holding Facility.

G005 Facilities for Processing CPERS

1. The processing of CPERS as described in Chapter 3 of this Publication will usually take place at a holding area or may also be completed at a long-term facility. Figure G-5 shows an example of the layout of a CPERS processing facility.

⁷ The psychological impact on the local population and CPERS of using prison facilities that have been the site of grievous human rights violations should be considered.




Figure G-5: Example of a CPERS Processing Facility.

G006 Planning Factors for Holding Areas and Long-Term Holding Facilities

1. The following factors should be taken into consideration when selecting a particular area for the establishment of a holding area or a long-term holding facility:
 - a. Whether there are any features of the ground such as marshes or swamps that might promote conditions affecting the health of CPERS.
 - b. Sufficient water supplies to meet the needs of the long-term holding facility.
 - c. The availability of suitable electrical power supplies.
 - d. Existing buildings or structures which can be adapted, thus avoiding unnecessary construction work.
 - e. The availability of local construction materials.
 - f. Proximity to potential target areas.
 - g. Proximity to existing infrastructure such as road (MSR), rail or airhead.
 - h. Additional logistic support which the establishment of a holding area or facility in the Area of Operations will require.
 - i. The attitude of the local population.

- j. The threat of guerrilla or terrorist activity in the area.
- k. The general attitude of the CPERS, i.e. aggressive and uncooperative or subdued and cooperative.
- l. The influence of the terrain on construction, access and security.
- m. Any climatic considerations.

G007 Construction Recommendations

1. The construction of holding areas and long-term holding facilities is an engineer task. The following are the construction standards that are considered to be necessary in order to satisfy security, sanitation and safety requirements for holding facilities:

- a. **Fences.** Perimeter fencing is to consist of:
 - (1) A double barbed wire fence around the perimeter of each of the one or more enclosures, which make up the holding area or long-term holding facility.
 - (2) Top guards with two or more strands of barbed wire at the top of the outside perimeter fence.
 - (3) A 4-meter lane, free of any vegetation between the inside and outside perimeter fences.
- b. **Guard Towers.** Towers are to be sited around the perimeter of each enclosure constructed to meet the following requirements:
 - (1) Of sufficient height to permit unobstructed observation of the section of perimeter which they are sited to cover.
 - (2) Placed immediately outside the perimeter and where the perimeter is a double fence, sited in such a manner as to allow an unrestricted view of the lane between the fences.
 - (3) Low enough to allow an adequate field of fire.
 - (4) Spaced to provide optimum observation. In conditions of poor visibility, extra guard posts may have to be established between towers outside the outer perimeter fence.
 - (5) Of sufficient size to allow the mounting of crew served automatic weapons.
 - (6) Fitted with retractable ladders.
- c. **Lighting.** Generators (including stand-by equipment) and lighting sets are to be provided to enable the following lighting requirements to be met:
 - (1) Sufficient lighting of fences or walls to enable the detection of CPERS attempting to escape at night.
 - (2) Sufficient lighting at strategic points within the holding area or facility to enable security to be maintained at night within the compound.

- (3) All light fittings to be protected against breakage where necessary.
- (4) All lighting to be shaded so that tower and other perimeter guards are not dazzled.
- d. **Access for Vehicles.** Construction work is to be carried out to allow:
 - (1) Full vehicular access to the inside of the compound.
 - (2) Vehicle patrols full access to the perimeter fence along its complete length.
- e. **Communications.** Telephone communications are to be established between perimeter towers and other guard posts and the compound headquarters or operations centre. A secondary means of communication, possibly by radio, is also to be in place.
- f. **Separation.** A four-compound (2000 CPERS) facility is the maximum size of any one enclosure. If it is assessed that the holding requirement is likely to exceed this figure, further enclosures will be established.
- g. **Waste Disposal.** An important aspect of the construction and management of CPERS facilities is the requirement for an efficient waste disposal system. This must be considered under two headings:
 - (1) **Human Waste.** A system must be put in place at the outset of construction for disposing of the human waste from latrines in compounds and enclosures. For anything other than the initial collecting point, the deep trench latrine will not suffice and a more effective form of latrine must be provided. Depending on the resources available, this will range from simple chemical toilet to a fully fledged disposal system equipped with flushing lavatories and connected to either a local sewage system or to cess pits. Failure to make provision for disposal of human waste will almost inevitably lead to the rapid spread of disease among the CPERS.
 - (2) **Other Waste.** Arrangements must be made for the collection and disposal of the waste and rubbish resulting from the wide range of activities taking place in detention facilities. The amount of rubbish generated in a holding area for 2,000 CPERS each day will be considerable and unless an organised system of rubbish collection and disposal is set up from the first occupation of the facility, environmental and health problems will arise.
 - (3) **Waste Collection.** The GC3 allows the use of POWs for tasks connected with camp maintenance. The operation of sewage systems and waste disposal are tasks which fall within this category provided that POWs employed on them are given appropriate training and suitable protective equipment and clothing.
- h. **Fire Precautions.** Fire fighting equipment must be provided in all CPERS facilities to the same standard as that required for own forces accommodated in similar conditions. Where piped water is not readily available, there may be a requirement for emergency water supply tanks or reservoirs to be constructed close to the detention compound or enclosure.
- i. **Marking of Holding Areas and Facilities.** GC3 provides protected status to POW facilities. Roofs and walls of holding areas and long-term holding facilities for POWs are to

be clearly marked with the letters "PW" or "PG" (Prisonnier de Guerre) so as to be visible from both ground and air.

j. **Facilities.** The following facilities are to be provided in each long-term holding facility:

- (1) A facility command post and administration office.
- (2) A medical centre.
- (3) A facility for the storage and issue of clothing and equipment and where appropriate the operation of a POW Canteen.
- (4) A facility for the conduct of religious services and intellectual pursuits for POWs.

Each separate compound within the long-term holding facility will have the following facilities:

- (5) Accommodations.
- (6) Kitchen and Messing Facilities.
- (7) Bath and washing facilities.
- (8) Latrines.

G008 Interrogation Facility

1. The facility must provide the requisite number of rooms to service the volume of interrogations. The rooms must be large enough to comfortably contain a minimum of four persons with appropriate lighting and climate control with a table and chairs. Furthermore, they should be soundproof so that CPERS undergoing interrogation cannot hear or be heard by other CPERS in the facility. Adequate screening to obscure observation of the approaches to and from the interrogation facility is required. Latrine facilities must be located in close proximity to the interrogation facility (within the screened area). The interrogation facility should have space for guards and medical personnel, since they must be available at all times during interrogations in very close proximity to the interrogation rooms. The facility should also have rooms for observation through two-way mirrors or by means of surveillance cameras.

2. The interrogation facility should be located far enough from the CPERS holding area or facility that observation of interrogation operations and movement of CPERS to and from the interrogation facility is not possible.

3. The interrogation facility should also contain a suitable room for the operations and analysis cell. This room should have adequate space for necessary files, map boards, computers and workstations and be located with discretion to the interrogation rooms.

4. Also, the interrogation facility should have office space for the interrogators, storage space for CPERS effects, CMAT and CDOCs that are used in the interrogations.

5. Access control into the interrogation facility (by guards) must be tightly observed.

6. An example of the layout of an interrogation facility is shown in Figure G-6.




Figure G-6: Example of an Interrogation Facility

ANNEX H

Escorts and Guards

H001 Introduction

1. From the moment of capture to the time when released from captivity, the CPERS will be escorted or guarded by members of the armed forces of the Detaining Power. The procedures for escorting and guarding CPERS must be well known by those who carry out these tasks in order to prevent CPERS from escaping from custody.
2. As the ultimate method of preventing a CPERS from escaping may be the use of lethal force, it is essential that an effective system for escorting and guarding CPERS should be in place in order to prevent the need for lethal force.
3. The purpose of this annex is to set out principles for the escorting and guarding of CPERS.

H002 Definitions

1. The terms escort and guard are defined as follows:
 - a. **Escort.** An escort is an individual or a formed body of military personnel whose task it is to prevent the escape of CPERS in the course of their movement from one CPERS facility to another.
 - b. **Guard.** A guard is an individual or a formed body of military personnel whose task it is to prevent the escape of CPERS from CPERS facilities and to maintain discipline among the CPERS within the facility.

H003 The Escort

1. **Role of the Escort.** The role of the escort is to prevent CPERS from escaping in the course of their movement from CPERS facility to another. The responsibility of an escort begins at the dispatching facility and ends when they are handed over.
2. **Provision of the Escort.** The escort may be detached from the capturing unit, or from other units as designated by CJ3 at Force HQ.
3. **The Size of Escorts.** The basic principle of escorting is that the minimum escort should consist of no less than the basic 4 man team.
4. **Planning the Move.** The basic information required for the planning process is as follows:
 - a. **The Number of CPERS to be escorted.** This will determine the size of the escort.

- b. **Availability of Restraints.** The availability of means of restraint (e.g. handcuffs) may reduce the need for escorts. However, the use of such means of restraint must be in accordance with provisions of GC3 and other applicable international law.
 - c. **The Condition and Morale of the CPERS.** Tired and co-operative captives do not need as many escorts as those who are fresher and better motivated. Some CPERS e.g. from special operations forces, may require a proportionally larger escort than other CPERS.
 - d. **The Method of Movement.** Movement on foot offers more opportunities for escape than vehicle movement. Certain types of movement such as movement by truck, train and air require specific precautions to be taken by the escort.
 - e. **The Terrain.** The terrain across which the CPERS are to be moved will influence the numbers in the escort and the method of escorting the CPERS. Close terrain will require more escorts than desert.
 - f. **Enemy Activity.** Any likelihood of enemy interference with the move will require an escort capable of taking offensive action to protect itself while still accomplishing its mission.
 - g. **The Location of Other Units on the Route.** Before departure, the escort should familiarise itself with the location of units on its planned route in order to be able to seek assistance or make rest stops in the course of the journey.
 - h. **The Communication Plan.** The escort is to be in communication at all times with the headquarters of the formation through whose AO it is moving.
5. **CPERS Transport.** It is unlikely that there will be dedicated transport for the evacuation of CPERS. Their movement will be based on the return journeys of vehicles and aircraft delivering combat supplies forward to the general area from which the CPERS are to be moved. Transport arrangements will be co-ordinated by the J1/G1 and J4/G4 staffs at the formation headquarters concerned. The movement of CPERS on foot will only be carried out where there is no transport available and immediate evacuation is essential for operational or security reasons.
6. **Briefing of CPERS.** CPERS should be briefed through an interpreter before the move takes place. The briefing is to include:
- a. The meaning of basic directions such as "Stop!", "Go!", "Lie Down!", "Hands Up!" etc.
 - b. The escort's orders for opening fire (providing the ROE permits firing upon escaping CPERS).
 - c. That the 'Silence Rule' applies at all times throughout the move (No talking to the escort, no talking to each other).
 - d. The actions which CPERS are to take in the case of an emergency.
7. **Briefing of the Escort.** Before the move takes place the escort is to be briefed. This briefing is to include:

- a. The destination, method of movement and route for the evacuation.
 - b. The understanding by the escort of its responsibility for the CPERS and the need to safeguard them.
 - c. The requirement for CPERS to follow orders and instructions.
 - d. The need for all members of the escort to be aware of potential opportunities for the CPERS to escape in the course of the move and of measures to prevent this happening.
 - e. The understanding that CPERS are only to be spoken to when it is necessary to give orders and maintain control.
 - f. What the appropriate actions are in the event of an enemy attack or other emergency.
 - g. What actions are to be taken to prevent escape attempts.
 - h. The rules for opening fire or the use of force.
8. **CPERS Documentation.** The escort commander is to ensure that he is provided with:
- a. A nominal roll of the CPERS who are to be escorted.
 - b. The appropriate CPERS documentation.

H004 The Guard

1. **Role.** The role of the Guard is to prevent the escape of CPERS from a CPERS facility, to maintain discipline and to provide security within such facilities. Guards will also have a subsidiary role in the day to day administration of the facility. The commander of the Guard Force is responsible for ensuring that the Guard personnel under his command perform their duties in a professional and detached manner. He must also ensure that the Guard Force is not pressured or subverted in the performance of their duties.
2. **Provision of the Guard Force.** The Guard Force is to be found from all or part of a formed unit or units, designated at the outset of operations by CJ3 at Force HQ. The designated unit or units are to have no other task apart from the provision of guards for CPERS facilities.
3. **Organisation of the Guard Force.** The Guard Force is to be composed of four elements:
 - a. **External Guards.** External guards secure the perimeter of the facility by manning guard towers and gate posts. Their main role is to ensure that CPERS remain confined inside the facility but they also have the subsidiary role of protecting the facility against attack or attempts to infiltrate the area from outside.

- b. **Internal Guards.** Internal guards maintain segregation and order within the facility and restrict access to areas where the possibility of escape may exist such as buildings sited close to the perimeter of the compound.
- c. **Roving Sentries.** Roving sentries, operating in pairs, carry out random patrols within the perimeter of the compound.
- d. **The Quick Reaction Force (QRF).** The roles of the QRF will include:
 - (1) Reinforcing the external and internal guards where necessary.
 - (2) Defending the perimeter against outside attack.
 - (3) Pursuing and re-capturing escaped CPERS in the immediate area of the facility.
 - (4) Resolving any internal breakdown of CPERS discipline.
- e. **Dogs.** Wherever possible, the guard force is to be augmented with trained dogs and handlers. The dogs should include at least one tracker dog in their number.

H005 Control of CPERS

- 1. **General.** The effective control of CPERS in holding areas and camps is essential to the conduct of humane internment operations within the requirements of the GCs. Effective CPERS control can be achieved through a combination of:
 - a. **Forward Planning.** Staffs must ensure that plans exist for adequate CPERS facilities, escorts, guard forces, transport and general administration and that these plans can be implemented speedily and efficiently.
 - b. **Abiding by the Geneva Conventions.** NATO personnel at each stage in the CPERS handling process from the point of capture to the CPERS Holding Facility must scrupulously abide by, and be seen to be abiding by, the detailed requirements of the GCs.
 - c. **An Effective System of CPERS Discipline.** There are a number of components that constitute an effective system of CPERS discipline.
 - (1) **A Definitive CPERS Regime.** There is a requirement for a framework on which CPERS can base an ordered life style and a system of discipline. This is provided in CPERS facilities by:
 - (a) Establishing a disciplinary policy and implementing it in a firm but equitable manner.
 - (b) Promulgating the rules, regulations, instructions and orders which CPERS are expected to obey in the CPERS' own language.
 - (c) Providing CPERS with copies of the GCs in their own language.

H006 Conclusion

The efficient escorting and guarding of CPERS is the key to the conduct of an effective and humane CPERS internment system. The brief guidelines set out in this annex should enable those involved in the escorting and guarding of CPERS to make a quantifiable contribution to the successful conduct of operations. It is stressed that the NATO Military Police are high value, limited assets and must not be used to guard ordinary CPERS.

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ORIGINAL

APPENDIX TO ANNEX H

Guidelines for the Movement of Captured Persons

GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS			
1. Segregate CPERS by category, maintain segregation as far as is possible throughout journey.			
2. Search captives and baggage before loading in any transport.			
3. If the use of restraints is specifically authorised, CPERS' hands may be secured in front of them using 'Plasticuffs'.			
4. If food is provided, do not allow the use of metal cutlery and can openers.			
ON FOOT			
Type of Formation	CPERS Numbers	Escorts Required⁸	Location of Escorts
Marching Column	300 – 500	40	Front, rear and flanks and in accompanying transport.
WHEELED VEHICLES			
Type of Transport	CPERS Load	Escorts Required	Location of Escorts
Light Utility Truck	8	2	One in vehicle cab, other in following vehicle.
Medium Utility Truck	10	2	One in vehicle cab, other in following vehicle.
4/8-Tonne Cargo	25	3	One in vehicle cab, the others in following vehicle.
14-Tonne Cargo	40	4	One in vehicle cab, the others in following vehicle.
Military Bus	54	5	One at front of vehicle, two at rear of vehicle, two in following vehicle.
For Vehicle Movement. The following special instructions apply:			
a. The proportion of escort to vehicles carrying CPERS is dependent on the size of the vehicle and numbers of CPERS. The proportion may be increased at night or in bad visibility.			
b. Drivers are to be fully briefed on routes, speeds and actions in the event of attack or escape of CPERS.			

⁸ The numbers of escorts detailed under the various categories are for planning guidance.

RAIL			
Type of Transport	CPERS Load	Escorts Required	Location of Escorts
Freight Car	25	3	In mesh enclosure in centre of wagon.
Passenger Car	50	10	At either end of the coach.
<p>For Train Movement. The following special instructions apply:</p> <p>a. Escorts are to be briefed to dismount at halts and to secure a perimeter around the train.</p> <p>b. Where CPERS are in passenger coaches, Escorts are to ensure that windows are locked closed and are to carry out periodic checks of windows.</p>			
AIRCRAFT⁹			
Type of Transport	CPERS Load	Escorts Required	Location of Escorts
Lynx or equivalent	7	2	Escorts to guard exits and prevent CPERS access to flight deck.
Sea King or equivalent	12 – 14	2 – 3	
Merlin or equivalent	25 – 30	3 – 4	
Puma or equivalent	14	3	
Chinook or equivalent	36	4	
C-130 Hercules or equivalent	100	12	
<p>For Aircraft Movement. The following special instructions apply:</p> <p>a. Load CPERS and escorts under instructions from aircrew or ground staff.</p> <p>b. Before loading remove from aircraft any equipment which could be used as a weapon.</p> <p>c. Before departure, inform CPERS in their own language that the area of the flight deck/controls is out of bounds to them at all times.</p> <p>d. Order CPERS to keep seat belts fastened throughout flight.</p> <p>e. Designate specific lavatories for the use of CPERS and remove locks from lavatory doors. If practicable, remove doors.</p>			
SHIPS			

⁹ Note that aircraft load limits may vary with different aircraft types.

GC 3 prohibits the establishment of CPERS holding facilities at sea. Ships are, therefore, most likely to be used to remove CPERS from the area of operations and/or to repatriate them on cessation of hostilities. Clearly the type of vessel used and the number of CPERS embarked will determine the size of the guard force, and how they will be deployed. CPERS being repatriated are less likely to be aggressive than those being removed from the area of operations while hostilities are continuing. Warships are unlikely to be tasked with such an activity; the most likely type of ship is a passenger vessel taken up from trade. There is the possibility that officials from an organisation such as the ICRC will be permitted onboard vessels repatriating CPERS. In such circumstances national authorities or the NATO Joint Forces Command will give guidance as to the formal relationship between such personnel and the Guard Commander. The national force commander or the CJTF Commander will detail the military guard force. The Captain or Ship's Company of the vessel should not be used for the supervision and handling of CPERS.

For ship movement. The following specific instructions apply:

- a. Wherever possible CPERS are to be kept in domestic areas which have only one entry/exit route.
- b. When possible CPERS are to have a period of recreation on the upper deck each day. Numbers undertaking recreation at any one time are to be commensurate with the size of the guard force available. CPERS recreation is to be taken separately from the Ship's Company.
- c. If CPERS meals are taken in a Ship's Dining Hall, they are to be taken separately from the Ship's Company. It may be that the CPERS administration will determine that meals are taken within accommodation areas.

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ANNEX I

Summary of Geneva Conventions Which Should Be Communicated to Prisoners of War

Pertinent
Articles
of
III Convention

1. The purpose of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 is to determine the treatment of victims of war and to relieve and reduce suffering thereby.

There are four conventions:

I - wounded and sick in the armed forces in the field

II - wounded, sick, and shipwrecked in the armed forces at sea

III - treatment of prisoners of war

IV - protection of civilians in time of war.

2. Whichever nation captures you is responsible for your care. Your individual captor is aware that he is responsible to his nation for your well-being. (12)

3. You have and will retain individual privileges under the 3rd Convention according to your status and rank if you abide by the rules of the Convention and state your true surname, first names and rank, date of birth, and service number. (17)

4. You will be treated humanely and respectfully as detailed in the 3rd Convention. If you are wounded, injured or sick you will receive medical treatment. (13, 14)

5. You will be removed from dangerous areas as soon as possible and every effort will be made to protect you from harm. (19)

6. You will not be humiliated or abused. (3, 13, 14)

7. You will be disarmed and have all warlike military equipment removed from you except articles required to protect you from harm and to help you maintain your health. You may keep your identification documents, gas mask, NBC clothing, water bottle, and while in the combat zone, your personal protective equipment. You will receive sufficient clothing and blankets to protect you from the environment. (18)

8. You will be supplied with food and potable water sufficient in quantity and quality. Your captor will consider any dietary requirements due to your (20, 26)

Pertinent
Articles
of
III Convention

racial, religious or environmental requirements.

9. Your personal documents and effects may be removed temporarily but will accompany you and be returned later after examination. Your identification documents will be shown for examination and administrative purpose to your captor upon demand. (18)

10. You will be segregated according to your nationality, sex, rank and physical condition but you will not be treated any differently by this action. (16)

11. You will be allowed to write to your family and to the Central POW Information Agency informing them of your capture, address and state of health. (70)

12. You will be allowed to receive correspondence, plus parcels, and send at least two letters and four post cards per month. (71, 72)

13. You will be allowed to address complaints and requests to the military authorities of your captor. (78)

ANNEX J

Internment Serial Number

J001 General

5. This Annex provides a recommended format for composing the Internment Serial Number (INTERNSN). The INTERNSN is a unique serial number allocated to a POW or other CPERS to enable his identification and tracking by the national POW handling organisation as well as his registration by the ICRC.

6. Each nation is responsible for determining the format of the INTERNSN for CPERS in its custody. However, in combined operations a standard format would be required.

J002 The Internment Serial Number

1. The INTERNSN recommended for combined operations consists of 17 alphanumeric characters. The composition of the INTERNSN may be as follows:
 - a. **Positions 1 through 3 - Country Codes.** The country code of the capturing nation. STANAG 1059 contains a listing of three-character alphabetic codes representing every country in the world. These country codes are the same as the three-letter International Standards Organisation codes used by the ICRC. (See Annex W.)
 - b. **Positions 4 and 5 - Superior Unit or Formation Identifying Codes.** A two-character alphanumeric code representing the unit or formation to which the capturing unit is subordinate. These codes will be promulgated by the relevant higher command or combined joint task force for the particular operation.
 - c. **Positions 6 through 9 – Identifying Nation.** A three-character alphabetical code from STANAG 1059 identifying the nation to which the CPERS owes allegiance. (See Annex W.)
 - d. **Positions 10 to 15 - Number.** A six-digit sequential number generated by the unit or CPERS registration unit allocating the INTERNSN.
 - e. **Position 16 – CPERS Status.** A single character indicating the status of the CPERS as follows:

Character	Meaning
P	POW
M	Retained Medical Personnel
R	Retained Religious Personnel
C	Civilian
O	Other

- f. **Position 17 – Gender Code.** A single character indicating the sex of the CPERS:
 - (1) F - Female.
 - (2) M - Male.

2. Example of an Internment Serial Number. An INTERNSN of DNK-DD-AND-100864-P-M translates as:

- a. DNK Denmark is the capturing nation.
- b. DD Capturing Unit was under full command of Danish Division.
- c. AND The CPERS owes his allegiance to Andorra.
- d. 100864 A unique number from a block allocated to the unit.
- e. P The CPERS is a POW.
- f. M The CPERS is male.

ANNEX K

Prisoner of War Personnel Record and Prisoner of War Record Card

K001 Preparation Instructions

1. The Prisoner of War Personnel Record will be used for POWs and should be completed in duplicate (an example is at Appendix 1). The unit holding the POW will retain one copy, the other should be forwarded as soon as possible to the POW Information Bureau.
2. The forms should be in electronic form wherever possible. Where this is not possible care should be taken to ensure that they are legible. Handwritten documents should be completed in BLOCK LETTERS.
3. The POW Personnel Record will accompany the POW throughout his internment, including any transfer between Allied Powers.
4. It is the responsibility of the Nation or NATO command (e.g. CJDIF) having custody of the POW to ensure that entries made in the POW Personnel Record are comprehensible to the POW. Thus arrangements should be made at the point where such documentation is carried out for a translation key to be available in the POW's own language.
4. POWs refusing to give any of the information required by the documentation other than (name, rank, number, and date of birth) will have a note to that effect placed in the remarks section of the form. POWs who are unable by reason of wounds, illness or injury to give this information should, as far as possible also be documented in the same way and a note placed in the remarks section to explain the reason. POWs who refuse to complete an ICRC Capture Card should also have a note to this effect placed on their personal records.
5. The point in the evacuation procedure at which this form is to be completed will be a matter of national policy or, as applicable, the NATO command.
7. Whenever possible the POW Record Card will be completed at the POW Collecting Point (see example at Appendix 2).
8. In accordance with the GC3, holding areas as well as POW holding facilities are subject to inspection by the Protecting Power or the ICRC. Officers in command of such areas and facilities shall ensure that all appropriate records are properly kept and are available to the Protecting Power in accordance with the Convention.
9. **Electronic Record.** Some nations have developed electronic systems for recording information on CPERS. The system should contain, as a minimum, the INTERNSN of the captured person, unit of capture and date/time of capture as well as biometric data necessary to identify the captured person. It may also produce labels with the same data, which can be used for attachment to effects and documents.

10. **Databases.** Information contained in the POW Record and the POW Record Card should be stored in a database that is accessible by intelligence and CPERS administration staff.

11. **The Internment Serial Number.** INTERNSN will be consecutive numbers prefixed by a country code identifying the capturing nation. (See Annex J.) The code will be in accordance with STANAG 1059. (See Annex X.)

APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX K

Sample Format of a Prisoner of War Personnel Record

(TO BE COMPLETED AT A CPERS HOLDING AREA OR
LONG-TERM DETENTION FACILITY)

--

INTERNMENT SERIAL NO.

PART I: INFORMATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH AINTP-3 PWPERSREC

SEQ	PWPERSEC MTF SETID		
2	OPER	OPERATION IN WHICH POW WAS CAPTURED (IF KNOWN):	
PRISONER OF WAR OR OTHER HOLDING FACILITY:			
7	ORGIDHLD	HOLDING ORGANISATION/FORMATION/UNIT:	
9	GEODATUM	CHECK (√) ONE:	
		GEOGRAPHIC COORDINATES (LATITUDE (IN 6 DIGITS) AND LONGITUDE (IN 7 DIGITS) TO BE GIVEN IN DEGREES, MINUTES AND SECONDS: E.G. 054321N 0524540E.)	UTM COORDINATES (TO INCLUDE GRID ZONE DESIGNATION AND 100,000-METER SQUARE IDENTIFICATION: E.G. 32UPG345679.)

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SEQ	PWPERSREC	
10	LOCATION	COORDINATES OF POW OR OTHER HOLDING FACILITY:
11	LOCAMPN	LOCATION AND/OR NAME OF POW OR OTHER HOLDING FACILITY:
PERSONAL DATA:		
12	PWBIODES	
		INTERNMENT SERIAL NUMBER:
		SURNAME:
		GIVEN NAME(S):
		OTHER NAME(S):
		MILITARY RANK/TITLE:

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SEQ	PWPERREC MTF SETID												
		GENDER (CHECK (√) ONE):											
		MALE	FEMALE										
		NATIONALITY (USE CODES IN STANAG 1059):											
		SERVICE NUMBER OR PERSONAL IDENTIFICATION NUMBER:											
		DATE OF BIRTH: <div style="text-align: center;"> <table border="1" style="margin: auto;"> <tr> <td style="width: 20px; height: 20px;"></td> <td style="width: 20px; height: 20px;"></td> <td style="width: 20px; height: 20px;"></td> <td style="width: 20px; height: 20px;"></td> <td style="width: 20px; height: 20px;"></td> <td style="width: 20px; height: 20px;"></td> <td style="width: 20px; height: 20px;"></td> <td style="width: 20px; height: 20px;"></td> <td style="width: 20px; height: 20px;"></td> <td style="width: 20px; height: 20px;"></td> </tr> </table> <p style="margin: 5px 0 0 0;">Y Y Y Y M M D D</p> </div>											
		PLACE OF BIRTH:											
		COUNTRY OF BIRTH (USE CODES IN STANAG 1059):											

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

SEQ	PWPERREC MTF SETID						
		REMARKS:					
13	BIOSUPP						
		ALLEGIANCE (IF POSSIBLE, USE CODES IN STANAG 1059):					
		MARITAL STATUS (CHECK (√) ONE):					
		SINGLE	MARRIED	DIVORCED	SEPARATED	OTHER (SEE REMARKS)	
		NUMBER OF CHILDREN:					
		RELIGION:					
		ETHNIC GROUP:					
		IN EVENT OF DEATH:					

SEQ	PWERSREC MTF SETID		
		PHOTOGRAPH (FRONT VIEW)	PHOTOGRAPH (RIGHT PROFILE)
		HEIGHT: _ _ · _ _ _ M CM	
		WEIGHT: _ _ _ _ KILOGRAMS	

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SEQ	PWPERSTREC MTF SETID								
		COLOUR OF EYES:							
		COLOUR OF HAIR:							
		DNA SAMPLE TAKEN: <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO							
		REMARKS:							
15	PROFSTAT								
		ALLEGIANCE (IF POSSIBLE, USE CODES IN STANAG 1059):							
		ARMED SERVICE OF POW:							
			AIR FORCE		COAST GUARD		COMBINED		TERRITORIAL FORCE
			ARMY		JOINT		MEDICAL SERVICE		OTHER (SEE REMARKS)
			MARINES		NAVY				

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SEQ	PWPERSSREC MTF SETID						
		START DATE OF ACTIVE MILITARY/GOVERNMENT SERVICE: <div style="text-align: center;"> Y Y Y Y M M D D </div>					
		END DATE OF ACTIVE MILITARY/GOVERNMENT SERVICE: <div style="text-align: center;"> Y Y Y Y M M D D </div>					
		REMARKS:					
16	PERSLANG						
		LANGUAGES		PROFICIENCY (STANAG 6001)*			
				LISTEN	SPEAK	READ	WRITE
		1					
		2					
		3					
		4					

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SEQ	PWPERSREC MTF SETID						
		5					
		* 0: NO ABILITY 1: BASIC 2: FAIR 3: GOOD 4: VERY GOOD 5. NATIVE					
		REMARKS:					
17	POSTADDR						
		POW'S ADDRESS OF RECORD:					
		STATE/ PROVINCE/ DISTRICT (USE CODES IN STANAG 1059):	COUNTRY (USE CODES IN STANAG 1059):	POSTAL CODE:	CITY/TOWN/VILLAGE/ LOCALITY:		
		STREET NAME:					NUMBER:
		TELEPHONE NUMBER:					

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

SEQ	PWPERSREC MTF SETID	
		REMARKS:
18	PERSONRS	
		NEXT OF KIN/PERSON TO BE INFORMED OF CAPTURE:
		RELATIONSHIP:
		LAST NAME:
		FIRST NAME(S):
		MIDDLE NAME(S)/INITIAL(S):
		BIRTH NAME:
		PERSONAL /PROFESSIONAL TITLE:

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

SEQ	PWPERSREC				
	MTF SETID				
		REMARKS:			
19	POSTADDR				
		POSTAL ADDRESS OF NEXT OF KIN/PERSON TO BE INFORMED OF CAPTURE:			
		STATE/ PROVINCE/ DISTRICT (USE STANAG 1059):	COUNTRY (USE STANAG 1059):	POSTAL CODE:	CITY/TOWN/VILLAGE/ LOCALITY:
		STREET NAME:		NUMBER:	
		TELEPHONE NUMBER:			
INFORMATION ABOUT CAPTURE:					
20	ORGIDCPT				

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

SEQ	PWPERREC MTF SETID		
		CAPTURING SUB-UNIT/UNIT/FORMATION/ORGANISATION:	
		CAPTURING UNIT'S HIGHER FORMATION:	
		NATIONALITY OF CAPTURING UNIT (USE CODES IN STANAG 1059):	ARMED SERVICE OF CAPTURING UNIT:
		UNIT IDENTIFICATION CODE (E.G. FIELD POST NUMBER):	
21	DTG	DATE-TIME GROUP OF CAPTURE: Z	
23	GEODATUM	CHECK (✓) ONE:	
		GEOGRAPHIC COORDINATES (LATITUDE (IN 6 DIGITS) AND LONGITUDE (IN 7 DIGITS) TO BE GIVEN IN DEGREES, MINUTES AND SECONDS: E.G. 054321N 0524540E.)	UTM COORDINATES (TO INCLUDE GRID ZONE DESIGNATION AND 100,000-METER SQUARE IDENTIFICATION: E.G. 32UPG345679.)
24	LOCATION	COORDINATES OF PLACE OF CAPTURE:	

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SEQ	PWPERSREC MTF SETID	
25	LOCAMPN	LOCATION AND/OR NAME OF PLACE OF CAPTURE:
27	GENTEXT	PHYSICAL CONDITION OF POW AT TIME OF CAPTURE (LIST ANY WOUNDS, INJURIES, ILLNESSES):
28	GENTEXT	OTHER INFORMATION ABOUT CAPTURE (CIRCUMSTANCES OF CAPTURE, BEHAVIOR, PERSONAL POSSESSIONS, WEAPONS AND OTHER MILITARY EQUIPMENT ETC.):

Remarks or Additional Information:

Prepared by:

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RANK, NAME:	UNIT/ORGANISATION:
DATE-TIME GROUP OF PROCESSING: Z	PLACE:

Part II: List of Impounded Personal Property, Valuables and Money

SERIAL NO.	NUMBER/ AMOUNT	DESCRIPTION
1		
2		
3		
4		
5		
6		
7		
8		
9		
10		
11		
SIGNATURE OF POW		SIGNATURE OF RECEIVING OFFICER

FINGERPRINT CARD

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(OPTIONAL: FOR IDENTIFICATION PURPOSES ONLY.)

IF FINGER IS MISSING, WRITE "NONE" IN APPROPRIATE SPACE.						
		THUMB	INDEX FINGER	MIDDLE FINGER	RING FINGER	LITTLE FINGER
RIGHT						

BIOMETRIC DATA

(IN ACCORDANCE WITH NATO STANDARDS THAT ARE TO BE DEVELOPED. GENERAL, SUGGESTED GUIDELINES ON THE USE OF BIOMETRIC DATA ARE PROVIDED IN APPENDIX 3 TO THIS ANNEX.)

APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX K

Sample Format of a Prisoner of War Record Card

LAST NAME _____ POW INTERNMENT SERIAL NO. _____

FIRST/GIVEN NAME _____ RANK _____

DATE OF BIRTH _____ SERVICE NO _____

DATE/TIME OF ARRIVAL _____

TRANSFER RECORD:

	FROM (location)	TO (location)	DTG
1			
2			
3			
4			
5			

FINANCIAL STATUS ON INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER

CERTIFICATE OF CREDIT BALANCE ISSUED TO POW

	Amount in Words	Amount in Figures	Currency Used	Location (from)	Location (to)	Date
1						
2						
3						

REPATRIATION _____
REASON _____
METHOD _____ DATE _____

FINANCIAL STATUS ON REPATRIATION

Amount in Words	Amount in Figures	Currency used	Location (from)	Signature Name	Date	Rank
_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____

PRISONER OF WAR RECORD CARD (Reverse)

MEDICAL RECORDS

1. IMMUNIZATION VACCINATIONS AND INOCULATIONS - WITH DATES
2. MEDICAL HISTORY - WOUNDS, ILLNESS, INJURIES, BLOOD GROUP, TREATMENT

	DETAILS	DATE(s)
a.		
b.		

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- c.
- d.
- e.
- f.

3. MONTHLY WEIGHT RECORD

MONTH – YEAR	WEIGHT (KG)	MONTH – YEAR	WEIGHT (KG)

GENERAL

1. INTERNMENT EMPLOYMENT DETAILS/QUALIFICATIONS

2. DISCIPLINARY OFFENCES/RECORD

	DETAILS	DATE	SIGNATURE OF AUTHORISING OFFICER
a.			
b.			
c.			
d.			

3. REMARKS

APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX K

Biometrics

J003 General

7. This Appendix provides general, suggested guidelines for the collection and processing of biometric data to identify and register CPERS. These guidelines may change as new technologies are developed and as international organisations develop new standards¹⁰.

8. Each nation is in principle responsible for determining its standards for the use of biometric data as well as its procedures for the collection, processing, transmission and storage of biometric data from CPERS in its custody. However, in combined operations agreed biometric standards as well Standard Operating Procedures for collecting, processing, transmitting and storing biometric data from CPERS will have to be developed.

J004 Types of Biometric Data

3. The following types of biometric data may be collected from CPERS:

- g. **Fingerprints.** CPERS should be fingerprinted for registration and identification purposes. The two most common methods for collecting fingerprints are the paper-and-ink method and the electronic, or “live scan” method.
 - a. **Paper-and-Ink Method.** The paper-and-ink method has been used by most member Nations. This method provides a greater level of fingerprint detail than the “live scan” and is, therefore, often preferred by latent fingerprint examiners. It also provides increased opportunities for matching partial latent fingerprints to an original fingerprint sample. In addition, a paper-and-ink fingerprint card can be digitised for use with an electronic fingerprint scanning device. However, this method may increase the time needed to identify an individual if the necessary conversion equipment is not available and identification subsequently requires manual processing of his fingerprints.
 - b. **Electronic or “Live Scan” Method.** This method provides near real-time capability for the transmission of collected fingerprint data for searching and matching against data stored in automated fingerprint identification systems. “Live scan” devices capture the entire area of the fingerprint surface from one edge of the fingernail to the other and from the crease of the first joint to the tip of the finger. An alternative means of electronic collection is the “flat” fingerprint device, which captures the fingerprint image by placing the finger onto a sensor. The use of “flat” fingerprint devices when collecting fingerprint data for the registration of CPERS is not recommended.
- h. **Facial Photographs (“Mug Shots”).** Facial photographs (popularly known as “mug shots”) of CPERS should also made for registration and identification purposes. When possible digital cameras should be used.

¹⁰ As they are approved, the International Standardisation Organisation’s biometric standards in the ISO/IEC 19794 series (Biometric Data Interchange Formats) should be adopted.

- i. **Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA)**. DNA collected from CPERS provides a virtually foolproof method of identification. DNA samples are usually collected by intra-oral cheek swabbing.
- j. **Iris**. Iris images provide additional means of identifying CPERS. A special iris imaging device is required to collect iris images.
- k. **Voiceprints**. Voice data is useful for the identification of persons, whose speech has been captured on sound recordings. Voice biometric data may be collected using analogue or digital recording devices.

J005 Standards

1. At present there are no NATO standards for biometrics. Until such standards are developed the following specifications may serve as guidelines:

- g. **Fingerprinting**. For electronic collection the following standards are suggested:
 - All electronic fingerprint sensors (“live scan” devices) should be interoperable. (A list of certified devices should be agreed on.)
 - 14-image fingerprint collection should be made (10 rolled images, separate images of each thumb, and two four-finger slap prints).
 - 500 pixels per inch (ppi) resolution at nominal 15:1 Wavelet-packet Scalar Quantisation (WSQ) compression is recommended.
- h. **Facial Photographs (“Mug Shots”)**. All photographs should be made in colour. Photographs of CPERS should be made with the camera lens pointed to the front of the person photographed, aligned approximately in the centre of the face and taken from a short distance (approximately 1.50 metres). Five photographs of the person should be made from several angles to ensure proper identification (e.g. frontal view, 90 degrees left side, 45 degrees left side, 90 degrees right side, and 45 degrees right side).

Digital images should meet the following format requirements:

- They should have sufficient resolution to allow a human examiner to ascertain small features such as moles and scars that can be used to determine identity (preferably 3 mega pixels, but not less than 640 pixels (vertical) by 480 pixels horizontal) with 24 bit colour).
- The width:height aspect ratio of the captured image should be 1:1.25.
- Digital cameras and scanners used to take facial photographs should use square pixels with a pixel aspect ration of 1:1.
- The facial image of the person to be photographed should always be in focus from the nose to the ears. When photographed, the subject should not wear glasses, sunglasses, headgear, headdress, or other items obscuring the area photographed.
- The photograph should, at minimum, be marked with the INTERNSN and the full name of the CPERS.

The full-face pose should be positioned as follows:

- The approximate horizontal midpoints of the mouth and bridge of the nose should lie on an imaginary vertical straight line positioned at the horizontal centre of the image.

- An imaginary horizontal line through the centre of the subject's eyes should be located at approximately the 55% point of the vertical distance up from the bottom edge of photograph.
 - The width of the subject's head should occupy approximately 50% of the width of the capture image. This width should be the horizontal distance between the midpoints of two imaginary vertical lines. Each imaginary line should be drawn between the upper and lower lobes of each ear and should be positioned where the external ear connects to the head.
 - Conditions and resources permitting, the desired illumination of the subject should be achieved by using a minimum of three balanced light sources.
 - Appropriate diffusion techniques should also be employed, with lights positioned to minimise shadows and eliminate hot spots on the facial image. These hot spots usually appear on reflective areas such as cheeks and foreheads.
 - Flash techniques such as the use of flash fill to reduce red eye, shadows around the nose and mouth should be considered.
- i. **DNA.** DNA samples should be collected, labelled, prepared, handled, transferred and tested in the following manner:
- a. **Collection.** Two buccal (intra-oral cheek) swabs should be collected from each CPERS. One swab should be collected from the inside of each cheek (right and left). DNA samples are collected using a sterile cotton-tipped applicator for the buccal swabs by briskly rubbing the inside of the inner cheek 10 times with the buccal swab, concentrating on scraping cells from the oral mucosa (inner cheek), not just collecting saliva. The CPERS must not have consumed food or beverages; chewed gum; or chewed, dipped, or smoked tobacco or any other substances for at least 15 minutes prior to the DNA sample being collected.
 - b. **Labelling.** The DNA samples should be marked with the INTERNSN and name of the CPERS; the date and location of collection; as well as the name and unit of the individual responsible for collecting the sample.
 - c. **Handling.** It is important that all persons handling the DNA samples use surgical gloves and avoid direct skin, hair, or breath contact that might contaminate the samples.
 - d. **Preparation.** The two swabs should be air dried for at least 30 minutes when possible prior to repackaging and transport. The dried oral swabs should be placed in a properly labelled paper envelope or paper box, never a plastic container, and sealed with evidence tape. Surgical gloves should be worn when packaging the swabs.
 - e. **Transfer.** A chain of evidence should be maintained for each pair of swabs. Transfer of CPERS DNA swabs to other military as well as non-military agencies should be in accordance with national or CJTF procedures.
 - f. **Testing.** DNA samples may be tested by short random repeat (STR) marker systems that include the 13 Combined DNA Index System (CODIS) loci. Furthermore, these samples may undergo mitochondrial DNA analysis, Y-chromosomal analysis, or other forensic testing as deemed appropriate. DNA profiles should be maintained in a joint or combined joint database and should be traceable to other biometric information on the CPERS.

- j. **Iris.** Iris images should be collected in accordance with JPEG standards outlined in an iris image interchange format. The following procedures should be followed when collecting iris images:
- An iris-imaging device should collect separate images of the left and right irises of each CPERS.
 - Each iris record should be labelled as the right or left iris, and should be associated with all other biometric and biographic data collected on the CPERS.
 - If the medical condition of the detainee precludes collection of one or both irises, then this should be noted in the record.
 - Each captured iris image should be formatted and stored in accordance with the logical record type designated by national authorities or the CJTF.

Acceptable iris-imaging conditions include the following:

- Iris images should have an image resolution equal to a minimum of 150 (and preferably 200) pixels across the iris diameter, with a focus quality sufficient to resolve the specified spatial resolution.
 - Near-infrared illumination between 700 and 900 nanometres (nm) (sensor and algorithm dependent), at an angle off-set from the optical axis (to avoid the "red eye" effect) at least 5 degrees, and of sufficient intensity to provide an image with sufficient contrast for the user to visually see the structure of the iris features.
 - The subject's eye should be open to the greatest extent possible (recognising that this may be difficult for some persons), with the iris occluded (i.e., concealed by the eyelid and/or eyelashes) no more than 70%; the orientation of the iris image should be right side up (i.e., the upper eyelids in the upper part of the image); further, for right eyes, the tear duct should be on the right side of the image, and for left eyes, the tear duct should be on the left side of the image.
 - The presentation of the iris to the imaging device should be aligned to the subject's head, so that a horizontal line between the pupils is within +/- 10 degrees of the horizontal plane of the iris-imaging device. Furthermore, any eyeglasses and contact lenses must be removed from the subject to optimise the quality of the images.
- k. **Voice.** Voice biometric data (speech) should be collected in accordance with the following procedures and standards:
- Voice data should be collected in an indoor location relatively free of background noise. The room used for voice data collection should use materials, such as carpeting, cubicle walls, blankets, or similar materials, to suppress reflective noise and "echo effects".
 - Dedicated microphones should be positioned 15 to 30 centimetres from the subject. Microphones built into laptop computers, personal digital assistants (PDAs), or similar devices should not be used.
 - If possible, multiple voice samples should be collected from each subject on different days and at differing times of the day (e.g. morning, mid-day, and evening).
 - The voice biometric data (speech) should be recorded at a sample rate of at least 48,000 hertz and a resolution of 16 bits, using Pulse Code Modulation (PCM).
 - Captured voice files should be stored in .WAV format.

2. The collection of biometric data from CPERS is very important to the verification of their identity as well as to the identification of persons suspected of crimes against humanity and terrorism.

Therefore, collection of biometric data must be in accordance with agreed standards in order to achieve operational and legal benefits.

3. Appropriate national and, in combined joint operations, NATO agencies should test and certify all biometric data collection systems to ensure that they meet the established requirements.
4. The development of additional biometric standards may be based on common specifications used by law enforcement agencies, etc.

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ANNEX L

Procedures Governing the Handling of Property and Money of Prisoners of War

L001 Personal Effects

1. The policy to be adopted in respect to those items of personal effects, money, valuables, etc., which POWs may be allowed to retain in captivity shall be a matter for national decision. Likewise, the policy regarding the rate of exchange to be used for conversion of currency will also be a matter for holding nations. The primacy of the GCs on these and related matters is, however, stressed. All provisions of the GC3 will be adhered to.
2. In the event of an international transfer of a POW, his impounded personal effects will be recorded (see POW Personnel Record). The responsible officer of the receiving nation will verify the receipt and sign for any articles and money received.
3. Any monies impounded from a POW will be credited to his account, and a copy of all such accounts shall be sent to the POW Information Bureau in the event of the transfer, escape or death of a POW.
4. All personal property impounded from POWs should be kept in a secure location and should, whenever possible, be kept in individually marked packages which should be sealed in such a way as to show clearly if such packages have been opened. A property custodian should be designated.
5. Non-military items that are found in the possession of a POW and are not the personal property of the prisoner should be separately stored and safeguarded and marked with the details of the POW concerned. Disposal of such items will be at the discretion of the nation holding the POW.

L002 Personal Documents and Effects

POWs must be allowed to retain documents and effects of personal or sentimental value although such items may be inspected. Documentation and effects in their possession that are assessed to be of intelligence value or harmful to themselves or others may be removed.

L003 Military Effects

POWs shall be allowed, particularly in the early stages of evacuation prior to arrival at a Long-Term Holding Facility, to keep items of military equipment that are essential to their safety. This particularly applies to respirators, protective clothing, including helmets and other personal protective equipment, but will not apply to any weapons or article capable of being used as a weapon or an escape aid.

L004 Medical Supplies

POWs should be allowed to retain such medical supplies as may be required for the treatment of any condition or injury until such time as they are held in a location where medical support is available. Where medically qualified personnel are captured, such supplies will normally be kept in their charge.

L005 Food

The feeding of POWs is the responsibility of the Detaining Power. POWs may, in the early stages of captivity, be allowed to retain their own rations, but arrangements for the collective feeding of POWs in accordance with the terms of the GC3 should be made at the earliest opportunity.

ANNEX M

The International Committee of the Red Cross

M001 The International Committee of the Red Cross

1. The ICRC has the pivotal role in the handling of CPERS, especially POWs. It has served as the Protecting Power in all major conflicts during the past century.
2. The ICRC is Swiss based, neutral and a private organisation. Its work is conducted through National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (through the League of Red Cross Societies), governments and voluntary organisations. The ICRC has a number of roles stemming from its principal responsibility for monitoring the application of the GCs by signatory states. These can be summarised as follows:
 - a. **Aid to POWs.** The ICRC helps wounded, sick and shipwrecked members of the armed forces (POWs). The ICRC checks on the conditions of captivity for POWs and it attempts to ensure that states abide by the provisions of the GCs. It does so over the whole period of POW detention; from their capture to their release. It carries out this work through its own delegates and also through the agency of the Protecting Power.
 - b. **Aid to Civil Populations.** The ICRC acts on behalf of civil populations in enemy territory or in occupied areas. It seeks to limit the effects on civilians of such aspects of conflict as bombing of urban areas and indiscriminate mining of areas open to civilians by attempting to persuade the belligerent nations to conduct their operations away from such areas. In the event of civil wars and uprisings within a nation's borders, it functions as a neutral intermediary with the same role of assisting the civil population. When populations are brought to starvation through the breakdown of the normal mechanism of the production and sale of food and goods, the ICRC will exercise its neutrality and bring food and medicines to those civilians who are in need.
 - c. **The Central Tracing Agency.** From its offices in Geneva, the ICRC operates a database of missing and separated personnel. Through this agency, the ICRC attempts to locate missing persons and re-unite families separated by conflict. Through its contacts with national POW Information Bureaux, it also maintains records of those held in POW facilities worldwide.

M002 Inspections of CPERS Facilities

1. Representatives and delegates of the Protecting Power, such as the ICRC, have the right to investigate the treatment and administration of all CPERS wherever they may be and are to be allowed to interview them without witnesses. They are to be given every assistance in this work.
2. This right can be temporarily suspended for reasons of imperative military necessity by the CJTF Commander.

3. The treatment of CPERS in the custody of NATO-led forces and the standing of NATO and the member Nations in the eyes of the international community will depend, to a large extent, on the manner in which the Protecting Power (e.g. the ICRC) reports that CPERS are being treated. The provision of full and open inspection facilities will assist in establishing a favourable impression of the quality of the treatment of CPERS by NATO-led forces.

ANNEX N

System of Allocating Interrogation Serial Numbers

N001 General

1. Every CPERS selected for interrogation shall receive an INTGSN. This number shall be allocated by the interrogation unit conducting the first interrogation of the CPERS.
2. The number should not be confused with the POW INTERNSN required in Chapter 3 which is to be used for administrative purposes only.
3. The purpose of the INTGSN is to identify the source of information to ensure its proper evaluation, processing and follow-up action. It will also identify the nationality and location of the IU.
4. The nationality of the CPERS and the IU will be indicated using 3-letter codes in accordance with STANAG 1059. (See Annex W.)

N002 Composition of the Interrogation Serial Number

1. The INTGSN shall be constituted as follows:
 - a. 3 letters to indicate the Nationality of the CPERS (See para 6).
 - b. 2 letters to indicate the Service of the CPERS (See para 7).
 - c. 1 letter to indicate the Arm of Service of the CPERS (See para 8).
 - d. 4 numbers to indicate the Interrogation Sequence Number of the CPERS (See para 9).
 - e. 4 numbers to indicate the Day and Month of Capture.
 - f. A dash (-) to show a sequence break.
 - g. 5 letters to indicate the Nationality in accordance with STANAG 1059 and the Service of the IU (See para 10).
 - h. 4 numbers to indicate the IU.
2. Each group shall be separated by a dash. The final number shall therefore appear as in the following examples:

LIE - NV - B - 0012 - 2105 - USANV - 0159

Liechtenstein - Naval prisoner - Seaman - 12th CPERS interrogated – captured 21 May
- interrogated by US Navy - interrogation team 159

AND - AF - H - 0357 - 0211 - DEUAF - 0007

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Andorra - Air force prisoner - Intelligence - 357th CPERS interrogated – Captured 2 Nov - interrogated by German Air Force – interrogation team 7

SMR - NI - X - 0431 - 0707 - GBRAR - 0019

San Marino - Naval infantry prisoner - One star or above - 431st CPERS interrogated - Captured 7 Jul - interrogated by British Army - interrogation team 19

3. The three letters used for indicating the Nationality of the CPERS will be in accordance with established NATO Country codes in STANAG 1059.

4. The following list of letters is to be used to indicate the Service of the CPERS:

AR - Army	NI - Naval Infantry/Marines
NV - Navy	AB - Airborne Forces
NA - Naval Air Arm	SF - Special Operations Forces
AF - Air Force	PL - Police
IR - Irregular	CV - Civilian (other than Police)

5. The following list of letters is to be used to indicate the Arm of Service of the CPERS:

<u>Navy</u>	<u>Army</u>	<u>Air Force</u>	<u>Other/Partisan Forces</u>
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
A. Aircrew	Aircrew	Aircrew	Aircrew
B. Seamen	Infantry	Ground Crew	Merchant Marine
C. Communications	Signals	Communications	Radio Officers/Operators
D. Weapons/Electronic Engineer	Electrical/Electronic Engineer	Electrical/Electronic Engineer	
E. Mechanical/Marine/Engineers	Engineers	Mechanical/Air Frame/Engineers	
F. Gunnery	Artillery	Ordnance	Weapons/Ordnance/Explosives
G. *HQ Staff	*HQ Staff	*HQ Staff	*HQ Staff
H. Intelligence	Intelligence	Intelligence	Intelligence
I. Marines	Airborne Forces	Airfield Defense	
J. Cooks/Stewards	Catering	Catering	Catering
K. Legal/Political	Legal/Political	Legal/Political	Legal/Political

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	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Army</u>	<u>Air Force</u>	<u>Other/Partisan Forces</u>
	(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
L.	Medical/Dental/ Nursing	Medical/Dental/ Nursing	Medical/Dental/ Nursing	Medical/Dental/ Nursing
M.	Electronic Warfare	Electronic Warfare	Electronic Warfare	Electronic Warfare
N.	Operations	Operations	Operations	Operations
O.	Police	Police	Police	Police
P.	Supply	Quartermaster	Supply	Supply
Q.	Strategic Weapons	Strategic Weapons	Strategic Weapons	Strategic Weapons
R.	Special Purpose Forces	Special Purpose Forces	Special Purpose Forces	Special Purpose Forces
S.	Air Traffic Control	Armored	Air Traffic Control	Air Traffic Control
T.	*Unknown	*Unknown	*Unknown	*Unknown
U.	Instructors	Education	Education	Instructors
V.	Ministers of Religion	Ministers of Religion	Ministers of Religion	Ministers of Religion
W.	*Submarines	Artillery Spotters	Forward Air Controllers	Couriers, etc.
X.	*One Star +	*One Star +	*One Star +	*Officers in Command of Irregular Forces
Y.	*Other	*Other	*Other	*Other

* Notes:

- G - Headquarters staffs below one star rank
- T - CPERS's arm of service not known to report writer
- W - To be used in respect of all submariners regardless of arm or specialisation
- X - To be used in respect of all ONE STAR or above officers regardless of arm
- Y - CPERS arm of service not included in the appropriate list

6. The sequence number of the interrogated CPERS shall be of four digits allocated in numerical order of interrogation by the team first interrogating the CPERS.

7. Country, services and team codes.

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- a. Country codes, as laid down in STANAG 1059, are to be used for indication of the Nationality of the Interrogation Team.
- b. The following lists of letters are to be used for indicating the Service of the Interrogation Team:





Army - AR	Air Force - AF
Navy - NV	Marine/Naval Infantry - MR
Coast Guard - CG	Paramilitary - PM

- c. NATO teams will use the codes for commands and subordinate commands as laid down in the latest edition of STANAG 1059, if applicable, or other codes designated by NATO. These codes should conform to the formats in STANAG 1059.
8. Nations will allocate 4 digit serial numbers to their interrogation teams. NATO Commands will issue similar serial numbers to subordinate national interrogation teams under their command.

ANNEX O

Sample Format of an Interrogation Search Report

INTERROGATION NO (Refer to Annex N):		(SECURITY CLASSIFICATION)	
Name:		Gender:	<input type="checkbox"/> MALE <input type="checkbox"/> FEMALE
Rank:			
National Service or Personal Identification No:		Blood Type:	
Date of Birth:		Religion:	
ASSESSMENT OF THE CAPTURED PERSON			
Physical Condition (Cold, Wet, Injured)			
Mental Condition (Alert, Lethargic, Stable, Emotional)			
Behaviour (Aggressive, Passive)			
Gestures (Facial Expressions, Posture,)			
Language (Used/Understood)			
QUESTIONING APPROACH USED DURING SEARCH			
Neutral		Firm	Admin
PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION OF CAPTURED PERSON			
Skin Colour		Height	cm
Build		Eyes (colour)	Hair (colour)
Weight	kg		Glasses/lenses
Peculiarities, Distinguishing Marks (e.g. tattoos, birthmarks) – Refer to Body Figures			



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ORIGINAL

EFFECTS OF MILITARY INTEREST	EFFECTS OF PERSONAL INTEREST

INFORMATION OBTAINED DURING SEARCH

EVALUATION OF POTENTIAL INTELLIGENCE VALUE OF CPERS AND/OR EFFECTS

ADDITIONAL COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATION FOR FURTHER ACTION

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ANNEX Q

Joint Captured Materiel Exploitation Centre

Q001 General

1. Materiel exploitation (MATEX), like document exploitation (DOCEX) is an important source of intelligence. CMAT can provide much information of intelligence value. Therefore, MATEX should be integrated into the intelligence organisation. Giving proportionate attention to MATEX, DOCEX and interrogation operations alike will optimise the results of this part of the intelligence collection effort.
2. Procurement of qualified personnel and the way they should be utilised for technical intelligence exploitation are to be decided by the nations. If nations decide to establish a materiel exploitation center operating within a joint framework on a permanent or ad hoc basis, the following guidance is offered.

Q002 Joint Captured Materiel Exploitation Centre

1. Operations to technically exploit CMAT and ATDs may be conducted by a Joint Captured Materiel Exploitation Centre (JCMEC). The JCMEC will normally be established for any operation where significant amounts or types of CMAT will be available and/or require field exploitation. The JCMEC is under the supervision of the intelligence staff. Two or more nations may establish a Combined Joint Captured Materiel Exploitation Center (CJCMEC). The personnel of a (C)JCMEC should be composed of trained technicians, academic engineers and scientists, supported by technical translators and interpreters.
2. **Location.** The JCMEC/CJCMEC may be located in the rear area near main supply routes and air and sea ports to facilitate the rapid evacuation of CMAT. If possible, the JCMEC/CJCMEC should be collocated with the Joint Intelligence Centre (JIC) or the Combined Joint Interrogation Centre (CJIC) to integrate human intelligence (HUMINT) and technical exploitation operations. Additionally, being collocated provides a single geographical area where subordinate units can bring CPERS and CMAT, as well as consolidating many transportation and security requirements. Regardless of its location, the JCMEC/CJCMEC is normally fully equipped with sensitive and sophisticated test and communication equipment. This equipment is used to perform detailed in-theater exploitations.
3. **Tasks.** The JCMEC/CJCMEC may have the following tasks:
 - a. Exploitation of CMAT based on the supported commander's requirements.
 - b. Production of technical intelligence reports (including countermeasures) for commanders.
 - c. Provision of render safe procedures, in coordination with explosive ordnance disposal staff, for foreign munitions to combat units.
 - d. Coordination of the safe handling and removal of CMAT.

- e. Coordination of the removal of special-interest CMAT and ATDs from locations in the field to the JCMEC/CJCMEC.
- f. Supervision of the removal of CMAT out of the joint operations area.
- g. Coordination with the JIC or CJIC for the selection and technical interrogation of CPERS assessed to have knowledge of technical interest. Technical exploitation analysts and translators of ATDs may assist interrogators during interrogation of a wide range of HUMINT sources of technical interest..
- h. Recommendations regarding CMAT disposition to the commander and his staff.
- i. Maintenance of the command's technical intelligence database.
- j. Management of the command's scientific and technical intelligence requirements.
- k. Coordination of the collection of technical intelligence and information in close coordination with the command's intelligence staff.

Q003 Captured Materiel Exploitation Operations

1. **Technical Exploitation Teams.** The JCMEC/CJCMEC can also organise teams from its organic assets to meet immediate requirements of echelons without technical intelligence support. These teams may be attached to formations and can deploy forward or support rear area units as required. They carry out complementary field exploitation of CMAT in situ (operation permitting). These teams should be able to conduct the examination with sufficient expertise in order to prepare the proper type of technical reports as described in Annexes E, R, S or T. A sufficient number of teams should be organised based on safety considerations, timeliness and geographical areas to be covered. They should be properly equipped to carry out the field examination, communicate with and report to relevant agencies.

2. **Specialist Exploitation Teams.** In certain situations it may be necessary to form exploitation teams to carry out highly specialised and technical analysis of a particular and unusual item of CMAT. The teams will be constituted in accordance with the task at hand and may be dissolved when their mission has been completed. They may carry out their work in rear area facilities such as main workshops or outside the joint operations area at research and development establishments with highly sophisticated test equipment, as necessary.

ANNEX R

COMTECHREP - Type A

R001 Purpose

1. A Complementary Technical Report, COMTECHREP-TYPE A, is used for reporting information about captured aircraft.
2. It is to be submitted by the fastest available means immediately following examination of captured aircraft by technical intelligence team.

R002 Format

1. The format of the report is as follows:

(Only use those letters for which information is available.)

- a. DTG of report.
- b. Rank, name and unit of person submitting report.
- c. Aircraft:
 - (4) Type¹¹.
 - (5) Name.
 - (6) Quantity.
- d. Nationality or warring faction (using identifying letters in accordance with STANAG 1059—see Annex W) and designation of unit or organization to which the aircraft belongs.
- e. Locations.
 - (1) Capture
DTG and location (geographic co-ordinates or UTM grid reference including grid zone designation and 100,000 m square identification) of capture.
 - (2) Present
Present location (geographic co-ordinates or UTM grid reference including grid zone designation and 100,000 m square identification) of captured aircraft.
- f. Description/characteristics of aircraft (as applicable):
 - (1) Type of aircraft.
 - (2) Name and model (mark) of aircraft.
 - (3) Role¹².

¹¹ Term to be in accordance with AIntP-3. Refer to APP 08 pertaining to aircraft type designation.

¹² In accordance with role designator codes as set out in STANAG 3236.

(4) Manufacturer, factory and country of origin (using national identifying letters in accordance with STANAG 1059—see Annex W).

g. Dimensions:

- (1) Overall length.
- (2) Overall wing-span.
- (3) Wing configuration.

h. Identification and distinguishing marks.

i. Power plant:

- (1) Type and number of engine(s)
- (2) Condition of engine(s).
- (3) Type and number of intakes.
- (4) Configuration of intakes.

j. Circumstances of capture.

- (1) Reason for capture.
- (2) Cause of crash (if applicable).
- (3) Projectile strikes on aircraft.
 - Number
 - Location
 - Caliber
- (4) Condition of aircraft.

k. Armament:

- (1) Guns:
 - (a) Type.
 - (b) Caliber.
 - (c) Installation positions.
 - (d) Quantity.
- (2) Ammunition.
 - (a) Type.
 - (b) Number of magazines.
 - (c) Ammunition holding.
- (3) Bombs.
 - (a) Type.
 - (b) Bomb installations.
 - (c) Quantity.
- (4) Mines.
 - (a) Type.
 - (b) Carrier installation.
 - (c) Quantity.
- (5) Rocket projectiles

- (a) Type.
 - (b) Caliber.
 - (c) Carrier installation.
 - (d) Quantity.
- (6) Missiles.
- (a) Type.
 - (b) Type of warhead.
 - (c) Guidance system.
 - (d) Firing positions.
 - (e) Quantity.
- (7) Pyrotechnics.
- (a) Type.
 - (b) Firing installations.
 - (c) Quantity.
- l. Armor plate¹³.
- (1) Position.
 - (2) Type.
 - (3) Thickness.
 - (4) Strikes.
 - (5) Penetration.
- m. Crew.
- (1) Number.
 - (2) Functions.
 - (3) Disposal.
- n. Passengers.
- (1) Number.
 - (2) Type.
 - (3) Disposal.
- o. Unusual features.
- (1) Wings.
 - (2) Control surfaces.
 - (3) Fuselage.
- n. Fluid samples:
- (1) Fuel.
 - (2) Oil.
 - (3) Coolant.
 - (3) Hydraulic fluids.
 - (4) De-icing fluids.
- p. Internal Equipment.
- (1) Avionics.
 - (2) Communications.
 - (3) Weapons guidance systems.

¹³ To be repeated as necessary.

- (4) Defensive aids suite.
- (5) Sensors.

- q. External Equipment.
 - (1) Antennae.
 - (2) Sensors.
 - (3) Air-to-air refuelling equipment.
 - (4) Drop tanks.

- r. Landing gear.
 - (1) Type.
 - (2) Location.
 - (3) Condition.

- s. Other unusual features not mentioned above.

- t. Imagery of:
 - (1) Airframe.
 - (2) Engine.
 - (3) Other items.

- u. Other information.

ANNEX S

COMTECHREP - Type B

R003 Purpose

- a. A Complementary Technical Report, COMTECHREP-TYPE B, is used for reporting information about explosive ordnance.
- b. The report is to be submitted by the fastest available means immediately following initial examination.

R004 Format

a. For reports of significantly new items of extreme urgency only paragraphs a.-g., n. (1), and y. of COMTECHREP-TYPE B should be completed in an initial priority report. This should only be done if the completion of the full report will entail serious delay. Additional paragraphs of particular importance, e.g. those referring to safety (o., u. and x.) may be included at the originator's discretion. Paragraph y. should state an estimate of the time required for a detailed report to be completed.

- b. The format of the report is as follows:

(Only use those letters for which information is available.)

v. DTG of report.

w. Rank, name and unit of person submitting report.

x. Explosive ordnance.

(1) Type.

(2) Name.

(3) Quantity.

y. Nationality or warring faction (using identifying letters in accordance with STANAG 1059—see Annex W) and designation of unit or organization to which the explosive ordnance belonged.

z. Locations.

(1) Find

DTG and location (geographic co-ordinates or UTM grid reference including grid zone designation and 100,000 m square identification) of find.

(2) Present

Present location (geographic co-ordinates or UTM grid reference including grid zone designation and 100,000 m square identification) of explosive ordnance.

- æ. Source (name of person, unit or organization finding explosive ordnance).
- ø. Details (as applicable):
 - (1) Variant of ordnance.
 - (2) Country of manufacture (using national identifying letters in accordance with STANAG 1059—see Annex W).
 - (3) Origin.
 - (a) Manufacturer.
 - (b) Factory.
 - (4) Identification marks.
- å. Length
 - (1) Overall length, including fuze, tail, vanes or control surfaces and fittings.
 - (2) Measurements of stages¹⁴.
- aa. Maximum diameter of each stage¹.
- bb. Shell configuration.
 - (1) Shape.
 - (2) Design.
 - (3) Internal configuration.
- cc. Vanes and control surfaces¹.
 - (1) Number.
 - (2) Relative positions.
 - (3) Dimensions
 - (a) Width/span.
 - (b) Length.
 - (c) Configuration of control surfaces.
- dd. Thickness of casing at:
 - (1) Nose.
 - (2) Sides.
 - (3) Base.
- ee. Body and control surface.
 - (1) Type.
 - (2) Material.
- ff. Color and markings of:
 - (3) Nose.
 - (4) Body.
 - (5) Tail and vanes.
- gg. Weights:
 - (1) Total weight, including propellant.
 - (2) Weight of filling.

¹⁴ Repeat as necessary.

- hh. Nature of main filling.
 - (1) If of CW/BW nature:
 - (a) Type of filling (e.g. bomblets or massive fill).
 - (b) Method of delivery (e.g. spray, groundburst or airburst).
 - (2) For antitank missiles with HEAT warheads:
 - (a) Type of cone liner material.
 - (b) Cone angle.
 - (c) Cone diameter.
 - (3) For anti-tank missiles with non-HEAT warheads:
 - (a) Type of warhead.
 - (b) Shape of warhead.

- ii. Missile guidance system
 - (1) Type.
 - (2) Type of control/guidance radar(s).
 - (3) Type of target acquisition radar.
 - (4) Transponder frequencies.
 - (5) Type of proximity fuze (if fitted).
 - (6) ECM equipment.
 - (7) ECCM equipment (including chaff dispensers).

- jj. Method of stabilisation.

- kk. Type of sensor.¹⁵

- ll. Dimensions of radome (if fitted):
 - (1) Diameter.
 - (2) Depth.

- mm. Homing dish (if fitted):
 - (1) Diameter.
 - (2) Depth.

- nn. Wave guides:
 - (1) Location (e.g. homing head, wing, fuselage).
 - (2) Dimensions:
 - (a) Internal (length x height x width).
 - (b) External (length x height x width).
 - (3) Type of technology used in aerials in the wings or body.

- oo. Aerials/Antennas:
 - (1) Location (e.g. wing, fuselage).
 - (2) Dimensions (length x height x width).
 - (3) Type of technology used.

- pp. For torpedoes:
 - (1) Homing head:
 - (a) Dimensions (length x height x width).
 - (b) Type of technology used.

¹⁵ Repeat as necessary.

- (2) Transducer:
 - (a) Type/design.
 - (b) Shape.
 - (c) Dimensions (length x height x width).
- (3) Method of propulsion.
- (4) Propeller data:
 - (a) Type.
 - (b) Number of blades.
 - (c) Blade dimensions (length x width x thickness).

- qq. Detonating system:
 - (1) Type of fuze.
 - (2) Location (e.g. nose, tail, traverse).
 - (3) Description of firing mechanism.

- rr. Suspension system:
 - (1) Type (e.g. mechanical or electrical).
 - (2) Description of devices used (e.g. electrically operated hooks or release gear).

- ss. Description of power source for integrated or associated mobile systems other than the propulsion system.

- tt. Description of anti-handling or booby trap devices.

- uu. Estimate of time required for completion of detailed report.

- vv. Other information (to include estimate of time required to prepare item for shipment to technical intelligence center or designated industrial firm for detailed analysis).

- c. If feasible, a preliminary set of photographs should be sent with the report.

ANNEX T

COMTECHREP - Type C

R005 Purpose

- a. A Complementary Technical Report, COMTECHREP-TYPE C, is used for reporting items not reported under COMTECHREP-Types A and B.
- b. It is to be submitted within 72 hours following the acquisition of an item of captured materiel not covered under COMTECHREP-Types A and B.

R006 Format

- a. The format of the report is as follows:

(Only use those letters for which information is available.)

- a. DTG of report.
- b. Rank, name and unit of person submitting report.
- c. Materiel, device or other object:
 - (1) Type.
 - (2) Name.
 - (3) Quantity.
- d. Nationality or warring faction (using identifying letters in accordance with STANAG 1059—see Annex W) and designation of unit or organisation to which the explosive ordnance belonged.
- e. Locations.
 - (1) **Find**
DTG and location (geographic co-ordinates or UTM grid reference including grid zone designation and 100,000 m square identification) of find.
 - (2) **Present**
Present location (geographic co-ordinates or UTM grid reference including grid zone designation and 100,000 m square identification) of explosive ordnance.
- f. Source (name of person, unit or organisation finding explosive ordnance).
- g. Description/characteristics of materiel, device or object (as applicable):
 - (1) Nomenclature including variant(s) of item.
 - (2) Country of manufacture (using national identifying letters in accordance with STANAG 1059—see Annex W).
 - (3) Origin:
 - (a) Manufacturer.

- (b) Factory.
- (4) Distinguishing marks.
- (5) Measurements (length x width x depth/thickness).

- h. Description of condition of materiel, device or object.
- i. Technical characteristics of immediate tactical value (additional details).
- j. Recommended disposal.
- k. Other information.

ANNEX U

Joint Captured Document Exploitation Centre

W001 General

1. Document exploitation (DOCEX), like materiel exploitation, is an important source of intelligence. Captured documents (CDOCs) contain information on a wide range of topics of intelligence value. Therefore, DOCEX should be integrated into the intelligence organisation. DOCEX conducted in conjunction with interrogation operations enhances the intelligence collection efforts of both functions and optimises the use of available linguistic personnel.
2. Procurement of qualified personnel and the way they should be utilised for DOCEX are to be decided by the Nations. If Nations decide to establish a DOCEX center operating within a joint framework on a permanent or ad hoc basis, the following guidance is offered.
3. The use of information technology makes it possible to transfer documents and translations of documents with great speed to experts for exploitation and to intelligence customers. Databases make it possible to retrieve stored documents, and link analysis exploits information obtained from these documents by identifying links to persons, places and events. The Commander needs to be aware of these capabilities and direct their utilisation by units and intelligence personnel. Where these capabilities do not properly interface, the Command needs to address this deficiency and develop appropriate alternate solutions.

W002 Joint Captured Document Exploitation Center

1. DOCEX may be conducted by a Joint Captured Document Exploitation Center (JCDEC). The JCDEC will normally be established for any operation where significant amounts or types of CDOCs will be available and/or require field exploitation. The JCDEC is under the supervision of the intelligence staff. Two or more nations may establish a Combined Joint Captured Document Exploitation Centre (CJCDEC).
2. **Location.** If possible, the (C)JCDEC should be collocated with the (C)JIC to integrate DOCEX and human intelligence (HUMINT) operations. Additionally, being collocated provides a single geographical area where subordinate units can bring CPERS and CDOCs, as well as consolidating many transportation and security requirements.
3. **Tasks.** The JCDEC/CJCDEC may have the following tasks:
 - a. Exploitation of CDOC based on the supported commander's requirements.
 - b. Production of detailed document reports for tactical commanders.
 - c. Coordination of the evacuation of special-interest CDOC from locations in the field to the JCDEC/CJCDEC.
 - d. Operation of the CDOC archives.

- e. Coordination with the (C)JIC for the selection of CPERS assessed to have knowledge of intelligence value based on the content of associated CDOCs. DOCEX specialists may assist interrogators during interrogation of a wide range of HUMINT sources.
- f. Recommendations to the commander and his staff regarding the disposition of CDOCs.
- g. Maintenance of the command's DOCEX database.
- h. Entry of intelligence produced through DOCEX into the command's intelligence database.
- i. Coordination of CDOC collection in close coordination with the command's intelligence staff.

W003 Captured Document Exploitation Operations

1. **DOCEX Teams.** The JCDEC/CJCDEC can also organise teams from its organic assets to meet immediate requirements of echelons without DOCEX support. These teams may be attached to formations and can deploy forward or support rear area units as required. They carry out complementary field exploitation of CDOCs in situ (operation permitting). These teams should be able to conduct the examination with sufficient expertise in order to prepare the proper type of reports as described in Chapter 6. A sufficient number of teams should be organised based on timeliness and geographical areas to be covered. They should be properly equipped to carry out the field examination, communicate with and report to relevant agencies.

ANNEX V

Prisoner of War Handling Aide Memoire

This aide-memoire may be adapted for use in Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations.

<u>THE COMMANDER</u>	
<u>POW INTELLIGENCE</u>	As part of IPB, J2/G2 staff make assessment of likelihood of significant numbers of POWs being captured in the course of the operation.
<u>THE ESTIMATE</u>	J3/G3 staff make provision for impact of capture of significant numbers of POWs in considering "Other relevant factors" as part of the estimate process.
COMMANDER'S RESPONSIBILITIES	<p>Commander's responsibilities for POWs are summarised as ensuring that:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Individuals under his command comply with the Geneva Conventions (GCs) and other applicable international law. • POWs captured by forces under his command are treated in accordance with the GCs and other applicable international law. • An appropriate POW handling organisation is in place within his command. • POWs are evacuated as soon as possible and are not needlessly exposed to danger. • Information and intelligence are collected from POWs, CMAT, CDOCs and other items.

<u>THE STAFF</u>	
J1/G1 RESPONSIBILITIES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • POW policy. • ICRC liaison. • Guidelines for ICRC inspections. • Administration of POWs including transmission of information on POWs required by GC3 in accordance with directives from higher headquarters. • All aspects of safe custody and evacuation of POWs. • Determination of POW status. • Transfer of POWs between nations. • Establishing and manning the POW holding organisation.

THE STAFF	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Receipt of and action on Group Capture Reports (including information of other staff elements.)
J2/G2 RESPONSIBILITIES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Estimating POW numbers. • Tasking of interrogation units and centres. • Processing and dissemination of intelligence and information from interrogations and exploitation of CMAT and CDOCs. • Security policy.
J3/G3 RESPONSIBILITIES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Locating and ordering the construction of POW facilities. • Activation of POW facilities. • Allocating units to act as guards and escorts.
J4/G4 RESPONSIBILITIES	<p><u>J4/G4</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Construction materials for POW facilities. • Logistics resources for handling POWs. • Administrative instructions for feeding, clothing, moving and accommodating of POWs. • Instructions for medical examinations and treatment of POWs. • Removal and disposal of CMAT after exploitation.

CAPTURING UNIT	
<u>WHO IS A POW?</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Adversary military personnel. • Other persons who: are commanded by a person responsible to his subordinates; have a fixed distinctive sign recognisable at a distance; carry their arms openly; and conduct their operations in accordance with the laws of war. • Civilians who accompany the adversary's armed forces e.g. war correspondents, supply contractors, civilian members of aircraft crews. • Crews of adversary merchant ships and civil aircraft. <p align="center"><u>IF IN DOUBT – TREAT AS A POW</u></p>
<u>ACTION AT POINT OF CAPTURE</u>	<p><u>Disarm. Remove and render safe all weapons.</u></p> <p><u>Secure. Prevent POWs from escaping and from communicating with each other.</u></p> <p><u>Administer first aid, if necessary.</u></p> <p><u>Search. Remove items that may endanger</u></p>

	<p><u>POWs or own personnel and items of intelligence value.</u> Safeguard POWs from danger. Move out of line of fire.</p>
	<p>Evacuate emergency POW casualties to nearest aid station, if possible. Segregate officers and senior NCOs from other ranks and women from men.</p>
	<p>Provide POWs with tag or label . Tag or label:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Weapons. • Documents or equipment captured with the POW.
	<p>Speedily remove POWs with documents and equipment to collecting point as directed. Transmit Group Capture Report, if possible. Send INTREP, if Category A or B POWs identified, and/or if CMAT and CDOCs of intelligence value found.</p>

POW HANDLING ORGANISATION	
ACTION AT COLLECTING POINT	<p>Provide POWs with tags and tag or label their weapons, documents and equipment, if this has not been done at point of capture. Conduct thorough search and complete Interrogation Search Report. Do not remove:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Clothing. • Personal protective equipment. • Personal effects.¹⁶ • ID discs or documents.¹ • Any medication.¹ <p>Provide medical treatment, if necessary. Conduct tactical questioning. Categorise POWs as to potential intelligence value. Complete Tactical Questioning Report. Send INTREP, if Category A or B POWs are identified, and/or if CMAT and CDOCs of intelligence value are found. Feed, water and shelter POWs and provide additional clothing, if possible, Transmit Group Capture Report to next</p>

¹⁶ May be temporarily removed for examination and for intelligence and/or interrogation purposes and should be returned as soon as possible. Personal items which may harm own personel or the POW may be removed for safekeeping. Medication in sufficient quantities to be used to inflict self-harm may be taken into safekeeping and dispensed as needed.

	<p>echelon in the POW handling organisation. Foresee ICRC inspections. Move POWs to next echelon's Collecting Point or to POW holding area as soon as the tactical situation permits.</p>
<p>ACTION AT HOLDING AREA</p>	<p>Provide POWs with tags and tag or label their weapons, documents and equipment, if this has not been done at point of capture. Conduct thorough search and complete Interrogation Search Report. Do not remove:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Clothing. • Personal protective equipment, if needed. • Personal effects.¹ • ID discs or documents.¹ • Any medication¹. <p>Maintain segregation of POWs. Provide medical treatment, if necessary. Conduct tactical questioning. Scan and evaluated CMAT and CDOCs for information of intelligence value. Send INTREP, if Category A or B POWs identified, and/or if CMAT and CDOCs of intelligence value found (to be followed by PRETECHREP). Inform POWs of rights under GC3. Issue Internment Serial Number. Initiate POW Personnel Record and POW Record Card. Have POWs complete ICRC capture card. Feed, water and shelter POWs and provide additional clothing, if necessary, Prepare to receive ICRC inspections. Move to POW long-term holding facility as soon as the tactical situation permits.</p>
<p>ACTION AT LONG-TERM HOLDING FACILITY</p>	<p>Maintain custody of POWs until their release or transfer. Maintain segregation of POWs in accordance with GC3. Feed, water and house POWs and provide suitable clothing and appropriate shelter. Provide bathing and laundry facilities. Facilitate interrogation operations. Conduct thorough medical examination and provide medical treatment (including delousing), if necessary. Complete in-processing actions not</p>

	<p>complete at holding area:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Inform POWs of rights under GC3.• Issue Internment Serial Number.• Initiate POW Personnel Record and POW Record Card.• Have POWs complete ICRC capture card. <p>Prepare to receive ICRC inspections.</p>
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ANNEX W

STANAG 1059 Country and NATO Command Codes

W004 General

4. STANAG 1059 provides unique sets of codes for use throughout NATO to distinguish geographical entities, nations and countries.
5. NATO is committed to using ISO standards wherever possible. Therefore, NATO nations have agreed to use the 3-character codes, based on ISO3166-1, for the countries and geographic entities listed in this Annex in publications, documents and orders. Within formatted text messages and NATO and national IT systems, the 3-character as well as the older 2-character formats of character codes listed in this STANAG are valid. Nations are encouraged to update legacy systems to the 3-character, ISO-based country codes wherever practicable and ensure that all future systems will be compatible with the ISO-based codes.
6. Codes for other geographical entities such as provinces, bodies of water and large geographical regions may found in STANAG 1059.
7. It should be noted that STANAG 1059 is continually updated. Therefore, the latest amended edition of STANAG 1059 should always be consulted especially regarding codes for the political and administrative subdivisions, the NATO commands, etc.

W005 Three-Letter ISO-Based Codes and Two-Letter NATO Codes for Countries

Country	New NATO (ISO-based) three letter code	NATO ¹⁷ two letter code
Afghanistan	AFG	AF
Albania	ALB	AL
Algeria	DZA	AG
American Samoa	ASM	SS
Andorra	AND	AN
Angola	AGO	AO
Anguilla	AIA	AV
Antarctica	ATA	AY
Antigua and Barbuda	ATG	AC
Argentina	ARG	AR
Armenia	ARM	AM
Aruba	ABW	AA
Ashmore and Cartier Islands	ACI	AT
Australia	AUS	AS
Austria	AUT	AU
Azerbaijan	AZE	AJ
Bahamas	BHS	BF

¹⁷ To be used as an interim solution within NATO and national AIS only, until a change to 3 letter codes is technically possible.

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Country	New NATO (ISO-based) three letter code	NATO¹⁷ two letter code
Bahrain	BHR	BA
Bangladesh	BGD	BG
Barbados	BRB	BB
Belarus	BLR	BO
Belgium	BEL	BE
Belize	BLZ	BH
Benin	BEN	BN
Bermuda	BMU	BD
Bhutan	BTN	BT
Bolivia	BOL	BL
Bosnia and Herzegovina	BIH	BK
Botswana	BWA	BC
Bouvet Island	BVT	BV
Brazil	BRA	BR
British Indian Ocean Territory	IOT	IO
Brunei Darussalam	BRN	BX
Bulgaria	BGR	BU
Burkina Faso	BFA	UV
Burundi	BDI	BY
Cambodia	KHM	CB
Cameroon	CMR	CM
Canada	CAN	CA
Cape Verde	CPV	CV
Cayman Islands	CYM	CJ
Central African Republic	CAF	CT
Chad	TCD	CD
Chile	CHL	CI
China	CHN	CH
Christmas Island	CXR	KT
Cocos (Keeling) Islands	CCK	CK
Colombia	COL	CO
Comoros	COM	CN
Congo	COG	CF
Congo, The Democratic Republic of the	COD	CG
Cook Islands	COK	CW
Coral Sea Islands	CSI	CR
Costa Rica	CRI	CS
Côte d'Ivoire (Ivory Coast)	CIV	IV
Croatia (Hrvatska)	HRV	HR
Cuba	CUB	CU
Cyprus	CYP	CY
Czech Republic	CZE	CZ
Denmark	DNK	DA
Djibouti	DJI	DJ
Dominica	DMA	DO
Dominican Republic	DOM	DR
Ecuador	ECU	EC

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

Country	New NATO (ISO-based) three letter code	NATO¹⁷ two letter code
Egypt	EGY	EG
El Salvador	SLV	ES
Equatorial Guinea	GNQ	EK
Eritrea	ERI	ER
Estonia	EST	EN
Ethiopia	ETH	ET
Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas)	FLK	FK
Faroe Islands	FRO	FO
Fiji	FJI	FJ
Finland	FIN	FI
France	FRA	FR
Gabon	GAB	GB
Gambia, The	GMB	GA
Georgia	GEO	GG
Germany	DEU	GE
Ghana	GHA	GH
Gibraltar	GIB	GI
Greece	GRC	GR
Greenland	GRL	GL
Grenada	GRD	GJ
Guam	GUM	GQ
Guatemala	GTM	GT
Guinea	GIN	GV
Guinea-Bissau	GNB	PU
Guyana	GUY	GY
Haiti	HTI	HA
Hear Island and McDonald Islands	HMD	HM
Holy See (Vatican City State)	VAT	VT
Honduras	HND	HO
Hong Kong	HKG	HK
Howland Island	HQI	HQ
Hungary	HUN	HU
Iceland	ISL	IC
India	IND	IN
Indonesia	IDN	ID
Iran, Islamic Republic of	IRN	IR
Iraq	IRQ	IZ
Ireland	IRL	EI
Israel	ISR	IS
Italy	ITA	IT
Jamaica	JAM	JM
Jan Mayen	JNM	JN
Japan	JPN	JA
Johnston Atoll	JQA	JQ
Jordan	JOR	JO
Kazakhstan	KAZ	KZ
Kenya	KEN	KE
Kiribati	KIR	KR

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Country	New NATO (ISO-based) three letter code	NATO¹⁷ two letter code
Korea, Democratic People's Republic of	PRK	KN
Korea, Republic of	KOR	KS
Kuwait	KWT	KU
Kyrgyzstan	KGZ	KG
Lao People's Democratic Republic	LAO	LA
Latvia	LVA	LG
Lebanon	LBN	LE
Lesotho	LSO	LT
Liberia	LBR	LI
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	LBY	LY
Liechtenstein	LIE	LS
Lithuania	LTU	LH
Luxembourg	LUX	LU
Macao (Macau)	MAC	MC
Madagascar	MDG	MA
Malawi	MWI	MI
Malaysia	MYS	MY
Maldives	MDV	MV
Mali	MLI	ML
Malta	MLT	MT
Marshall Islands	MHL	RM
Mauritania	MRT	MR
Mauritius	MUS	MP
Mexico	MEX	MX
Micronesia, Federated States of	FSM	FM
Moldova, Republic of	MDA	MD
Monaco	MCO	MN
Mongolia	MNG	MG
Montserrat	MSR	MH
Morocco	MAR	MO
Mozambique	MOZ	MZ
Myanmar	MMR	BM
Namibia	NAM	W
Nauru	NRU	NR
Nepal	NPL	NP
Netherlands	NLD	NL
Netherlands Antilles	ANT	NA
New Zealand	NZL	NZ
Nicaragua	NIC	NU
Niger	NER	NG
Nigeria	NGA	NI
Niue	NIU	NE
Norfolk Island	NFK	NF
Northern Mariana Islands	MNP	CQ
Norway	NOR	NO
Oman	OMN	MU
Pakistan	PAK	PK

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

Country	New NATO (ISO-based) three letter code	NATO¹⁷ two letter code
Palau	PLW	PS
Panama	PAN	PM
Papua New Guinea	PNG	PP
Paracel Islands	PFI	PF
Paraguay	PRY	PA
Peru	PER	PE
Philippines	PHL	RP
Pitcairn Islands	PCN	PC
Poland	POL	PL
Portugal	PRT	PO
Puerto Rico	PRI	RQ
Qatar	QAT	QA
Romania	ROU	RO
Russian Federation	RUS	RS
Rwanda	RWA	RW
Saint Helena	SHN	SH
Saint Kitts and Nevis	KNA	SC
Saint Lucia	LCA	ST
Saint Vincent and The Grenadines	VCT	VC
Samoa	WSM	SS
San Marino	SMR	SM
Sao Tome and Principe	STP	TP
Saudi Arabia	SAU	SA
Senegal	SEN	SG
Serbia and Montenegro	SCG	SB
Seychelles	SYC	SE
Sierra Leone	SLE	SL
Singapore	SGP	SN
Slovakia	SVK	LO
Slovenia	SVN	SI
Solomon Islands	SLB	BP
Somalia	SOM	SO
South Africa	ZAF	SF
South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands	SGS	SX
Spain	ESP	SP
Sri Lanka	LKA	CE
Sudan	SDN	SU
Suriname	SUR	NS
Svalbard and Jan Mayen Islands	SJM	SV
Swaziland	SWZ	WZ
Sweden	SWE	SW
Switzerland	CHE	SZ
Syrian Arab Republic	SYR	SY
Taiwan, Province of china	TWN	TW
Tajikistan	TJK	TI
Tanzania, United Republic of	TZA	TZ
Thailand	THA	TH

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Country	New NATO (ISO-based) three letter code	NATO¹⁷ two letter code
Timor-Leste (East Timor)	TLS	TM
Togo	TGO	TO
Tokelau	TLK	TL
Tonga	TON	TN
Trinidad and Tobago	TTO	TD
Tunisia	TUN	TS
Turkey	TUR	TU
Turkmenistan	TKM	TX
Turks and Caicos Islands	TCA	TK
Tuvalu	TUV	TV
Uganda	UGA	UG
Ukraine	UKR	UP
United Arab Emirates	ARE	TC
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	GBR	UK
United States of America	USA	US
U.S. Minor Outlying Islands	UMI	IQ
Uruguay	URY	UY
Uzbekistan	UZB	UZ
Vanuatu	VUT	NH
Venezuela	VEN	VE
Viet Nam	VNM	VM
Virgin Islands (British)	VGB	VS
Virgin Islands (U.S.)	VIR	VI
Western Sahara	ESH	WI
Yemen	YEM	YE
Yugoslavia, Federal Republic of	YUG	YU
Zambia	ZMB	ZA
Zimbabwe	ZWE	ZI
<u>TEMPORARY CODES</u>		
Macedonia ¹⁸ , The Former Yugoslav Republic of	FYR	FY
Yugoslavia, Federal Republic of	YUG	YU
Palestinian Territory, Occupied	PSE	PS

¹⁸ Turkey recognizes the Republic of Macedonia by its constitutional name.

W006 Three-Letter ISO-Based Codes and Two-Letter NATO Codes for NATO Commands

NATO Command	Three-Character (ISO-Based) NATO Command Code	Two-Character NATO Command Code ¹⁹
NATO (BLUE)	XXN	XN
HQ SACT (ACT)	XXS	XS
SHAPE (ACO)	XXE	XE

W007 Six-Character ISO-Based Codes and Four-Character NATO Codes for NATO Subordinate Commands

NATO Subordinate Command	Six-Character (ISO-Based) NATO Subordinate Command Code	Four-Character NATO Subordinate Command Code ²⁰
JFC HQ Brunssum	XE-001	XE01
CC-Mar HQ Northwood	XE-002	XE02
CC-Land HQ Heidelberg	XE-003	XE03
CC-Air HQ Ramstein	XE-004	XE04
CAOC Uedem	XE-005	XE05
DCAOC Uedem	XE-006	XE06
CAOC Finderup	XE-007	XE07
JFC HQ Naples	XE-008	XE08
CC-Mar HQ Naples	XE-009	XE09
CC-Land HQ Madrid	XE-010	XE10
CC-Air HQ Izmir	XE-011	XE11
Joint HQ Lisbon	XE-012	XE12
CAOC Poggio Renatico	XE-013	XE13
DCAOC Poggio Renatico	XE-014	XE14
CAOC Larissa	XE-015	XE15
ACT Staff Element	XS-001	XS01
Joint Warfare Centre	XS-002	XS02
Joint Force Training Centre	XS-003	XS03
Joint Analysis & Lessons Learned Centre	XS-004	XS04
Undersea Research Centre	XS-005	XS05

¹⁹ To be used as an interim solution within NATO and national AIS only, until a change to 3 letter codes is technically possible.

²⁰ To be used as an interim solution within NATO and national AIS only, until a change to 6 character codes is technically possible.

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GLOSSARY

A

- AO.** Area of operations.
- AOR.** Area of responsibility.
- AP.** Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions Dated 12 August 1949.
- ATD.** Associated technical document.

B

biometrics. For the purpose of this publication, biometrics refers to technologies for measuring and analyzing human body characteristics such as fingerprints, eye retinas and irises, voice patterns, facial patterns and hand measurements for identification purposes.

C

CAPTAG. Capture tag.

captured persons. For the purpose of this publication, CPERS are defined as persons who have been captured or have surrendered during the course of a military operation. CPERS may have POW status as defined in the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War dated 12 August 1949 (GC3), Article 4.

CDOC. Captured document.

child. GC4 and the Additional Protocols refer to CPERS under the age of 15 as children. GC3 does not address the issue of children captured as active participants in an armed conflict. This issue will be referred to the member nations for legal guidance and should be addressed in the MOA, if relevant to the particular operation or mission. Guidance may also be found in the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child of 20 November 1989 and in the Optional Protocol of 25 May 2000 to this Convention on the involvement of children in armed conflict. (For the purposes of that Convention, a child means every human being below the age of 18 years unless, under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier.)

CJDIF. Combined Joint Detention and Interrogation Facility.

CJIC. Combined Joint Interrogation Centre.

CJIU. Combined Joint Interrogation Unit.

CJTF. Combined Joint Task Force.

CJCDEC. Combined Joint Captured Document Exploitation Centre.

CMAT. Captured materiel.

COMTECHREP. Complementary Technical Report.

CPERS. Captured person(s).

D

DATO. Defence Against Terrorism Operation.

debriefing. For the purpose of this publication, debriefing is defined as the systematic and extended questioning of cooperative personnel (e.g. defectors and deserters) to obtain information of intelligence value.

DEDOCREP. Detailed Document Report.

defectors. For the purpose of the publication, defectors are defined as politically or otherwise disaffected non-NATO nationals who repudiate their country when beyond its control, and are not entitled to the protection of Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War Dated 12 August 1949 as prisoners of war who possess information of sufficient potential value to NATO to warrant intelligence exploitation. Such persons are not to be deprived of any rights they may have under the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War Dated 12 August 1949, and may be provided, in accordance with national policy, the protections of Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War Dated 12 August 1949.

Defence Against Terrorism. (NATO definition pending).

deserters. For the purpose of this publication, enemy "deserters" are those persons who absent themselves from their military place of duty without permission of the proper authority. Deserters shall be considered prisoners of war.

Detaining Power. For the purpose of this publication, the Detaining Power is defined as the Power having custody of CPERS and, in consequence thereof, having the duties and responsibilities pertaining to their treatment that are stipulated in the Geneva Conventions and other applicable international law.

DETECHREP. Detailed Technical Report.

DNA. Deoxyribonucleic Acid.

DOCEX. Document exploitation.

document. For the purpose of this publication, "document" is defined as any recorded information regardless of its physical form or characteristics including, but not limited to, all:

1. Written material, whether hand-written, printed or typed.
2. Painted, drawn or engraved material.

3. Video, sound or voice recordings.
4. Imagery.
5. Computers and computer storage media such as floppy, compact, digital versatile and hard disks, flash drives, portable memory devices, magnetic tape and associated material including punched cards, punched paper tape and printed output.
6. Reproductions of the foregoing, by whatever process.

Engraved material etc., such as manufacturers' plates and the like, permanently fastened to captured equipment, is not considered a document.

DTG. Date time group.

E

Escort. An escort is an individual or a formed body of military personnel whose task it is to prevent the escape of CPERS in the course of their movement from one CPERS facility to another.

F

Force Provost Marshal. The NATO Commander's principal staff advisor on Military Police matters. He may, or may not, be double-hatted as the NATO Military Police Commander.

FPM. Force Provost Marshal.

G

GC. Geneva Convention.

GC2. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea Dated 12 August 1949

GC3. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War Dated 12 August 1949.

GC4. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War Dated 12 August 1949.

GRPCAPREP. Group Capture Report.

Guard. A guard is an individual or a formed body of military personnel whose task it is to prevent the escape of CPERS from CPERS facilities and to maintain discipline among the CPERS within the facility.

H

HUMINT. Human intelligence.

I

ICRC. International Committee of the Red Cross.

INTERNSN. Internment serial number.

interrogation. For the purpose of this publication, interrogation is defined as the systematic and extended questioning of captured personnel to obtain information of intelligence value. While being held for interrogation and during interrogation, CPERS remain entitled to the full protection of GC and other applicable international law.

interrogator. For the purpose of this publication, an interrogator is defined as as a person trained and qualified to conduct systematic and extended questioning of CPERS to obtain information of intelligence value.

INTGREP. Interrogation Report.

INTGSN. Interrogation serial number.

INTREP. Intelligence Report.

IU. Interrogation unit.

J

JCDEC. Joint Captured Document Exploitation Centre.

JIC. Joint Interrogation Centre.

JIU. Joint Interrogation Unit.

JPEG. Joint Photographic Experts Group.

L

M

materiel. For the purpose of this publication, materiel is defined as all items (including ships, tanks, self-propelled weapons, aircraft, etc., and related spares, repair parts, munitions, and support equipment, but excluding real estate, installations, and utilities) necessary to equip, operate, maintain, or support military, terrorist or criminal activities without distinction as to its application for administrative or combat purposes.

memorandum of agreement. For the purpose of this publication, a memorandum of agreement is defined as an agreement between the member Nations of NATO and

nations participating in a NATO-led coalition which delineate tasks, jurisdiction, standard operating procedures and other parameters for the Combined Joint Task Force to which they are contributing forces.

MOA. Memorandum of agreement.

MSR. Main supply route.

N

NA5CRO. Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operation.

P

POW Prisoner of war.

PSO. Peace Support Operation.

PSYOPS. Psychological operations.

prisoner of war. The definitions contained in the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War dated 12 August 1949 (GC3), Article 4, shall be used with the same meaning throughout this publication. Prisoners of war, in the sense of the GC 3, are persons belonging to one of the following categories who have fallen into the power of their enemy.

1. Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict as well as members of militias or volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces.
2. Members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps, including those of organized resistance movements, belonging to a Party to the conflict and operating in or outside their own territory, even if this territory is occupied, provided that such militias or volunteer corps, including such organized resistance movements, fulfil the following conditions:
 - a. That of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;
 - b. That of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance;
 - c. That of carrying arms openly;
 - d. That of conducting their operations in accordance with the law and customs of war.
3. Members of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a government or an authority not recognized by the Detaining Power.
4. Persons who accompany the armed forces without actually being members thereof, such as civilian members of military aircraft crews, war correspondents, supply contractors, members of labor units or services responsible for the welfare of the armed forces, provided they have received authorization from the armed

forces which they accompany, who shall provide them with an identity card in accordance with GC3, Article 4.

5. Members of crews, including masters, pilots and apprentices of the merchant marine and the crews of civil aircraft of the parties to the conflict, who do not benefit by more favorable treatment under any other provisions of international law.
6. Inhabitants of a non-occupied territory, who in the approach of the enemy spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading forces, without having had time to form themselves into regular armed units, provided they carry arms openly and respect the laws and customs of war.
7. **Treatment as Prisoners of War.** The following shall likewise be treated as prisoners of war under the present Convention:
 - a. Persons belonging, or having belonged, to the armed forces of the occupied country, if the occupying Power considers it necessary by reason of such allegiance to intern them, even though it has originally liberated them while hostilities were going on outside the territories it occupies, in particular where such persons have made a unsuccessful attempt to rejoin the armed forces to which they belong and which are engaged in combat or where they fail to comply with a summons made to them with a view to internment.
 - b. The persons belonging to one of the categories enumerated in the present Article, who have been received by neutral or non-belligerent Powers on their territory and whom these Powers are required to intern under international law, without prejudice to any more favorable treatment which these Powers may choose to give and with the exception of Articles 8, 10, 15, 30, fifth paragraph, 58-67, 92, 126 and, where diplomatic relations exist between the parties to the conflict and the neutral or non-belligerent Power concerned, those Articles concerning the Protecting Power. Where such diplomatic relations exist, the Parties to a conflict on whom these persons depend shall be allowed to perform towards them the functions of a Protecting Power as provided in the present Convention, without prejudice to the functions which these Parties normally exercise in conformity with diplomatic and consular usage and treaties.
 - c. This Article shall in no way affect the status of medical personnel and chaplains as provided for in Article 33 of the present Convention.

Protecting Power. For the purpose of this publication, the Protecting Power is defined as a neutral state or an international humanitarian organisation such as the International Committee of the Red Cross that may be designated as such to monitor whether CPERS are receiving humane treatment as required by the Geneva Conventions or other applicable international law.

Q

QRF. Quick reaction force.

R

ROE. Rules of engagement.

S

screening. For the purpose of this publication, screening is the selection of CPERS for interrogation. In principle, all CPERS should be assessed on their probable knowledge and willingness to provide information. The purpose of screening is to determine which CPERS can best satisfy the Commander's Priority Intelligence Requirements and other intelligence requirements. Screening should be conducted at every echelon.

SEARCHREP. Search Report.

T

tactical questioning. For the purpose of this publication, tactical questioning is defined as basic questioning of short duration for the purpose of obtaining time-sensitive information or information of immediate value to the capturing unit. The object of tactical questioning is also to identify CPERS of particular value requiring subsequent interrogation as soon as possible by trained interrogators. Tactical questioning should be conducted by trained personnel.

TECHINT. Technical Intelligence.

TQREP. Tactical Questioning Report.

U

UTM. Universal Trans-Mercator.

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