





**INTERSERVICE
CHEMICAL BIOLOGICAL RADIOLOGICAL
NUCLEAR
EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL
OPERATIONS (CBRN EOD)
ON
MULTINATIONAL DEPLOYMENTS**

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
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NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION
NATO STANDARDIZATION AGENCY (NSA)
NATO LETTER OF PROMULGATION

3 November 2011

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Cihangir AKSIT, TUR Civ
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**INTERSERVICE CHEMICAL BIOLOGICAL RADIOLOGICAL NUCLEAR
EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL OPERATIONS (CBRN EOD) ON
MULTINATIONAL DEPLOYMENTS – AEODP-8**

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CHAPTER 1

PREFACE

101. Object

1. The purpose of this publication is to define principles for structuring and conducting multinational Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) operations across the spectrum of multi-national operations and for any size force. This document provides information on command and control (C2) principles, concepts, procedures, responsibilities and safety principles in addition to those set out in ATP 72.
2. The information provided in this document enables efficient, effective, and safe employment of available CBRN EOD forces to support the multinational taskforce. Observance by all nations involved is an essential precondition for the conduct of CBRN EOD operations in an effective and safe way and, at the same time, an essential condition for improving the protection of multinational deployed forces, the civil population and the environment.

102. Background and scope

1. Because individual nations will provide different capabilities in the fields of CBRN defence, EOD and other supporting assets, these must be coordinated and harmonized. Supporting capabilities must be adapted to the specialized requirement of a CBRN EOD operation. This is of particular importance when non-military assets are involved.
2. The elimination or minimization of a hazard or threat caused by CBRN Devices and CBRN Weapons requires a clear and common understanding from each participating nation on how to control and conduct CBRN EOD tasks. As a rule, CBRN EOD activities are of a complex nature and require very high levels of co-ordination by all parties involved, including special assignment and safety regulations, additional education, training and equipment. Therefore it is necessary to publish and issue clear, simple and effective regulations for a multinational deployment of all parties involved, in particular for the CBRN and EOD elements.
3. Disposal of Nuclear Weapons. This document does not address standardization in the field of the disposal of nuclear weapons. However, NATO EOD Forces should agree to exchange necessary information within the limits of national security policies in time of emergency.

103. Applicability

In conjunction with other NATO reference documents, this document is to be used by commanders, staff and CBRN EOD operators who are involved in or influence the organization, planning and conduct of CBRN EOD operations.

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CHAPTER 2**COMMAND AND CONTROL (C2) ORGANIZATION****201. Principles**

1. **Safety.** The safe and successful completion of CBRN EOD operations may require capabilities beyond those of a typical CBRN EOD team. Therefore, additional capabilities could be provided by other military or civilian agencies such as emergency services. Possible domains of support are risk assessment, hazard management (including decontamination), detection, identification, monitoring and medical countermeasures. As a result, CBRN EOD operations are likely to be highly multidisciplinary, requiring a thorough synchronization of all assets but still allowing a flexible response to every unique incident.
2. **Command and Control Compatibility.** The conduct of CBRN EOD Ops typically involves several nations supporting the same operation at different levels, providing similar capabilities, and usually using different manpower and equipment. Therefore, it is not sufficient to focus only on capabilities and resources. Embedded CBRN EOD Ops also requires a clearly defined and effective C2 organization. Each operation may require different command, control and communication structures, but basic guiding principles can be applied to each operation.
3. **Interoperability:** Interoperability between CBRN EOD assets and other involved capabilities (e.g. civilian emergency services) is essential to the successful conduct of CBRN EOD operations.

202. Allocation of Responsibilities

1. CBRN EOD tasks are seldom completed autonomously due to the high risk during these types of operations and the need to establish large danger areas to account for the possibility of negative effects on the mission, population, infrastructure and environment. It is imperative to work as a team. Therefore it is necessary to:
 - determine who are the participants at command level and who are the participants at execution level,
 - separate execution level from command level,
 - allocate responsibilities to command level,
 - allocate responsibilities to execution level,
 - check and practice procedures and essential capabilities,
 - establish effective and practicable cooperation between all staff elements involved including civil-military relations,
 - establish effective and practicable cooperation between command and execution levels.
2. With regard to CBRN EOD tasks, Annex A gives an overview of C2 functions / elements with allocated tasks and responsibilities.

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203. General Structures

1. Since EOD and CBRN defence resources are normally limited, these national resources should be centrally tasked and coordinated, to the maximum extent possible, to optimize effectiveness and in order to concentrate effort where it is most needed.
2. The minimum required C2 elements are organizationally located at different levels and are assigned different command authority. Some of these elements are necessary in all cases, while some are necessary only for specific tasks (if available). Dual functions are possible:
 - a. C2 at the staff level:
 - Essential Tasking and Coordinating Authorities required in every case:
 - o Multinational Joint Operations Centre (MNJOC)
 - o Multinational EOD Coordination Cell (MNEODCC)
 - o Multinational CBRN Collection Centre (MN CBRN CC)
 - o National Point of Contact EOD (NPOCEOD)
 - o National Point of Contact CBRN (NPOC CBRN)
 - o National Operations Centre (NOC)
 - If necessary and available:
 - o Civil Defence Agencies
 - o Civil Local Authorities
 - b. C2 at the execution level:
 - Essential Coordinating and Execution Authorities on site:
 - o Incident Commander (IC)
 - o Liaison Officer CBRN on site
 - o Liaison Officer EOD on site
 - If necessary and available:
 - o Liaison Officer Civil Defence Agencies
 - o Liaison Officer Civil Local Authorities

204. Threat, Vulnerability and Risk Analysis

1. To be prepared to take appropriate action and to enhance safety, it is of fundamental importance to undertake a realistic threat and vulnerability analysis followed by the preparation of a clear risk management plan. Threat analysis should include the evaluation of all hazards including those caused by meteorological conditions, explosive ordnance (EO), enemy forces and irregular parties including their capabilities and tactics, environmental, industrial and other hazards to personnel and materiel. An important precondition is the establishment of a fully functional information management system. Accurate threat analysis is key to enable adequate pre-

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incident precautions and if necessary, pre-positioning of assets or reduction of readiness category.

2. The rendering safe of a CBRN device is an inherently dangerous task. Due to the multitude of hazards, the CBRN EOD Operator is responsible for providing input (EOD technical) to the overall multidisciplinary threat, vulnerability and risk analysis in order to determine the course of action. The final decisions are to be based upon an accurate overall threat assessment, understanding of EOD and CBRN actions and effective and relevant training.




Figure 2-1 Threat Vulnerability Risk Analysis Process

205. Planning

1. "Proper planning prevents poor performance". To avoid unacceptable delays and confusion it is imperative to establish a CBRN EOD response plan. Therefore the best and most effective approach is to establish a CBRN EOD response package. Depending on the situation and the risk analysis, an appropriate arrangement of participating teams, capabilities, notice to move (NTM) regulations and alert procedures must be established. In this context the MNEODCC and MNCBRNCC have a crucial role.
2. Therefore, special CBRN EOD-relevant SOPs must be issued for each operation. ATP-72 contains a proposed list of headings for the minimum contents of such SOPs. Close co-operation between multinational and national staff elements, including their legal advisers, is of essential importance in the preparation of these SOPs.

206. Tasking, Coordinating and Prioritization

1. The MNJOC acts as the command authority with permission to launch CBRN EOD assets, especially CBRN EOD Immediate Response Team (IRT), if available. The MNJOC is the POC for the on-site IC. If necessary the MNJOC acts as a liaison cell to equivalent local civil authorities.

2. The MNEODCC is the central point of contact for operational and tactical requests regarding matters relevant to CBRN EOD and for all other EOD issues.
3. The MNCBRNCC is the central point of contact for operational and tactical requests regarding CBRN relevant matters and issues. The main responsibilities of the MN CBRN CC, among others, is the:
 - Co-ordination of allocated CBRN forces within the AOR
 - Allocation of CBRN tasks to national LOs
 - Co-ordination and determination of required support
 - Establishment of a flexible and practicable CBRN defence 24h stand-by system in support of IRT Package
 - Close co-operation with national POCs (NPOCs) and MN staff elements
 - Assessment and advice element in CBRN related matters
 - Collection of relevant CBRN information
4. The IC acts as the overall on-site authority. The main tasks of the IC are:
 - C2 element on site
 - Command, control and co-ordination of all assets and activities on site
 - Confirmation and co-ordination of all required safety measures on site
 - Decision about the start of the action against the CBRN EO after permission to start from the MNJOC
 - Decision on measures in light of CBRN and EOD advice.
 - The IC is responsible for the overall multidisciplinary TVRA. He has to supervise the Transfer of Authority (time and situ) between the different agencies (actors).
 - Since a render safe procedure (RSP) could cause a functioning of the device and due to the wider implications of a CBRN release, the IC must be briefed on the intended actions of the EOD operator before the implementation of any RSP. A command structure must be present to support the IC by additional directives (possibility to refer up).
 - Hand over scene to civil or military authorities
 - Establishment of reach back capability if needed.
5. Each nation participating in multinational CBRN EOD must appoint a NPOC for CBRN, EOD and Support measures. The NPOC, independent of its role as an EOD, CBRN or Support POC is the nation's central co-ordination and tasking authority. The NPOCs are responsible for the accomplishment of allocated tasks in the area of EOD, CBRN and support measures, in accordance with national regulations and agreed multinational procedures. To facilitate proper coordination, nations must ensure via their NPOCs that the MNEODCC and MNCBRNCC are advised of national capabilities, restrictions and limitations.

207. Responsibilities and General Relationships On Site

1. It is of crucial importance to allocate specific responsibilities before starting activities on site. Therefore, it is essential to identify and coordinate specific roles on site.
2. For a clearer understanding it is important that this chapter focuses on the description of essential and possible elements involved on site. This doctrine does not describe which forces, units and personnel of a particular nation are responsible for which function. Dual roles are possible, depending on national policy. For example it is possible that one individual has the role of consultation, command and control CBRN function and at the same time the role of CBRN reconnaissance team leader. Therefore the number of roles may not equate to the number of individuals involved.
3. The essential on-site roles required during the execution of a CBRN EOD task (possible parts of an CBRN EOD IRT) are:
 - a. Overall C2 POC (Incident Commander)
 - b. CBRN EOD related elements (coordinating and Executing EOD Authorities on site):
 - C2 EOD (coordinating Authority EOD)
 - EOD team or teams (Executing Authority EOD)
 - EOR team (Executing Authority EOD)
 - c. CBRN related elements (coordinating and Executing CBRN Authorities on site):
 - C2 CBRN (coordinating Authority CBRN)
 - CBRN reconnaissance asset (Executing Authority CBRN)
 - CBRN decontamination asset (Executing Authority CBRN)
 - d. Elements in specific fields of support (Executing Authorities on site):
 - Military Medical Assistance Team
 - Cordon and evacuation elements (e.g. MP, Civil Police)
4. Annex A gives an overview of listed elements with regard to their allocated tasks and responsibilities.

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CHAPTER 3

CAPABILITIES AND TASK AREAS OF MULTINATIONAL CBRN EOD

301. Multinational Operations Spectrum

1. CBRN EOD operations are not autonomous operations. CBRN EOD operations are always a part of a larger mission in a multinational environment.
2. The aim of conducting CBRN EOD operations is to protect personnel, materiel, infrastructure and environment and to maintain, restore or improve operational capabilities before, during and after a mission. CBRN EOD is a vital operational task from the point of view of survivability, force protection, freedom of movement, protection of lines of communication, intelligence and civil-military cooperation support.

302. CBRN EOD Task Spectrum

1. CBRN EOD assets are employed to counter confirmed or suspected EO hazards associated with the presence of CBRN devices. These hazards are presented by a wide range of devices and manufactured weapons in combination with environmental conditions at the scene:
 - a. Munitions and devices, which are the subject of CBRN EOD activities, include combinations of suspected and confirmed explosive or non-explosive devices, either manufactured or improvised or in a combination of both. These may be used in conjunction with CBRN agents and/or Toxic Industrial Materials (TIMs); and
 - b. These munitions and devices may be encountered in a 'clean' or CBRN contaminated environment, which may include the hazard from a CBRN agent or TIM release.
2. These factors should also be considered when CBRN EOD teams are confronted by non-explosive CBRN devices e.g. non-explosive Improvised Spraying Device (ISD) or non-explosive Improvised Dispersal Device (IDD).
3. It is important to consider CBRN in the widest sense possible and not to limit its meaning to e.g. chemical agents. The availability and possibly the accessibility of TIM in the operational environment, obliges us to take due consideration of this threat.

303. Support Missions

CBRN EOD operators will participate in the following activities only as a support element and will not operate autonomously:

1. **Search Operations:** These operations are usually conducted by Search specialists. However, the CBRN EOD Operator may be given responsibility

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for specific search tasks such as a suspect vehicle (naval, ground or air) or the immediate area of a device. Other areas may be searched at the Operator's discretion, based upon the TVRA and the specific circumstances.

2. **Sampling and Identification** of Biological, Chemical and Radiological Agents (SIBCRA): This is a function of SIBCRA specialists.
3. **Final disposal of the agent or TIM:** Although the treatment of the agent or TIM is not the function of an CBRN EOD team, they may be requested to use an EOD technique to dispose of the agent or TIM, e.g. high order detonation. The application of these techniques needs to be in accordance with the rules of engagement (ROE). Due attention is to be given to international laws and conventions.
4. **Hazard management.** Decontamination of personnel, equipment and of the incident site is usually the role of support agencies, either military or civil. Decontaminants, however, may be used during RSP.

CHAPTER 4**INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING SYSTEM****401. Communications and Information Systems**

1. Communication and information systems (CIS) are essential for all elements employed at the EOD incident site involving CBRN agents or TIM. It is vital that the IC be able to communicate with:
 - a. Commanders of the safety and security cordons;
 - b. CBRN survey teams; and
 - c. Critical functional commanders such as fire service, police or security and medical.
2. The senior medical officer must also maintain reliable radio or telephone communications with local medical treatment facilities in order to warn them of the CBRN agent or TIM employed and to ensure the efficient intake of casualties.
3. While military radio is desirable, the existing telephone system in buildings can and should be used. Additionally, private cellular telephones may also be used as an expedient means of communication. In some situations, electronic mail and facsimile may also be used.

402. Reporting

1. The following represents potential reports that the IC may have to use during CBRN EOD operations.

Table 4-1 Report Submission

Report	Submission	Comments
Operations Report	As soon as possible after arrival at the incident site	Suggested format provided at Annex 4A, Appendix 1
Situation Report	Every 12 hours after submission of the Operations Report	Suggested format provided at Annex 4A, Appendix 2
Request for Support	As required	Suggested format provided at Annex 4A, Appendix 4
Final Situation Report	At the end of the operation	Suggested format provided at Annex 4A, Appendix 3
Request for Information or Intelligence	As required	Suggested format provided at Annex 4A, Appendix 5

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ANNEX 4A

REPORT FORMATS

Appendix	Description
1	Operations Report
2	Situation Report
3	Final Situation Report
4	Request for Support
5	Request for Information or Intelligence

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APPENDIX 1, ANNEX 4A - OPERATIONS REPORT

1. The IC will use the operations report template in Table 4A-1-1 to report the situation at a CBRN EOD incident site to the MNJOC as soon as possible after his arrival on site. The MNJOC will forward this information up the appropriate chain of command.

Table 4A-1-1 Operations Report Template

<i>Security Classification</i>
<i>Subject or Operations Report</i>
<i>1. Describe the incident and include references to any previous reports by voice or email.</i>
<i>2. Describe the results of the incident.</i>
<i>3. State the number of casualties arising from the incident (if any).</i>
<i>4. Provide any intelligence regarding the incident.</i>
<i>5. Provide position and status of organizations.</i>
<i>6. Describe any immediate support required.</i>

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APPENDIX 2, ANNEX 4A - SITUATION REPORT

1. The IC will use the Situation report template in Table 4A-2-1 to report the situation at an incident site to the MNJOC every 12 hours after submission of the Operations report. The MNJOC will forward this information up the appropriate chain of command.

Table 4A-2-1 Situation Report Template

<i>Security Classification</i>
<i>Subject and Situation Report #</i>
1. Situation
2. Intelligence
3. Operations
4. Logistics
5. Communications
<i>Provide information on connectivity and POCs/LOs</i>
6. Personnel
<i>Detail service, location, mission and numbers</i>
7. Health Services
<i>List hospitalized or injured military personnel, reasons for hospitalization or injury</i>
8. Interagency Coordination
9. Domestic Support Activities
10. Commander's Comments to include as a minimum:
<i>A. Activities of last 12 hours</i>
<i>B. Activities of next 12 hours</i>

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APPENDIX 3, ANNEX 4A- - FINAL SITUATION REPORT

1. The IC will use the Situation report template in Table 4A-3-1 to report the final situation at a CBRN incident site to the MNJOC just before the force redeploys. The MNJOC will forward this information up the appropriate chain of command.

Table 4A-3-1 Final Situation Report Template

<i>Security Classification</i>	
<i>Subject and Situation Report #</i>	
1. Situation	<i>Discuss circumstances leading to redeployment, authority that deploys the force, final recapitulation of extent of incident (include casualty estimates and/or property damage)</i>
2. Intelligence	
3. Operations	<i>Provide summary of operational activity for next 24 hours to recovery</i>
4. Logistics	<i>Detail current locations and date and time of redeployment of advance party of force, main body of force and any stay behind elements</i>
5. Communications	<i>Provide information on connectivity and POCs/LOs and times for After Action Reports (AAR)</i>
6. Personnel	<i>Detail service, location, mission and numbers</i>
7. Health Services	<i>List hospitalized or injured military personnel, reasons for hospitalization or injury</i>
8. Interagency Coordination	
9. Domestic Support Activities	
10. Commander's Comments to include as a minimum:	
	<i>A. Activities of last 12 hours</i>
	<i>B. Activities of next 24 hours</i>

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APPENDIX 4, ANNEX 4A - REQUEST FOR SUPPORT

1. The IC will use the Request for support template in Table 4A-4-1 to request support from the MNJOC or the appropriate chain of command. The MNJOC will forward this information up the appropriate chain of command as required.

Table 4A-4-1 Request for Support Template

<i>Security Classification</i>
<i>Subject or Request for</i> 1. General A. Force or sub-unit to be supported B. When support is required C. Location of supported force or sub-unit when support is required D. Force or sub-unit POCs/LOs E. Number of personnel to be supported 2. Concept of Operations <i>Provide a general summary of the unit's operational activity over the past 24 hours to include response and assessment operations, interagency coordination and anticipated activities based on validated requests for assistance</i> 3. Location of MNJOC 4. Urgency of Support 5. Details of Support 6. Coordinating Instructions or Remarks <i>Indicate where to link up for receipt of supplies, services, maintenance, repairs and exchange of information to validate shipper and receiver. List primary, alternate, contingency and emergency coordinating instructions</i>

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APPENDIX 5, ANNEX 4A - REQUEST FOR INFORMATION OR INTELLIGENCE

1. The IC will use the Request for information or intelligence template in Table 4A-5-1 to request information or intelligence from the MNJOC or the appropriate chain of command. The MNJOC will forward this information up the appropriate chain of command as required.

Table 4A-5-1 Request for Information or Intelligence Template

<i>Security</i>
<i>Classification Subject or Request for Information</i>
1. Situation <i>General summary of the unit's operational activity over the past 24 hours and the next 24 hours to include response and assessment operations, interagency coordination and anticipated activities based on validated requests for assistance</i>
2. Information Required <i>List of questions that need to be addressed, with possible sources and when information is required</i>
3. POC

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CHAPTER 5**SAFETY PRINCIPLES AND CONSIDERATIONS****501. General Safety Principles and Considerations**

1. The basic principles governing EOD operations are described in ATP 72 Chapter 5. Specific considerations due to the CBRN hazards are listed hereunder.
2. The spectrum of CBRN EO, worldwide, is not covered by specific safety regulations; instead general safety regulations should always be applied. CBRN EOD tasks are hazardous, by their nature, and always involve a certain element of risk to personnel and the environment. No CBRN EOD action is absolutely safe, but CBRN EOD procedures are designed to minimize that risk.
3. Specific national safety regulations vary widely across NATO. For multinational CBRN EOD operations, the most stringent safety regulation amongst nations involved in a specific task should apply. Stricter regulations can be directed by orders for a specific task or by SOPs.
4. Relaxation of safety regulations of individual nations is prohibited.
5. Minimum Exposure Time Principle: A general principle is to avoid the exposure of personnel and environment to such hazards or, if it is unavoidable, to keep exposure As Low As Reasonable Achievable (ALARA)¹.
6. The ROE for CBRN EOD assets, describing the acceptable risk, need to be harmonized before tasking. Since each troop-contributing nation (TCN) will have set its own standards there is a need to study the impact on the combined and/or multi agency operations. For example, exposure limits to TIMs, which includes ionising radiation, could influence the time-on-target, the safety distance, etc. thus influencing the conduct of the overall operation. These issues need to be deconflicted not only looking at the different regulations between nations but also between different populations (public, military, law enforcement).
7. The statutory provisions of the country where the CBRN incident occurs, will determine the limits for public exposure.
8. Containment is key to the CBRN EOD philosophy. A successful containment will be an important contribution to minimizing loss of life and damage to property. It will allow a more rapid return of the scene to normal. Therefore the IC must consider containment as a part of his solution.

¹ As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA): A Risk Management principle that mandates the minimum exposure of personnel to NBC hazards, subject only to the overriding demands of the operational mission (AAP-21).

9. Use of High Value Assets. The potential for an IED to be combined with a CBRN agent may require the use of remote means (i.e. remote operated vehicle) to interrogate the device and to conduct the render safe procedure so that the CBRN component can be safely disposed. The likelihood that high value assets such as Remote Operated Vehicles (ROVs) will be contaminated suggests the need to carefully evaluate the impact on the future operational capability of the team or e.g. to include spare equipment (e.g. ROV).
10. The mitigation and/or elimination and removal of CBRN hazards present after the RSP, is not the responsibility of the CBRN EOD team. If appropriate an agency should be assigned to sanitize the incident site. Their mission also include the management of the waste produced during the CBRN EOD operations, e.g. disposable protective clothing.
11. A CBRN EOD team is to be self-sustaining for emergency decontamination. This is a significant task that may require the team and its equipment composition to be adjusted.
12. The task of an EOD team is finished when the explosive hazards are minimized. All elements should be ready for sealing in appropriate containers. Therefore before handover, the EOD Team Leader must brief the CBRN Team Leader on the condition of the EO.
13. Specific national safety regulations vary widely across NATO. For multinational CBRN EOD operations, the most stringent safety regulation amongst nations involved in a specific task should apply. Stricter regulations can be directed by orders for a specific task or by SOPs.
14. Worst Case Principle: Concerning risk assessment, selected procedures and techniques, suspected payload, CBRN EO condition, ignition system etc., the operators should always consider the impact of the worst case unintentional scenario by implementation of suitable countermeasures (hazard areas, level of personal protection, etc.).
15. One Team – One Nation Principle: The multinationality level of the agencies intervening during the incident must not compromise safety standards. In order to permit the different agencies to operate in their “usual” modus operandi, the multinationality of assets involved in a single incident should be kept to a minimum.
16. Unity-of-Command Principle: The chain of command for a CBRN EOD task is to be clearly defined. On site only one leader, the IC, has overall responsibility. The IC has to coordinate all safety measures and elements operating on site. The IC is not responsible for the technical action against the CBRN EO target (techniques, render safe procedures etc.). In this matter responsibility rests only with the CBRN EOD operator. In the field of CBRN

EOD, the EOD operator² decides on the actions to be performed on site. In the field of CBRN defence (reconnaissance, decontamination, etc) the CBRN defence team leader decides the actions to be performed on site.

17. The IC is the overall site coordinator. The IC is the single POC for staff level elements of the MNJOC and for all elements involved on site, concerning the coordination of on-site activities. Because of the complexity of CBRN EOD tasks it is recommended that the IC should have no additional function on site.

² Note that depending upon the scale of the task certain nations may require their EOD operator to refer up the technical chain for confirmation of proposed RSPs

502. Support Measures

1. One of the most important support measures is adequate medical support. This should be provided in accordance with national policy, regulations and SOPs and should take into account the fact that CBRN EOD tasks require specific medical capabilities (e.g. emergency decontamination of wounded personnel).
2. POC CBRN EOD should advise the IC on the necessary support assets, stressing the need for their CBRN capability.

503. Disposal

1. Disposal of CBRN EO may be a multinational issue.
2. Disposal of CBRN EO is not advised if there is no suitable Central Demolition Sites (CDS) or dismantling facility available.
3. As a general rule, CDS are established and used during operations for the disposal of conventional EO by means of high-order disposal techniques.
4. Due to specific hazards associated with the CBRN payload additional requirements and regulations (hazard area, environmental and weather conditions, host nation directives) are to be observed before using disposal areas.
5. If it is possible to establish a suitable CDS for the disposal of CBRN EO, appropriate multinational regulations and procedures must be prepared. National directives, in accordance with considerations, regulations and procedures relevant to multinational CDS, are to be observed by the executing nations and, in cases with a highly political dimension, by the United Nations.

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ANNEX A**CBRN EOD RELATED EXECUTING FUNCTIONS / ELEMENTS**

This table offers a non-exhaustive overview of executing functions / elements which are important to counter CBRN EO threats. The table does not describe which forces / units of a nation are responsible for which function. Double-head functions are to be avoided if possible. For example it is possible to be the **CBRN EOD C3 element on site** at the same time is the **CBRN EOD team leader**

EXECUTING Function Element	Tasks / Responsibilities	Military Authority	Civil Authority
Incident Commander (IC) (military or civilian, depending on the operation, ROE, specific task, etc.)	▪ C3 element on-site ▪ overall on site responsibility ▪ to assume control of the incident on site ▪ to determine his/her own ICCP (Incident Commanders Command Post) ▪ to co-ordinate all assets and activities required on site ▪ to establish the communication lines on-site ▪ to determine signals in case of emergencies ▪ to fully brief all required actors on their role (clear designation), responsibilities and what the IC expects of them ▪ to confirm and co-ordinate all required safety measures (overall hazard area, evacuation, cordoning-off) ▪ to decide the minimum dress state for all subordinate assets on site ▪ to authorize the start of the action against the CBRN EO (permission to start) after he/she requested the permission to start from the MNJOC ▪ to establish direct communications link to MNJOC ▪ to establish communications to all subordinate assets on site ▪ to oversee the collection and distribution of information and intelligence regarding ongoing CBRN EOD operations ▪ to decide on measures in light of the sequence of priorities ▪ to make arrangements about the course of action ▪ to hand over scene (in accordance with the CBRN and EOD side) to civil or military authorities (depends on the situation) ▪ to liaise with the media on site	X	(X)

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EXECUTING Function Element	Tasks / Responsibilities	Military Authority	Civil Authority
CBRN Element on site C2 (CBRN Team Leader) Coordinating Authority, CBRN	▪ responsible for the CBRN action on-site ▪ C3 CBRN assets on site ▪ to advise IC on all CBRN matters ▪ to co-ordinate CBRN action on site ▪ to liaise with POC EOD ▪ to determine CBRN Command Post (CP) ▪ to establish direct communications link to IC, POC EOD and CBRN teams ▪ to determine / predict CBRN hazard area ▪ to determine "clean-dirty line" and Contamination Control Point (CCP) ▪ to establish local weather observation ▪ to establish detection, identification and monitoring activities ▪ to determine site for hazard management activities ▪ to determine the CBRN dress state in its AOR	X	
CBRN Reconnaissance Team Part of Executing Authority CBRN	▪ to report to CBRN Team Leader all information gathered ▪ to establish CBRN detection systems in downwind direction ▪ to establish CBRN monitoring in the CCP ▪ to evaluate the extent of contamination ▪ to determine and mark the contaminated area ▪ to conduct the final check for CBRN contamination before leaving the scene	X	
CBRN Decontamination Team Part of Executing Authority CBRN	▪ to establish, control and co-ordinate both operational and thorough decontamination ▪ to mark access and exit routes ▪ to collect contaminated and decontamination waste in accordance with national and host nation regulations ▪ to report to CBRN Team Leader	X	
CBRN Sampling Team Part of Executing Authority CBRN	▪ to collect specific samples ▪ to prepare samples for analysis ▪ to collect, seal and pack forensic evidence (if necessary and possible) ▪ to seal and pack the device (if possible) ▪ to report to CBRN Team Leader	X	
EOD Element on site C2	▪ responsible for the EOD action on site ▪ POC for the IC on all EOD matters	X	

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EXECUTING Function Element	Tasks / Responsibilities	Military Authority	Civil Authority
(EOD Team Leader) Coordinating Authority EOD	▪ C2 EOD assets on site ▪ to advise IC on all EOD related matters ▪ to determine EOD CP ▪ to co-ordinate the EOD action on site with IC and CBRN Team Leader ▪ to establish communications with MNEODCC ▪ to establish direct communications link to IC, CBRN Team Leader and EOD teams ▪ to determine hazard area caused by EO ▪ to determine the level of EOD Protection in its AOR ▪ to question witnesses		
EOD Team Part of Executing Authority EOD	▪ to execute the EOD action against the CBRN EO under national responsibility (methods, Render Safe Procedures (RSPs), dress state) ▪ to provide safe access to the CBRN device/munitions ▪ to declare "area free from explosive hazards" (if possible) to POC EOD ▪ to establish transportability of CBRN EO (if possible)	X	
EOD Back-up Team³ Part of Executing Authority EOD	▪ to replace the first EOD team in action, in case of necessity	X	
Medical Team	▪ to establish mobile medical assistance on site with priority for the military teams in action	X	
Military Police	▪ to establish communication to IC ▪ to support by cordoning and evacuation measures	X	
Site Security Cordon Troops	▪ to establish communications with IC ▪ to support cordon and evacuation measures ▪ to protect the military assets in action, on site	X	
CBRN Payload Transport Team	▪ to transport the CBRN EO or the separated CBRN payload to a temporary storage facility, dismantling facility, or to the final	X	(X)

³ Back up may be required for all functional areas as part of operational sustainability, not just EOD.

EXECUTING Function Element	Tasks / Responsibilities	Military Authority	Civil Authority
	- disposal area - not responsible for establishing the transportability of the CBRN EO		
Interpreter	- to translate into the local language and back - to assist the IC and other actors (e.g. questioning of witnesses, translation of orders, etc.)	X	(X)
Civil Police (depends on the operation, ROE, the specific task)	- to establish communications with IC - to support by cordoning and evacuation measures		X
Fire Service (from military or civil side or both, depending on the operation, ROE, the specific task, availability)	- to establish communications with IC - to provide support in emergencies	X	X
Civil Medical Assistance	- to establish communications with IC - to provide support in case of emergency		X

ANNEX B**MAIN PHASES AND STEPS FOR THE CONDUCT OF CBRN EOD TASKS**

Main Phase	Allocated Steps
1 TASKING	1. Tasking by the responsible Tasking Authority 2. Briefing / transmission of information - o Incident Location - o Specific on site situation - o Cordon / evacuation situation - o Contamination situation - o Reason for particular CBRN EO suspicion - o Witnesses - o Casualties - o POC - o Further Information and specific measures
2 PRE DEPLOYMENT	1. Initiate TVRA 2. Initiate cordon measures 3. Initiate evacuation measures 4. Contact specialists and support units
3 DEPLOYMENT	1. Establish communications links 2. Detailed TVRA 3. Detailed evaluation of situation on site 4. Determination of hazard areas 5. Determination of evacuation and cordon areas 6. Determination of incident entry point, approach routes and rendezvous point 7. Obtain cordon and evacuation objectives 8. Establish CPs (IC, EOD, CBRN), "clean-dirty line" and CCP 9. Establish Personnel Decontamination Station 10. Initiate action (direct action against target) after: - o All necessary safety measures are taken - o All teams involved are fully briefed - o All teams involved are ready to act - o Permission granted by IC
4 EXECUTION	1. Reconnaissance and location of object 2. Reassessment and determination of revised decision, as necessary 3. Determination of RSP / Disposal Method 4. Action on target 5. Establishing transportability (only if possible and suitable) 6. Survey Boundaries for inhalation hazards 7. CBRN hazard detection, identification and monitoring (if possible)
5 FINAL	1. Transport CBRN EO or parts of it, CBRN payload (if possible and suitable) 2. Decontamination measures, if necessary (personnel, equipment, area) 3. Collection of contaminated and decontamination waste for initiation of waste disposal 4. Final reconnaissance measures 5. Hand-over incident location with necessary info (return scene to normal) 6. Report to Tasking Authority in accordance with SOPs 7. Collapse communication lines 8. Depart scene 9. Forensic investigation 10. Final reporting

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ANNEX C

References

AAP-6	NATO GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND DEFINITIONS
AAP-15	NATO GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS USED IN NATO DOCUMENTS AND PUBLICATIONS
AAP-21	NATO GLOSSARY OF CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL AND NUCLEAR TERMS AND DEFINITIONS ENGLISH AND FRENCH
ATP-3.8.1 Vol I	ALLIED JOINT TACTICAL DOCTRINE FOR CBRN DEFENCE
ATP-3.8.1 Vol 2	SPECIALIST NBC DEFENCE CAPABILITIES
ATP-45	REPORTING NUCLEAR DETONATIONS, BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL ATTACKS AND PREDICTING AND WARNING AND ASSOCIATED HAZARDS AND HAZARD AREAS (OPERATORS MANUAL)
STANAG 2002	WARNING SIGNS FOR THE MARKING OF NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL CONTAMINATIONS
STANAG 2112	NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL RECONNAISSANCE
STANAG 2133	VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL HAZARDS
STANAG 2143	EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE RECONNAISSANCE/EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL
STANAG 2221	EOD REPORTS AND MESSAGES – AEODP-6
STANAG 2282	INTERSERVICE EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE OPERATIONS ON MULTINATIONAL DEPLOYMENTS (ATP 72)
STANAG 2283	MILITARY SEARCH (ATP 73)
STANAG 2370	PRINCIPLES OF IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE DISPOSAL-AEODP-3(A)
STANAG 2377	EOD ROLES RESPONSIBILITIES, CAPABILITIES AND INCIDENT PROCEDURES WHEN OPERATING WITH NON EOD TRAINED AGENCIES AND PERSONNEL
STANAG 2389	MINIMUM STANDARDS OF PROFICIENCY FOR TRAINED EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL PERSONNEL

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STANAG 2391	EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL RECOVERY OPERATIONS ON FIXED INSTALLATIONS - AEODP-5
STANAG 2426	CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL AND NUCLEAR (CBRN) HAZARD MANAGEMENT DOCTRINE FOR NATO FORCES
STANAG 2473	COMMANDER'S GUIDE TO RADIATION EXPOSURES IN NON- ARTICLE 5 CRISIS RESPONSE OPERATIONS
STANAG 2485	COUNTERMINE OPERATIONS IN LAND WARFARE
STANAG 2516	GRADUATED TOXIC INDUSTRIAL MATERIALS THREAT LEVELS AND ASSOCIATED PROTECTION
STANAG 2897	EOD EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS AND EQUIPMENT
STANAG 2909	COMMANDERS' GUIDANCE ON DEFENSIVE MEASURES AGAINST TOXIC INDUSTRIAL CHEMICALS (TIC)
STANAG 2984	GRADUATED LEVELS OF CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL AND NUCLEAR THREATS AND ASSOCIATED PROTECTIVE MEASURES