



**Semi-Annual Lesson Report:**  
**Allies and Partners in**  
**Peace and Stability Efforts**

**April 2024**

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## Introduction

The US' *National Security Strategy* (NSS) of October 2022 uses the phrase *allies and partners* 47 times in its 48 pages.<sup>1</sup> The related 2022 80-page *National Defense Strategy* (NDS), which includes the *Missile Defense and Nuclear Posture Reviews*, refers to *allies and partners* 127 times and titles an entire section: *Anchoring Our Strategy in Allies and Partners and Advancing Regional Goals*.<sup>2</sup> The slimmer 8-page *National Military Strategy* (NMS) mentions *allies and partners* six times, to include in one of the four identified Joint Force Strategic Objectives: "Deter strategic attacks and other aggression against the United States, *allies, and partners*."<sup>3</sup> [Emphasis added]. It also lists *allies and partners* in the seventh of ten Joint Force Tasks, *Strengthen Relationships with Allies and Partners*, with this urging: "Seek opportunities to collaborate and improve interoperability with allies and partners to confront enduring and emerging challenges. Foster strong relationships now — because we cannot surge trust in crisis."<sup>4</sup>

The reference to and respect for the US' strategic allies and partners as articulated in these 2022 published national strategies is not new. However, Jennifer Kavanagh, a senior fellow in the American Statecraft Program at the *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, points out that the NDS, specifically, "reveals several areas where the DOD [Department of Defense] signals an explicit intention to concentrate its own investments...while delegating other responsibilities to interagency, private sector, and foreign partners—a tactic known as burden sharing."<sup>5</sup> She highlights three areas of modified focus from previous NDSs to the most recent one of 2022; two of the modified areas refer to *partners*. She notes:

...the 2022 NDS commits not just to cooperate with allies and partners, but to put them in the driver's seat on issues of self-defense and regional security, freeing up US forces for (other) security demands.... (and it) ...calls for more cooperation between the DOD and the private sector.<sup>6</sup>

So, given a new—or renewed—US strategic emphasis on *allies and partners*, who and what are they? What do those terms mean to US government officials when operationalizing national policies and programs, to include peace and stability efforts? Apparently, it depends. It depends on the term, the government agency, or the program or policy. The Joint Chiefs of Staff doctrine portal contains the most recent (accessible) *United States Government Compendium of Interagency and Associated Terms*, subtitled "a non-official guide to Department Dictionaries and other terminology sources" which shares terms of reference from various US government agencies.<sup>7</sup> In it, the term *allies* has only one entry, which references US Code<sup>8</sup> and defines *allies* as "any nation with which the United States is engaged in a common military

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<sup>1</sup> President, *National Security Strategy* (Washington, DC: White House, 2022), <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf> (accessed April 1, 2024). Interestingly, it uses the qualifier adjective of 'democratic' in conjunction with *allies and partners* (as in, *democratic allies and partners*) only twice in the document. See also: The White House, *FACT SHEET: The Biden-Harris Administration's National Security Strategy*, October 12, 2022, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/10/12/fact-sheet-the-biden-harris-administrations-national-security-strategy/> (accessed April 1, 2024).

<sup>2</sup> Department of Defense, *DOD Releases National Defense Strategy, Missile Defense, Nuclear Posture Reviews*, October 27, 2022, <https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3202438/dod-releases-national-defense-strategy-missile-defense-nuclear-posture-reviews/> (accessed April 1, 2024).

<sup>3</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, *National Military Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2022), 7, <https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/NMS%202022%20%20Signed.pdf> (accessed April 3, 2024).

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, 6.

<sup>5</sup> Jennifer Kavanagh, "The New National Defense Strategy Makes a Subtle Yet Significant Break From Its Predecessors," *Carnegie Endowment For International Peace*, November 28, 2022, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/11/28/new-national-defense-strategy-makes-subtle-yet-significant-break-from-its-predecessors-pub-88477> (accessed April 3, 2024).

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>7</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, *United States Government Compendium of Interagency and Associated Terms* (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, November 2019), [https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/dictionary/repository/usg\\_compendium.pdf?ver=2019-11-04-174229-423](https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/dictionary/repository/usg_compendium.pdf?ver=2019-11-04-174229-423) (accessed April 3, 2024).

<sup>8</sup> Interestingly, it references USC 42, which is titled *Public Health and Welfare*, and section §1651, which refers to *Compensation authorized as part of Chapter 11, "Compensation for Disability or Death to Persons Employed at Military, Air, and Naval Bases Outside United States."*

effort or with which the United States has entered into a common defensive military alliance.”<sup>9</sup> However, the *Compendium* provides many definitions for the term *partners*. The US Agency for International Development (USAID)-sourced entry is the most comprehensive of the assortment. This entry indicates a *partner* is:

An organization or individual with which/whom the Agency collaborates to achieve mutually agreed upon objectives and to secure participation of ultimate customers. Partners include host country governments, private voluntary organizations, indigenous [sic] and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs), universities, other US Government agencies, the United Nations and other multilateral organizations, professional and business associations, and private businesses and individuals.<sup>10</sup>

DHS states a *partner* is an “outside entity who participates in a project as a source of operational requirements, testing support, solution providers, co-researchers/developers, or other support functions may include End Users and the Customer.”<sup>11</sup> The Department of State (DOS) makes a distinction between *partner countries* and *partner governments*, in which both terms refer to US Code and Public Law, respectively. At the same time, both definitions also relate to explicit foreign assistance health programs to combat or address HIV (human immunodeficiency virus)/AIDS (acquired immunodeficiency syndrome).<sup>12</sup> The DOD entry refers to a *partner nation*, or PN, with two defined contexts: “1. A nation that the United States works with in a specific situation or operation; (and) 2. In security cooperation, a nation with which the Department of Defense conducts security cooperation activities.”<sup>13</sup>

The plethora of nuanced US government *partners* definitions may make it more difficult to understand the role of allies and partners in peace and stability efforts. Consequently, the [first Lesson](#) in this collation focuses on naming conventions and terms of reference, followed by a Lesson describing the [United Nations \(UN\)](#) as a partner. As seen in both [the third](#) and [fourth Lessons](#) herein, this collection uses *allies and partners* in its broadest sense akin to the USAID definition of *partner* shown above.

The remainder of the Lessons lightly follows a framework based on one topic from the US Army’s Fiscal Year (FY) 24 Lessons Learned Program—*Allies and Partners*. The *Allies and Partners* topic includes three subtopics: [Multi-National Interoperability \(MNI\)](#), [Mission Partner Environment \(MPE\)](#), and [Security Force Assistance \(SFA\) and Cooperation](#).<sup>14</sup> These subtopics address the challenges in the human, procedural, and technical interoperability domains—to include, but not limited to, information and intelligence sharing—and it seeks development of an effective SFA enterprise. Several of the Lessons in this collection nest under one of the three subtopics, albeit imperfectly.<sup>15</sup>

PKSOI’s Lessons Learned Analyst, Colonel Lorelei Coplen (US Army, Retired), authored or edited the Lessons found here between November 2023 and April 2024, unless otherwise indicated. These lessons are also found in the Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS) database, identified by the JLLIS number adjacent to each lesson title. JLLIS access is at <https://www.jllis.mil> and requires a Department of Defense Common Access Card (CAC) for registration.

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<sup>9</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, *United States Government Compendium of Interagency and Associated Terms*.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid.

<sup>14</sup> Definitions for these terms are all accessible on open sources.

<sup>15</sup> PKSOI’s December 2021 report, [Multinational Interoperability \(MNI\) Command and Control \(C2\) and Transitions](#)—which built on a 2020 PKSOI report, [Multinational Interoperability](#)—covers the interoperability discourse in more detail than included here.

## Who or What are Allies and Partners?

### What is in a Name? JLLIS#N231004-6408

**Observation.** The 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine sent many commentators to their dictionaries to ensure they accurately describe the official relationship between the US with Ukraine and Ukraine to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), among others. Sweden's and Finland's requests for full membership in NATO soon after the invasion also inspired reviews of terminology. While there are, indeed, formal US government and US military definitions to understand, it is also important to recognize the use of terms not included in formal agreements—or included but not as well understood.

**Discussion.** Writing for the website, *ExecutiveGov*, author Steffan Lyson provides a tutorial on US allies and the difference between alliances and partnerships. In the simplest terms, *allies* refer to the other nation-states in which the US has a formal (usually, signed) treaty or agreement that describes “the commitment of the US to supporting the nations and vice versa for interests related to defense, peace, security, trade, and more.”<sup>1</sup> In contrast, *partners* or *partnerships* are less defined, often short-term, for specific purposes. Allies can be partners, and partners can also be allies.

Lyson indicates the US has only five formal alliances: NATO, the Organization of American States (OAS), the Australia, New Zealand, and United States Security Treaty (ANZUS), the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), and the Moroccan-American Treaty of Peace and Friendship. Of these five, the Moroccan-American Treaty (also known as the Treaty of Marrakesh) is the oldest, dating to 1786 but with origins from 1777. More recently, the US designated Morocco as a major non-NATO US ally in 2004. The OAS is the oldest regional alliance in the world. While it was chartered in 1948, the First International Conference of American States in 1889 was its predecessor.

Lyson introduces the term, *Quas-Allies*, to explain the US relationship “with non-sovereign nations and unrecognized states” that may not include an official agreement, but still have “a tacit mutual understanding between two or more nations to provide some level of military or political support.”<sup>2</sup> *Bilateral relations* are yet another agreement option to the US and other nations, usually focused on limited items or actions of common interest not including defense and security—except, at times, international trafficking and/or terrorism.<sup>3</sup>

*Bilateralism* as a foreign relations tool is resurging currently, and not just in the US. A 2023 study of British international agreements post-*Brexit* suggests an ongoing transition from *multilateralism* to *bilateralism*. It may be obvious to recognize that the United Kingdom's 2016 departure from the European Union (EU) required the rework of decades of pre-existing formal agreements. The researchers posited that Britain would re-sign with the EU in a multilateral agreement. Instead, the UK initiated several tens of bilateral agreements with individual European nations, due to the format's “high degree of customisation [sic] and intrinsic reliance on specific reciprocity.”<sup>4</sup> In other words, it allows for maximum flexibility for both parties. Yet, ironically, its advantages may also be its disadvantages. Flexibility may also allow for any one party to seek adjustments which may create uncertainty. In contrast, multilateral agreements by definition require multiple parties to agree to change which enhances the agreements' sustainability in the long term.

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<sup>1</sup> Steffan Lyson, “Who Are The US Allies: Understanding The Foreign Relations of the United States,” *ExecutiveGov*, October 12, 2023, <https://executivegov.com/articles/who-are-the-us-allies-understanding-the-foreign-relations-of-the-united-states/> (accessed November 3, 2023).

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.* Lyson concludes with a description of “independent nations and territories... ‘friendly’ with the United States...to leverage the nation's massive resources, military power, trade partners, and economic capital.”

<sup>4</sup> M. B. Meislová and A. Glencross, “From multilateralism to bilateralism: Making sense of the UK's security cooperation with EU member states after 2016,” *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations* (2023), 0(0). <https://doi.org/10.1177/13691481231208146> (accessed November 29, 2023).

Stewart Patrick of *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace* argues that *multilateralism* best serves the US' foreign policy goals because of "a profusion of transnational challenges that can only be addressed, mitigated, or resolved through collective action," but also notes "a resurgence of geopolitical competition that hinders that very cooperation."<sup>5</sup> He offers four multilateralism models, summarized here:

*Charter*, as seen in the United Nations (UN) model with its universal membership.

*Club*, "which seeks to rally established democracies as the foundation for world order."

*Concert*, which encourages common action in limited areas and topics "among the world's major powers" such as seen with the *Concert of Europe* from the late 18<sup>th</sup> century to the early 19<sup>th</sup> century.

*Coalition*, essentially *ad hoc* frameworks to address a global contingency, such as seen in the Gulf War of the early 1990s.<sup>6</sup>

Patrick notes that each of the models have distinct differences across four criteria (legitimacy, solidarity, capability, and flexibility) and each has "specific assumptions, makes distinct causal and normative claims, and poses real-world trade-offs for the pursuit of US preferences and prospects for effective collective action."<sup>7</sup> Additionally, the four models "represent ideal types and can blur in practice" as well as have distinct advantages and disadvantages in their implementation.<sup>8</sup>

He expresses particular concern for the *coalition*, or *ad hoc*, multilateralism model, suggesting such *mini-lateralism*, may "come at the expense of existing bodies, diluting the coherence of the multilateral system" and "contribute to rampant forum shopping—and not just by the United States—as governments flit among alternative institutional frameworks based on situational circumstances and exigencies."<sup>9</sup> Lastly, "ad hoc groupings, with their attendant summits, work streams, and reporting requirements, tests the bandwidth of all national governments with demands on scarce personnel, resources, and time" which is true even in major nations.<sup>10</sup>

The last type of foreign policy agreement discussed here is the *entente*. Akin to other informal partnerships, the entente "make no formal pledges of armed support in the event of hostilities," yet "they do not entirely rule out military support either."<sup>11</sup> Recent authors asked: "Why might states embrace this form of strategic ambiguity over firm alliance commitments?"<sup>12</sup> In their research, they determined:

an entente might be a more effective alignment choice than a formal alliance for states to balance against powerful threats.... entente permits states to strike the middle ground between entrapment and deterrence. The strategic ambiguity inherent in these two seemingly self-contradictory goals of an entente is a key component of its success as an alignment strategy, especially when external threats are large. However, asymmetry in strength between two states can result in divergent preferences between alliance and entente.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> Stewart Patrick, "Four Contending U.S. Approaches to Multilateralism," *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, January 23, 2023, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/01/23/four-contending-u.s.-approaches-to-multilateralism-pub-88852> (accessed November 15, 2023).

<sup>6</sup> Ibid.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid. Another viewpoint argues that minilateralisms combines the best of bilateral and multilateral agreements. See: Jada Fraser and Mohammed Soliman, "The Quad, AUKUS, and I2U2 formats: Major lessons from minilaterals," *Foreign Policy Research Institute*, July 2023, <https://www.fpri.org/article/2023/07/the-quad-aukus-and-i2u2-formats-major-lessons-from-minilaterals/> (accessed November 3, 2023).

<sup>11</sup> Emerson M. Niou and Sean M. Zeigler, "Entente Versus Alliance, When Should States Be Friends but Not Allies?" *RAND*, June 8, 2023, [https://www.rand.org/pubs/external\\_publications/EP70098.html](https://www.rand.org/pubs/external_publications/EP70098.html) (accessed November 3, 2023).

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

<sup>13</sup> Niou and Zeigler, "Entente Versus Alliance, When Should States Be Friends but Not Allies?"

**Recommendation(s).** Anna Wieslander, writing in 2019 about the relationship of both Sweden and Finland with NATO, asks: “What makes an ally?”<sup>14</sup> She determines four core elements necessary for a *partner nation* to transition to an *informal ally*, summarized here:

- “a common threat to national sovereignty, and a realization that defense against that threat is needed in concert, regardless of the formal status of all nations involved.”
- “a certain degree of institutionalization, despite lack of formal membership.”
- “a high degree of political will and energy to pursue a closer relationship.”
- “identification with the community which constitutes the institution: a sense of trust and belonging.”<sup>15</sup>

In retrospect, all four of those elements exist within Sweden and Finland, which explains their interest in full NATO membership after the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. Other authors more recently suggest another element to formal alliance formation, particularly for Sweden and Finland with NATO—the symbolic value of the relationship:

the alliance, is not necessarily just functional but also ontological and political. The treaty itself has a symbolic aura that affects national identity and sends a *political* message about the alignment and identity of a country...it is this political and identity shift that provides much of the thrust of why Swedish and Finnish membership of NATO is a significant development in European security..<sup>16</sup> [Original emphasis]

### **The United Nations (UN) as an Enduring and Relevant Partner, JLLIS#N231004-6407**

**Observation.** Acting Haitian Prime Minister Ariel Henry asked for an international security force to restore law and order in his country, but specifically in the capital, Port-au-Prince, for over two years. On October 2, 2023, the United Nation’s Security Council (UNSC, often referred to as P5) finally authorized the Multinational Security Support (MSS) Mission for Haiti, “for an initial period of 12 months, with a review after nine.”<sup>1</sup> Since that authorization, the Port-au-Prince violence has spread throughout the country, indicating the criminal perpetrators’ unconcern for the pending UN deployment.<sup>2</sup>

In the meantime, other UN missions of various types closed with inconsistent reputation and results (or the missions are transitioning to other entities). As one author points out, “these transitions (are) amidst declining international attention to UN peace operations and rising fiscal constraints.”<sup>3</sup> Further, the UNSC itself—and, therefore, its decisions—suffers from international reputational decline in recent decades as well as in more recent months and years. As another author posits:

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<sup>14</sup> Anna Wieslander, “What makes an ally? Sweden and Finland as NATO’s closest partners,” *Journal of Transatlantic Studies* (March 2019) 17. 1-29. DOI:[10.1057/s42738-019-00019-9](https://doi.org/10.1057/s42738-019-00019-9) (accessed November 15, 2023).

<sup>15</sup> Ibid.

<sup>16</sup> Katherine Kjellström Elgin and Alexander Lanoszka, “Sweden, Finland, and the Meaning of Alliance Membership,” *Texas National Security Review*, Vol 6, Iss 2, Spring 2023, <https://tnsr.org/2023/05/sweden-finland-and-the-meaning-of-alliance-membership/> (accessed November 23, 2023).

<sup>1</sup> UN News, “Security Council Authorizes Multinational Security Support Mission for Haiti for Initial Period of One Year, by Vote of 13 in Favour with 2 Abstentions,” *United Nations*, October 2, 2023, <https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15432.doc.htm> (accessed November 2, 2023).

<sup>2</sup> UN News, “Haiti: Gangs move into rural areas as Türk says new force ‘must be deployed’,” *United Nations*, November 28, 2023, <https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/11/1144067> (accessed November 28, 2023).

<sup>3</sup> Security Council Report, “In Hindsight: UN Transitions in a Fractured Multilateral Environment,” October 31, 2023, <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2023-11/in-hindsight-un-transitions-in-a-fractured-multilateral-environment.php> (accessed November 3, 2023).

the council has suffered previous blows—among them the ill-fated U.S. decision to invade Iraq in 2003 without its authorization—[but] Russia’s brazen aggression against Ukraine in February 2022 and ability to veto any council response have radicalized reform demands. “Where is this security that the Security Council needs to guarantee?” Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy thundered in April 2022. With collective security paralyzed, another question hung in the air: is the UN destined, like the League of Nations, for the ash heap of history?<sup>4</sup>

In addition to the UN’s reputational decline (and related concerns about the effectiveness of its peace or multidimensional missions) is the apparent intensification of global *Great Power Competition*. As authors writing for *Foreign Affairs* highlight:

Many analysts perceive a new cold war brewing between the United States and China. Observers of the UN fear that its past will be prologue. Superpower competition could once again paralyze the organization. The UN’s inability, after all, to end the war raging in Ukraine makes it easy to jump to the conclusion that it is incapable of managing the defining events of the age.<sup>5</sup>

Yet, the same authors argue that Great Power Competition is more likely to “result in more cooperation at the UN, not less,” because “as long as the UN remains the primary institution of global governance, those who dominate the organization will find compelling reasons to preserve it.”<sup>6</sup> Consequently, “serving as a venue for great-power cooperation remains the chief way the UN maintains its relevance” globally, and, as a US partner, the UN remains “the best tool for achieving a rules-based international order—at least one in which the leading powers set the rules.”<sup>7</sup>

**Discussion.** UN-led interventions of any type, but especially peacekeeping and/or multidimensional missions, have waned in recent years. Prior to the October 2023 authorization for Haiti, the Security Council Report summarized:

It has been nearly a decade since the Security Council authorised [sic] its most recent UN peacekeeping mission, the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), in 2014. During this time, four UN peacekeeping missions—in Côte d’Ivoire (2017), Haiti (2017), Liberia (2018), and Sudan/Darfur (2020)—wound down their operations and saw their responsibilities transferred to the host government, UN Special Political Missions (SPMs) and/or UN Country Teams (UNCTs). New SPMs were deployed in Colombia (2016) and Yemen (2019), and peacekeeping missions were replaced by SPMs in Haiti in 2019 and Sudan in 2020.<sup>8</sup>

The “declining international attention to UN peace operations and rising fiscal constraints” of the donors or the force providing countries may explain the decline of peace-focused operational interventions.<sup>9</sup> Yet it does not explain it fully. A simple but significant reason may be that the UN members may have vastly different focus or purposes for a military/security intervention. Long-term or short-term, allies and security partners often have both aspirational and practical reasons to intervene within another nation’s boundaries. As one example, a 2018 study reviewed the impact of a military intervention among the interveners’

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<sup>4</sup> Stewart Patrick, et al, “Cutting the Gordian Knot: Global Perspectives on UN Security Council Reform,” *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, June 28, 2023, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/06/28/un-security-council-reform-what-world-thinks-pub-90032> (accessed November 1, 2023).

<sup>5</sup> Kal Raustiala and Viva Iemanjá Jerónimo, “Why the UN Still Matters: Great-Power Competition Makes It More Relevant—Not Less,” *Foreign Affairs*, June 7, 2023, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/why-united-nations-still-matters> (accessed August 30, 2023). A reader could extrapolate this phrase to include recent events in Gaza, among others.

<sup>6</sup> Raustiala and Jerónimo, “Why the UN Still Matters: Great-Power Competition Makes It More Relevant—Not Less.”

<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

<sup>8</sup> Security Council Report, “In Hindsight: UN Transitions in a Fractured Multilateral Environment.”

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

allies. The authors note “A common view... suggests that states should support and find reassuring their allies’ faraway military interventions.”<sup>10</sup> However, they declare instead:

that such interventions call into doubt the intervener’s will and capacity to fulfill its core alliance commitments, undermine the credibility of the alliance, and threaten allies’ security in both the short and long run. Allies thus ultimately oppose powerful partners’ hawkish postures in distant conflicts, and they may even consequently explore routes to security beyond the alliance.... We conclude that, *if one reason to deploy force is to signal to allies that you will come to their aid when they call, states should not bother.*<sup>11</sup> [Emphasis added.]

Specific to UN deployments, a more recent study posits “that PKOs [peacekeeping operations] should be less likely in countries with such [a P5, or permanent Security Council member] alliance, given that the major powers can block peacekeeping in states with whom they have a strategic relationship.”<sup>12</sup> Instead, they found “that it is *P5 apathy* towards a conflict country, rather than *P5 interest*, that restricts UN peacekeeping in these conflicts.”<sup>13</sup> [Emphasis added.] They argue:

an alliance with a P5 does not make PKOs per se less likely, but rather missions of certain types. Specifically...missions that have a mandate to meddle in what the alliance partner considers their internal affairs. (i.e., civil society capacity building, ensuring good governance, or promoting free media).<sup>14</sup>

Other observers suggest the *Great Power Competition* between China and the US is another reason for the UN’s reluctance and/or inability to approve an intervention in the past decade (excepting the recent decision for Haiti). China has, in many ways, matched or exceeded US contributions to the UN—and therefore is in a better position to disregard traditional and historical US influence in the UN. As one source describes:

In 2021, China paid 15 percent of the peacekeeping budget, making it the second-largest contributor behind the United States. Since 2013, Beijing’s contributions to peacekeeping operations have increased almost threefold, and the country provides more personnel than any other UN Security Council permanent member...Beyond peacekeeping, China’s contributions to the United Nations have been largely concentrated in development agencies, specifically WFP, the UN Development Program, and the UN Peace and Development Trust Fund...In addition, Chinese nationals have assumed leadership positions in UN agencies. As of December 2022, four of the United Nations’ senior leaders were Chinese nationals, compared to twenty-one U.S. nationals.<sup>15</sup>

In addition, many of the UN member states seek reform of its processes, charging the UN’s organizational infrastructure does not work in a contemporary global context. As one author describes:

The impulse for reform is understandable. Nearly eight decades after its creation, the Security Council retains the same five permanent members (P5)—China, France, Russia (following the dissolution of the Soviet Union), the United Kingdom, and the United States. Since 1945, however,

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<sup>10</sup> Ronald Krebs and Jennifer Spindel, “Divided Priorities: Why and When Allies Differ Over Military Intervention,” *Security Studies* (2018). 27. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2018.1483609> (accessed November 30, 2023).

<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

<sup>12</sup> S. Hellmüller, X.-Y. R. Tan, and C. Bara, “What is in a Mandate? Introducing the UN Peace Mission Mandates Dataset,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, (2024) 68(1), 166-192, <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/00220027231159830> (accessed November 30, 2023).

<sup>13</sup> Hellmüller, et al, “What is in a Mandate? Introducing the UN Peace Mission Mandates Dataset.”

<sup>14</sup> Ibid.

<sup>15</sup> Editors, “Backgrounder, Funding the United Nations: How Much Does the U.S. Pay?” *Council for Foreign Relations*, August 22, 2023, <https://www.cfr.org/article/funding-united-nations-what-impact-do-us-contributions-have-un-agencies-and-programs#chapter-title-0-8> (accessed November 1, 2023).

major players like India and Brazil have emerged, to say nothing of Japan and Germany, the long-rehabilitated aggressors of World War II. Even as the UN's overall membership has nearly quadrupled (from fifty-one to 193 member states) thanks to decolonization and the dissolution of multi-ethnic states, the council's composition has expanded only once, in 1965, when the addition of four elected seats grew the council from eleven to fifteen members.<sup>16</sup>

Yet, despite these concerns, the P5 and the UN members still agreed to the upcoming Haiti mission. As one author acknowledges, "Many are bound to criticize another intervention in Haiti, but this is the only feasible way forward in a very difficult situation."<sup>17</sup>

**Recommendation(s).** UN peace missions have evolved and continue to do so. However, there is little data to define the success—or failure—of missions other than the literal measurements of costs and benefits. Even those metrics depend on the discussion of cost/benefit to Who? What? Why?

Recent research, however, yields the UN Peace Mission Mandates (UNPMM). It is a dataset designed "to study the evolving nature of UN peace missions."<sup>18</sup> The researchers project several potential uses for the UNPMM:

1. Scholars can...use the UNPMM data as... an outcome to be explained.
2. The data can be used to add nuance to studies of peace mission effectiveness.
3. The UNPMM contributes to research on local-global interactions in two ways:
  - To address the "strong critique of liberal peacebuilding," and
  - To allow "for an analysis of how UN peace missions are adapted to local priorities."<sup>19</sup>

The researchers conclude, "This [ability to review mission details] has become especially important in current times as we bear witness to tectonic shifts in world politics and, as a result, in the role of the UN in maintaining international peace and security."<sup>20</sup> As another author summarizes, "In the benign post-Cold War context of the 1990s, optimism ran high that the council might finally fulfill the aims of the UN Charter. Such optimism gradually faded."<sup>21</sup> In more recent years, "Tensions between the P5's democratic and authoritarian members reasserted themselves," especially after the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.<sup>22</sup> These tensions have predictably slowed, if not stopped, even some routine business in the UN. However, at the same time, the "gridlock" of the UNSC "*has reinvigorated the UN General Assembly.*" As example is

the General Assembly's resurgent determination to hold P5 nations accountable and expand its own role in international security. Frustrated by Russia's ability to block Security Council action, other council members resurrected the so-called Uniting for Peace resolution, first employed during the Korean War, to request an emergency assembly session. On March 2, 2022, the assembly overwhelmingly approved its own resolution deploring the Russian invasion, demanding

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<sup>16</sup> Stewart Patrick, et al, "Cutting the Gordian Knot."

<sup>17</sup> Christopher Shell, "Haiti Only Has One Feasible Way Forward," *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, October 5, 2023, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/10/05/haiti-only-has-one-feasible-way-forward-pub-90727> (accessed November 5, 2023).

<sup>18</sup> Hellmüller, et al, "What is in a Mandate? Introducing the UN Peace Mission Mandates Dataset." According to the researchers, the UNPMM dataset includes: "30 years of data between 1991 and 2020, a broad scope that includes peacekeeping and political missions, and information on 41 mandate tasks, the UNPMM represents one of the most detailed and up-to-date datasets on UN peace mission mandates...to highlight how mission types, objectives, and specific tasks have changed since the end of the Cold War, and to analyze what factors influence the kind of missions the UN is willing to authorize."

<sup>19</sup> Ibid.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid.

<sup>21</sup> Stewart Patrick, et al, "Cutting the Gordian Knot."

<sup>22</sup> Ibid.

Russia's immediate withdrawal, and reaffirming Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity. More pointedly, on April 26, 2022, the body passed another resolution requiring a special assembly debate within ten days of any use of the veto, including justification from the permanent member that wielded it.<sup>23</sup>

While Security Council reform may be necessary, the UN remains relevant, despite the individual costs to nations and the increasing *Great Power Competition*. As the Foreign Affairs authors highlight:

Both China and the United States share an interest in preserving...the powers of the Security Council, the UN's core body, and one they dominate. To do so, however, they must rein in zero-sum thinking and find areas of common ground that serve their shared interest: retaining power over others.<sup>24</sup>

Specific to Haiti, an international military or military-like intervention will not be a full solution to Haiti's woes. As one author notes:

Alternative solutions to international intervention such as canceling the nation's debt, installing a transitional government approved by Haitian civil society, or moving the capital to the northern port city of Cap-Haïtien are all excellent ideas that can offer a democratic reset and place Haiti on the path to stability." *But they cannot work unless security is reestablished.*<sup>25</sup> [Emphasis added]

It is that military intervention—even as a police force—that provides the security to give Haiti the space, both physical and abstract, to address its greater issues of democratic governance. The UN remains the only entity that can provide that for them:

For all its shortcomings...There is simply nothing on the horizon to replace it. Failure to update its composition and rules, however, could imperil these enduring strengths....The world of the twenty-first century desperately needs a healthy multilateral body that is grounded in international law and capable of advancing global peace.<sup>26</sup>

### ***Minilateral Economic Partnerships Provide Stability Opportunities, JLLIS#N240003-7054***

**Observation.** The increasing number of the United States' economic frameworks and partnerships in the past couple of years "are not mere economic initiatives; they represent a calculated recalibration of American statecraft" towards *minilateral* engagement and agreements that "ensures America's favorable position in an emerging multipolar world order."<sup>1</sup> The most recent of these is the *Partnership for Atlantic Cooperation*, announced in September 2023. At the same time, these partnerships address ubiquitous cross-border—or cross-ocean—economic challenges that threaten security, peace, and stability. As stated in the November 2023's leaders' remarks of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF):<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>23</sup> Stewart Patrick, et al, "Cutting the Gordian Knot."

<sup>24</sup> Raustiala and Jerónimo, "Why the UN Still Matters: Great-Power Competition Makes It More Relevant—Not Less."

<sup>25</sup> Christopher Shell, "Haiti Only Has One Feasible Way Forward."

<sup>26</sup> Stewart Patrick, et al, "Cutting the Gordian Knot."

<sup>1</sup> Mohammed Soliman, "America Re-engages Africa and Latin America in a Reimagined Atlantic," *Foreign Policy Research Institute*, January 10, 2024, <https://www.fpri.org/article/2024/01/america-re-engages-africa-and-latin-america-in-a-reimagined-atlantic/> (accessed January 12, 2023).

<sup>2</sup> The White House, "FACT SHEET: In Asia, President Biden and a Dozen Indo-Pacific Partners Launch the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity," May 23, 2022, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/05/23/fact-sheet-in-asia-president-biden-and-a-dozen-indo-pacific-partners-launch-the-indo-pacific-economic-framework-for-prosperity/> (accessed January 15, 2024). The IPEF is articulated in four pillars describing *Connected*, *Resilient*, *Clean*, and *Fair* Economies.

Through our ongoing engagement and cooperation, IPEF will enhance our ability to promote workers' rights, protect the environment, and create decent work and inclusive, sustainable economic opportunities in a future of peace, stability, development, and prosperity for all our people.<sup>3</sup>

**Discussion.** The September 2023 United Nations (UN) General Assembly was where the newest of the US' minilaterals was promoted, the Partnership for Atlantic Cooperation. Thirty-one nations are included, from "economic powerhouses" (Brazil, the United Kingdom, and the US) through regional leaders (Ghana, Nigeria, and Argentina) to "strategic gateway countries" (Morocco and the Netherlands). As the White House announced, "We recognize that no country alone can solve the cross-boundary challenges in the Atlantic region or fully address the opportunities before us."<sup>4</sup> As one author asserts:

This partnership ushers in a new era of transatlantic cooperation, venturing beyond the traditional US-Europe axis. It tackles broader economic—and, by extension, geopolitical—challenges facing the Atlantic basin, demanding a more integrated North-South approach.<sup>5</sup>

The same observer suggests "The emphasis on the Atlantic's benefits for Africa and Latin America anchors a humbled US engagement strategy with these continents, previously neglected in favor of a dominant American focus on the Indo-Pacific, Europe, and the Middle East"<sup>6</sup> but also notes a changed perspective of globalization may be in effect as well:

Globalization's cracks become visible in the shaky grounds of the Washington Consensus, which was once seen as a blueprint for prosperity in a post-World War economic order...Market access loses its shine in a world of rising nationalism and broken supply chains.<sup>7</sup>

This author echoes National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan in a speech at the Brookings Institution in May 2023. As reported in *The Atlantic*:

*The Washington Consensus* was a phrase that entered circulation at the very end of the 1980s, describing the emerging bipartisan faith in globalization, deregulation, and the wisdom of markets, suited to an era of optimistic triumphalism. But that era is ending. Or, as Sullivan put it, "The last few decades revealed cracks in those foundations." What Sullivan championed in the speech was something like the antithesis of that old paradigm. He said that ever-greater global interdependence is no longer desirable. One reason is China, which participates in global capitalism without fairly playing by its rules. Another is the realization, exposed by the pandemic-induced crisis in the intricate global supply chain, that the American economy is vulnerable to even small disruptions on the other side of the planet.<sup>8</sup>

**Recommendations.** As no nation or region can remain completely isolated—despite the waning influence of globalization—no minilateral agreement or framework can serve as a "standalone strategy" for regional,

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<sup>3</sup> The White House, "Leaders' Statement on Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity," November 16, 2023, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/11/16/leaders-statement-on-indo-pacific-economic-framework-for-prosperity/> (accessed December 15, 2023).

<sup>4</sup> The White House, "FACT SHEET: 32 Countries Launch the Partnership for Atlantic Cooperation," September 18, 2023, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/09/18/fact-sheet-32-countries-launch-the-partnership-for-atlantic-cooperation/> (accessed January 16, 2023).

<sup>5</sup> Soliman, "America Re-engages Africa and Latin America in a Reimagined Atlantic."

<sup>6</sup> Ibid.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

<sup>8</sup> Franklin Foer, "The New Washington Consensus," *The Atlantic*, May 9, 2023, <https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2023/05/biden-economics-industrial-policy-trump-nationalism/673988/> (accessed January 16, 2023).

oceanic, or hemispheric peace and stability.<sup>9</sup> However, they do provide opportunity to share the challenges and leverage economic benefits.

### **Whole of Government Collaboration Between Civil and National Security Actors, JLLIS#N240414-8998**

**Observation:** In national security, wicked challenges are solvable with teamwork.<sup>1</sup> When making decisions about climate change, the switch to renewable energy, water supplies, and other complicated challenges, the US national security community—which is made up of the agencies in charge of the nation's defense and intelligence gathering—need access to current, credible science.

There are several examples to consider. For instance, climate change impacts the stability of several nation-states. The diminishing volume and extent of Arctic Sea ice is changing global navigation patterns. Discovery of new sources of rare earth minerals is essential to supplying the next wave of electric cars and planes, both military and commercial. Additionally, access to drinkable water is necessary for military operations, which calls for knowledge of how freshwater resources change.

While the US defense and intelligence entities do have scientists, their knowledge and expertise are not prioritized, perhaps due to bias and institutional inertia. There is simply not enough regular, fulsome communication between the national security and the “whole of government” geoscience communities studying wicked topics. Therefore, there is power in creating a regular pattern of communication outside of the greater national security agencies. One model may be a *Triple Junction* framework to work through these challenges and create a *National Center for Human and Environmental Security* (NESC).

#### **Discussion.**

*Leveraging the Triple Junction in Human, Climate and Environmental Security.* A recent Joint Staff exercise titled *Elliptic Thunder* taught an interagency group of Defense (DOD), Intelligence Community (IC) and Federal Civil Agency Community participants about the immense importance of the triple junction – the intersection of three government partner groups crucial to solving human and environmental security issues. The exercise focused on climate security issues, but those issues are inevitably linked to broader elements of human and environmental security. Yet, the relationship between “global environmental change and human security” is “often overlooked” by key global power brokers.<sup>2</sup> This is not surprising. Despite the obvious need for a “whole of government” response to these issues, the security-focused elements of many governments including the US are not aligned with those elements focused on research and science in this arena. The two aspects of government are culturally divided, funded in a disparate manner, and use their own lexicon.

Part of the solution for better collaboration and integration between the government’s security and the science professionals could be the *triple junction* – a partnership framework championed by the Civil Applications Committee that leverages the federal civil, defense and intelligence engagement. It is also a reference to the scientific concept of three lithospheric plates meeting, as an homage to all those who work in the geosciences.

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<sup>9</sup> Soliman, “America Re-engages Africa and Latin America in a Reimagined Atlantic.”

<sup>1</sup> Churchman, C. West (December 1967). “Wicked Problems”. *Management Science*. 14 (4): B-141–B-146. <https://pubsonline.informs.org/doi/abs/10.1287/mnsc.14.4.B141> (accessed February 20, 2022).

<sup>2</sup> “Linking Environmental Change and Security,” International Center for the Study of Terrorism. <http://sites.psu.edu/icst/2013/04/21/linking-environmental-change-and-security/> (accessed February 19, 2022).

Initiatives to study issues that fall within the triple junction, such as stratospheric atmospheric injection, are extremely challenging. Yet there are ways in which triple junction techniques can effectively merge and deal with these wicked problems. These include effectively developing definitions, redefining dual or triple-use, interagency expertise management and compelling visualizations.

*Strategic Definition.* One of the first aspects of working across the triple junction is the crucial importance of a common lexicon. Taking the time to build common definitions when initiating interagency working groups is part of operating effectively in the Triple Junction. There are several existing examples. For instance, the US Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality uses “common formats” to enable communication across disparate communities of healthcare providers in relaying information about patient safety in a standardized manner.<sup>3</sup> In another example, the Open Geospatial Consortium produces standards in spatial processing.<sup>4</sup> The Partnership for Public Service and the General Accountability Office (GAO) both have highly effective programs focused on the effective development of effective interagency groups.<sup>5</sup>

*Redefining Dual or Triple Use.* Organizations that effectively live in the triple junction appreciate the power of dual or triple-use of capabilities. For example, geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) collection managers routinely “bonus” requirements to satisfy a diverse set of constituents as when the same compound targeted for a counter-terror raid may be near a repository of critical minerals. The counter-terror raid has its operational—perhaps even strategic—importance, but the critical minerals fit into a more long-term strategic requirement. Those minerals may be needed for crucial radar development components and specific wing struts on a fighter like the F-35. A geologist, when asked, may answer both types of questions in a dual-use scenario and answer an unrelated question (i.e., geology formations near a US Air Force base that may impact runway improvements) in a triple use scenario. Normally, the term dual or triple-use has a more negative definition, such as the use of nuclear power facilities to also produce weaponry. This flips the paradigm on its head to focus on a positive use case.

*Interagency Expertise Management.* The challenge is true interagency expertise management. A geologist that has the expertise to address both short- and long-term concerns may not be aware of the counter-terror raid, or even the significance of the critical minerals nearby. The geologist may not have a security clearance or the ‘need to know’ necessary to provide a comprehensive answer to the questions at hand. Even with appropriate clearances, the geologist may not have access to information technology to provide useful information. Empowering interagency expertise requires effective partnership development and facilitation, such as ‘clearing’ climate scientists with relevant expertise to join an important conversation in a nearby Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF) to develop an intelligence product. The Civil Applications Committee and its working groups, which includes the IC Environmental Security Working Group, often facilitates this type of access for cleared personnel without necessary IT on a regular basis. This fits with the organization’s focus on the Triple Junction to coordinate and oversee the use of IC/DoD remote sensing data, tools, and technologies to support Federal Civil Community missions.<sup>6</sup>

*Compelling Visualization Tools.* The triple junction requires the effective use of visualized data to enable the interagency to connect with the data effectively. The adage “a picture says a thousand words” applies broadly. Using a previous example, stratospheric atmospheric injection may not mean much to a policy-maker or commander. However, in context using triple junction techniques, we can connote its relationship to weather modification and causing specific types of effects, such as rain, which will impede force movement and logistics. Broader, more strategic contexts can also be developed in documents visualizing

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<sup>3</sup> “Common Formats,” Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, <https://psa.ahrq.gov/common-formats> (accessed February 20, 2022).

<sup>4</sup> Open Geospatial Consortium, <http://www.ogc.org.tw/en-US/Standards> (accessed February 20, 2022).

<sup>5</sup> Managing for Results, General Accountability Office, <https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-14-220.pdf> (accessed February 20, 2022).

<sup>6</sup> Opstal, D.W., and Rogers, R.T., 2022, Civil Applications Committee (ver. 1.1, February 2022): U.S. Geological Survey Fact Sheet 2022–3002, 2 p., <https://doi.org/10.3133/fs20223002> (accessed February 20, 2022).

geoscience data, for example. The National Intelligence Estimate on Climate Change is one such compelling example.<sup>7</sup>

**Recommendation(s).** Triple junction techniques are not a panacea, yet they start the conversation across an interagency audience working wicked problems in geoscience and related arenas. Common definitions and engagement lead to effective communication and problem solving. This is crucial if the next evolution is to be achieved through the development of a full interagency National Center for Human and Environmental Security (NESC) on par with the current Director of National Intelligence (DNI)-led centers for counterterrorism (NCTC) and counter-proliferation (NCPC). This effort should build on the work and character of the Civil Applications Committee.

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### **Multi-National Interoperability (MNI) or Working with Allies and Partners**

#### **The Way Forward for Gaza is a Multinational Approach, JLLIS#N231105-6765**

**Observation.** Daniel Kurtzer, a former US ambassador to Egypt and Israel, reflects on Yitzhak Rabin's alleged quote following the 1967 war: "turn the fruits of this war into peace."<sup>1</sup> He suggests that Rabin "understood that a conflict that ends without peace is merely an interregnum until the next war breaks out."<sup>2</sup> Therefore, he argues:

The only approach to "the day after" [for Gaza] that could prove enduring is to turn the postwar situation into an opportunity for a political settlement that would end the occupation and give Palestinians an opportunity to achieve self-determination. In parallel to the stabilization and reconstruction efforts in Gaza, *a peacemaking process must get under way.*<sup>3</sup> [Emphasis added.]

Writing for the *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, authors Nathan Brown and Amr Hamzawy acknowledge that the Israeli-Palestinian coexistence conundrum has eluded peace negotiations for decades. The current conflict illustrates the failures, but the authors suggest those past processes also "showed what makes negotiations work."<sup>4</sup> Further, "recent history has shown that heightened attention to Israel and Palestine during phases of intense violence and human suffering could produce unexpected multilateral efforts to push forward conflict resolution measures and peaceful settlements."<sup>5</sup> They ask:

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<sup>7</sup> "National Intelligence Estimate on Climate Change," Director of National Intelligence, <https://www.dni.gov/index.php/news-room/reports-publications/reports-publications-2021/item/2253-national-intelligence-estimate-on-climate-change> (accessed February 20, 2022).

<sup>1</sup> Daniel Kurtzer, "What Needs to Happen When the Fighting Stops in Gaza," *The Atlantic*, December 14, 2023, <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2023/12/plan-day-after-gaza-israel-palestinian-peace/676326/> (accessed December 20, 2023).

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

<sup>4</sup> Nathan J. Brown and Amr Hamzawy, "Arab Peace Initiative II: How Arab Leadership Could Design a Peace Plan in Israel and Palestine," *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, November 17, 2023, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/11/17/arab-peace-initiative-ii-how-arab-leadership-could-design-peace-plan-in-israel-and-palestine-pub-91047> (accessed December 3, 2023).

<sup>5</sup> Brown and Hamzawy, "Arab Peace Initiative II."

Can the current high-level attention to Palestine and Israel lead to a peace breakthrough? Are regional and international actors ready and willing to seize the moment? Can they help get Israelis and Palestinians out of the current spiral of violence?<sup>6</sup>

They believe it can happen and that a multinational approach with Arab nation leadership is “uniquely positioned to leverage relationships with all parties to lay out the conditions that could broker a lasting peace.”<sup>7</sup>

**Discussion.** Brown and Hamzawy outline the timeline encapsulating the peace processes of the past several decades, arguing “None was anything like a success, but neither can they be written off as complete failures.”<sup>8</sup> Consequently, there are lessons to consider in all cases. In the overarching positive column, each peace effort reduced the immediate violence; yet as a significant negative, issues were “left unaddressed until the next war or crisis forced them onto the agenda in a forceful and unexpected way.”<sup>9</sup> Still, there were some tangible outcomes as well as a positive lesson to consider: “multilateral efforts can be constructed that set broad negotiating frameworks, and although those efforts are not an alternative to bilateral diplomacy among disputants, they can facilitate them and prevent their collapse.”<sup>10</sup>

This lesson leads the authors to highlight the most significant difference between past Israeli-Palestinian crises and today:

In the past, Arab states have been parties to the conflict. They have been deeply divided and each had their own interests, making diplomacy difficult and often centered around merely getting parties to the table. When they arrived, all attention was on courting them to make concessions and grant recognition; each grudging step in that direction was hard-won. But key Arab actors today are not waiting to be courted: they are deeply interested in a secure regional order, more capable of acting (not merely reacting) diplomatically and engaging with both Israelis and Palestinians rather than waiting for the telephone to ring. Regional stability used to be the coin of American policy speeches, but it is now the goal of key Arab states. To be sure, those states are not used to acting together, and none of them could act alone.<sup>11</sup>

**Recommendations.** Brown and Hamzawy suggest an *Arab Peace Initiative II*, with multilateral oversight, may be the best way forward for a Gaza peace process. However, it must uphold certain conditions:

- Palestinian and Jewish national identities should be recognized as legitimate and in need of institutional expression. Individual human rights in both communities need to be protected.
- Antisemitic, Islamophobic, and racist rhetoric and actions must be explicitly and unconditionally repudiated by all actors.
- Any targeting of civilians should not be merely rejected but actively combated by all actors.

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<sup>6</sup> Brown and Hamzawy, “Arab Peace Initiative II.”

<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid. The authors list as “negative lessons...—the lack of staying power and determination from key international actors; the way diplomatic initiatives can get bogged down in procedural niggling; the inability to address deep power imbalances between Israelis and Palestinians that meant the continuation of the occupation and armed resistance; and the limited willingness of regional actors to renounce all forms of violence against civilians, which legitimized concerns about antisemitism and dehumanization.”

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

- Settlement activities in the Palestinian territories and forced displacement of Palestinians to Egypt, Jordan, or anywhere else should be considered outlawed actions that all actors commit to fight against.
- Full diplomatic, political, and economic relations among participating states should be an outcome of the negotiation process.
- No stateless people should be left behind at the conclusion of any set of agreements.

They recognize these principles may be too much to meet but could be used “as a way of testing the honest intention” of peace process participants.<sup>12</sup> Daniel Kurtzer, the former ambassador, describes a phased diplomatic strategy of two tiers for Gaza peace: the immediate and the long-term. For the immediate, Gaza’s internal security and infrastructure reestablishment must happen with a transitional government of some type until a Palestinian government is in place yet again. Then the challenging work can begin for the second tier—end of the Israeli occupation and the two-state solution. All stakeholders—local, regional, and national—must participate.<sup>13</sup>

He also notes that while all potential involvement is seen with suspicion from all parties, the United Nations or another international body is the least controversial to provide organizational oversight during the initial phase. The second phase should include the now-expected stabilization measures, more security to allow Israel to withdraw forces and reconstruction projects that allow people homes and services. The third phase would see local government in Gaza—likely the Palestinian Authority. All phases must have a timeline with transparent criteria and conditions, so the “Palestinians [can] see their lives being rebuilt and Israelis [can] see credible governance and security emerging.”<sup>14</sup>

The immediate tier—end the violence and reestablish security and governance—is hard enough as it is. However, as Kurtzer expresses:

If these transitional measures are the *only* thing happening, Palestinians will see this as a return to an unacceptable status quo: Israeli occupation and blockade, and the denial of their freedoms. A narrow approach limited to Gaza’s reconstruction will end up building an elaborate sand castle that will wash away as soon as the terrorists regroup, rearm, and renew attacks—this time against both the Palestinian Authority and Israel.<sup>15</sup>

Echoing Brown and Hamzawy, Kurtzer asserts the US “needs to turn back to the effort to help Saudi Arabia and other Arab nations normalize their relations with Israel” as:<sup>16</sup>

Only such a transformational approach holds the possibility, slim as it is, of changing the disastrous trajectory of Israeli-Palestinian relations. We all know what that looks like: continued occupation, repression, radicalization, and conflict, ensuring an endless cycle of the trauma and tragedy that these two peoples have experienced these past months. We have the choice to try something different.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> Brown and Hamzawy, “Arab Peace Initiative II.”

<sup>13</sup> Kurtzer, “What Needs to Happen When the Fighting Stops in Gaza.”

<sup>14</sup> Ibid.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid.

## What Should be Next for Haiti? JLLIS#N240105-7588

**Observation.** In October 2023, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) approved a new mission for Haiti over a year after the current Prime Minister, Ariel Henry, requested it. The *Multinational Security Support* (MSS) mission, as outlined in UNSC Resolution (UNSCR) 2699,<sup>1</sup> is “the latest in a series of UN-authorized missions to Haiti since the mid-1990s.”<sup>2</sup> It is designed to help the Haiti national government counter the gangs and restore security to create conditions for elections. Unusually, UNSCR also authorizes “temporary executive policing authority in Haiti, including the powers of detention and arrest” in conjunction with Haitian policing colleagues.<sup>3</sup>

Kenya pledged to send 1,000 police officers to lead the MSS mission but a Nairobi court blocked the deployment as unconstitutional without a memorandum of understanding between Kenya and Haiti. While officials from both countries as well as the United States (US) are in the midst of negotiations to rectify the situation,<sup>4</sup> the idea of “an international mission to help restore Haiti’s security and address its humanitarian crisis offers Haitians a glimpse of safety and dignity.”<sup>5</sup> What remains imperative is “The mission will need to tread carefully – both in prior planning and once on the ground – to sidestep pitfalls in its path.”<sup>6</sup>

**Discussion.** In February 2024, reporters for the *Miami Herald* summarize the status of the MSS and Haiti:

But the mission, which has an estimated price tag at between \$515 million and \$600 million for two years, is struggling to find funding. In the meantime, the security situation in Haiti grows more chaotic and violent by the day. More than 3,400 people were killed, kidnapped and injured over the last four months, the U.N. said, and the country in January had its deadliest month in two years. In addition to deadly gang clashes, the country has also seen a resurgence of anti-government protests. Angry Haitians have taken to the streets demanding the resignation of Henry, who 14 months ago promised elections but has been unable to stage them due to the continuing violence and the lack of a political agreement.<sup>7</sup>

United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk “noted that more than 800 people were killed, injured or kidnapped across Haiti in January, more than three times the number compared with the same month in 2023.”<sup>8</sup> The *Washington Post* reporters note the political situation is no better:

This Caribbean nation of 11 million has no democratically elected officials. The National Assembly is empty. The presidency is vacant. That’s left Ariel Henry, the unelected and deeply reviled prime minister, in charge. Appointed by President Jovenel Moïse days before Moïse’s still-unsolved

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<sup>1</sup> United Nations, “Security Council authorizes ‘historic’ support mission in Haiti,” *UN News*, October 2, 2023, <https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/10/1141802> (accessed February 2, 2024).

<sup>2</sup> John D. Ciorciari, “Policing Without a Political Plan? The New UN-Backed Mission in Haiti,” *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs*, December 18, 2023, <https://gija.georgetown.edu/2023/12/18/policing-without-a-political-plan-the-new-un-backed-mission-in-haiti/> (accessed February 15, 2024).

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>4</sup> Associated Press, “Haiti says it is working on an agreement with Kenya to secure a long-awaited police deployment,” *The Washington Post*, February 14, 2024, [https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/02/14/haiti-kenya-agreement-armed-force-gangs/9a4fb4ec-cb81-11ee-aa8e-1e5794a4b2d6\\_story.html?isMobile=1](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/02/14/haiti-kenya-agreement-armed-force-gangs/9a4fb4ec-cb81-11ee-aa8e-1e5794a4b2d6_story.html?isMobile=1) (accessed February 15, 2024).

<sup>5</sup> International Crisis Group, “Haiti’s Gangs: Can a Foreign Mission Break Their Stranglehold?” January 2024, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/latin-america-caribbean/haiti/b49-haitis-gangs-can-foreign-mission-break-their-stranglehold> (accessed February 15, 2024).

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>7</sup> Jacqueline Charles and Michael Wilner, “Haiti, Kenya, U.S. make progress on deployment of armed force. But there’s no date yet,” *The Miami Herald*, February 14, 2024, <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article285497452.html> (accessed February 14, 2024).

<sup>8</sup> Associated Press, “Haiti says it is working on an agreement with Kenya to secure a long-awaited police deployment.”

assassination in 2021, Henry was due to leave office on Wednesday, but has so far successfully stymied a political transition.<sup>9</sup>

Henry serves under an agreement that was to conclude over a year ago with elections in 2023. In fact, the inauguration of a new government was planned for February 7, 2024—a date with significant historical meaning to Haitians.<sup>10</sup> At this time, there does not appear to be any way forward politically. As one author from *Brookings* points out:

Positions have only hardened...One challenge is that many opposition groups, possessing little electoral or financial support, are incentivized to remain in opposition...At the same time, the country is moving further and further away from constitutionality, which it arguably left behind following Moïse's assassination, if not before. Elections were last held in 2016, and all elected officials' terms have subsequently expired.<sup>11</sup>

Now, "amid this stew of instability," arrives Guy Philippe.<sup>12</sup> In 2004, he led the violent and political effort to exile then-President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. He was arrested in January 2017 and sent to the US for federal corruption charges. Sentenced to nine years in federal prison in Georgia, he was unexpectedly released in September 2023 and arrived in Haiti in November 2023. He has the support of an armed brigade from the Environment Ministry and advocates for Haitians to physically overthrow their government.<sup>13</sup> Henry's attempts to restrict the brigade's public use of arms and chastise its leadership led to more demonstrations and protests. As its leader asserted "If Ariel Henry does not leave power, this population will get in [his residence] and take him the same way it happened during the presidency of Vilbrun Guillaume Sam."<sup>14</sup>

Meanwhile, Rutenbar from *Brookings* suggests "one area where more assistance is needed is greater clarity from the US government"<sup>15</sup>:

With a long history of intervention by the United States, including U.S. military occupation of the country between 1915 and 1934, Haitians are accustomed to looking toward their much larger neighbor for signals about its priorities, even, or especially, in the absence of clear guidance.<sup>16</sup>

She notes, however, "the legacy of U.S. involvement in Haiti means that even a seemingly well-intentioned effort to stay out of the Haitians' way is being perceived as further American political maneuvering."<sup>17</sup>

**Recommendation(s).** Given the situation in Haiti, authors with the *International Crisis Group* offer a general caution for the MSS success. They state:

Should forces deploy before they reach the numbers and obtain the training that will allow them to operate effectively and with adequate protection for themselves and civilians in Haiti's close urban

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<sup>9</sup> Widlore Mérancourt and Amanda Coletta, "Rebel leader who ousted Aristide sets sights on Haiti's current leader," *The Washington Post*, February 11, 2024, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/02/11/guy-philippe-haiti-ariel-henry/> (accessed February 15, 2024).

<sup>10</sup> Mérancourt and Coletta, "Rebel leader who ousted Aristide sets sights on Haiti's current leader." This is the date in 1986 that Haitians pushed out the Duvalier dictatorship and, in 1991, swore in Aristide, their first democratically elected president.

<sup>11</sup> Sophie Rutenbar, "A way forward for Haitian politics amid continued insecurity," *Brookings*, February 6, 2024, <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/a-way-forward-for-haitian-politics-amid-continued-insecurity/> (accessed February 12, 2024).

<sup>12</sup> Mérancourt and Coletta, "Rebel leader who ousted Aristide sets sights on Haiti's current leader."

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.* The National Agency for Protected Areas was created to protect environmentally sensitive places such as sand quarries and forests.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.* A mob assassinated Sam in 1915 and paraded his butchered body through the streets. That event prompted U.S. President Woodrow Wilson to send in the Marines.

<sup>15</sup> Rutenbar, "A way forward for Haitian politics amid continued insecurity."

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*

quarters, then the gangs could well turn the tables on them, discrediting the whole enterprise. Unless the force's efforts are complemented by downstream reforms, and a political settlement that the country's factions in government and opposition see as legitimate, then any good work it does could quickly be imperilled.<sup>18</sup>

Ciorciari, writing for the *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs*, offers specific recommendations while noting "To have lasting effects, international policing also has to serve a viable long-term political plan."<sup>19</sup> The challenges to meet, he asserts, are summarized here:

- "First, an effective mission requires a sufficiently large, competent, and well-funded force over a sustained period." He notes the contributions offered, but not yet forthcoming, as well as the personnel committed but not yet deployed. The uncertainty, he implies, can be damaging to the final efforts.<sup>20</sup>
- "Second, assuming they deploy, MSS personnel will need clearly delineated roles and responsibilities." He points out the international police force objectives have already morphed before they are deployed. These modifications increase the opportunity for the MSS to have conflicting authorities with the Haitian National Police (HNP).<sup>21</sup>
- "Third, the MSS must earn acceptance from the Haitian public." In this regard, the Kenyan forces may have more inherent support from the Haitian population than previous forces—which were too often comprised of nationalities with "a long history of colonial rule and foreign exploitation." However, an initial acceptance of the MSS' Kenyan forces will atrophy with poor performance or inability to communicate in French and Creole. Therefore, "establishing a consultative council with a diverse array of Haitian civil society actors would signal the mission's commitment to learn from local perspectives."<sup>22</sup>
- "Fourth, the international officers must use effective and appropriate policing methods." In other words, no paramilitary tactics." The author acknowledges the short-term security advantage in such tactics. However, he notes "When international police use excessive force, they risk alienating some communities and legitimating the domestic use of heavily armed, paramilitary forces to buttress incumbent political power." Further, Kenya police forces themselves are accused of human rights violations, extrajudicial killings, and enforced disappearances in their home country.<sup>23</sup>
- "Fifth, in light of possible abuses, both on and off duty, the MSS must have stronger accountability mechanisms than those of past peacekeeping missions in Haiti." The author reviews the UN discredit in previous missions for "the spread of cholera by Nepalese peacekeepers, cases of sexual abuse, and abandoned children." Instead, he indicates "Locally accessible reporting mechanisms, on-site international personnel with the authority to investigate alleged abuses, and UN penalties on countries that do not hold their forces accountable are imperative."<sup>24</sup>
- "Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, long-term political initiatives accompany the MSS." The author reminds "To some, the planned Kenyan-led international police force represents yet another U.S. and UN-backed effort to exercise political control by buttressing favored local political elites."

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<sup>18</sup> International Crisis Group, "Haiti's Gangs: Can a Foreign Mission Break Their Stranglehold?"

<sup>19</sup> Ciorciari, "Policing Without a Political Plan?"

<sup>20</sup> Ibid.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid.

This perspective is compounded by the fact “of an unelected leader with abysmal public legitimacy” requesting the international force.<sup>25</sup>

The *Miami Herald* reporters share an observation from a “western official” which summarizes these six recommendations above. They quote the official:

But even if tomorrow the multinational mission is deployed to Haiti, it will not be enough to solve the crisis. What is needed is a strengthened political dialogue leading to a compromise on a political project for Haiti... and going through elections. *We cannot impose anything from outside.*<sup>26</sup> [Emphasis added]

### ***Creating the Mission Partner Environment (MPE)***

#### **Beyond the Fog:**

#### **Building Collaborative Resilience against Information Pollution, JLLIS#N240414-8996**

**Observation.** Working in a permissive environment where there is not an active conflict in support of peace and stability efforts may seem to be an easy mission to have. On the contrary, these environments often fester with malign actors who want to alter the current state. One common tactic some mission environment actors use to manipulate the current situation is in their introduction of information of varying credibility levels into the situation. Their aim is to sway decision-makers and policymakers by influencing the information they receive.

These actors use several methods to disseminate information which will challenge the status quo and create *information pollution*. In these situations, it is imperative to find allies and partners that support the mission and can validate information received. Practitioners must understand the operational environment and historical context and have a clear idea of information pollution and how to identify it to operate successfully in that environment and achieve mission success. Additionally, it is essential to identify best practices for future operations in similar environments before employment and what some implications might be if recommendations are not followed. Recent allied and partnered military operations in Kosovo are an example of the challenges of *information pollution* in the operational environment.

**Discussion.** Kosovo, situated in the Balkans, boasts a tumultuous history characterized by ethnic tensions. Part of the former Yugoslavia, the region plunged into turmoil in the 1990s. NATO military intervened in 1999 to halt Serbian forces' ethnic cleansing campaign against Kosovo Albanians. Subsequently, the United Nations (UN) administration was established in Kosovo. In 2008, Kosovo declared independence from Serbia, a move recognized by many nations but contested by Serbia and others, including Russia, China, Greece, Spain, and Romania.

The presence of NATO's Kosovo Force (KFOR) and the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) presents numerous challenges for Kosovo's government as it seeks global legitimacy. KFOR and UNMIK maintain oversight and partial control over ethnically disputed areas, restricting the authority of Kosovo's governmental institutions, such as the police and military. Furthermore, some countries participating in these missions either do not acknowledge Kosovo's sovereignty or have other vested interests, compromising their neutrality and impartiality. Consequently, these actors intentionally or inadvertently contribute to *information pollution* in the region.

In military terms, information in the operating environment refers to the collective intelligence gathered from various sensors, stakeholders, and sources, which may include unreliable reports that can degrade

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<sup>25</sup> Ciorciari, “Policing Without a Political Plan?”

<sup>26</sup> Charles and Wilner, “Haiti, Kenya, U.S. make progress on deployment of armed force.”

the overall quality of data and information. Factors such as the quantity, range of quality, and the potential for circular reporting all contribute to what is commonly referred to as *information pollution*, which can significantly impact decision-making and operational effectiveness. Examples include all aspects of mal-/mis- and dis-information and misinterpretation, compromised security, undermined legitimacy of institutions, and challenges in conflict resolution.

**Recommendation(s).** The most effective approach to addressing *information pollution* is in collaboration with Unified Action Partners (UAPs) and host nation partners to conduct thorough monitoring and analysis of sources and reports. It is crucial to ally with partners committed to sharing information transparently, free from narrative distortion. However, there is still more to be done to invest in capacity building and use technology to stop the spread of information pollution.

An essential aspect of this approach is maintaining clear information silos, particularly for sensitive data, classified reports, and safeguarding sources. A clearer picture of the reality of the ground can be obtained by effectively layering the inputs from UAPs and host nation partners. Given the constraints of time and resources, it is necessary to trust the information provided by partners, as individually verifying each report may not be feasible.

Alongside collaboration with UAPs and host nation partners is the thorough monitoring and analysis of sources and reports. This activity requires systems established to identify patterns of mal-, mis-, and dis-information. Understanding the tendencies, narratives, and dissemination channels of sources used by malign actors is crucial. Initially, finding the pollution amidst the vast amounts of information and data is a challenge. However, with time and a systematic approach, it becomes routine to identify and filter out these reports.

In Kosovo, with dozens of information sources, it is essential to identify partners with shared objectives. These partners include USAID, the Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC), the Defense Attaches Office (DAO), the EUCOM National Intelligence Center – Pristina (NIC-P), KFOR Regional Command East, Kosovo Security Forces (KSF), Kosovo Police, and other Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). However, aligning all these partners to simultaneously focus on the same objectives remains a challenge. Yet, while cultivating these relationships requires considerable time and effort, the resulting unified efforts are precious to mission success.

Specific information sources in Kosovo must be carefully vetted or filtered due to their subjective nature and potential for misinformation. Yet, despite a source's contribution to information pollution, there may be some truth in every report. Therefore, it is important to identify areas requiring further investigation using reliable sources. Utilizing the UAPs and host nation partners to verify reports for legitimacy is a practical approach.

*This Lesson is based on a March 2024 submission to the editor by a US Army Captain, Civil Affairs expertise, with recent experience in the Balkans.*

### **Proactive Joint and Multinational Civil Affairs—The Future is Now, JLLIS#N240414-8997**

**Observation.** All too often, civil considerations within the battle space are not a primary focus. Such considerations are normally addressed case-by-case by the separate US combatant commands within in a Joint environment, particularly at the tactical level. Hence, regional insights and specialized resources are not fully realized due to high operations tempo and a dearth of prior coordinated experience or understanding. Another exacerbating issue is the disparity between Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) and Civil Affairs (CA) qualification courses and doctrine. These differences make it difficult to align mission execution and priorities.

Addressing these separate issues is challenging, requiring coordination across disparate fronts. One such aligned effort occurred in conjunction with the preparation for Talisman Sabre 23, a large-scale US military exercise with the Australian Defence [sic] Force (ADF).<sup>1</sup> This expanded exercise also featured the first time imbedding of US Army Civil Affairs (CA) personnel within Australia's 2nd Division Civil-Military Coordination (CIMIC) forces. The lessons learned from this combination of forces clearly demonstrate the importance of proactive cross-training and coordination of US CA expertise and resources across joint forces to maximize operational impact.

**Discussion.** After the reduced presence in 2021 due to COVID, a cooperative push was made to expand the biennial Talisman Sabre Exercise and its participants for 2023. Subsequently, the 2023 Talisman Sabre was the largest of its kind, with more than 33,000 soldiers from 13 countries. The 15-day exercise featured a wide variety of joint large-scale logistics and amphibious assault training operations, multinational firepower demonstrations, and combined field training exercises; with many of its Pacific Island Partners participating for the first time.

As a key component of the preparation, Australia leveraged public lands to augment its dedicated training areas to accommodate the increase in operations and military personnel. Consequently, while US Army CA were initially delegated to a limited planning capacity, additional CA Teams were also requested to aid the Australian Government in deconflicting civilian presence within the public areas used for training. As Australian CIMIC and US Army CA forces began their coordination, the ADF offered openings in its Joint CIMIC Staff Planning Course to allow the US Army CA Command Staff to meet with the CIMIC leadership responsible for the exercise, outside of the scripted planning conferences. In addition to facilitating coordination, the course attendance provided US Army CA leadership a rare and in-depth view of the organization, capabilities, and mission set of ADF CIMIC forces. It was these casual conversations that conceived the concept to imbed US Army CA personnel within the ADF exercise units, providing strengthened civil engagement capabilities for the combined forces.

Equipped with an improved understanding of ADF CIMIC doctrine and situational context within the exercise, the US Army CA Command Team returned to expand and realign its personnel and organizational structure to better integrate within the Australian Battle Group. CA team leaders and senior enlisted were assigned directly to ADF tactical combat units and within Battle Group's own command staff. For the first time in Talisman Sabre's recent history, CA and CIMIC forces were able to truly partner capabilities to maximize effectiveness.

At the tactical level, US Army CA teams applied their extensive training and experience in key leader and community engagement. The teams shared their real-world and National Training Center lessons learned, providing newly certified ADF CIMIC forces with advanced engagement best practices. The teams also shared data collection and presentation examples, such as storyboards, bolstering the ADF's reporting capabilities and product development. Finally, while outside of conventional CA tasking but readily experienced by operational teams, CA personnel also aided ADF soldiers in media relations and conducting interviews. These tenants readily found within US Army CA were of great use to the ADF in their engagement skill proficiency.

At the strategic level, the ADF's CIMIC regional real-world crisis response and security cooperation throughout the Pacific Rim took center stage in the impact created by the joint Australian and US force. US Army CA learned a great deal from the ADF's CIMIC experience in coordinating external and Partner Nation resources to address civil instabilities. Leveraging sustainable supply chains to shore up and promote the legitimacy of local leadership, the ADF is incredibly adept at utilizing what was at-hand and

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<sup>1</sup> Department of Defense, "Talisman Sabre," <https://www.defense.gov/Multimedia/Experience/Exercise-Talisman-Sabre/> (accessed April 12, 2024).

allowing the CIMIC forces to quickly return the impacted area back to its civil populace. The lessons and examples provided by the ADF significantly improved the visiting US Army CA personnel's skillsets, mitigating reliance on internal resources and extended engagements to stabilize civilian populaces.

The success of the imbedded forces was recognized through the highest levels of exercise leadership, garnering written commendations for both Australian and US personnel. This only occurred through the extensive training and preparation between the ADF and US Army CA.

**Recommendation(s).** While unique, the imbed and coordination process could easily be replicated across varied operational environments and military services to become a template for future joint operations. The only resources needed would be to disseminate an active contact list and open existing qualification courses to allied services.

Of the two resources described above, the only real complication experienced was identifying the specific points of contact with which to initiate a dialogue. Even within the scope of the exercise, it was challenging finding the specific foreign service representatives responsible for developing staffing and operational planning. Once accomplished, the teams immediately created a regular dialogue which has endured to this day, with a continued expanding impact with the incorporation of the Chaplain Corps and Women, Peace, and Security Initiative.

As the importance of addressing the civil component within a battlespace becomes more readily apparent, simple solutions such as this magnify existing resources and capabilities with minimal added expenditures while helping to ensure success of the overall stability effort.

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## **Effective Security Force Assistance (SFA) and Cooperation**

### **The Security Assistance and Human Security Relationship, JLLIS#N240205-8614**

**Observation.** A 2023 study published in the journal of *Conflict Management and Peace Science* observes:

The United States has long been one the world's largest military aid donors. Over the past two decades, it has provided military equipment, training, and a broad range of other security sector assistance to more than two-thirds of the sovereign states in the world.<sup>1</sup>

Noting the “dramatic increase in the amount of US military aid flowing to foreign governments” since 2001 (after 9/11, e.g.), the study asks: *What is the impact of [security assistance] aid on human security?* The study's author, Patricia Sullivan, examines the relationship between US security assistance and “the use of deadly force against civilians.”<sup>2</sup> She determines “foreign security assistance and, in particular, aid in the form of military materials, combat skills training, and direct assistance in combat, *is likely to increase the incidence of civilian targeting by state security forces*” but “the impact of security assistance on state violence varies based on the type of assistance provided and the institutional environment in the recipient state.”<sup>3</sup> [Emphasis added.]

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<sup>1</sup> Patricia L. Sullivan, “Lethal aid and human security: The effects of US security assistance on civilian harm in low- and middle-income countries,” *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, 40(5), 467-488 (2023), <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/07388942231155161> (accessed March 14, 2024).

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid. For this paper, *security assistance* also represents *security force assistance*, or SFA.

**Discussion.** The author acknowledges that other “countries like Russia, China, and France also provide significant military assistance to low- and middle-income countries,”<sup>4</sup> but confirms the US is either the largest or among the top three. She does not offer an aid-to-lethality relationship comparison between one donor nation to another because the data from other countries is less-readily available (or not available at all). In contrast, the US appears more transparent, given the amount of information available from the US government about US aid to foreign nations and their militaries.

This apparent transparency developed deliberately in recent decades. In a short history of US security assistance, Sullivan quotes a 2006 RAND report which describes the Cold War subordination of democratic advocacy and human rights promotion under the imperative of “containing the Soviet Union and the spread of communism.”<sup>5</sup> According to the RAND report, as relayed by Sullivan, US security assistance of that era understood that “government repression was unfortunate but sometimes inevitable in countries dealing with subversive elements.”<sup>6</sup> In the contemporary political environment, the US has a plethora of laws and regulations “intended to prevent the provision of military aid to recipients who may use the aid to commit human rights abuses” and, she acknowledges, the “[US] Congress does occasionally suspend or prohibit the provision of lethal aid in response to severe and persistent [human rights] violations [by a recipient foreign government].”<sup>7</sup> Therefore, according to Sullivan, “The combination of legal constraints, Congressional oversight, and evolving military doctrine should bias against finding that security assistance from the US is associated with increases in extrajudicial killings” for a variety of reasons. Conversely, one could assume that a donor nation “with less concern about human rights violations” (i.e., Russia, China, Iran) might see more harm to civilians by recipient state governments through their security forces.<sup>8</sup> In today’s global environment, the US

uses security assistance to advance a variety of foreign policy goals, including improving the ability of foreign militaries to conduct joint operations with American forces, securing access in strategically important regions, and deterring strategic rivals [as well as] countering the spread of terrorism while avoiding the costs and risks of engaging American troops in ground combat.<sup>9</sup>

Sullivan provides two examples: Kenya, “one of the largest recipients of US military training, weapons, and equipment because of its strategic location in the Horn of Africa and its willingness to fight al-Shabaab in Somalia” and the Philippines, which in five years (2015 – 2020) “received almost half a billion dollars in US security assistance and the US provided training for thousands of Filipino soldiers and police officers.”<sup>10</sup> Since receipt of the US assistance, internal and external observer groups accuse Kenyan security forces of “torture, extrajudicial killings, mass arrests, and forced disappearances—particularly targeting Muslim and Somali communities.”<sup>11</sup> In the Philippines, within a year of receiving the first package of US security assistance, President Rodrigo Duterte began his ‘war on drugs’ which used the Philippine security forces that received the aid package. Those forces killed “thousands of civilians, primarily among the urban poor.”<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Sullivan, “Lethal aid and human security.”

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid. Sullivan shares an observation from Jonathan Caverley: “the U.S. military–industrial complex may appear to be a collection of rent-seeking, war-profiteering, influence-peddling, threat-inflating sociopaths until you look at nearly every other country’s version.” See: Jonathan D. Caverley, “America’s arms sales policy: Security abroad, not jobs at home,” *War on the Rocks*, April 6, 2018, <https://warontherocks.com/2018/04/americas-arms-sales-policy-security-abroad-not-jobs-at-home/> (accessed March 29, 2024).

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

So, “Does American military aid increase the risk of civilian harm? Or, as some recent studies suggest, can US military engagement with foreign security forces promote improved respect for human rights?”<sup>13</sup> Sullivan’s work attempts to provide an answer, but finds it may depend on certain factors. In her literature review, Sullivan details the previous analyses and reports and notes they

draw contradictory conclusions about the impacts of military aid, some providing evidence that arms transfers, military aid, or military training have detrimental impacts on the security of civilians in recipient states, while others find that security assistance actually reduces state-sponsored human rights violations...Two studies suggest that the effect of security cooperation is conditional on either the type of assistance or the strategic value of the recipient country..<sup>14</sup>

To reconcile this dichotomy, the author separated US security assistance into two categories:

“non-lethal” aid—a broad category encompassing professional military education, non-proliferation, law enforcement, and a variety of other types of assistance—from “lethal” aid—which includes material aid, direct combat assistance, and combat training—reveals divergent effects on state violence..<sup>15</sup>

With this separation in effect, she finds that provision of “lethal aid significantly raises the risk of civilian harm at the hands of state security forces,” whereas “non-lethal security assistance has a dampening effect on extrajudicial killing in states with a unified internal security sector.”<sup>16</sup> She also determines the strength and focus of “institutional arrangements” within the recipient states can influence how the state may use its US-provided training or equipment for its internal security, maintaining:

In states with legislative and judicial constraints on the executive, neither lethal nor non-lethal assistance has any impact on extrajudicial killing. Although lethal aid could still increase the capacity of security forces to repress dissent in these countries, constraining institutions appear to mitigate against the use of coercive capacity to target civilians. In contrast, security assistance has more deadly consequences in states in which...a leader has manipulated the structure of its security forces to ensure loyalty to the ruling regime. In states with interior troop counterweights, both lethal and non-lethal aid increases the frequency of extrajudicial killing by state security forces..<sup>17</sup>

Her analysis of previous studies also notes the refusal to comply to government’s oppression demands among some state security forces in some situations. She indicates this non-compliance with violent orders is more often seen, as expressed earlier, in those states with strong institutions—especially legal/judicial apparatuses—and when the received security assistance is non-lethal (i.e., professional education). However, if the ‘institutional arrangements’ are weak, she finds that US security assistance is “likely to increase the incidence of civilian targeting by state security forces”<sup>18</sup> when it provides one of three items:

- (1) goods and services a leader can use to reward loyalty and incentivize compliance with repressive orders,
- (2) increased capacity to forcibly respond to civilian threats to the regime, and
- (3) evidence that a foreign patron is invested in regime stability..<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> Sullivan, “Lethal aid and human security.”

<sup>14</sup> Ibid.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid.

In other words, the non-lethal training (i.e., education) is not enough to preclude security forces' harm to their own population:

By raising security agents' expectation that the regime will survive to compensate them and shield them from sanctions, and providing the tools and skills to effectively repress dissent with force, foreign security assistance should increase the likelihood that agents will comply with orders to use deadly force to counter opposition arising from the population..<sup>20</sup>

**Recommendation(s).** As Sullivan reminds her audience:

spending on security assistance—US State and Defense Department programs to arm, equip, train, organize, finance, advise, educate, and/or assist the security forces and security sector institutions of a foreign country—increased by more than 300% between 2001 and 2011, from US\$5.7 billion annually to over US\$24 billion. Between 2002 and 2019, US\$300 billion in US security assistance flowed to foreign governments and at least one million foreign nationals received US military training..<sup>21</sup>

Given the immense amount of monies involved, not to mention the moral and ethical implications when security assistance is misused by a recipient state, it behooves practitioners to recognize the situations in which military aid may not be appropriate. As Sullivan summarizes:

The results of this study suggest that the impact of security assistance on state violence against civilians varies based on the type of assistance provided and the institutional environment in the recipient state. There is strong evidence that “lethal” aid—military equipment, weapons, military training, and combat assistance—increases extrajudicial killings by security forces in states without effective institutions to constrain executive authority. In contrast, non-lethal security sector assistance—a broad category that includes professional military education for officers, defense institution-building, and disarmament initiatives—can mitigate the effects of lethal assistance so that, on average, total security assistance is unrelated to civilian harm. The exception is states in which the ruling regime has manipulated the structure of its security forces to ensure loyalty to the leadership. While, in the average state, non-lethal aid has a dampening effect on state violence and total security assistance has no effect, all types of security aid increase civilian targeting in states with fragmented internal security forces..<sup>22</sup>

### **How Peace Operations Shaped Ghana's Military, JLLIS#N240205-8614**

**Observation.** In January 2024, Andrew Tchie published his study of the peace operations experience on Ghana's military. Early in the report, he acknowledges:

Ghana's Armed Forces (GAF) have demonstrated an aptitude for tackling insecurity, professionalism, and the capacity to contribute to and support United Nations-led Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs) and African Peace Support Operations (PSOs)...its preparedness to deal with emerging challenges during these missions has gained GAF recognition as an active African force involved in peace and security matters and, more broadly, peacekeeping and PSOs across the African continent..<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> Sullivan, “Lethal aid and human security.”

<sup>21</sup> Ibid.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1</sup> Andrew E. Yaw Tchie, “The Inadvertent Influence of Peacekeeping and Peace Support Operations on Ghana's Armed Forces,” *African Security* (2024), <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/19392206.2023.2291629> (accessed February 20, 2024).

His observation is not unique. In October 2023, Donna Charles of the *United States Institute of Peace* (USIP), more bluntly stated: *Ghana represents a “bastion of democracy” in a region beset by political instability.*<sup>2</sup> [Emphasis added.]

However, Tchie’s study also offers a cautious observation, noting “While PKO and PSO exposure has uplifted the GAF [the armed forces] professionalism, these capacities do not convert into tangible approaches to dealing with structural issues like poor governance, weak implementation of the rule of law, and economic development.”<sup>3</sup> He explores the “inadvertent influence” of Ghana’s troop contribution to international and regional PKOs and PSOs on the GAFs contact with its own population and suggests, “due to GAFs building its military doctrine off PKOs and PSOs interactions [sic], colonial structures and liberal peace regimes...*the GAFs risk gaining knowledge...that could harm their interactions with civilians back home.*”<sup>4</sup> [Emphasis added.] He then asks: “What has been the impact on other African armies like Chad, Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria and Rwanda, who are influenced doctrinally by PKOs and PSOs but who also have significant other national military experience?”<sup>5</sup> Most importantly, what does this mean for inter-regional security as well as internal security? What do donor nations<sup>6</sup>—those nations who may provide funds for a PK/PSO on behalf of an international and regional organization but not necessarily offer military forces—need to consider for the future?

**Discussion.** Tchie’s research confirms the improved efficiency of various peace and stabilization efforts throughout the African continent in the last few decades and suggests these efforts “facilitated a decline in the number and intensity of armed conflicts” within the African continent.<sup>7</sup> However, he wryly observes the plethora of these operations in the same space and time period, remarking that “Africa’s military forces have...enjoyed growing status as influential actors in shaping PKOs and PSOs [sic] operations across the continent – *including the number of contributions by African forces.*”<sup>8</sup> [Emphasis added] He asserts the “political economy” of PK/PSO efforts by African states, for African states, also motivates African national governments’ support of PK/PSO efforts. As an “international package or brokerage”:

governments can reduce part of the bottom-up demands for increased military spending (i.e., salaries and allowances) and outsource critical resources that help it to meet military organizational priorities (i.e., training, weapons, perks for the military elite, etc.). In essence, “civil – military resource substitution” has become an established way to pay for salaries and sustain the army...<sup>9</sup>

Tchie provides a historical summary up to present day of the formation of African state armies in general and the GAF, specifically, to illustrate the doctrinal basis of contemporary military forces on the continent. According to his review, many African armies of the colonial era—which, for many, continued well-into the latter half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century—“functioned primarily as civilian police units, built and equipped to deal with

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<sup>2</sup> Donna Charles, “Donna Charles on Ghana’s Democracy Amid West Africa’s Instability,” *United States Institute of Peace* (pod-cast transcript), October 10, 2023, <https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/10/donna-charles-ghanas-democracy-amid-west-africas-instability> (accessed March 24, 2024).

<sup>3</sup> Tchie, “The Inadvertent Influence...”

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

<sup>6</sup> United Nations Peacebuilding, “PBF Donor Commitments and Pledges,” United Nations, March 1, 2024, <https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/content/contributions> (accessed March 28, 2024).

<sup>7</sup> Tchie, “The Inadvertent Influence...” The author highlights operations in United Nations (UN), the African Union (AU) and Regional Economic Community or Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs).

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid. He refers to other recent research that finds: “the UN PKO contributing states allocate fewer resources to the defense sector than the non-contributing states, and higher troop-contributing states are likely to allocate fewer resources to the defense sector than the lower-contributing or non-contributing states.” See: Nazmus Sakib and Md Muhibbur Rahman, “The Political Economy of Peacekeeping: Civil–Military Resource Substitution through International Brokerage,” *Foreign Policy Analysis*, Volume 19, Issue 3, July 2023, <https://doi.org/10.1093/fpa/orad014> (accessed March 28, 2024).

local and internal matters aligned with the interests of the colonial administration.”<sup>10</sup> These colonial forces leveraged “marginalized or disadvantaged social groups” as “a tactic that deliberately promoted intra-group strife, thus forestalling the possibility of internal rebellion” against colonial powers.<sup>11</sup> Further:

While most conventional Western armies developed their military doctrine over decades and through engagement in warfare, Ghana and most of anglophone West Africa adopted their military doctrines from British colonizers... “The armies of contemporary Africa are the direct descendants of forces created by the colonial administration.”<sup>12</sup>

As evidence of this colonial influence, he highlights that “at Ghana’s independence in March 1957, Africans represented merely 10% of her army officers.”<sup>13</sup>

The GAF’s role in internal security between 1960 and 1980s was inconsistent, at its best, destabilizing at its worst. In those intervening 20 years, the country suffered five successful and five attempted *coup d’états*. GAF leadership led many of the coups which reinforced the population and/or government lack of trust in the national armed forces. However, the twenty-year period after one of the coups—the second one led by Jerry Rawlings, a former flight lieutenant in the Ghana Air Force in 1981<sup>14</sup>—was ultimately characterized by both political stability and improved national economy (albeit aided by “the International Monetary Fund and World Bank structural adjustment programs”).<sup>15</sup> This stability occurred despite a period more than a decade long of a military *junta* government which forced “severe austerity measures, widespread economic reforms and civil unrest that raised serious concerns about human rights abuses against government opposition.”<sup>16</sup> In 1992, Rawlings left the military and sought and won the first Ghanaian presidential election since his first coup in 1979.<sup>17</sup>

One of the policy changes Rawlings made in his years in office was to increase the GAF’s role in PK/PSO efforts. Tchei points out, “[Rawlings’] successful push for GAFs to serve as members in PKOs or PSOs provided critical learning opportunities and helped consolidate its military doctrine” and “aligned with Ghana’s plans to redefine and assert her strength as a regional player.”<sup>18</sup> The engagement in PK/PSO efforts did much to improve “fractured civil-military relations” internal to Ghana and may have contributed to the government’s decision “to embrace capitalism.”<sup>19</sup> However, perhaps the main success of this policy change was that the PKOs and PSOs—all external to Ghana’s borders—“kept the GAFs occupied and diverted forces’ attention from political tensions at home.”<sup>20</sup> And, likely important to a newly elected president who had been a military and coup leader, “This strategy kept the troops ‘on track’, far removed from

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<sup>10</sup> Tchie, “The Inadvertent Influence...”

<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid.

<sup>14</sup> In his second coup, Rawlings established the Provisional National Defence [sic] Council (PNDC) military *junta* as the national-level government. His “economic policies led to an economic crisis in 1983, forcing him to undertake structural adjustment and submit himself to election to retain power. Elections were held in January 1992, leading Ghana back to multiparty democracy.” See: The Editors, “Jerry J. Rawlings, head of state, Ghana,” Encyclopaedia Britannica, Updated: Feb 9, 2024, <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Jerry-J-Rawlings> (accessed March 24, 2024).

<sup>15</sup> Donna Charles, “Amid a Region Rife with Coups and Instability, Ghana is a Democratic Bulwark,” *United States Institute of Peace*, October 11, 2023, <https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/10/amid-region-rife-coups-and-instability-ghana-democratic-bulwark> (accessed February 20, 2024).

<sup>16</sup> Ibid.

<sup>17</sup> In his first coup in 1979, Rawlings and his Armed Forces Revolutionary Council ruled for only 112 days. While short in duration, it was long enough for trial and execution of the former heads of state, Gen. Ignatius Kutu Acheampong and Lieut. Gen. Frederick W.K. Akuffo. See: The Editors, “Jerry J. Rawlings.” 2021 saw the first coup attempt in several decades in Ghana. Six soldiers were executed in 2024 for their roles in the alleged plot. See: Wycliffe Muia, “Ghana coup plot: Soldiers among six sentenced to death by hanging,” *BBC News*, January 25, 2024, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-68090780> (accessed February 20, 2024).

<sup>18</sup> Tchie, “The Inadvertent Influence...”

<sup>19</sup> Ibid.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid.

potential domestic mutinies.”<sup>21</sup> To prove his point, Tchie refers to a statement by General Emmanuel Erskine<sup>22</sup> who allegedly asserted that Ghana’s government leaders “prolonged [the] deployment of [Ghanaian] peacekeepers in Lebanon precisely because their presence at home would likely complicate the tumultuous political situation.”<sup>23</sup>

Tchie also suggests that Ghana’s Military Academy and Training Schools, as well as the *Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre*, “demonstrates how deliberate institution-building played a role in the professionalization of the GAFs, grounded in their service with PKOs and PSOs” but also its dependence “on the exploitation of PKOs and PSOs to attract external support and funding.”<sup>24</sup> He warns:

The political economy of missions as revenue for TCCs [Troop Contributing Countries] has left the GAFs structurally and financially constrained toward peace operations as a revenue stream for its troops. *This could open the GAFs to potential misconduct if they engaged in intense battles when deployed for internal counterterrorism operations.*<sup>25</sup> [Emphasis added.]

Tchie acknowledges that Ghana’s internal security problems are not unique. Instead, those concerns reflect challenges across the region with corresponding questions of the peace operations experience as applied to domestic safety and well-being of the population. He notes:

the rise of groups like Boko Haram, Islamic State West Africa Province, Allied Democratic Forces, Salafist-jihadists, and other non-state armed groups, has seen *African armies increasingly face conflicts that are theoretically and mechanically dissimilar from their engagements in PKOs, PSOs, and their general doctrinal and operational training and experience.* Conflicts surfacing in these regions result from a complex configuration of historical, governance, and socioeconomic developmental difficulties, often emerging in the periphery areas of the nation, where the state plays a minimalist role in supporting these marginalized communities.<sup>26</sup> [Emphasis added.]

Tchie points directly to the GAF’s foundational purpose—“GAFs were set up to fight conventional warfare, where rival states are the potential adversaries”—coupled with its PK/PSO experiences of the past several decades, as reasons for the GAF’s “training and doctrinal mismatch with [current] reality.”<sup>27</sup> In particular, he highlights the type of UN PKOs of recent years:

these new PKOs were framed as *stabilization operations* and often deployed with a mandate designed to enforce forms of stability. These stabilization operations or peace enforcement<sup>28</sup> missions were characterized by a lack of strategic consent from conflict actors or conflicting parties. They were designed to primarily use force designed to defeat or neutralize an armed

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<sup>21</sup> Tchie, “The Inadvertent Influence...” The author further asserts that Ghana’s contribution of female troops to UN PKOs—often, Ghana’s troop contribution has the largest number of women in a mission—is also evidence of the UN peacekeeping norms influence on the GAF’s structure and doctrine. However, he also reflects that Ghana had the first female officer pilots in its African sub-region as early as 1965.

<sup>22</sup> From the Ghana’s Mission to the United Nations: “In 1978, Lt. Gen. Erskine was appointed the first Commander of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), which was established that year to confirm Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, restore international peace and security and assist the Lebanese Government in restoring its effective authority in the area. This was preceded by his appointment as Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine (UNTSO) on 1st January 1976 to April 1978.” He died on May 7, 2021. See: News, “UNFIL’s 1st Force Commander Lt. Gen. Emmanuel Erskine passes on,” *The Permanent Mission of Ghana to the UN*, <https://www.ghanamissionun.org/unifils-1st-force-commander-lt-gen-emmanuel-erskine-passes-on/> (accessed March 28, 2024).

<sup>23</sup> Tchie, “The Inadvertent Influence...”

<sup>24</sup> Ibid.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid. He also notes: While there have been discussions about whether or not the term “peace enforcement” should be used for operations that are not linked to a peace process, e.g. counter-terrorism or counterinsurgency operations with no political engagement or strategy, i.e. no “peace” to enforce, this distinction is still not been made clear by the UN or the AU.

actor...Thus...operations shifted from pursuing and consolidating peace agreements to disrupting and degrading the military advantage and capability of *insurgent groups, who were often embedded amongst civilian populations*...In practice, this meant that the peacekeeping and PSOs became military-heavy and adopted enemy-centric counterinsurgency methods designed to deal with conventional and non-conventional violence against civilians. <sup>29</sup> [Emphasis added.]

He contrasts the “new PKOs” with the more traditional peace operations of the latter part of the 20<sup>th</sup> century which usually had “strategic level consent for a deployment and military action, including *the use of force*, is taken primarily for other purposes, e.g. *to protect civilians and deter actors that undermine peace processes*.” <sup>30</sup> [Emphasis added.] He then offers a third reason for the *training and doctrinally mismatch* that may put the GAF at odds with its own population if not resolved: “western perspectives and training have influenced the responses that African state sees as a solution to the problem.” <sup>31</sup> He asserts that the bilateral training from the United Kingdom and other states (i.e., *capacity-building or security force assistance*) is “primarily focused on increasing troops to affected [conflict] areas” and, further:

these Western actors are not fully aware of the local context and often import Western models that do not fit the realities of most African security challenges. Adding that, often Western perspective is seen as universal and crucial to a body of knowledge that sees the Western standard and knowledge as key, but this neglects the African experience and, in part, has contributed to an ongoing cycle of support which has left many African states unprepared for current realities. <sup>32</sup>

Donna Charles of USIP shares the broader concern for Ghana—and, by extension, the entire African sub-region—if those governments cannot determine more appropriate responses to internal security demands. She acknowledges:

The recent spate of coups in Africa has raised questions about whether democracy works as a “one-size fits-all” model of governance on the continent, as some would argue the West often promotes. According to an Afrobarometer survey, *only 38 percent of respondents from 36 African states are satisfied with how democracy works in their country*. While related surveys indicate that most Africans prefer democracy over other systems of governance and embrace multiparty systems and other democratic norms, worrying trends in West Africa, the Sahel and parts of southern Africa suggest growing acceptance of military rule amid of [sic] poor governance. These results demonstrate how important it is for aspiring and mature democracies throughout Africa and beyond to demonstrate the value of democracy through basic service delivery, accountability, transparency and inclusion. <sup>33</sup> [Emphasis added.]

**Recommendation(s).** In summary, Tchier contends that the GAFs peacekeeping experience, while laudable, does not adequately address its internal threats while not alienating Ghana’s population. He argues for “an adaptive stabilization strategy” <sup>34</sup> which he describes as:

A broader stabilization approach that is people-centered, holistic, and agile in its approach to internal security threats...and supplemented with the promotion of good governance, strengthening of the rule of law, addressing social injustices and vulnerabilities such as poverty, marginalization, illiteracy, and unemployment, especially among youth and women. <sup>35</sup>

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<sup>29</sup> Tchier, “The Inadvertent Influence...”

<sup>30</sup> Ibid.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid.

<sup>33</sup> Charles, “Amid a Region Rife with Coups and Instability...”

<sup>34</sup> Tchier, “The Inadvertent Influence...”

<sup>35</sup> Ibid.

Therefore, he asserts, “The training and doctrine of the GAFs must be reviewed to reflect contemporary threats, including terrorism, drug trafficking, piracy and armed robbery at sea, among others” despite the potential “loss of earnings from PKOs – for particular units – which boosted relatively low salaries and, by extension, impacted the GAFs’ performance.”<sup>36</sup> Finally, he stresses that donor nations that contribute monies, equipment, and training to the GAF should have a more comprehensive understanding to Ghana—and other African nations—internal and regional concerns.

### **A Security Partner’s Illegal or Inhumane Weapons Use—Who is Responsible? JLLIS#N240105-7440**

**Observation.** On October 7, 2023, *Hamas*-aligned terrorists attacked Israelis in towns near the Israel-Gaza border through breached border security fences as well as by motorboats on Israeli beaches and paragliders into an open-air festival. Within days, thousands of civilians were dead, injured, or refugees; millions of dollars of infrastructure were irrevocably damaged.<sup>1</sup> The four months since the initial attack and the unrelenting Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) counterattacks in a 25-mile-long strip of land less than seven-miles wide compounds the horrific situation for those civilians in the region. More, the apparent existence of hostile actors embedded in civilian and/or protected infrastructure and the seemingly disproportionate IDF military response leads to emerging war crime accusations (violations of *International Humanitarian Law*, or IHL) for both parties to the conflict, *Hamas* and the IDF.<sup>2</sup>

An emerging conundrum in this debate is this question: What is the place of origin (national-level trade or law and/or corporate industrial) responsibility for weapons and arms used in IHL violations? As *Foreign Affairs* challenged in November 2023, “Is Washington Responsible for What Israel Does With American Weapons?”<sup>3</sup> Or what any country recipient of United States arms does with them? Authors for the *Lieber Institute for Law and Land Warfare* at West Point took another perspective, writing about “Arms Exporters’ Corporate Liability for Due Diligence Failures.”<sup>4</sup> Both author groups note the complications of liability and responsibility for improper arms use among their recommendations. However, as Josh Paul, the former director in the Bureau of Political Military Affairs in the United States’ (US) State Department, asserts, those same complications demand “many complex and morally challenging debates over what weapons to send where.”<sup>5</sup>

**Discussion.** Josh Paul resigned from his US State Department position in October 2023 “due to a policy disagreement concerning the U.S.’s continued lethal assistance to Israel.”<sup>6</sup> He declared at the time, “I don’t believe that U.S. arms should be provided into a context when they are going to kill thousands of

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<sup>36</sup> Tchie, “The Inadvertent Influence...”

<sup>1</sup> Bill Hutchinson, “Israel-Hamas War: Timeline and key developments,” *ABC News*, November 22, 2023, <https://abcnews.go.com/International/timeline-surprise-rocket-attack-hamas-israel/story?id=103816006> (accessed January 24, 2024).

<sup>2</sup> Jackie Northam, “Both sides of the Israeli-Hamas war are being accused of war crimes,” Weekend Edition Sunday, *National Public Radio*, November 12, 2023, <https://www.npr.org/2023/11/12/1212534838/both-sides-of-the-israeli-hamas-war-are-being-accused-of-war-crimes> (accessed January 15, 2024).

<sup>3</sup> Brian Finucane, “Is Washington Responsible for What Israel Does With American Weapons?” *Foreign Affairs*, November 17, 2023, [https://www.foreignaffairs.com/israel/washington-responsible-what-israel-does-american-weapons?utm\\_medium=news-letters&utm\\_source=fatoday&utm\\_campaign=Redefining%20Success%20in%20Ukraine&utm\\_content=20231117&utm\\_term=FA%20Today%20-%20112017](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/israel/washington-responsible-what-israel-does-american-weapons?utm_medium=news-letters&utm_source=fatoday&utm_campaign=Redefining%20Success%20in%20Ukraine&utm_content=20231117&utm_term=FA%20Today%20-%20112017) (accessed January 15, 2024).

<sup>4</sup> Machiko Kanetake and Cedric Ryngaert, “Arms Exporters’ Corporate Liability for Due Diligence Failures,” *Lieber Institute*, November 15, 2023, <https://lieber.westpoint.edu/arms-exporters-corporate-liability-due-diligence-failures/> (accessed January 20, 2024).

<sup>5</sup> Josh Paul, “This is not the State Department I know. That’s why I left my job.” Opinion, *The Washington Post*, October 23, 2023, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/10/23/state-department-quit-israel-arms/> (accessed January 24, 2024).

<sup>6</sup> Paige Sutherland and Maghna Chakrabarti, “Why this U.S. government arms dealer resigned over weapon transfers to Israel,” On Point, *WBUR, National Public Radio*, November 16, 2023, <https://www.wbur.org/onpoint/2023/11/16/why-this-u-s-government-arms-dealer-resigned-over-weapon-transfers-to-israel> (accessed January 15, 2024).

civilians.”<sup>7</sup> Some observers found his assertions ironic, given he and his office facilitated the US provision of arms “to numerous governments that went on to use those weapons to violate human rights, including the governments of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Honduras.”<sup>8</sup> Despite this observation, Paul asserts that the recent arms transfer to Israel was “different” in that it was “was a complex and morally challenging transfer in the absence of a debate.”<sup>9</sup>

The absent process—or debate—Paul refers to is part of the Conventional Arms Transfer (CAT) policy. According to authors for *Just Security*, the design of CAT is to “guide the United States’ arms export decisions” with focus on “considerations and objectives for arms exports.”<sup>10</sup> Issued by the Biden Administration in February 2023, the CAT fortified arms transfer standards in comparison to both the Obama and Trump administrations with “a clear red line: the United States will not transfer weapons when it is ‘*more likely than not*’ that those weapons will be used to commit, facilitate the commission of, or aggravate the risk of specified violations.”<sup>11</sup> [Emphasis added]

Yet, as some observers note, “When it comes to current arms transfers to Israel, the implementation of the ‘*more likely than not*’ standard deserves scrutiny.”<sup>12</sup> [Emphasis added] As Paul maintains, the necessary scrutiny CAT policy expected did not occur. Elias Yousif, writing for *Stimson Center*, further notes:

In the waning days of 2023, the Biden administration twice invoked a rarely used emergency authority to bypass congressional review of more than \$250 million in weapons sales to Israel...amidst growing concern over the severe humanitarian toll of Israel’s military campaign in Gaza...In bypassing Congress, the Biden administration is both circumventing an important oversight mechanism as well as exposing the erosion of congressional authority over U.S. arms transfers...<sup>13</sup>

Given either the apparent “missing” scrutiny or the alleged Congressional oversight circumvention, is the US administration responsible for any suspected IDF committed war crimes? Brian Finucane, for *Foreign Affairs*, suggests the answer is yes. He states, “U.S. officials risk complicity if Israel uses U.S. support to commit war crimes,” yet acknowledges “promoting compliance with the law of war is not enough.”<sup>14</sup> He further asserts “the Israeli military’s conduct in Gaza and the accompanying rhetoric from Israeli officials should prompt both legal and policy concerns in Washington,”<sup>15</sup> and highlights:

*In the first six days of the air campaign, Israel dropped 6,000 bombs more than the U.S.-led coalition did against the Islamic State in any single month of the war against ISIS, even at the height of the operation.* This rate of attack raises questions regarding Israel’s target selection, its interpretation of proportionality, and the precautions the country is taking to avoid civilian casualties...More generally, the scale of death and destruction in Gaza—the Health Ministry has counted

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<sup>7</sup> Sutherland and Chakrabarti, “Why this U.S. government arms dealer resigned...”

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

<sup>9</sup> Paul, “... why I left my job.” See also: Benjamin Wallace-Wells, “Whate a State Department Official Lost Hope in Israel,” *The New Yorker*, November 6, 2023, <https://www.newyorker.com/news/the-political-scene/why-a-state-department-official-lost-hope-in-israel> (accessed January 15, 2024).

<sup>10</sup> John Ramming Chappell, Annie Shiel, Seth Binder, Elias Yousif, Bill Monahan, and Amanda Klasing, “Law and Policy Guide to US Arms Transfers to Israel,” *Just Security*, November 8, 2023, <https://www.justsecurity.org/90010/a-law-and-policy-guide-to-us-arms-transfers-to-israel/> (accessed January 20, 2024).

<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

<sup>13</sup> Elias Yousif, “A Primer on the Emergency Declaration for Arms Transfers to Israel,” *Stimson Center*, January 8, 2024, <https://www.stimson.org/2024/emergency-declaration-for-arms-transfers-to-israel/> (accessed January 15, 2024).

<sup>14</sup> Brian Finucane, “Is Washington Responsible for What Israel Does With American Weapons?” *Foreign Affairs*, November 17, 2023, [https://www.foreignaffairs.com/israel/washington-responsible-what-israel-does-american-weapons?utm\\_medium=news-letters&utm\\_source=fatoday&utm\\_campaign=Redefining%20Success%20in%20Ukraine&utm\\_content=20231117&utm\\_term=FA%20Today%20-%20112017](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/israel/washington-responsible-what-israel-does-american-weapons?utm_medium=news-letters&utm_source=fatoday&utm_campaign=Redefining%20Success%20in%20Ukraine&utm_content=20231117&utm_term=FA%20Today%20-%20112017) (accessed January 15, 2024).

<sup>15</sup> Ibid.

more than 11,000 deaths as of November 13—calls into question how Israel is assessing whether civilian harm is excessive in relation to the anticipated military advantage from individual attacks.<sup>16</sup> [Emphasis added]

Machiko Kanetake and Cedric Ryngaert, writing for the *Lieber Institute*, consider another perspective—the corporate and/or industrial arms manufacturing entities’ responsibilities for IHL violations. They note:

When it comes to the actual use of exported weapons, it is primarily incumbent on the recipients of the weapons to observe the applicable obligations under international human rights law (IHRL) and international humanitarian law (IHL). Yet arms exporters are part of the “value chain of actors” in the complex life cycle of weapon systems.<sup>17</sup>

Given their legal research, they claim, “arms exporters are expected to conduct their own autonomous due diligence to identify and mitigate risk to human rights and IHL” and “that failure to properly conduct due diligence may potentially lead to civil or criminal liability.”<sup>18</sup>

**Recommendation(s).** Finucane begins his recommendations “to mitigate the risk that U.S. military support is facilitating violations of the law of war” by stating, “U.S. officials merely repeating talking points about the importance of law of war compliance is not enough.”<sup>19</sup> He points to the US military’s share of casualty-reducing bombing techniques and the Marine Corps three-star general sent to offer advice to the IDF on urban warfare and suggests:

These current efforts to prod Israel to minimize civilian casualties and comply with the law of war are all too reminiscent of the unsuccessful push by the Obama administration to improve targeting by Saudi Arabia in its air campaign in Yemen, including by dispatching advisers to share technical recommendations with the Saudi military. In that conflict, the only measure that demonstrably reduced civilian casualties was reducing and ultimately ending airstrikes by the Saudi-led coalition.<sup>20</sup>

Instead, he asserts the most basic step is to follow US law and monitor “whether Israel is using U.S.-origin weapons and intelligence consistent with the law of war,” noting the need for intelligence input and IDF targeting rationale. The next step is to consider what is learned “to approve or continue implementing arms transfers to Israel.”<sup>21</sup>

The *Just Security* authors echo the demand the US follow its own laws, but also remind the US Congress to “exercise oversight of the administration’s implementation of the CAT policy to ensure it is applied properly and universally.”<sup>22</sup> Yousif of *Stimson Center* repeats the call for Congressional reengagement:

to transfer weapons to Israel despite grave humanitarian and human rights concerns is emblematic of an enterprise that is run by a narrowing set of stakeholders and without sufficient checks and balances that are key to democratic governance. In this context, Congress should consider what a more effective and meaningful approach to security cooperation oversight might look like, and how it can avoid the pitfalls that have made current guardrails so easy to ignore.<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>16</sup> Finucane, “Is Washington Responsible...?”

<sup>17</sup> Machiko Kanetake and Cedric Ryngaert, “Arms Exporters’ Corporate Liability for Due Diligence Failures,” *Lieber Institute for Law and Land Warfare*, November 15, 2023, <https://lieber.westpoint.edu/arms-exporters-corporate-liability-due-diligence-failures/> (accessed January 20, 2024).

<sup>18</sup> Ibid.

<sup>19</sup> Finucane, “Is Washington Responsible...?”

<sup>20</sup> Ibid.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid.

<sup>22</sup> Chappell, et al, “Law and Policy Guide to US Arms Transfers to Israel.”

<sup>23</sup> Yousif, “A Primer on the Emergency Declaration for Arms Transfers to Israel.”

Kanetake and Ryngaert merely remind arms exporters—and, by extension, the related corporate and industry entities—that they “are expected to conduct heightened due diligence in light of the high risk of military items being used in ways that violate human rights and IHL.”<sup>24</sup> Yet, they also acknowledge that supply chain liability determination needs additional research.

Finally, in an aspirational rather than practical manner, more than a dozen humanitarian and human rights organizations simply call for “all UN Member States to stop fuelling [sic] the crisis in Gaza and avert further humanitarian catastrophe and loss of civilian life”<sup>25</sup>:

the undersigned organisations [sic], call on all States to immediately halt the transfer of weapons, parts, and ammunition to Israel and Palestinian armed groups while there is risk they are used to commit or facilitate serious violations of international humanitarian or human rights law.<sup>26</sup>

### ***A Plan Ecuador? Or Other Lessons from the Past? JLLIS#N240103-7547***

**Observation.** On January 9, 2024, a dozen or more shooters entered an Ecuadoran television station during a live broadcast. They continued their assaults and threats to the studio staff for several hours before surrounding to the tactical police units.<sup>1</sup> For many Latin American countries, this situation may be considered routine. While Latin America and the Caribbean have only 9 percent of the world’s population, they approximate a third of the world’s homicides.<sup>2</sup> Yet while Ecuador has, in the past, been “one of the most peaceful in South America,” the event was “emblematic of the growing power of Ecuador’s armed gangs.”<sup>3</sup>

Some observers suggest the US should develop a *Plan Ecuador*, similar to the eleven-year *Plan Colombia* (2000 to 2011). They highlight the alleged effectiveness of Plan Colombia, to include US Ambassador Brownfield’s declaration that it was “the most successful nation-building exercise by the United States in this century.”<sup>4</sup> Yet the authors of the *War on the Rocks* online article note:

*Ecuador is not Colombia.* Instead...the U.S. and Ecuadorian governments should look to the lessons and pitfalls of another multi-billion-dollar security assistance package, the Mérida Initiative in Mexico...[because]...the magnitude of Ecuador’s challenges is akin to those confronted by Mexico, offering clues to how policymakers might structure their approach for stifling crime and corruption in the South American nation.<sup>5</sup> [Emphasis added.]

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<sup>24</sup> Kanetake and Ryngaert, “Arms Exporters’ Corporate Liability for Due Diligence Failures.”

<sup>25</sup> “16 humanitarian and human rights organisations call to stop arms transfers to Israel, Palestinian Armed Groups,” *Plan International*, January 24, 2024, <https://plan-international.org/news/2024/01/24/call-to-stop-arms-transfers-to-israel-palestinian-armed-groups/> (accessed January 30, 2024).

<sup>26</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1</sup> Yury Garcia and Herbert Villarraga, “Ecuador TV station hostage recounts 'surreal' armed takeover,” *Reuters*, January 10, 2024, <https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/ecuador-tv-station-hostage-recounts-surreal-armed-takeover-2024-01-10/> (accessed February 13, 2024).

<sup>2</sup> Paul J. Angelo, “A “Plan Ecuador” Is Needed: U.S. Assistance Should Draw Lessons From The Past,” *War on the Rocks*, February 5, 2024, <https://warontherocks.com/2024/02/a-plan-ecuador-is-needed-u-s-assistance-should-draw-lessons-from-the-past/> (accessed February 10, 2024).

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

<sup>4</sup> Angelo, “A “Plan Ecuador” Is Needed...”

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

**Discussion.** The authors note:

Historically, Ecuador's security concerns focused on its shared borders with neighboring Colombia and Peru, where spillover violence from insurgent and paramilitary groups occasionally took place. Yet the country's recent political volatility, economic shocks and rising unemployment during the COVID-19 pandemic, and an underfunded and corrupt police force opened the door to cocaine traffickers.<sup>6</sup>

The COVID-19 pandemic disrupted criminal supply chains as much as it did with legal supply routes and storage. Narco- and other illegal organizations also responded as their legal peers did—they diversified their transit means and hubs. Therefore, "Countries long perceived to be immune from the worst effects of the illicit narcotics trade, including Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, and Uruguay, have seen violent crime mounting."<sup>7</sup> The influence of the drug trade in Ecuador now lends itself to comparison to Colombia in the late 1990s and early 2000s. However, there are too many vastly different variables to make a simple switch of the word *Colombia* for *Ecuador* in any foreign aid package. The most significant difference is this: Colombia was both a hub for drug manufacturing as well as distribution. Thus far, Ecuador appears to be a transit hub only. In this aspect, the US' cooperation with Mexico, *the Mérida Initiative* from 2007 to 2021, may be the best model to consider—with acknowledgment of some *lessons learned*:

First, the deliberate targeting of Mexican cartel kingpins tended to exacerbate societal violence rather than reduce it, as existing rivalries resulted in fighting over who should replace leaders who had been killed or arrested....Alternatively, some of the most propitious operations against criminal groups targeted their cash flow, underscoring the supreme importance of financial intelligence for disrupting transactions, seizing assets, and arresting prominent cartel allies.

Second, successful strategies to improve security forces' effectiveness incorporated the preferences and oversight of Mexican business leaders, who had grown weary of the violence and frustrated with the declining investment climate....security taxes shouldered by the local private sector financed reformed police forces, community programs to prevent cartel recruitment, and infrastructure projects to improve citizen safety.

Third, the bureaucratic fragmentation of Mexico's security institutions rendered coordinated action among the military services and between the military and the police unworkable....Crime reduction strategies require a united front among security and justice institutions — one enabled by background checks on personnel, routine coordination meetings between state security forces, and integrated operations.

Finally...In the absence of consensus on how to deal with leading threats, security investments rarely carried over from one presidential or mayoral term to the next, stunting even successful measures in the name of political tribalism.<sup>8</sup>

These issues are also ongoing concerns in Ecuador and any plan for US-based aid or programs must consider them.

**Recommendation(s).** While the authors do not provide specific recommendations for any future *Plan Ecuador*, they do offer a few cautions. The first is acknowledgment of the "slippery slope" of security efforts militarization. As they state:

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<sup>6</sup> Angelo, "A "Plan Ecuador" Is Needed..."

<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

Although military responses can be effective in responding to immediate security crises, the persistence of criminal violence prevents governments from sending soldiers back to their barracks and investing in wholesale police reform.... The increased contact between citizens and soldiers, untrained in policing operations, often leads to escalating human rights abuses, as well. At a time when governments are most desperate to bolster their credibility, they inadvertently expose their most popular institutions — the armed forces — to widespread public criticism over arbitrary arrests and extrajudicial murders.<sup>9</sup>

Conversely, a demonstrated increase in personal security may lead some of the population to excuse the violations of civil and human rights. El Salvador may be a contemporary case in this point. The arrest of “more than 75,000 suspected gang members” in one year appears to have resulted in a 70 percent drop in homicides nation-wide in the same period.<sup>10</sup> Despite the alleged civil rights abuses incurred in the year-long arrest efforts, the population appears supportive of the current government.<sup>11</sup>

In another caution, the authors highlight “sovereignty sensitivities over U.S.-supported operations in Ecuadorian territory” which were not, apparently, a policy factor for Plan Colombia.<sup>12</sup> They emphasize “Although the spirit of shared responsibility for the regional drug crisis and the bilateral cooperation mechanisms that underpinned Plan Colombia can be instructive, there are clear limits to drawing inspiration from Ecuador’s northern neighbor.”<sup>13</sup>

Their most urgent caution is this:

Ecuador’s president has the support of a broad coalition of political currents, both at home and abroad....As the country gears up for another general election in 2025, and as the security situation possibly worsens before it gets better, the goodwill he currently enjoys — and the opportunity to deliver long-needed reforms — may be short lived.<sup>14</sup>

Therefore, they imply, Ecuador needs to do what it needs to do now— “following cartel cash, harnessing the resources of big business, fostering intra-governmental trust, and sustaining legislative consensus”— to succeed as “a model for neighbors struggling to stem regional insecurity.”<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> Angelo, “A “Plan Ecuador” Is Needed...”

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid.

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