NATO Stability Policing

Centre of Excellence

Stability Policing Framework Concept for Community Policing in NATO Stabilization and Reconstruction operations

Edition 1

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LIST OF REFERENCES

A. Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, adopted by Heads of State and Government at the NATO Summit in Lisbon 19-20 November 2010.
B. AJP – 3.4.5 "Allied Joint Doctrine for the military contribution to stabilization and reconstruction".
C. AJP – 3.22 "Allied Joint Doctrine for Stability Policing" (ratification draft).
D. "Universal declaration of human rights" adopted by the UN General Assembly on 10 December 1948.
E. "International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights" adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966.
F. "Charter of fundamental rights of the European Union" adopted on 7 December 2000, in Nice.
G. "European convention for the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms", adopted on 4 November 1950, in Rome.
H. Allied Administrative Publication – 06 "NATO Glossary of terms and definitions (English and French)" (2015).
I. "NATO Security Force Assistance Concept", MCM 0034-2014, as amended on 18 March 2014.
J. "How can gender make a difference to security in operations – Indicators", version 2011, NATO e-Library.
K. "Revised NATO/EAPC policy for the implementation of UNSCR 1325 on women, peace and security and related resolutions", PO(2014) 0253, 10 April 2014
L. "Gender makes sense: a way to improve your mission", 2nd ed., 2013, issued by the NATO Civil–Military Cooperation COE.
M. "Good practices in building Police-Public partnerships", ed. 2008, issued by the Organization for security and co-operation in Europe (OSCE).
N. "Guidebook on Democratic Policing", 2nd ed., 2008, issued by the Organization for security and co-operation in Europe (OSCE).
O. "Training manual on policing in urban space", ed. 2013, issued by the United Nations Office on drugs and crime.
P. Concept of the NATO Stability Policing Centre of Excellence (NATO SP COE) approved on 15 May 2015 by the Steering Committee.

CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION

BACKGROUND

1-1.   The NATO Strategic Concept at Reference A. commits the Alliance to prevent crises, manage conflicts and stabilize post – conflict situations since instability or conflicts beyond NATO borders can directly threaten its security. A comprehensive approach, including political, civil and military instruments, is necessary for an effective crisis management and, when a conflict ends, for post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction. In this regards, illegal activities are accounted as a factor of instability and a consequent possible threat, therefore, the Concept stresses the importance for the Alliance to "develop the capability to train and develop local forces in crisis zones, so that local authorities are able, as quickly as possible, to maintain security without international assistance". Furthermore, the Strategic Concept highlights that the Alliance constitutes a unique community of values committed to the principles of individual liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law.

1-2.   The Allied Joint Publication 1 (D) (AJP -1) and the AJP – 3 series address the importance for the deployed Joint Force Commander (JFC) to tackle, inter alia, the threats posed by illegal activities and to meet the need to provide the local populace with an effective and accountable police service. The latter is achieved through either replacing the indigenous police forces (when either not existing or unable/unwilling to execute their duties) or reinforcing their capabilities to an acceptable standard of efficiency.

1-3.   The AJP – 3.4.5 at Reference B. introduces the concept of Stability Policing (SP) as a set of police related activities intended to strengthen or temporarily replace indigenous police in order to contribute to the restoration and/or upholding of the public order and security, rule of law, and the protection of human rights in the wider framework of the stabilization and reconstruction process. The AJP – 3.22 at Reference C., while envisaging the definition in the following paragraph 1-7., sets out the specific doctrine for the implementations of SP.

1-4.   The "Declaration" at Reference D. envisions a set of human rights, from the right to life to that of property, which the contracting States recognize and commit themselves to secure. Accordingly, the "Covenant" at Reference E., the "Charter" at Reference F. and the "European Convention" at reference G. require Member States to protect the same human rights within their jurisdictions. The immediate protection from unlawful violations of the human rights set out by the above-mentioned international acts is direct police responsibility within the framework of the rule of law.

AIM

1-5.   The aim of the document is:

   a.   to provide a framework concept for Community Policing, as below defined, in accordance with international best practices, within the concept of Stability Policing envisaged in NATO doctrine;

b. to contribute to the transformation of the capabilities of the Alliance, notably, supporting future doctrinal developments, training and planning of operations. In connection to this, it helps identify the capabilities of the Joint Force (JF), focusing on the specific police capabilities and professional skills that embedded Stability Policing assets should be endowed with, in both the envisioned scenarios of either replacing or reinforcing the indigenous police forces.

SCOPE

1-6. This concept is applicable to the areas of doctrine, training and planning of operations. It establishes general principles concerning Community Policing, mainly in support of Stabilization and Reconstruction activities implemented by NATO (see Ref. B.).

TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

1-7. The following definitions are NATO agreed terminology (Reference H.)

a. Area of operations / Zone d'opérations (AOO): An area defined by the joint force commander within a joint operations area for the conduct of specific military activities.

b. Civil-military cooperation / Coopération civilo-militaire (CIMIC): The coordination and cooperation, in support of the mission, between the NATO Commander and civil actors, including the national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organizations and agencies.

c. Counter-insurgency / Contre-insurrection (COIN): Comprehensive civilian and military efforts made to defeat an insurgency and to address any core grievances.

d. Counterterrorism / Contreterrorisme (CT): All offensive measures taken to neutralize terrorism before and after hostile acts are carried out. Note: Such measures include those counterforce activities justified for the defence of individuals as well as containment measures implemented by military forces or civilian organizations.

e. Force protection / Protection des forces (FP): All measures and means to minimize the vulnerability of personnel, facilities, equipment and operations to any threat and in all situations, to preserve freedom of action and the operational effectiveness of the force.

f. Host Nation / Pays hôte (HN): A nation which, by agreement: a. receives forces and materiel of NATO or other nations operating on/from or transiting through its territory; b. allows materiel and/or NATO organizations to be located on its territory; and/or c. provides support for these purposes.

g. Hostile environment / Environnement hostile: An environment in which an adversary has the capability and intent to oppose or disrupt operations of friendly forces.

h. Human intelligence / Renseignement humain (HUMINT): A category of intelligence derived from information collected and provided by human sources.

i. Irregular activity / Activité irrégulière: The use or threat of force by irregular forces, groups or individuals, frequently ideologically or criminally motivated, to effect or prevent change as a challenge to governance and authority.

j. Non-permissive environment / Environnement non permissif: An environment in which friendly forces anticipate obstructions to, or interference with, operations.

k. Sector / Secteur: An area designated by boundaries within which a unit operates, and for which it is responsible.

l. Standing operating procedure / Instructions permanents (SOP): A set of instructions covering those features of operations which lend themselves to a definite or standardized procedure without loss of effectiveness. The procedure is applicable unless ordered otherwise.

m. Terrorism / Terrorisme: The unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence against individuals or property in an attempt to coerce or intimidate governments or societies to achieve political, religious or ideological objectives.

1-8. The following definitions, while envisaged in the NATO doctrine, are not NATO agreed terminology

a. Stability Policing: a set of police related activities intended to reinforce or temporarily replace indigenous police in order to contribute to the restoration and/or upholding of the public order and security, rule of law, and the protection of human rights (AJP 3-22 - Rat. Draft).

b. Stabilization and Reconstruction (S&R): stabilization is an approach used to mitigate crisis, promote legitimate political authority, and set the conditions for long-term stability by using comprehensive civilian and military actions to reduce violence, re-establish security, and end social, economic, and political turmoil. Reconstruction is the process of rebuilding physical infrastructure and re-establishing governmental or societal institutions that were damaged during the crisis (AJP 3-4.5).

1-9. Safe and Secure Environment (SASE) is not defined in NATO doctrine while it is described as follows: in a SASE, the population has the freedom to pursue daily activities without fear of persistent or large-scale violence. Such an environment is characterized by a local norm of public order, physical security, territorial security, a state monopoly on violence and protection of civilians. A SASE allows other S&R activities to proceed (AJP 3-4.5).

1-10. There is not international agreed definition of "Community Policing" (CP). For the purpose of this document, CP is defined as: "the systematic use of partnership and the implementation of collaborative effort between the deployed SP assets, the indigenous police, when existing, and the community, to effectively and

efficiently identify, prevent and solve problems of crime, the fear of crime and social disorder, in order to contribute to establish a safe and secure environment (SASE). It includes proximity policing instruments".

CHAPTER 2 – STABILITY POLICING AS A COMPONENT OF THE MILITARY CONTRIBUTION TO THE STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION PROCESS

OVERALL MILITARY CONTRIBUTION TO STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION

2-1.   Stabilization and Reconstruction (S&R) is an overarching concept for stabilizing unstable states, which is addressed throughout the AJP – 3 series, notably in the AJP 3.4 series, with specific focus on the publication at mentioned Reference B.. S&R activities may be components of operations conducted within the framework of Peace Support Operations (PSO), Humanitarian Assistance (HA), Defence Against Terrorism Operations (DATO), Counterinsurgency (COIN) and Major Combat Operations, and, in some cases, will overlap with their activities. Even though S&R is categorized as a crisis response, nevertheless, it may also be the result of Art.5 operations.

2-2.   The NATO military contribution to S&R may be summarized in:

   a. establishing a Safe and Secure Environment (SASE), where the population has the freedom of movement and is enabled to pursue daily activities without fear of persistent or large-scale violence. The SASE is the general framework that allows all S&R activities to proceed;

   b. restoring public security, which includes the establishment of law and order, the rule of law and a basic legal infrastructure;

   c. contributing to the efforts of international civil agencies or local authorities to restore essential services and infrastructure;

   d. helping establish conditions for meeting longer-term governance requirements.

STABILITY POLICING CONTRIBUTION TO STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION

2-3.   The JFC, if so mandated, will have the necessity to conduct police or police - related activities in all the areas of the military contribution to S&R. These activities, which require a police approach, a civil – oriented mindset and a specific set of capabilities, lie within the concept of Stability Policing. Although it may be necessary for conventional military forces to conduct police functions in the initial stage of S&R, in particular when it is the result of Art.5 operations, the transition to SP assets consisting of police forces from within the NATO Force or from the Allied or Partner Nations should occur as soon as possible.

2-4.   SP assets are military assets with a unique capability of civil policing, therefore, they can replace the indigenous police forces (when either not existing or unable/unwilling to execute their duties) in executing the full spectrum of police and police – related activities for the benefit of the local population. Moreover, SP assets are able to reinforce the capabilities of failing indigenous police forces raising them to an acceptable standard of efficiency and effectiveness, through training, mentoring, monitoring, advising, partnering with and reforming.

2-5.   In terms of SP, a one-fits-all scenario does not exist and each SP mission (either replacement or reinforcement mission), operation or activity is to be tailored to the peculiar local public order, security, civil society and police conditions and needs. In this regard, the SP applies not only to tackling criminality but also, as part of the wider military effort to stabilization, to countering all potential forms of irregular activities[1] that may be destabilizing the HN and exposing civilians to violence, intimidation, reprisals and other forms of systematic violence.

2-6.   SP is, in fact, a component of primary importance in the Protection of Civilians (PoC)[2], the Alliance's overall effort to mitigate the negative effects of conflict on the civilian population. In this framework, SP actively protects civilians from violence or worry, through contributing to the establishment of a SASE that progressively enables S&R activities to proceed. SP supports the protection of civilians within the area where NATO Forces are deployed, by means of policing, in a twofold way:

  a. complementing NATO conventional military operations with stability policing operations or measures aimed at protecting civilians from potential unintentional harm caused by NATO Forces' actions (e.g. physical protection, cordoning the population off dangerous areas or sites, contributing to evacuation operations, disseminating information to local population, advising the military commanders, etc.);

  b. contributing to protect the local population from deliberate and unlawful attacks or violence by other armed actors, including insurgents, terrorists and criminals, and investigating, when so mandated, such crimes.

2-7.   Finally, SP needs to be synchronized and harmonized with the other NATO activities in support of the local security forces, notably with those falling within the NATO Security Force Assistance (SFA) concept at Reference I.. Stability Policing and Security Force Assistance complement one another and offer the Alliance a range of capabilities and tools fully covering the security needs in crisis zones where a NAC-approved operation/mission is executed. Training, mentoring, monitoring, advising, partnering with and reforming of indigenous forces performing civil police duties, be these forces have either military or civil status, lies within the SP concept.

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[1] Besides the NATO agreed terminology, AJP-3.4.4 "Allied Joint Doctrine for counterinsurgency (COIN)", para. 0256, lists the following as irregular activities: insurgency, terrorism, criminality, disorder, subversion.
[2] Although, the "Protection of Civilians" has not yet been defined in NATO documents, the essence of this concept is described in the paragraph.

CHAPTER 3 - THE ROLE OF STABILITY POLICING IN COMMUNITY POLICING

GENERAL

3-1.   The chief request of a community living in a State that is either unstable or destabilized by conflicts is for protection from violations to the human rights, in particular to life, to physical integrity of the person and to property, as well as protection from worry. This defence is provided by security forces, notably, those endowed with police capability and entitled to policing. In this regard, the following distinction needs to be made between:

   a. police action or policing, which focuses on preventing and repressing crimes by means of police responsive-based tactics;

   b. security action, which focuses on proactively addressing the immediate conditions that give rise to public security issues (including crime, social disorder and fear of crime). The security action is, therefore, a comprehensive approach to public security, which involves a number of institutional and non-institutional actors and a wide array of instruments, including political, legislative, legal, administrative and practical. The security action is the wider framework where police action and CP lie.

3-2.   Policing, in order to be successful, cannot be an isolated activity. In fact, to improve security up to a satisfactory standard by effectively responding to the community's needs and concerns as well as to engage and mobilize all the actors, it entails constant interaction and collaboration with various institutions, civil society, communities, influential or common individuals within the community. Moreover, it requires the physical proximity of the police to the community (e.g. by patrolling and garrisoning the territory through scattered police stations, thus having police easily accessible for the public and making the police presence visible, etc.) and to the victims of crime (by helping and supporting them). The overarching philosophy and organizational strategy are commonly referred to, as a whole, as "Community policing". It complements and supports traditional policing.

3-3.   CP is commonly and widely implemented all over the world, to different degrees, as an ordinary way to improve security and social order in stable situations, applicable to both urban and rural areas. Its helpfulness is even higher in unstable or destabilized situations, where it becomes a decisive factor to reach a SASE, since it integrates many stabilization factors, including crime prevention, local knowledge building, the promotion of human rights and the protection of civilians from the consequences of the conflict.

3-4.   In NATO operations, CP integrates and supports all the other activities conducted under the overall concept of SP. Moreover, CP is characterized by a number of interactions with other operations/activities conducted by NATO Forces in separated but connected functional fields.

   a. Civil-military cooperation. Although focusing on the indigenous social network and population, CP is not part of CIMIC but the two can and must

complement and support one another in order to achieve their respective and contiguous goals.

b. Force Protection. CP is not one of the FP measures, albeit being a decisive contributing factor for the security of NATO Forces deployed in the AOO. In fact, it can either establish a shield against hostile forces, through social control, or facilitate their deactivation or the mitigation/stabilization of hostile or non-permissive environments, leveraging the synergy stemming from networking and collaborating with local actors[3].

c. Counter-insurgency. CP can also play a significant role in support of COIN operations/activities, although not being part of them, by being conducive to the protection of both civilians and NATO Forces as well as to the disruption of hostile activities.

d. Human intelligence. CP is not part of HUMINT operations whereas it can be a source of intelligence not only for police but also for military purposes.

STABILITY POLICING AND COMMUNITY POLICING

3-5. The enforcement of law and order in NATO operations, including the protection of human rights, is a police activity that is encompassed in the concept of Stability Policing in the wider framework of S&R and lies with the SP assets embedded in the JF. The concept of Stability Policing, consequently, also includes Community Policing, which is explicitly addressed as an SP tasks in the Annex "A" of the AJP at Reference C..

3-6. CP is not a mere instrument that the SP assets can actually take advantage of, while a fundamental component of the SP strategy to achieve the mission. It is also the most challenging part of an SP mission, as it requires not only interacting but also working, relating and collaborating with civilians, civil HN Institutions and communities as well as civil International Organizations and non-Governmental Organizations. CP puts the military and the civil worlds in close partnership to reach together the common good of a SASE. This requires mutual understanding and respect.

3-7. The specific role of SP assets in this regard varies accordingly with the stage of the S&R process and with the mission assigned to the SP assets themselves.

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[3] The TRADOC Pam 525-3-1 "The United States Army operating concept 2016-2028", ed. 2010, pag. 12, illustrates how collaborating with local actors can be conducive to deactivating/mitigating hostile environments. It quotes an Army Brigade Commander deployed to Ramadi, Iraq: "*As commander of 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division in Ramadi, Iraq in June 2006, Colonel Sean MacFarland was told "Fix Ramadi, but don't destroy it." MacFarland decentralized his brigade's operations and set up security posts all over Ramadi and the surrounding area to protect the population while the brigade conducted isolated attacks to defeat enemy forces. As the situation on the ground developed, MacFarland realized that the key to fixing Ramadi was to win over the tribal leaders. He discovered the sheiks wanted protection for their own tribes and families and made them an offer: "If the tribal leaders encouraged their members to join the police, we would build police stations in the tribal areas and let the recruits protect their own families." The tribes agreed. Once the tribal leaders switched sides, attacks on U.S. forces stopped, almost overnight, in those areas. It was the tipping point that led to defeat of al-Qaeda in Ramadi. In the end, he accomplished the desired outcome using approaches he could not foresee at the outset.*"

Nevertheless, CP needs to be addressed as a functional component of the overall campaign to establish a SASE and needs to be incorporated, at all levels, in the planning of a SP mission.

3-8. **Replacement mission.**

    a. A replacement mission might be a Comprehensive Police Replacement Mission (CPRM) or a Partial Replacement Mission (PRM), as envisaged at mentioned Reference C.. A replacement mission entails that the SP Force/assets have an executive police mandate.

    b. Despite the assigned mission, the SP Force/assets are most likely to have a territorial organization, with each unit exercising police authority and functions in its sector of responsibility. At the initial stage of a replacement mission, however, notably during major combat operations or Art.5 operations, SP activities may be conducted by conventional military forces substituting for or supporting SP assets, which might have a limited strength.

    c. The SP primary effort in the early stage of a CPRM/PRM is to restore acceptable conditions of public order[4] and security and to protect civilians from violence. To this end, although the social network may be weakened or even disintegrated by the conflict, the assets tasked with SP activities need to identify institutional and non-institutional interlocutors who have influence and authority within the community and search for their co-operation. This will enable CP to suitably and progressively develop into an effective partnership in the following stages of the SP operation.

    d. The nature of interlocutors varies in accordance with the cultural environment and the development of state and local official institutions, also taking into account the gender dimension of the civil situation.

        (1) Some Countries are traditionally characterized by influential individuals, like religious leaders, or well developed unofficial or semi-official structures based on traditional social bodies, like tribes or village communities. Such actors are capable of influencing the public opinion and practically responding to the population's needs. The same, in time of crisis, wield increased authority, empowering them to deliver effective governance by substituting for an absent or weak state. This will challenge the SP Force/assets to pinpoint the right influential partners in CP (in this regard, see footnote 3).

        (2) At this stage of the operation, it is likely to be difficult to incorporate a comprehensive gender perspective in the selection process of partners; nevertheless, such an approach needs to be always implemented. Concerning gender, it is always to be taken into consideration that women play a substantial role in the social fabric thus influencing the decision-making processes also when not wielding official authority.

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[4] Public order is the set of norms derived from rules posed by constitution, national law, common law, tradition and values in order to safeguard fundamental society values. Public order is established when all social interaction occur in accordance with that particular set of local norms (AJP 3.4.5).

(3) Although it is essential for the long-term objective of state governance that official institutions not be disregarded, a practical and effect-based approach suggests that also interlocutors with no official while effective authority should be leveraged, at least in the early stage of an operation, to establish the initial CP network. In this stage, complementing CP with CIMIC projects in favour of the target community can be decisive and, in this framework, addressing women and children needs is likely to be conducive to gaining support from the community. The brochure at Reference J. offers some examples about it.

e. The criterion to identify and select the potential partners to establish the CP network is that the latter must bring added value to Stability Policing action by:

(1) channelling the actual community's needs and concerns to the SP Force/assets;

(2) being able to engage and mobilize all the relevant actors to support SP action aimed at meeting the security expectations of the community;

(3) playing a pivotal role in the PoC, acting as a unique network for gathering and channelling information, advising and surveying;

(4) supporting FP through advising, conveying information and mitigating the possible hostility against the NATO forces, leveraging social control;

f. The SP Force/assets deployed in a CPRM/PRM must abide by the following basic principles. Failing to comply with them will either refrain the potential partners from participating in the CP network or disrupting it, when established.

(1) Legitimacy
Legitimacy is associated with consent and trust by the population. In this regard, the military nature of the SP Force/assets, which are not civil police, albeit performing civil police tasks, is of no importance to the local population and to the local institutional and non-institutional partners. However, a crucial aspect of legitimacy is that the forces performing SP must be other than those involved in the conflict, especially in actions conducted locally: this is of the utmost importance when conventional military forces, instead of Gendarmerie/MP, are tasked with SP activities.

(2) Posture
A posture of the SP Force/assets open to public and a behaviour of their individual members shaped by a civil-oriented mindset are crucial to achieve legitimacy and partnership. The SP Force/assets need to be consequently trained and guided.

(3) Visibility
SP Force/assets need to be visible and easily recognizable as law and order enforcers. Uniforms and vehicles shall clearly identify the members of the SP assets to enhance the public perception of security and to deter possible disruption of public order, crime and civil unrest.

(4) Accessibility
The SP Force/assets as well as their individual members must be easily approachable by all actors of CP, including the members of the community, within the framework of the FP standing operating procedure (SOP), whose instructions must be tailored to leave adequate flexibility. Accessibility requires the creation of a visible, legitimate and non-threatening presence. Proximity measures will enhance accessibility.

(5) Integrity
The individual members of the SP Force/assets must possess strong ethical principles. By definition, an individual has integrity if he/she is doing their work competently, completely and honestly. Likewise, an organization has integrity if its work is done within proper accountability, competently, to completion and without diversion of output or resources to corrupt or dishonest ends.[5] *Integrity is doing the right thing, even when no one is watching.*[6]

(6) Accountability
The SP Force/assets as well as their individual members must be responsible for their actions and behaviours. Tolerating misconducts against the local population will weaken or, even, cancel legitimacy.

(7) Responsiveness
Promptness and effectiveness in responding to the community's security needs and concerns in an even-handed and unbiased manner, showing empathy to those in need and respect for human rights, is crucial to gain legitimacy and enhance the effectiveness of the network established trough CP. The response, according to the complexity of the need or concern, can result in:
− immediate police action, either preventive or repressive of crime;
− immediate police/HN Institutions/community shared and multifaceted action, comprehensive of police, military, administrative, judicial, community, and other institutions coordinated actions;
− long-term projects countering the threat or meeting the need.

(8) Communication
Developing an effective communications strategy targeting the local community, including the potential partners in the CP network, is a key requirement for the success of the SP operation. A failure in communicating why the SP Force/assets are deployed and how they can help and protect the population can seriously undermine the effort to establish the CP network or to make it efficient and effective.

g. The CP philosophy and strategy can be applied to both urban and rural areas. In this regard, nevertheless, it is to be taken into consideration that CP in

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[5] NATO Building Integrity (BI) Programme – BI Self-Assessment Questionnaire and Peer Review Process
[6] Lewis, C.S. retrieved from http://chroniclesofcslewis.com/351/2013/11/19/integrity-is-doing-the-right- thing-even-when-no-one-is-watching-c-s-lewis/

urban areas, notably megacities, is more demanding and challenging as the dynamics are more volatile and the number of variables is extremely higher than in rural areas, thus making it more difficult the collection of proper intelligence. Besides, the fragmentation and the unravelling of the social fabric, where the traditional figures are either not existing or less influential, makes it challenging to establish an effective CP network and to implement the traditional mechanics of social control. In urban areas, in particular megacities, interference from ordinary and organized crime is more likely to occur, also influencing the participation in the CP network and/or its sincerity. The risk of being deceived by unfaithful or external-influenced participants in the CP network is always to be taken into consideration and the practice of periodic verifications to be implemented.

h. As the S&R proceeds, CP will enlarge to other actors and will become more effective in preparing for the handover of executive tasks from the SP Force/assets to the indigenous police forces and the potential turn of the replacement mission into a reinforcement mission.

(1) This process is to be accompanied by an increasing role of the state or institutional partners and of the community itself and by a decreasing influence of those actors traditionally replacing absent or weak state institutions.

(2) Particular focus, in this stage, is to be given to the gender issue, notably when partnering and collaborating with counterparts in the community. A gender balance of the counterparts and a gender perspective of stabilization and reconstruction will bring added value to CP as men and women perceive security differently. This reflects in their needs and concerns and, eventually, in the overall request for security originating from the community. The document at Reference K., while defining the NATO policy on women, peace and security, recognizes the disproportionate impact that conflict and post-conflict situations have on women and girls and the importance to take in due consideration their protection and security needs. An overall picture about the integration of a gender perspective in operations is contained in the publication at Reference L..

3-9. **Reinforcement mission.**

a. A reinforcement mission is likely to be even more complex than a replacement mission since it involves a conspicuous number of interactions with key Institutions of the HN, which is presumably retaining at least partial legitimate sovereignty, or with international institutions, such as the UN, the EU or the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol), that may be operating in the HN. In particular, the UN and the EU may be present in the same AOO with deployed individual Police Officers or units carrying out similar or correlated activities.

b. Moreover, in case of monitoring, mentoring, advising, partnering with and reforming, the deployment of SP assets might be limited to a cluster of

specialized individual Officers detached to the HN Institutions without the immediate support of the JF, which makes the assigned task more demanding. The key factors of such a specific reinforcement mission are the personal skills and the professional qualifications of the deployed Officers.

c. The end state in terms of CP should be its integration into the national criminal justice and the security sector architectures and its implementation as a common philosophy and organizational strategy of civil policing throughout the HN. This could also play a role in an S&R wider educational effort into dialogue and cooperation amongst the HN Institutions and between the Institutions and the civil society, where this logic does traditionally not exist or it is deteriorated by conflict, destabilization or instability, thus helping recompose the different strands of the state and of the society.

d. **Training of the indigenous police.** This specific activity focusses on collective professional education and training (E&T) and it is likely to be conducted by dedicated SP training assets in training centres, on a cyclic basis.

(1) Beyond the traditional technical skills and basic requirements for democratic policing (including cultural, religious and gender awareness, police ethics, compliance with human rights), the issue of CP should be incorporated in the training curricula, as part of the common education and training delivered to the indigenous police, in order to spread the philosophy supporting it. The documents at Reference M. – O. set out general lines. Moreover, the criterion and the general principles of CP illustrated above, when describing CPRM/PRM, also apply to the training of the indigenous police forces.

(2) The ambition of the training objectives will vary in accordance with the rank and the role of the trainees.

(3) Talented indigenous police Officers of all ranks should receive advanced collective E&T, in order to form a network of qualified police personnel scattered throughout the HN able to implement CP, at all level of policing. Such advanced E&T must aim at changing the style of policing and developing individual abilities, in order to endow the students with a broader range of skills, common to all ranks:

– ability to communicate with diversified interlocutors;

– ability to listen to different opinions;

– ability to understand the environment and the needs of the public;

– ability to build trust;

– ability to mediate in conflicts;

– ability to develop creative approaches to community concerns.

In this framework, Senior Officers must be educated to plan and conduct a CP campaign and to assume a coordinating, guiding and supporting role

while subordinate ranks to become more self-directing, creative and initiative taking.

(4) Educated Officers of all ranks, when assigned to their posts, should be additionally monitored, mentored, or advised by specialized SP Officers, as outlined below.

e. **Monitoring/mentoring/advising/partnering with and reforming the HN Institutions.** While training is targeting the audience collectively, this group of reinforcement activities aims at strengthening the professional and personal capacities of the individual HN Officers in accordance with their ranks and roles within the police force. This applies also to the area of CP. This group of activities is the most demanding and, in the specific area of CP, may address not only the indigenous police but also other HN Institutions that can have a specific role in it.

(1) This group of activities may either follow on from a collective training mission or be performed with no collective training background. In both cases, it is important that the matter of CP is not neglected and that it is addressed to the appropriate levels of the police and other HN Institutions, since the inception of the reinforcement operation.

(2) The selection of all individual SP Officers detached to the HN police/ Institutions plays a pivotal role. In addition to a wide and solid professional experience and to the language skills to perform their general duties as monitors, mentors or advisers (the additional knowledge of the local language is always a benefit), a solid education and practice in the field of CP must be part of their overall specialization. Besides, the deployed monitors, mentors and advisers, although military, need to have a civil – oriented mindset to understand the surrounding environment and to meet its needs. This will also help partnering with International Organizations that may be operating in the HN in the same functional area o in connected functional areas. It is also crucial that the deployed Officers have a rank suitable to their indigenous partners and to the environment they are called to work at (political, strategic, operational, tactical), in order to be trustable and accepted and to prevent tension. The Officers strengthening the capabilities of the HN political and strategic levels must also be able to support a practical transformation process and to promote a new legal regulation of the matter, if needed.

(3) Monitoring/mentoring/advising/ partnering with and reforming in the area of CP must develop along different lines in accordance with the target audience. High-ranking Officers might need to be reinforced in their managerial capability and attitude (vision, leadership, management style, relationship and partnering ability, etc.), in order to be able to successfully conceive, organize and conduct a CP campaign. Front-line Officers, patrolmen, on the other hand, need to be reinforced in their tactical skills in order to be able to practically and successfully tackle everyday challenges of CP, from local knowledge building and interacting with

useful partners to practically meet the basic needs and dissolve the concerns and worries of the community.

3-10. CP needs to be taken into consideration within the framework of the overall planning of the SP operation, as part of the tasks assigned to the deployed SP assets, regardless if they are to replace or to reinforce the indigenous police. This task requires, furthermore, to be addressed in the pre – mission training as a general task of the SP assets. All personnel must receive a general teaching in the subject matter of CP while monitors, mentors and advisers need to receive in depth teaching, comprehensive of the general lines of the HN legislation, if existing, concerning the subject matter.

CHAPTER 4 – CONCLUSIONS

4-1.   Community Policing can play an important role in the S&R process of an unstable area since it contributes to create the conditions for a sustainable durable security, actively actioned also by the community, and for a more cohesive society, all this paving the way for establishing a SASE.

4-2.   The present framework concept, released under the Concept at Reference P., is intended to constitute the ground for doctrinal development, education and training, planning of operations within the framework of the transformation of the capabilities of the military instrument. The concept describes an innovative and specialized capability aimed at coping with the challenges of future military operations. This capability matches the constantly evolving sensitivity of the public within the Euro – Atlantic space, which results in an increasing request for the Alliance's military instrument to protect the fundamental rights of the population within the area of NATO operations from threats and violations, to bring justice and to impose the rule of law. This framework concept lies under the overarching concepts of Smart Defence, Connected Force Initiative and Framework for Future Alliance Operations and it is harmonized with their guiding principles.

4-3.   The NATO SP COE is a hub of Subject Matter Experts in the area of Stability Policing. The Centre provides a focal point and a hub of expertise for this specialty and acts as a prime mover to increase the contribution to the Stabilization and Reconstruction efforts of the Alliance in unstable scenarios, providing NATO with a unique tool to fill the capability gap in this area. The SP COE is committed to help the Alliance and the Sponsoring Nations to enhance and transform their capabilities, procedures and functions in order to meet potential and future security challenges